


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THE THEOLOGY OF THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.

I.

INTRODUCTORY.

THERE are those to whom the title of this paper will seem to rest on a false assumption. We may speak, they will say, of the theology of Aquinas or Calvin, of the theology of Schleiermacher and Ritschl, because when these great men wrote there was a fairly defined range of subjects constituting the field of theology and inviting their attention. They gave their minds to the whole field; they defined with all the clearness at their command their intellectual and spiritual relation to all the problems it presented, and the result is their theology. But there is nothing like this in the apostolic age, and especially is there nothing like it in St. Paul. It is easy for us to put ourselves in the place of a man like Calvin, who had fifteen centuries of constructive Christian thinking behind him, who had the outlines of his *Institutes* marked out for him in the Creed, and who even in controverting his predecessors was necessarily dependent upon them; it is far harder to put ourselves in the place of St. Paul, a man who in his expositions of what Christianity is had no precedents to go upon, who had never seen a creed, who had no "authorities" either to appeal to or to protest against, and who at every step had to be independent, original, creative. Can it be fair to speak of his "theology" at all when we remember that we have only occasional productions of his pen in our hands? Can it be fair, when we remember that

his mind lived to the very last, and that the Christian life was for him a voyage of discovery in a new world, where unsuspected wonders rose on the horizon every morning? Can it be fair, when we remember that every new challenge from the world revealed to him new resources in the gospel, and that as we catch the pulse of his thought we feel as though the human mind itself were being raised to a higher power? If this is the kind of man Paul was and the kind of intellectual life he led as a Christian, can it be fair to take one of his casual writings—even the Epistle to the Romans—and to speak of its “theology”?

These are serious questions, but they are not to be answered *a priori*. No matter how creative and buoyant the mind may be, there is such a thing as its maturity. It does not cease to learn, but there is a point at which it is formed, so to speak, and ceases to go back upon itself. If it is at all a speculative mind—if it has the instinct in it to think things as a whole and to present their parts in relation to each other—no one can tell beforehand on what occasion it may do so, nor how comprehensively and adequately it may reveal itself in a very narrow compass, and on what may seem a very accidental appeal. It is not assuming anything which can be disputed to say that St. Paul's was pre-eminently a mind of this sort. Great man of action though he was—the expression is Renan's—and able to become all things to all, he never argues the smallest practical question without setting it in the light of ideal ethical principles. It is the same in doctrine. The comprehension of Christianity by the intelligence, the defining of its relations to all else that made up his world, were necessities of existence to him; there is no one of whom it could be said more truly that when you see one idea you see the whole mind and the whole man. There is nothing of the inorganic in his intelligence, no motley, nothing that simply lies there; all his thoughts are living

thoughts, and to realize one is to enter into the living mind. Hence it is possible for him to reveal more in a single document than the objections just referred to would allow. And if we look at the particular document with which we are concerned—the Epistle to the Romans—a *priori* objections to speaking of its “theology” will hardly weigh in our minds. For one thing, it stands at what may be called a provisional terminus in the Apostle’s life. He had five-and-twenty years of Christian and apostolic activity behind him, and his opportunities had been abundant of finding out what the gospel was, how it struck men of different races and antecedents when they first heard it, what was its attractive power and what its offence. He had been compelled to think out the significance of the fundamental Christian facts, and the place of Christianity itself in the providential order of the world. He had been compelled to see a preparation for it in the past of all races and of all men. He had been compelled to face the agonizing problem presented by the rejection of God’s glad tidings by God’s chosen people. But through all conflicts of thought and passion he had come into a great peace; and that peace, which rests on the Epistle to the Romans like sunlight on the sea, is itself an indication that we are getting into contact with the whole and unperturbed mind of the man. The gospel is presented here, if we will, in contrast with another religion; but except in chap. xvi. 17–20 (which probably belongs to a different epistle), there is nothing here about the dogs, the bad workers, the concision, the false apostles, the subverters of whom he speaks so bitterly in Galatians v. We move in a clear, calm air, and see far and wide. And not only does the place of the Epistle in St. Paul’s life justify us in finding in it what may fairly be called a theology; the purpose for which it was written does the same. It was meant to introduce St. Paul and his gospel to a Church to which he was yet a

stranger—a Church which, as he foresaw, was to be the most important in the world, and in which he was naturally anxious to have firm footing, as it was the indispensable base of apostolic work in the West. We do not know whether St. Paul's gospel had been previously misrepresented to this Church, or whether it was likely to be so; but he purposely writes them such a letter as shall put them in possession of his conception of Christianity as a whole. Whoever has mastered it knows St. Paul's gospel. But in the apostolic age, gospel and theology closely correspond. St. Paul's theology is not something which anybody can separate from his gospel; it is his gospel itself as his mind grasped it. The theology of Romans has always been the theology of the evangelist, and the very points at which the student thinks it hard to understand St. Paul are those at which the evangelist knows it is impossible to misunderstand him. Further, the Epistle to the Romans is unquestionably systematic in a sense in which no other book of the New Testament is. It contains what is so rare in Scripture, so unnatural apparently to the Semitic mind, a train of thought. There is a definite plan and structure in it, and one thing leads on to another till the argument is complete. And to allude to one point more, of an external sort, the circulation of the Epistle is not without significance as a mark of its systematic or theological character. A purely occasional letter would naturally be sent to that Church only whose circumstances evoked it. But the various terminations of the Epistle to the Romans afford as clear a proof as circumstantial evidence can yield—a proof supported by the various readings in chap. i. vv. 7 and 15—that this Epistle was treated as a circular letter by the Apostle himself. The natural explanation of this is that he felt it to possess some kind of universal significance; it was a representation of his mind on the whole subject of the Christian religion, the relevance of which was not

limited to the special circumstances of a given community. Now this is as near as we can get in a creative age and a creative mind to what is now called a "theology."

In regard to every genuine theology, that is, to every theology which is not the mere reproduction or modification of a tradition, but springs out of intellectual and spiritual necessities which require *bona-fide* satisfaction, certain preliminary questions have to be asked. The chief of these concern the materials at the theologian's disposal, the categories he can use for their arrangement and interpretation, and the impulse or challenge in response to which he theologizes. These questions may be asked in regard to Calvin or to Ritschl, and it is no less necessary to ask them in regard to St. Paul.

(a) As for the materials of his theology, they consisted of his religious experience, pre-Christian as well as Christian. Paul's life fell abruptly into two parts, which he himself often distinguishes as "now" and "then." Yet widely sundered as they were, they were intimately related to each other, and it takes both of them to explain his theology. The pre-Christian Paul had experiences into which we must be able to enter if we would understand Paul the Christian. There is in truth no "past" in the spiritual life; what we call the past lives on into the present, and if it simply ceased to be for us the present itself would be unintelligible. Unlike as Paul's pre-Christian and his Christian experiences were, it was one interest which dominated his life in both stages—the interest in righteousness. He knew, as no man ever knew better, what it is to live a life in which the aspiration after righteousness is perpetually baffled; he knew also, as no man ever knew better, what it is to be made right with God, and to find that God has put within our reach what we could never achieve alone. To use his own language, he knew what it was to live under law, and what it was to live under grace. He knew what it was to have

his whole relation to God determined by law, and what it was to have it determined by Christ. These are the fundamental experiences in relation to which everything he has to say possesses vital significance for himself and abiding value for the Church. Everything that enters into his theology in a living way enters into it through its connexion with these experiences. His thoughts of God and of His earlier revelation of Himself to Israel, his conception of Christ and of the experiences which constitute the Christian, his sense of God's love, his appreciation of God's wisdom, his faith in God's providence, his hope of glory, are all rooted here. It is only when we fail to apprehend this, and treat the most organic mind of the New Testament as if it were a heap of sand, that St. Paul is an ambiguous or baffling writer. No one who writes with his concentration and passion can really be ambiguous or hard to understand; there is but one thing he can mean, even if the attempt to utter it should sometimes miscarry—the thing which is in harmony with the all-controlling experience through which he has become what he is.

It cannot be denied, however, that in using the materials provided by his experience, St. Paul may yield to contrary impulses. Sometimes he is so possessed by the difference between the Christian and the pre-Christian states, between life under grace and life under the law, that he can only define them by contrast with each other. Christianity is all that the earlier religion was not, and is nothing that it was. It is opposed to it as life to death, as justification to condemnation, as freedom to bondage, as the abiding to the transitory glory; in a word, it is nothing less than a new creation, and the Christian is another man in another world. But at other times the thought asserts itself, that in spite of these differences, one man has come through all the experiences with one unchanging interest, the interest in righteousness; and one God, too, has been present in them all, working

toward the gracious end which has at last been reached. Hence it is not enough to define the stages in experience such as Paul's, or the stages in the history of religion which we call the Old and the New Testament, merely by contrast with each other. It is not enough to say that the one is what the other is not, and is not what the other is. True though the contrasts may be, they are not the whole truth; in some sense the early stage must be regarded as a preparation for the later; unsatisfactory and even desperate as it was at the moment, there must be a divine meaning in it, a purpose of God connecting it in a real and not an accidental way with that by which it is to be superseded and annulled. Of this St. Paul was fully conscious, and it is the explanation of the superficial inconsistencies in his treatment of the Old Testament, and of the difficulty which has been felt in understanding these from his own day to ours. On the one hand, he knows that a Jew is not a Christian, the Old Testament is not the New, law is not grace—and in all these negations he is uncompromising; on the other, he feels that the Jew ought to be a Christian, that the New Testament, new as it is, is witnessed to by the Law and the Prophets, and that though the law is not grace, yet if there were no law, grace itself could have no meaning. Hence the balance of his thoughts sways according as he emphasizes the essential originality of the gospel, or the essential connexion between the various stages in the history of the true religion, and in the experience of the Christian man. But the key to all this variation of emphasis lies in what St. Paul himself had actually lived through.

(b) It is difficult, if not impossible, to speak *in vacuo* about the categories or forms of thought which a theologian has at command for the interpretation and exposition of his experience. A truly original mind, like that of St. Paul, shows its originality most of all in this direction. It is open to all influences and ideas around it, but the more central

and vital its action, the more certainly will it have a productive power of its own, and the more certainly too will it react on and to some extent transform everything it receives. Many of the great words which are the instruments of St. Paul's mind—words like law and righteousness, or like flesh and spirit—had a currency independent of him. Many of them, indeed, may be said to have had a twofold currency. They circulated among the Rabbinical teachers at whose feet he had sat; they circulated also among Greek and Jewish-Greek philosophers, with whom he may have had relations with which we are not definitely acquainted; many of them had no doubt a popular circulation as well; and in different areas they must have had very different values. How are we to determine the value they had for St. Paul? Are we to find the key to his use of such great conceptions as sin, grace, flesh, spirit, law, righteousness, death, life, in the Old Testament, or in the Rabbinical schools of later Judaism, or in the philosophy of Greece? Without questioning St. Paul's relatedness or indebtedness to any or all of these sources for his mental equipment, it is necessary to assert that in this case the mind which borrows is infinitely more important than that which it appropriates. For an intelligence like St. Paul's to touch is to transmute, to appropriate is to recreate. A dull mind can take over ideas, and manipulate them unchanged, but not a mind like his. Whatever conception he makes use of is used to interpret a vivid experience, and it is there, in the last resort, that its meaning is to be sought. Words like those cited may be Rabbinical or philosophical in other places, but they are not Rabbinical or philosophical in the New Testament. In passing through St. Paul's spirit they have been baptized into Christ; and if we leave this out of account in the interpretation of them, no investigation of their pre-Christian history will save us from misapprehension. Most of us, according to Pascal, live

mentally in furnished lodgings ; the house and the things in it are not our own. But Paul, like Pascal, is one of the magnificent exceptions, and it is to himself, and not to the Rabbis or the philosophers, we must come at last if we want to know what anything in the house means, or what it is worth.

(c) Experience supplies the materials for theologizing ; the mind receives or creates the intellectual instruments it requires ; but what of the impulse ? Why should any man theologize at all ? It is practically certain that, except in response to some challenge or compulsion from without, no one does. In other words, the motive to theologize is always in some sense apologetic. The new spiritual life is summoned to explain and vindicate itself to that which already holds the ground : it may be to an earlier or a lower form of religion, it may be to some conception of the world which makes all religion impossible. The task of theology at the present day, for instance, is to vindicate a Christian conception of the world against the sheer negations of a naturalistic one, whether it figure as materialism or idealism. In other words, the challenge comes from what theology describes as unbelief. At the Reformation, again, it was otherwise. The new evangelical life was challenged by the Latin Church, in which, under the name of Christianity, a type of religion was perpetuated which was essentially pre-Christian or infra-Christian ; a type which, as it was an obdurate relapse from Christianity, might legitimately be called anti-Christian. It is in relation to this that Reformation theology is defined, and but for the challenge from this quarter it is impossible to tell what form it might have assumed.

It was the same from the beginning. All the theologies of the New Testament are apologetic, and the variety in them, so far from proving that there is any incoherence or want of clear self-consciousness in Christianity, only

proves the magnificent courage and sufficiency with which it answered every kind of challenge. In the Epistle to the Hebrews, for example, we see Christianity vindicating itself in relation to the religion of the Temple. That religion, for Jews, may be said to have held the field; it rested on the authority of God, and it had a *prima facie* right to demand explanations from the new religion which was treating it as a thing waxing old and ready to vanish away. In the Epistle to the Hebrews the explanations are frankly given. The new is defined in relation to the old, conceived as a way of worshipping God, and its superiority at every point is asserted. "The law made nothing perfect"; it did not bring anything in religion to the ideal goal; but Christ, "by His one offering, has perfected for ever" the people of God; the true religion is realized and guaranteed in Him as He appears in the presence of God on our behalf. Therefore "in Him the shadows of the law are all fulfilled and now withdraw." We see a still more striking instance of this theologizing in response to a summons in the great theological passage of the New Testament, the prologue to St. John. Here Christian experience is challenged, not merely by the old religion, but by the philosophy (which means, by the science and the morality) of the pagan world. And it is not afraid to meet the challenge. It defines itself as frankly, and with as simple a sense of its own triumphant inclusive superiority, in relation to the universe and to humanity with all its achievements, as it had assumed in relation to the religion of Israel. Platonic and Stoic philosophers spoke of a Logos, a word or reason, which was the divine ideal of the world, the divine law or presence in it, the source of its rationality and of all the light and goodness it displayed. There is nothing in the history of the human mind like the courage with which the Evangelist defines the relation of the Christian faith to this sublime conception. He knows that in Christ he has

found the real key to existence, the real Alpha and Omega, the ultimate truth and secret of God. It is in Him that the mystery of nature, of humanity, of history, of revelation, is to find its solution. It is only through Him and in relation to Him that it can all be made intelligible. And so he theologizes in the overwhelming sentences which have dominated Christian intelligence ever since. "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. . . . All things were made through Him. . . . In Him was life; and the life was the light of men. . . . He was the light, the true light that lighteth every man, coming into the world. . . . And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, and we beheld His glory, the glory as of the only begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth." These simple sentences, in which the universe and all that goes on in it are set in relation and in subordination to Christ, are the most comprehensive statement of Christian theology ever made, and they are made in answer to a challenge. They define Christianity in an original and independent way in relation to the world as it existed in the minds of those who surrounded the Evangelist.

To this rule, that theology is a response, St. Paul is no exception. He, too, theologizes in answer to a summons. But the summons does not come to him from the Temple, or from the Logos doctrine of the universe; it comes from the Law. Christianity was everything to him because it meant Righteousness, and hence it was challenged persistently and vehemently by those who thought they had the way of Righteousness without it. In all essentials, St. Paul's theology is a definition of Christianity in relation to, and as a rule in contrast with, legal religion. Sometimes the legal religion is of what we call a ritual type (as in Galatians), though we should remember that the Jew felt a moral obligation to keep the ritual law. Sometimes (as in

Romans) it is of a moral type, and appeals to the ten commandments. In either case, it is by its relation to legalism that Paul has to define Christianity; his theology is his response to this challenge. Nevertheless, in interpreting him, we must remember what has just been said about the action of the mind upon the categories it employs. Even if there be sometimes a sense in which, in his theologizing, Paul becomes a Jew to the Jews that he may win the Jews, he is not a Jew for all that. He is a man in the first place, and a Christian in the long run, and his peculiar vocation as Apostle of the Gentiles depended on his unique capacity for eliminating the accidental and fixing the universal and permanent—that is, the human—elements in Jewish experience. To an earnest spirit, as St. Paul well knew, the net result of legal religion, in the Jewish form in which it challenged Christianity, was a hopeless and paralyzing sense of guilt; but this is not an exclusively Jewish experience; there is nothing in the world with which human nature is so familiar. Hence St. Paul's theology is not only the vindication of Christianity as against Judaism, though it was from Judaism the challenge came; it is a proclamation of Christianity as the Divine response to the spiritual need and despair of the whole race. That is why we still read St. Paul and understand him. That is why his theology is not an antiquarian puzzle, or the solution of problems which can have no interest for us, but, like the words of Jesus, a word of eternal life, in the inspiration of which we can speak to men when they cry, "What must I do to be saved?"

It is from this point we must start in the exposition of the Apostle's mind in the Epistle to the Romans. His central idea, the sum and substance of his gospel, *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*, is not to be understood by itself; it can only be understood in its relations to all the ideas which make one intellectual whole with it. The order of thought in

the Epistle itself invites us first to investigate its negative presupposition, the necessity for it in the universal prevalence of sin. Sin, again, is only one in a complex of Pauline ideas ; and if we would have the whole thought of it present to our minds as it was to the mind of the Apostle, we must define it by relation to Law, to Wrath, to Death, to Flesh, to Adam. Only when we have some adequate conception of the problem presented by sin thus defined—a problem, as Dr. Chalmers used to say, “ fit for a God ”—do we see the conditions which the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* has to satisfy. From this the Apostle proceeds to the actual manifestation of this *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*, the setting forth of it, the putting of it within man’s reach, in the death of Christ. The death of Christ itself, it is not too much to say, must be defined in all those relations in which sin is defined ; it would not, as the revelation of God’s righteousness, meet the problem of sin as Paul himself has stated it, unless, like sin, it could be defined in relation to the Law, to Death, and to the Flesh, as well as to the love of God. From the manifestation of God’s righteousness we proceed to its appropriation and realization ; in other words, to St. Paul’s doctrine of faith and of the new Christian life. At this point many interpreters charge the Apostle with a certain incoherence or want of sequence and continuity in his thoughts. Some find that he supplements a juridical construction of Christianity, which he cannot get under weigh, with a mystical one, which is really independent of it, and should be put in its place instead of being used to make good its defects ; others, that he finds in the supernatural efficacy of the sacrament of baptism that initiation of the new life which is still to seek. I hope to show that there is no such *hiatus* in the Apostle’s intelligence, and that his real mind is both simpler and more profound than these criticisms would suggest. There have been doctrines of justification taught, so utterly out of relation to experi-

ence, that they either led to an entire indifference to the new life, or could only ascribe its appearance to some magical rite; but such doctrines find no support in the Epistle to the Romans. With the doctrine of the new life, including of course the earnest of the Spirit and the assured outlook to glory, the theology of the Epistle in the ordinary sense terminates. But the Apostle does not lay down his pen till he has vindicated the ways of God to men in face of the disconcerting historical fact that the mass of God's own people refused to submit to the revelation of His righteousness; and for him, at least, in the circumstances of the time, nothing was more essential in his theology than the daring argument of chaps. ix.-xi. The applied Christianity of the later chapters lies less in the theological field.

JAMES DENNEY.

NAZARETH AND BETHLEHEM IN PROPHECY.

THE very name of the fulfilment of prophecy has been brought into contempt by reason of the mistaken way in which the subject has been handled. Good people have erred herein in the most unfortunate manner, looking for such "fulfilments" as do not in fact exist,—or, if they do, are of very little value,—and ignoring such as do exist, and are often of superlative worth and beauty. That the Holy Ghost spake by the Prophets, they have been forward to acknowledge; but in their interpretations they have made Him speak so feebly and foolishly that men have turned their ears away and desired to hear no more. However well intended the conventional treatment of this subject may have been, it is certain (from its actual results) that it has run on altogether false lines.

A typical instance of such mistaken treatment may be

found in the case of Nazareth and Bethlehem, the two townships with which our Lord was specially connected before He was manifested unto Israel. One would say beforehand that no places can be so near to heaven, or so dear, as those in which "the Son of man which is in heaven" is born into the world, or spends His early years. And in fact all Christian people have looked back upon these two places with more or less of fondness and of desire to know more about them. One might compare them with one another, and magnify each in turn against the other, and yet wonder after all whether of the twain one ought to think most happy, most "exalted unto heaven."

There are, as St. Matthew tells us, "prophecies going before" upon both these places, prophecies from which we are certainly meant to learn something. For the office of prophecy is essentially a teaching office: no prophecy is mere vaticination (as though it were only an authoritative "Zadkiel"): it has always in it an element of revelation, showing us somewhat of God, and of His thoughts and ways.

Jesus "dwelt in a city called Nazareth, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the Prophets that He should be called a Nazarene."¹ The statement is quite general, "by the Prophets," and leaves us the whole field of prophecy in which to search. But in point of fact there is no prophecy extant in which the word Nazarene occurs at all. It is labour absolutely lost to try and find in the Old Testament any suggestion of a local connection between Nazareth and the Hope of Israel, the Messiah. In this strait it is suggested by some that what is really meant is not Nazarene, but Nazirite, or rather Nazir. These ascetics, concerning whom directions are given in Numbers vi., formed no doubt a peculiar and (at times) prominent class among the religious in Israel. They stood, apparently,

¹ St. Matt. ii. 23.

higher in popular esteem and in influence than is commonly believed. St. Matthew, however, could not possibly have confounded "Nazarene" with "Nazirite," (1) because the two words have very little resemblance to one another—much less in Hebrew than in English; (2) because our Lord was not in fact a Nazirite, as no one had better reason to know than Levi the publican. John the Baptist *was* a Nazirite, practically if not technically; and our Lord stood contrasted with him precisely in those points wherein John conformed to the distinctive character of the Nazirite.¹ This being so, it is suggested again that Nazareth (or Netzereth) means Branch-town, and that our Lord was "the Branch" so often foretold by the Prophets: that "the Branch" was, very appropriately, to live in "Branch-town." To which it is enough to reply that, however strange may be St. Matthew's methods of quoting prophecy, one ought to be ashamed to ascribe to him anything so puerile as this. There are plenty of instances in Scripture of play upon words—upon mere sound resemblances even—but not one of these instances is like to what is suggested here. It had been as reasonable to say that He should be called a native of Bethlehem because Beth-lehem means the House of Bread, and He is the true Bread which came down from heaven. Such fancies may not be out of place in a pious "meditation," but they have nothing in common with the narrative of St. Matthew. This method of escape is *not* open.

It is an unsolved enigma then—this asserted prophecy that our Lord should be called a Nazarene. So it shall remain for the present; and in the meantime it shall serve the very useful purpose of confounding the people who seek for "fulfilments" after their own heart, as much as possible in the letter, and as little as possible in the spirit.

We turn to Bethlehem, and recall the prophecy written

¹ St. Luke vii. 31-35.

of old by Micah, and quoted at length by St. Matthew.¹ Here surely there is no mistake. Here they have the very kind of prophecy which pleases them best—a prediction in which the very village is named in which the Christ should be born. With this prediction in one hand, and this fulfilment in the other, what does any man want more, or better? Thus spake the Holy Ghost by the Prophets, that He should be born in the interesting township of Bethlehem, whence David came; and so He was.

But if this be indeed the fulfilment of prophecy, two things are inexplicable. In the first place, what was the use of it? The mere prediction that a man should see the light in such or such a place has really little or no interest in it. It may awake a certain (more or less carnal) curiosity to see how Providence will arrange matters so as to bring it to pass, but that is all. The Jewish Rabbis, and Herod himself, knew of this prediction. What good did it do them, or any one else? And if there were use in it, why did not the prediction extend to the day of the month and of the week, and to other circumstances of that saving Child-bearing which had been so interesting to all of us? Such prediction, picking out a single circumstance from among so many, must always appear arbitrary and artificial, which is contrary to our fundamental conceptions of the true character of prophecy. In the second place, if this was indeed the fulfilment, why did our Lord Himself allow it to remain in oblivion? He never referred to His birth at Bethlehem; nay, He allowed the question of His having been born there to go against Him by default.² No one, as far as we can tell (His mother, of course, excepted), supposed Him anything else than a native of Galilee. It can hardly be thought that this prediction and fulfilment are sufficiently justified by that luxuriant undergrowth of poetry and legend—beautiful as it is in many ways—which

¹ Micah v. 2; St. Matt. ii. 5, 6.

² St. John vii. 41, 42.

has twined and festooned itself about the simple story of the stable cave of Bethlehem.

A study of Micah's prophecies—a study which is comparatively easy now even for the less learned of Bible students—seems to put the matter in a totally different light. Take Micah's view of things in general, and we see that it was characterized by antipathy to Jerusalem as the headquarters of tyranny and misrule in Israel. He remained quite loyal to the House of David, but he abhorred the policy which the actual rulers of Jerusalem pursued. He regarded Jerusalem much as many a provincial Frenchman may have regarded Paris—as though it exercised a disastrous tyranny first over the court, and then 'through the court over the country. To the old Judæan sentiment of Micah, Jerusalem was not ancient or venerable or holy as it was to the other southern Prophets; it was a comparatively new, and very unlovely, factor in the development of the political, social, and religious life of the chosen people. We, having in our minds the passionate love of the Psalmists for the city and the house of God—a love shared at least in some measure by our Lord—find it hard to enter into Micah's feelings. But there is no doubt about those feelings. Micah detested Jerusalem, and all that it stood for; he foretold with a certain fierce satisfaction that, for the sake of its evil rulers, Zion should be plowed as a field, and Jerusalem should become heaps, and the mountain of the house (*i.e.* the Temple area) as the high places of a forest.¹ On the other hand, he anticipated with joy the day when, willingly or unwillingly, the royal House should leave the new city, and go back to the old village, and to all that it stood for. Deliverance should indeed come to the daughter of Jerusalem, but not in or from Jerusalem. The ideal King, the Saviour of Israel, the destined One whom God had prepared from the beginning of the world, would be

¹ Micah iii. 9-12.

no child of Jerusalem, would have no connection with its pride, its injustice, its venality, its wealth and strength and splendour based upon cruelty and falsehood. He would spring—as David himself had—from the poverty and obscurity, the simplicity and hardihood, the modesty and straightforwardness, of the old-world village, of the little community of shepherds and rustics and small peasant proprietors—in a word, from Bethlehem Ephratah.¹ Take Micah's view of the coming One in particular, and it is evident that it was no direct vision of our Lord Jesus Christ.² Like all the Prophets, he foresees Him along his own line of vision, apart from time limitations—or, rather, with just those associations of time and place which belonged to his political and religious horizon. Like the rest, he saw the Christ amidst such surroundings as his own religious imagination furnished: and the imagination, even when inspired, *never creates*; it only combines with infinite fertility of design the materials supplied by observation and memory. Prophecy never escapes from this limitation, whether in Micah or in the Apocalypse: if it did, it would instantly become inoperative, like steam escaping into the open air. Micah therefore foresees the Christ as a Deliverer from the Assyrian terror. So, then, the prophecy about Bethlehem is not in fact a prediction about the place of our Saviour's birth at all, or is so only incidentally. It is a prophetic anticipation, springing (humanly speaking) out of the fervour of his own religious zeal and insight, that the destined Son of David, in whom God's everlasting purposes for His people are to be fulfilled, shall be as far as possible removed from what the kings of Judah were in Micah's days,—shall revert (in short) to the older and nobler type, the type set by David in his early life, before prosperity had spoilt him. Of this type of character Bethlehem—Bethlehem as contrasted with Jerusalem—was

¹ Micah iv. 8-v. 2.

² Micah v. 4-6,

the natural symbol and equivalent among places: it stood for all that in the earlier and better times which was capable of receiving the Divine benediction, and of expanding to the furthest breadth and length of the Divine purposes. With a thoroughly sane and sound insight Micah had appraised all the grandeur and the glitter of the royal establishment at Jerusalem at its true value, which was less than nothing. There was more real nobility—aye, and more abiding strength—in that poor open village than in this great city with all its wealthy houses, its walls and towers, its crowd of mercenary soldiers. “O Son of David,” Micah cries in effect, “leave those courts and palaces of Jerusalem, full as they are of insolence and cupidity; leave those walls and ramparts, manned as they are by hirelings and strangers; leave the shows and pretences, the greed and the violence, of Jerusalem; get thee back to the old-world village whence thy great father came: then shalt thou be poor, but strong; of little repute, but of honest worth; of small resources, yet destined to go forth conquering and to conquer.”

Such having been the motive and purport of Micah’s prophecy about Bethlehem, it is a matter of profound interest to discover in what manner it was fulfilled. And herein it is a notable fact (curiously overlooked by commentators) that even from a political and military point of view Micah’s prophecy completely justified itself. Deliverance came in truth to Judah, *not* from Jerusalem, *not* from princes and nobles commanding regular armies and holding fortified places; but precisely from that old popular militia, that association of volunteers fighting “in troops”—as neighbourhood or relationship united them—to which Micah points as Israel’s resource and opportunity.¹ The extraordinary victories achieved by the Maccabees were exactly of this kind. These popular levies, supplied of their own

¹ Micah v. 1.

free will by the villages of Judæa, defeated the finest armies of the day. The troops of Antiochus certainly had everything that money and skill and military knowledge and the *éclat* of great achievements could give them; but they went down hopelessly before the onset of these undaunted rustics. Not from Jerusalem did they come—for Jerusalem was ever a weakness and a menace to the national cause—but from villages and hamlets like unto Bethlehem, poor, old-fashioned, simple and severe in faith and living. In this matter, history has of course repeated itself often enough. So the Swiss peasants broke the disciplined ranks of Austria; so the American farmers defeated the regular troops of England; so the Montenegrins flung back again and again the bravest soldiers of Islam. Always fighting “in troops”—*i.e.* in comparatively small and loosely-organized bodies of men who were really “brothers” in arms, knit together by those closest ties of kinship and neighbourhood; fighting, therefore, with that mutual understanding and trust which stimulates to so high a degree the courage of the individual—they have from age to age waxed mighty in war, and turned to flight armies of aliens, beyond all expectation. Even from a political and military point of view Micah was right. Israel’s strength for war, her hope for victory, lay in the unsuspected valour and resolution of a God-fearing and hardy peasantry, not in the towering defences of Jerusalem, nor in the mercenaries and household troops whom her princes kept in pay. Away then from Jerusalem! back to Bethlehem!

The house of David, however, had no part in this uprising of the people. Had there been any worthy representative of the old royal family at that time, doubtless the nation would have gathered round him with a wonderful devotion. It may even seem strange that prophecy did not “fulfil itself” (as people say) in this matter; strange that the national expectation did not awake a corresponding ambi-

tion in the breast of one or another of David's descendants ! At no period of Israel's history were the conditions so favourable for such a self-fulfilment of prophecy. But, indeed, the capacity of prophecy to fulfil itself has been greatly exaggerated ; and in this particular case there is no hint of any such thing occurring. David was wholly wanting to his people. The Deliverer came, quite in the spirit of Micah's prophecy, quite in the spirit of the old hero of Bethlehem in his best days, when he was poor and simple and fearless, trusting only in God and in his right ; but he did not spring out of Judah, nor had he any local association with Bethlehem. It was *a* fulfilment therefore, and a remarkable one—under the Maccabees—but not the one which God had in view.

That our Lord was born in David's old village, and so fulfilled the prophecy literally, was the least part of its true fulfilment. His birth at Bethlehem—rather than at Nazareth, let us say—had no influence upon His life, had nothing really to do with His manifestation. The very fact remained (as we have seen) unknown. What gave colour and character to our Lord's life upon earth was not at all the romance of that stable-cave at Bethlehem, but the prosaic plainness of that cottage home in Nazareth, wherein He grew up to man's estate. He was and is "of Herod's jurisdiction." Galilee claims Him as her own, and not merely as her adopted. The title upon His cross does not lie when it proclaims Him once and for ever Jesus Nazarene. Exactly herein was Micah's prophecy made good in the essential meaning and spirit of it. The plainness and poverty ; the simplicity and obscurity ; the total indifference to all that ministers to pomp and pride and luxury and love of ease ; the entire unconcern with all that artificial opinion, that false judgment of men and things, which always grows up in courts and cities ; all this, which Micah connected with Bethlehem, belonged in the highest degree

to the Prophet of Nazareth. Whatever stress one may lay more than another upon our Lord's commendations of poverty and obscurity, there is no question that they had a real attraction for Him. He Himself, speaking of John the Baptist, pointed the contrast "they that wear soft raiment are in kings' houses." Whatever good there may be in "soft raiment" (and the things which go along with it), it was not *His*; it was as much out of His line as out of John the Baptist's. True, He fettered Himself not with the artificial restrictions of the ascetic; but all the same His life was essentially, and was by choice, poor and simple and hardy in its conditions. His neighbours and associates were peasants, plain and God-fearing folk, who worked hard, fared simply, enjoyed no luxuries. What they were, He was also in His human life. In this narrow circle, and amidst these common surroundings, He moved, and moved with a freedom, a courage, a straightforwardness, a directness of speech and action, which could not (humanly speaking) have been His had He lived "in kings' houses," had He surrounded Himself with the accessories and associations of earthly grandeur, had He been born "in any high estate." Micah looked not, it may be, so high as the sphere in which our Lord lived and moved; he thought rather of other victories on a far lower level; but beyond his range of vision his true prophetic insight was justified and was fulfilled in the life and ministry of the Son of man.

To this real fulfilment that birth at Bethlehem served as a picturesque frontispiece, a standing illustration merely, and therefore, although it was the *literal* fulfilment of the prophecy, He Himself laid no stress upon it, suffered others in His earthly lifetime to lay no stress upon it. For in His day to be born at Bethlehem had been no humiliation, but quite the contrary. Micah living would have abhorred the scribes and lawyers, and they would have detested him; but Micah dead was clothed in honour and glory, and his

prophecies were revered—in the letter of them. To be able to say, “I was born in Bethlehem—I, of the house of David,” had been a matter of boasting indeed for any one whom the people accounted as a prophet and a leader. But Bethlehem, in the Prophet’s conception, stood precisely for what was poor and simple and unsophisticated, and did not rely upon any artificial advantages, nor lean itself on titles and observances. Because the Son of man came in the *letter* of Micah’s prophecy He was actually born at Bethlehem; because He came in the *spirit* of Micah’s prophecy (which was vastly more important) He forewent all advantage of His birth at Bethlehem, and chose to be known, in life and death, as Jesus of Nazareth—*Nazareth*, of which no Prophet made mention, out of which (as the learned and religious said) no good thing could come. This abnegation was made possible and easy for Him by those events of His infant years—the massacre of the innocents, the flight into Egypt, the return to Nazareth. These occurrences completely cut all known or suspected connection between the Carpenter’s Son at Nazareth and the Babe of so much wonder and expectation at Bethlehem. So was Micah’s prophecy really and truly fulfilled.

We return to Nazareth, and to that other prophecy, “He shall be called a Nazarene.” It may be taken for granted that none such exists, in the letter. But in truth, if we substitute for “Nazarene” its *equivalent* in character and estimation, this was spoken of Him at large by the Prophets. It was most picturesquely intimated by Micah himself in that passage about Bethlehem. It was most pathetically described by Isaiah, speaking of Him that “hath no form nor comeliness, and when we see Him there is no beauty that we should desire Him.” Take the common feeling about Nazareth in our Lord’s time, as signified in the Gospel story, and a whole world of prophecy runs together into that name, “a Nazarene,” as

belonging to the Christ of God. It is one of the striking features of the Scripture that it uses such an astonishing freedom in *the interchange of religious equivalents*, wherein it seems often to pay no regard at all to what we consider the paramount duty of being *accurate* in quotation and statement. A very simple example may be seen in the apology of St. Stephen. In quoting from the Prophet Amos, he substituted "beyond Babylon" for "beyond Damascus."¹ That was indefensible in one way, because the prophetic vision of Amos certainly did not extend beyond Assyria as the arch-enemy of Israel. But in another way it was wholly justified, because, in fact, for the later Jews Babylon had altogether taken the place of Assyria as the name of terror and of chastisement. "Babylon" had become the accepted religious equivalent of "Assyria" or the vaguer "beyond Damascus." A far more interesting example may be found in St. Paul's great argument about the unity of the Church.² The whole matter turns upon the analogy of the human body, and this is declared in verse 12. At the end of that verse, according to every law of reason, ought to stand "the Church." It is so obviously called for, that no one can have read the passage without expecting it, without a sense of surprise at not finding it. But, in fact, the Apostle, without a word of explanation or apology, substitutes for "the Church," Christ! That is to say, he spoils his own argument, in the letter of it, in order to throw into the highest possible relief a great spiritual truth. "Christ" is, in this sense, the religious equivalent of "the Church"—so much so that the one name may be substituted for the other—because the Church (as here spoken of) is the *alter ego* of Christ, enjoying His prerogatives, living with His life. The mystical identity betwixt Christ and the Church (elsewhere dwelt upon) enabled the

¹ Acts vii. 43; Amos v. 27.

² 1 Cor. xii. 4-27.

Apostle to make so startling a substitution ; but, in fact, he *did* make it without a moment's hesitation and without stopping to justify it. Many other examples might be adduced, in which we find (it may be) a single name or word substituted, with wonderful effect, for a multitude of things or of ideas, because it stands as the embodiment, as the accepted religious equivalent, of them all.

Such seems to be the case with this citation from the Prophets, which nobody can find in any of their writings. Certainly St. Matthew's extreme indifference to what we call accuracy is surprising to all modern and western readers. Certainly the sacred writers (and he in particular) do seem to combine an occasionally remarkable devotion to mere literal fulfilments with a more frequent and more remarkable freedom in dealing with the letter of prophecy. Probably we shall never quite get to their point of view. But, at any rate, Bethlehem and Nazareth may help us to see in what direction we ought to look for the true fulfilment of prophecy—that fulfilment in the spirit, rather than in the letter, which alone is of profound and permanent importance.

RAYNER WINTERBOTHAM.

*THE OLD TESTAMENT IN THE LIGHT OF
TO-DAY.*¹

THE subject on which I propose to speak to-night is "The Old Testament in the Light of To-day." The subject is a wide one, and there are aspects of it on which naturally I can only touch in passing, or which I may even have to pass by altogether; but it seemed to me to be one which would embrace points of view which might be suitably considered upon an occasion which suggested rather naturally a comparison of the present with the past. We are standing at the end of a century which has been marked, almost more than any other, by a great intellectual awakening, and which certainly more than any other has been fruitful in great discoveries. Sciences which a hundred years ago were practically non-existent have now arrived at a vigorous and independent manhood; the observation of nature in all its departments has been pursued with indefatigable industry and skill, and lines of investigation, once unworked, have been opened up, and have been found often to conduct to startling and unexpected results. And the methods which in all these studies have been productive of solid results have been these—the systematic and all-sided observation of facts, the shrinking from no labour or pains to solve a difficulty or account for what was not fully understood, the bringing to bear upon a new subject whatever light or illustration might be available from other quarters, the endeavour to correlate, and subsume under general laws, the new facts discovered. Advance conducted upon lines such as these has been most marked throughout the century. It may have been most conspicuous and brilliant in the physical sciences and in the great mechanical arts based upon them; but it has been not less real in many other branches of knowledge, in language, in history, in

¹ An address delivered in connection with the Jubilee of New College, Hampstead, on Wednesday, November 7th, 1900.

archæology, in anthropology. How much, in all these departments of knowledge, is known now, which a century ago was unknown, and even unsuspected! How much more familiar are we now, for instance, not only with the languages, but also with the habits, and institutions, and art of the Greeks and Romans! How many dark points in their history and antiquities have been cleared up by the numerous inscriptions that have been found and published during recent years! Even since these last lines were written news has arrived of remarkable discoveries at Cnossus, in Crete, which promise in some respects to revolutionize former ideas of the early character and history of Greek civilization. On these and other subjects we owe our enlarged knowledge, partly to the discovery of new materials, partly to the application to old materials of more exact and systematic methods of inquiry. The facts of nature lay before our forefathers as fully as they lie before ourselves; yet how strangely they failed to elicit from them the secrets hidden within them! The great masterpieces of Greek literature were all familiar to the scholars of the sixteenth century, and yet some of the most serious blots on the Authorized Version of the New Testament are due to the translators' ignorance of some quite elementary principles of Greek syntax! But the same spirit of scientific study and research which has inspired new life into so many other departments of knowledge, and even in some instances created them altogether, has also pervaded Biblical and Oriental learning; and there is hardly any branch of these subjects, whether language, or literature, or antiquities, or history, in which the stimulus of the nineteenth century has not made itself felt, and in which improved methods of investigation have not conducted to new and important results.

I may assume on the part of those who hear me a general familiarity with the new light in which, to those who do

not refuse to open their eyes, the Old Testament appears to-day. The historical books are now seen to be not, as was once supposed, the works (for instance) of Moses, or Joshua, or Samuel. They are seen to present a multiplicity of phenomena which cannot be accounted for, or reasonably explained, except upon the supposition that they came into existence gradually; that they are compiled out of the writings of distinct and independent authors, characterized by different styles and representing different points of view, which were combined together and otherwise adjusted, till they finally assumed their present form. The various documents thus brought to light reveal, further, such mutual differences that in many cases they can no longer be held to be the work of contemporary writers, or to spring, as used to be thought, from a single generation: in the Pentateuch, especially, the groups of laws contained in the different strata of narrative differ in such a way that they can only be supposed to have been codified at widely different periods of the national life, to the history and literature of which they correspond, and the principles dominant in which they accurately reflect. Three well-defined stages in literature, legislation, and history thus disclose themselves. Nor is this all. Archæology and anthropology, two sciences which fifty years ago were completely in their infancy, come to our aid, and cast upon the Biblical history illuminative side-lights. Some progress had indeed been made fifty years ago in unravelling from the hieroglyphics the history and antiquities of ancient Egypt; but the cuneiform records of Babylonia and Assyria refused still to yield up their secrets. But Edward Hincks had already taken some important steps towards their decipherment; and Henry Layard's *Nineveh and its Remains*, which appeared in 1849, and excited at once the liveliest interest, told eloquently of a magnificent and imposing civilization, which, though as yet all but silent,

was destined before long to be again vocal. Major (afterwards Sir Henry) Rawlinson's great discoveries speedily followed; and from 1851 to the present day the stream of light which has poured from the mounds of Babylonia and Assyria upon the Eastern world has flowed unintermittently. The history and antiquities of two great civilizations, each, in a different way, having interesting links of connection with Israel, are now revealed to us—not, certainly, in their completeness; for that we must wait still for many years to come—but, nevertheless, in sufficient measure to enable us to estimate without serious error their magnitude and character, and to understand the nature of the influence exerted by them upon Israel. If not, on the whole, so epoch-making and surprising in their results as these two splendid achievements of modern genius and industry, the discovery and publication of inscriptions from Phœnicia, Syria, Moab, and Arabia, and the observations of travellers and explorers in the same regions, have in many important details augmented our former knowledge of the customs, and institutions, and habits of thought of Israel's neighbours, helping us thereby to realize more accurately the position taken by Israel amongst them, and the affinities, mental not less than physical and material, subsisting between them. The net result of these discoveries is that the ancient Hebrews are taken out of the isolation in which, as a nation, they formerly seemed to stand; and it is seen now that many of their institutions and beliefs were not peculiar to themselves; they existed in more or less similar form among their neighbours; they were only in Israel developed in special directions, subordinated to special ends, and made the vehicle of special ideas.¹

Archæology has also often a more direct bearing upon the Old Testament; it has made a series of most valuable

¹ In support of the statements in the preceding paragraph, the writer may be permitted to refer to his essay in Hogarth's *Authority and Archæology* (1899), pp. 1-152.

additions to our knowledge, sometimes supporting, sometimes correcting, sometimes supplementing, the Biblical data. What, for instance, can be more stimulating and welcome to the student than the Moabite king's own detailed account of an event dismissed in a single verse in the Kings? or the Assyrian king's own narrative of the entire campaign in which the Rabshakeh's mission to Jerusalem forms, as we now understand, a single episode? or the particulars, recounted by a contemporary, if not by an eye-witness, of Cyrus' conquest of Babylon? ¹ The importance to Biblical history of newly-recovered facts such as these I cannot now pause to develop; I will merely, before I pass on, remind you of the very important light which has been thrown by archæology upon the early chapters of Genesis. The monuments of Egypt and Babylon combine to establish the presence of man upon the earth, and the existence of entirely distinct languages, at periods considerably more ancient than is allowed for by the figures in the Book of Genesis; and the tablets brought from the library of Assurbanipal have disclosed to us the source of the material elements upon which the Biblical narratives of the Creation and the Deluge have been constructed. ² A clearer indication that in the early chapters of Genesis we are not reading literal history could hardly be found; and we see archæology supporting criticism in pressing upon theologians and apologists the urgent need of a revision of current opinions respecting parts of the Old Testament narrative.

¹ See Hogarth, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-90, 105-107, 124-5, 128.

² Cf. Dr. Watson, at the Church Congress, held last October at Newcastle: the source of the material elements in the Creation-narrative was "ancient traditions, not the peculiar treasure of the chosen people, but traditions current amongst the nations in that plain of Babylonia which the Bible describes as the aboriginal home of the human race." See for details the articles, "Cosmogony," by Principal Whitehouse, and "Flood," by the Rev. F. H. Woods, in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*; Sayce's *Higher Criticism and the Verdict of the Monuments*, pp. 61-78, 107-120; Ball's *Light from the East*, pp. 1-15, 34-41; or *Authority and Archæology*, pp. 9-27, 32-34.

If we turn to the prophets and poetical books, we find, similarly, that they also have in many respects received new light from the studies of the past century. Prophecy is no longer defined, as it was once, by a celebrated and still justly honoured divine, as "the history of events before they come to pass."¹ More careful and exact exegesis, a truer appreciation of the aim and object set by the prophet to himself, the study of his writings in the light of history, especially with the help of the new materials afforded by the inscriptions of Assyria and Babylonia, have shown what the prophets primarily were: they were primarily the teachers of their own generation; they spoke out of the circumstances of their own age; it was the political mistakes, the social abuses, the moral shortcomings of their own contemporaries which it was their primary object to correct; their predictions of national deliverance or disaster, their broader ideal delineations of a future age of moral and material blessedness, all start from their own present, and are conditioned by the historical environment in which they moved. Nor does their theological teaching stand all upon the same plane. It is adapted to the spiritual capacities of those to whom it is addressed; a progress is in many cases discernible in it; and the rise and development of new truths can be traced in their writings.

Mutatis mutandis, what has been said holds good of the poetical books. Their connection with the names with which they are traditionally associated must be almost uniformly abandoned; in some cases language, in others contents and character, imperatively demand this. The poetical books are seen now in fact to have a much wider significance than they would have had, if they had been, as largely as tradition asserts, the work of David and Solomon alone; they reflect, in singularly striking and attractive

¹ Butler's *Analogy*, part ii. ch. vii. § 3, 6th paragraph. See for the correction of this definition Kirkpatrick's *Doctrine of the Prophets*, ch. i., esp. p. 15 f.

forms, springing out of the varied experiences of many men and many ages, different phases of the national religious life; in the Psalms we hear Israel's religious meditations, in the Proverbs the maxims of practical philosophy which its sages formulated, in Job and Qohéleth ponderings on the problems of life, in the Song of Songs an idyllic picture of faithful Hebrew love.

In what I have said I have indicated in outline (for details on an occasion such as the present are obviously impossible) the general character of the new light in which the Old Testament now appears; and I propose to devote the remainder of my time to considering three questions: (1) How do the facts I have referred to bear upon the inspiration of the Old Testament? (2) How do they affect the estimate which we form of its moral and doctrinal value? (3) What practical conclusions may be deduced from them? And the principle which, in answering these questions, I desire to emphasize is the existence of a *double element* in Scripture, a human not less than a Divine element, and the extreme importance, in view of the new knowledge which the present day has brought to bear upon the Bible, of recognising *both* of these. An intelligible but mistaken reverence often prevents religious people from recognising properly the human element in the Bible; and I wish to show how it is that the interests both of truth and of religion demand that the reality of this element should not be overlooked.

(1) With regard to the first of these questions, it is, I think, convenient to start with the formularies of the Church to which we individually belong. I naturally here speak primarily from the point of view of my own communion; but I believe that what I am about to say will be in accordance also with the formularies of those whom I am addressing. The formularies, both of the Church of England,

and (unless I am greatly mistaken) of the Congregational Churches as well,¹ permit, in regard to inspiration, considerable freedom of individual opinion: they affirm the Scriptures to be of supreme authority in matters of faith, they specify certain doctrines, which they declare to be contained in the Scriptures, and to be the means of salvation; but they include no definition of inspiration, and while they define the books of which the Old Testament consists, they express no theory respecting either its literary structure, or the manner in which the Divine Will was communicated to its writers, or the stages by which, historically, revelation advanced.

The term inspiration is derived, of course, from the well-known passage in which St. Paul speaks of all Scripture as *θεόπνευστος*. What, however, does this term denote? or, to limit the question to the point which here concerns us, what are the necessary characteristics of a writing which is spoken of as "inspired"? The use of the word will not guide us; for it occurs only in the passage referred to. Clearly the only course open to us is to examine, patiently and carefully, the book which is termed inspired, and ascertain what characters attach to it. Unhappily, a different course has often been followed. Men have assumed that they knew, as it were intuitively, what inspiration meant. They have framed theories without basis, either in Scripture itself or in the definitions of their Church, as to the notes, or conditions, which must attend it; they have applied their theories forthwith to the Bible, and have demanded that it should conform to them. The theories of mechanical and verbal inspiration have indeed been now largely abandoned, as it is seen that they are too plainly inconsistent with the facts presented by the Bible itself.

¹ See the "Principles of Religion" of the Congregational Churches (reprinted in App. C, at the end of the second of the *Bampton Lectures* of the Rev. G. H. Curteis, on "Dissent in its Relation to the Church of England").

But other theories still prevalent are not less inconsistent with the facts. It is often supposed, for instance, that an inspired writing must be absolutely consistent in all its parts, and free from all discrepancy or error. But the Bible does not satisfy these requirements. I may quote here the words of a speaker at the recent Church Congress: "I hope I shall not pain any one when I express my own opinion that the Bible is not free from imperfection, error, and mistake in matters of fact. Let me add that it is a conclusion to which I have slowly and reluctantly come." The Bible, moreover, contains accommodations to an immature stage of religious practice or belief; even in the Psalms there are passages which cannot be appropriated by the followers of Christ. The Bible also exhibits other characteristics which we should not antecedently have expected to find in it. It contains double and divergent accounts of the same events. The history has in some cases been committed to writing a considerable time after its occurrence, and is thus probably presented to us in the form in which it has been gradually shaped by tradition. In some parts of the Old Testament there are cogent reasons for believing that we are not reading literal history, but history which has been idealized, or, as in the Chronicles, transformed in parts under the associations of a later age. Elsewhere, again, literary considerations show that sayings and discourses are strongly coloured by the individuality of the narrator; the writers themselves also afford indications that they are subject to the limitations of culture and knowledge imposed by the age in which they lived. *A priori*, no doubt, we should have expected these things to be otherwise; but our *a priori* conceptions of the works and ways of God are apt to be exceedingly at fault. The facts which I have referred to should not surprise us, or tempt us to doubt the authority of Scripture. They may help to refute a false theory of inspiration, they will

be embraced and allowed for in a true theory. They belong to the human element in the Bible. They show that, as inspiration does not suppress the individuality of the Biblical writers, so it does not altogether neutralize human infirmities, or confer upon those who have been its instruments immunity from error. As the writer whom I have just quoted forcibly puts it, "Men argue that since the Bible is God's Word it must be free from all imperfection. The argument is equally valid that since it is man's word it cannot be thus free." Too often, it is to be feared, the explanations offered of the discrepancies and other difficulties of the Old Testament leave much to be desired, and are adapted to silence doubt rather than to satisfy it. But each time that this process is repeated the doubt reasserts itself with fresh strength. What wonder that there are men who, when they find that their beliefs about the Bible cannot be sustained without a succession of artificial and improbable suppositions, cast off the entire system with which, as they have been brought up to believe, these improbabilities are inseparably connected? It is a fatal mistake to approach the Bible with a preconceived theory of inspiration, or a theory formed irrespectively of the facts which it is called upon to explain. A theory of inspiration, if it is to be a sound one, ought to embrace and find room for all the characteristics displayed by the book which claims to be inspired.

The inerrancy of Scripture, as it is called,¹ is a principle which is nowhere asserted or claimed in Scripture itself. It is a principle which has been framed by theologians, presumably from a fear lest, if no such principle could be established, the authority of Scripture in matters of doctrine could not be sustained. The end is undoubtedly a

¹ Though the expression is, perhaps, more familiar in America than in this country. See Dr. Briggs' *General Introduction to the Study of Holy Scripture* (1899), p. 615 ff.

sound one; but the principle by which it is sought to secure it is quite unable to support the weight which is laid upon it. In the past, probably, this was not apparent, but it is apparent now. We cannot honestly close our eyes to the facts contradicting it. It is the *facts* which force upon us the necessity of a revision of current theories of inspiration. It is true that, whether we are theologians or ordinary Christian men, it is the doctrines of Scripture that are of importance to us; it is the doctrines which are to form our guide in life, and our lode-star to eternity. But the truth of these doctrines will be best maintained if we judge Scripture by the canons of ordinary historical evidence. It certainly will not be maintained if we make it depend upon an artificial principle, which breaks down as soon as it is seriously put to the test. As I shall hope to show directly, the great theological verities taught in the Old Testament are absolutely untouched by critical investigation; while the documents on which the *specific* doctrines of Christianity rest are so different in their nature from those which are here concerned, that criticism, though it may in some cases modify the idea which we once held of their origin and structure, leaves the substance of them intact: in particular, the testimony to our blessed Lord's life and work is so much more nearly contemporary with the events recorded than can often be shown to be the case in the Old Testament, and also so much more varied and abundant, that, by an elementary principle of historical criticism, it is of proportionately higher value. It does not appear to me that the foundations of our faith are endangered either by the application of reasonable critical principles to the Old Testament, or by the adoption of a theory of inspiration which shall do justice to the facts that have to be accounted for.

(2) I pass now to the second question, viz., How do critical views of the Old Testament affect our estimate of its moral and doctrinal value? As I have just observed,

the vital truths declared in the Bible appear to me to be wholly unaffected by critical inquiries, or critical conclusions, respecting its structure: criticism deals with the external form, or shell, in which these truths appear, the truths themselves lie beyond its range, and are not touched by it. It may be that individual critics reject some or even many of those truths which Christians, speaking generally, regard as vital; but that is not because they are critics, as such, but because they approach the subject with some anterior philosophical principles, and they would reject these truths whether they were, in the technical sense of the word, critics or not. The Christian critic starts with the belief that the Bible contains a revelation of God, and that its writers are inspired: his object is not to deny the revelation or the inspiration, but to ascertain, as far as possible, the conditions under which the revelation was made, the stages through which it passed, and the character and limits of the inspiration which guided the human agents through whom the revelation was made, or who recorded its successive stages. By inspiration I suppose we may understand a Divine afflatus which, without superseding or suppressing the human faculties, but rather using them as its instruments, and so conferring upon Scripture its remarkable manifoldness and variety, enabled holy men of old to apprehend, and declare in different degrees, and in accordance with the needs and circumstances of particular ages or occasions, the mind and purpose of God. I say in different degrees, for it must be evident that the Old Testament does not in every part stand upon the same moral or spiritual plane, and is not everywhere in the same measure the expression of the Divine mind: inspiration did not always, in precisely the same degree, lift those who were its agents out of the reach of human weakness and human ignorance. The Bible is like a lantern with many sides, some transparent, others more or less opaque, and the

flame burning within does not shine through all with the same pure and clear brilliancy.¹ Or, to change the figure, there is room in the economy of revelation, as in the economy of nature, for that which is less perfect as well as for that which is more perfect, for vessels of less honour as well as for vessels of greater honour. Certainly, in a sense, every true and noble thought of man is inspired of God; the searchers after truth who in a remote past and in distant climes sought after God, in part also found Him; but with the Biblical writers, the purifying and illuminating Spirit must have been present in some special and exceptional measure. Nevertheless, in the words of the prophet, or other inspired writer, there is a human element not less than a Divine element; it is a mistake, and a serious mistake, to ignore either. We may not, indeed, be able to analyze the psychical conditions under which a consciousness of Divine truth was awakened in the prophets; but by whatever means this consciousness was aroused, the Divine element which it contained was assimilated by the prophet, and thus appears blended with the elements that were the expression of his own character and genius.

And so it is that the voice of God speaks to us from the Old Testament in manifold tones.² Through the history of Israel as a nation, through the lives of its representative men, and through the varied forms of its national literature, God has revealed Himself to the world. From the Old Testament we learn how God awakened in His ancient people the consciousness of Himself; and we hear one writer after another unfolding different aspects of His nature, and disclosing with increasing distinctness His gracious purposes towards man. In the pages of the prophets there shine forth, with ineffaceable lustre, those sublime declarations of righteousness, mercy, and judgment

¹ The simile is that of an old Puritan divine, quoted by Dr. Briggs, *The Bible, the Church, and the Reason* (1892), p. 101.

² πολυμερῶς καὶ πολυτρόπως (Heb. i. 1).

which have impressed all readers, to whatever age, or clime, or creed, they have belonged. In the Psalms we hear the devout human soul pouring forth its emotions in converse with God, declaring its penitence and contrition, its confidence and faith, its love and devotion, its thanksgiving and jubilation, its adoration and praise. In the Law, viewed in its different parts, we hear the voice of God accommodating itself to the needs of different ages, and disciplining His people by ordinances, sometimes imperfect in themselves, till they should be ready for the freedom to be conferred by Christ. The historians set before us, from different points of view, the successive stages in the Divine education of the race. They do not, like the prophets, claim to be delivering a message which they have received immediately from God: their inspiration is shown in the spirit which they breathe into the narrative and in their interpretation of the history; they show how a providential purpose overrules it; and they bring out the spiritual and moral lessons implicit in it. Sometimes, especially in dealing with the earlier period, to which no sure historical recollections reached back, they are dependent, doubtless, upon popular oral tradition; but penetrated as they are by deep moral and religious ideas, and possessing profound spiritual sensibilities, they so fill in the outlines furnished by tradition, that the events or personages of antiquity become spiritually significant—embody spiritual lessons, or become spiritual types, for the imitation or warning of succeeding generations. And like all other writers of the Old Testament, they declare very plainly God's approval of righteousness and His displeasure at sin. It is impossible not to believe that both the literature and the religious history of Israel would have been very different from what they were, had not some special *charisma* of supernatural insight into the ways of God been granted to its religious teachers.

And so there can be but one answer to the question of

the permanent religious value of the Old Testament. The Old Testament Scriptures enshrine truths of permanent and universal validity. They depict, under majestic and vivid anthropomorphic imagery, the spiritual character and attributes of God. They contain a wonderful manifestation of His grace and love, and of the working of His Spirit upon the soul of man. They form a great and indispensable preparation for Christ. They exhibit the earlier stages of a great redemptive purpose, the consummation of which is recorded in the New Testament. They fix and exemplify all the cardinal qualities of the righteous and God-fearing man. They insist upon the paramount claims of the moral law on the obedience of mankind. They inculcate with impressive eloquence the great domestic and civic virtues on which the welfare of every community depends; they denounce fearlessly vice and sin. The Old Testament Scriptures present examples of faith and conduct, of character and principle, in many varied circumstances of life, which we, whose lot is cast in less heroic times, may adopt as our models, and strive to emulate. They propound, in opposition to all formalism, a standard of pure and spiritual religion. They lift us into an atmosphere of religious thought and feeling, which is the highest that man has ever reached, save only in the pages of the New Testament; the Psalter, especially, provides us with a devotional manual which must ever retain a unique, unapproachable position in the Church. They hold up to us, in those pictures of a renovated human nature and transformed social state, which the prophets love to delineate, high and ennobling ideals of human life and society, which, though, alas! not yet realized as the prophets anticipated, remain, nevertheless, as visions of the goal which human endeavour should strive to reach. And all these great themes are set forth with a classic beauty and felicity of language, and with a choice variety of literary form, which

are no unimportant factors in the secret of their power over mankind.¹

(3) Thirdly, I should like, if I may be allowed to do so, to offer some suggestions of a more or less practical character. A large amount of new light has been shed upon the Old Testament; our knowledge of the ways in which God of old time "spake to the fathers by the prophets" has been variously modified, corrected, or enlarged; and it is clearly our duty to turn this knowledge to some practical account. If, then, I may begin by addressing a few words more particularly to those of my hearers who may be regarded still as students and learners, I would observe that the foundation of all true Biblical study consists in a first-hand knowledge of the Bible itself, to be obtained, wherever possible, by a training in sound and scientific methods of philology and exegesis. Nothing can supersede an acquaintance, as intimate as it can be made, with the original language of the Bible; it is that knowledge which brings us as nearly face to face as is possible with the original writers, and enables us to perceive many links of connection and shades of meaning, which can with difficulty, if at all, be brought home to us by a translation. But we live in another world from that in which the Biblical writers moved; and hence the associations suggested by a given word, which were obvious at once to those who originally used it, or heard it used, are often not apparent to us; and they have to be recovered, painfully and slowly, by research of various kinds, in geography, archæology, life and manners in the East, or other subjects,

¹ The subject of the preceding paragraphs has been developed by the writer more fully in the 6th and 7th of his *Sermons on Subjects connected with the Old Testament*, and in a paper on "The Permanent Moral and Devotional Value of the Old Testament for the Christian Church," read originally at the Church Congress at Folkestone in 1892, and prefixed to the same volume (p. ix. ff.). See also the comprehensive and illuminative treatment of the same subject in Prof. Sanday's *Bampton Lectures on "Inspiration"* (1893), esp. Lectures iii., iv., v. and viii.

if the Bible is to speak, even approximately, with the same distinctness to us as it did to those to whom its various parts were originally addressed.

Philology and exegesis, assisted by such ancillary studies, form, then, the foundations of sound Biblical knowledge; but the next aspect under which, if it is to be intelligently understood, the Bible must be studied, is the *historical* aspect. The Bible is the embodiment of a historical revelation; and if the significance of the successive stages of this is to be adequately grasped, the different parts of the Bible must be viewed in their true historical perspective, in order that the correlation of the revelation to the history may be properly perceived, and the aims, and position, and influence of the different prophets, for instance, may be properly understood. This work can only be accomplished by criticism. And it is here that criticism, by distinguishing—as its name implies—what was once confused, has proved a most helpful handmaid of theology. There is a principle, the importance of which has long been recognised by theologians, the *progressiveness of revelation*, its adaptation, at different periods, to the moral and spiritual capacities of those to whom it was primarily addressed; and the so-called “higher criticism”¹ of the Old Testament is really the extension, and development to its legitimate consequences, of this principle. A true historical view of the growth of the Old Testament, and of the progress of revelation, besides being important for its own sake, is valuable also in another way; it removes, viz., many of the difficulties, sometimes historical, sometimes moral, which the Old Testament presents, and which frequently form serious stumbling-blocks. The older apologists, by the harmonistic and other methods at their disposal, were quite unable to

¹ On the meaning of this expression, and on the general character of the questions with which it is the function of the “higher criticism” to dwell, see (briefly) the writer's *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament* (ed. 6 or 7), p. 3; more fully, Briggs, *op. cit.*, pp. 24, 92–109, 280.

deal with these : historical criticism shows that they belong to the human element in the Bible, and that they are to be explained by reference either to the historical position of the writer, or to the imperfections incident to a relatively immature stage in the spiritual education of mankind.¹

What conclusions reached by critics may, however, be reasonably accepted? I must here insist again upon a distinction to the importance of which I have called attention elsewhere, because it appears to me to be one which is not always sufficiently kept in view. I mean the distinction between *degrees of probability*. The value and probability of a conclusion depends upon the nature of the grounds upon which it rests. Hence, I venture to think, it is a sound practical rule to acquire early the habit of *classifying* conclusions, of estimating them with reference to the grounds alleged on their behalf, and of asking ourselves, Is this practically certain? or, Is it only probable? or, Is it not more than just possible? I should apply this rule pretty freely to emendations, to interpretations, to historical or archæological hypotheses, and to other similar subjects. Now, some of the conclusions reached by critics rest upon such a wide and varied induction of facts that they may be accepted as practically certain, and as deserving to be called the assured results of criticism. But beyond the limit of these assured results there is a tolerably wide fringe, in which, from the nature of the case, from the fact that the data are slight, or uncertain, or conflicting, no indisputable conclusions can be drawn; there is scope for more than one possibility; clever and even illuminative hypotheses may be suggested, but we cannot feel confident that they are correct. We must not resent hypotheses of this kind being propounded, even though in some cases they should seem to us improbable; for such hypotheses, in this as in

¹ Comp. Kirkpatrick, *The Divine Library of the Old Testament* (1891), pp. 103-109.

other departments of knowledge, are one of the conditions on which progress depends. They mark out the lines upon which attention should be concentrated and investigation carried on, with the view, as the case may be, of either confirming or invalidating them. This fringe of uncertainty, as it may be called, forms an attractive field for speculation, and it frequently gives rise to rival hypotheses; but it is essential that it should be distinguished carefully from the field within which we may speak rightly of assured results being reached, and that conclusions relating to it should be adopted with caution and reserve. I may add that the differences between critics, which are sometimes laid indiscriminately to their charge, and spoken of as if they implied on their part the habitual use of false methods, are in reality limited to this margin of uncertainty, where their occurrence is simply a natural consequence of the imperfection or ambiguity of the data.

May I say, lastly, in what way, as it seems to me, the critical view of the Old Testament should be introduced into teaching? As regards children, I do not think that on this ground any change whatever should be made in the manner in which they are taught; they are not in a position to understand the questions or distinctions involved. But they should be familiarized early with the text of the Bible: if I may speak from my own experience, a text of the New Testament a day is learnt without effort by a child of six, and if the process is continued, a valuable selection of continuous passages from both Testaments may be known by heart by the age of nine or ten. Gradually, as the child grows older, it should be familiarized with the historical parts of the Bible, the narratives of the Gospels, the stories of the patriarchs, the Exodus, the Judges, and Samuel. Whatever is to be added afterwards, a knowledge of the text is a primary essential, and of course simple lessons suggested by the narrative may be pointed out, for

these lessons are there, whatever the historical character of the narrative should ultimately prove to be. But when the children reach an age at which their powers are maturing—and if they were boys in the upper classes of a public school, their mental outlook would be beginning to be enlarged, and they would be encouraged to inquire about many things which it would not have occurred to them to inquire about before—then I think that the principal conclusions reached by scholars on the subject of the Old Testament should be gradually and judiciously placed before them. It does not seem to me to be right or just that young men should be sent into the world with antiquated and untenable ideas about the Bible, which are no part of Christian doctrine, and are no element in any creed, and so to run the risk of being disillusioned, when the time comes, at unfriendly hands, and of making shipwreck of their faith. We have our treasure in earthen vessels, and it is not wise to imperil the treasure for the sake of the vessel. The principal difficulties of the Bible do not, to most minds, consist in the doctrines which it teaches, but in the *historical setting* in which these doctrines are often presented. This historical setting has, in the cases I have in view, inherent improbabilities, entirely irrespective of the miraculous element in it, and arising out of the representation itself; they may consist, for instance, in false science, they may consist in historical or literary inconsistencies: but whatever they are, they are due to the human element in the Bible; and it is our duty to recognise this element, to discover its character and extent, and to show clearly that it does not enter into the creed of a Christian man in the same way in which the fundamental doctrines of the Bible do. In the Apostles' Creed, for instance, we confess our belief in God as the Maker of heaven and earth; but we do not affirm that He made it in the manner described in the first chapter of Genesis.

The Bible can never suffer by having the truth told about

it. The Bible suffers, and religion suffers, when claims are made on its behalf which it never raises itself, and which, when examined impartially, are seen to be in patent contradiction with the facts. The undue exaltation of the human element in the Bible finds then its Nemesis. It ought, then, to be shown that the primary aim of the Bible is not to anticipate the discoveries of science, or to teach correct ancient history, but to teach moral and spiritual truths, and history only in so far as it is the vehicle or exponent of these. It ought, further, to be shown that the historical and literary character of the Old Testament writings is just a natural consequence of the conditions under which the authors wrote; those who lived nearer the events described being naturally, for instance, better informed than those who lived at a distance from them. No historical writer ever claims to derive the materials for his narrative from a supernatural source (cf. St. Luke i. 1-4); and so far as we are aware, it has not pleased God in this respect to correct, where they existed, the imperfections attaching to the natural position of the writer. Applying these principles, I should explain how, in the opening chapters of Genesis, two writers had told us how the Hebrews pictured to themselves the beginnings of the world and the early history of man; how, borrowing their materials in some cases from popular tradition or belief, in others, directly or indirectly, from the distant East, they had breathed into them a new spirit, and constructed with their aid narratives replete with noble and deep truths respecting God and man; how one writer had grafted upon the false science of antiquity a dignified and true picture of the relation of the world to God; how another writer, in a striking symbolic narrative, had described how man's moral capacity was awakened, put to the test, and failed; how in the sequel, by other symbolic narratives, the progress of civilization, the growing power of sin, God's judgment upon

it, His purposes towards man, are successively set forth.¹ Passing next to the patriarchal period, where real historical recollections seem to begin, I should show how the skeleton, which is all that we can reasonably suppose to have been furnished by tradition, was clothed by the narrators with a living vesture of circumstance, expression, and character, —being, no doubt, in the process coloured to some extent by the beliefs and associations of the age in which the narrators lived themselves,—and that in this way the pattern-figures of the patriarchs were created, and those idyllic narratives produced which have at once fascinated and instructed so many generations of men.² I should proceed similarly through the other parts of the Pentateuch, explaining, without concealment or disguise, the grounds which preclude us from accepting the narrative as uniformly historical, but pointing out that it was the form in which the Hebrews themselves told the story of the Exodus and of their conquest of Canaan, and emphasizing especially what is really its most important element, the religious teaching embodied in it,—for example, the lessons suggested by the beautifully-drawn character of Moses, and the many striking declarations which it contains of the character and purposes of God. I repeat it, the irreligious or unspiritual man may ignore all this; but no criticism can eliminate it from the narrative. I should also call attention to the three great codes of law contained in the Pentateuch, indicating the general character and purpose of each, and dwelling in particular upon the lofty spiritual teaching of Deuteronomy. I should then, as occasion offered, select passages from the prophetic books, showing in what way they had a meaning and a significance in the circumstances, political or social, of the time at which they were written,

¹ Comp., for details, the small but instructive volume by the present Bishop-designate of Exeter, *The Early Narratives of Genesis* (1892).

² Comp. the articles on the different patriarchs in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*.

and pointing out the permanent moral and spiritual lessons contained in them.¹ I need hardly say that I should not meanwhile neglect the New Testament; but I am not dealing with that to-night. I do not understand that by teaching such as this the religious value or authority of the Old Testament would be depreciated or impaired: I believe, on the contrary, that its contents would gain very greatly in reality; it would be read with increased interest and appreciation, and the Divine element in it would be placed upon a far firmer and securer foundation than is provided for it by the ordinary view. The importance of improved methods in the Religious Teaching in Secondary Schools has been recently urged with much force, and at the same time, with reason and discrimination, in a volume bearing this title by Dr. Bell, the Headmaster of Marlborough College. I am aware that, for the purposes I have indicated, the helps in the shape of commentaries and manuals which many teachers might require are at present far from adequate; but the claims of the Bible to be studied more intelligently, though at the same time not less reverently, than it used to be, have of late years been widely recognised in this country, and it is reasonable to expect that the deficiency in suitable books may in due time be supplied.²

S. R. DRIVER.

¹ Miss Bramston's *Dawn of Revelation, Old Testament Lessons for Teachers in Secondary Schools* (1899), contains much that is valuable and suggestive from the points of view that have been indicated. (The title is not an adequate one; for the lessons are taken from all parts of the Old Testament, fully one-half being from the Prophets.)

² Since this address was delivered, there has reached me a brochure by Prof. Kautzsch, of Halle, entitled *Bibelwissenschaft und Religionsunterricht*, in which, while the subject is treated in greater detail than was consistent with the plan of my address, the practical conclusions reached are largely the same. Prof. Kautzsch emphasizes in particular the *religious value* of the narratives of the Old Testament; and while he calls attention to the need of higher and more intelligent teaching being given in secondary schools, is careful to point out that a judicious teacher will naturally accommodate his teaching to the age and capacities of his pupils, and not, for instance, burden them with technical details in cases where it can be of no value for them to know them.

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

I.

IMMORTALITY BEFORE CHRIST.

IN these papers I shall discuss the history of the phrase *Immortality of the Soul*, and the history and worth of the teaching therein embodied.

THE GREEKS.

That the *soul* of man is *immortal* or *deathless*, or in other words that every human soul will exist in happiness or misery for endless ages, is a conspicuous feature of the teaching of PLATO. But that this doctrine was by no means universal among the Greeks of his day, we learn from p. 70 of his *Phaedo*, where we read, "In what relates to the soul men are apt to be incredulous; they fear that when she has left the body her place may be nowhere, and that on the very day of death she may be destroyed and perish, (*διαφθείρηται τε καὶ ἀπολλύηται*,) immediately on her release from the body issuing forth like smoke or air and in her flight vanishing away into nothingness."

In the pages following, Socrates is represented as arguing against this popular belief. He endeavours first to prove that the soul existed before birth, and then that it will exist after death. On p. 70, he goes on to say, "Whether the souls of men after death are or are not in Hades, may be argued in this manner:—The ancient doctrine of which I have been speaking affirms that they go from hence into the other world, and return hither, and are born from the dead. Now if this be true, and the living come from the dead, then our souls must exist there: for, if not, how could they be born again?"

Lower down, at the foot of p. 72, an interlocutor says, "Your favourite doctrine, that knowledge is simply re-

collection, if true, also necessarily implies a previous time in which we have learnt that which we now recollect. But this would be impossible unless our soul had been in some place before existing in the human form. Here then is another proof that *the soul is an immortal something*": ἀθάνατόν τι ἔοικεν ἡ ψυχὴ εἶναι.

On p. 77, the argument and dialogue continue. "I think, said Simmias, that Kebes is satisfied. Although he is the most incredulous of mortals, yet I think that he is persuaded of this, that our soul existed before we were born. But that after death the soul will continue to exist is not yet proved even to my own satisfaction. I cannot get rid of the feeling of the many to which Kebes was referring, that when the man dies the soul may be scattered, and that this may be the end of her. For, admitting that she may have been born elsewhere and framed out of other elements and was in existence before entering the human body, why after having entered in and gone out again may she not herself be destroyed and come to an end? Very true, Simmias, said Kebes; that our soul existed before we were born, was the first half of the argument, and this appears to have been proved. That the soul will exist after death as well as before birth, is the other half of which the proof is still wanting and has to be supplied."

On the pages following, Socrates argues that the soul is not compounded, and therefore cannot be dissolved; that it is unseen, and that while the seen changes the unseen remains; and that at death the soul goes to the pure and the always-existing and the immortal and the unchangeable, to which it is akin.

On p. 81, he says that the soul which has learnt the lessons of philosophy goes at death to the divine and immortal and rational, and dwells in peace; but that the sensual are dragged down into gloom until they are im-

prisoned in another body appropriate to their former lives." "Men who have followed after gluttony and wantonness and drunkenness, and have no thought of avoiding them, will probably pass into asses and beasts of that sort. And those who have chosen the portion of injustice and tyranny and violence will pass into wolves or into hawks or kites. Whither else can we suppose them to go?" And Socrates goes on to argue at length that the true philosopher has no need to fear that at death his soul will cease to be.

Having thus endeavoured to prove that the soul will survive death, the dialogue goes on to adduce evidence that by its own nature the soul of man can never cease to be.

On p. 88, a serious question is raised. "Suppose we grant even more than you say, and besides acknowledging that the soul existed before birth admit also that after death the souls of some exist and will continue to exist, and will be born and die again and again, and that there is a natural strength in the soul which will hold out and be born many times, nevertheless we may be still inclined to think that she will weary in the labours of successive births and may at last succumb in one of her deaths and utterly perish; and this death and dissolution of the body which brings destruction to the soul may be unknown to any of us, for no one of us can have had any experience of it: and, if so, I maintain that he who is confident about death has but a foolish confidence, unless he is able to prove that the *soul* is altogether *immortal and imperishable*: ψυχὴ ἀθάνατον τε καὶ ἀνώλεθρον. But, if he cannot prove it, he who is about to die must needs fear about his soul lest when it is unyoked from the body it may altogether perish."

Against this serious objection, Plato, speaking through the lips of Socrates, argues at great length. His arguments move our pity. For they are the painful efforts of a good man straining his eyes, in the twilight and uncertainty of Greek philosophy, to catch a glimpse of a ray of light from beyond

the grave: and for us, walking in the light of the "promise of life in Christ Jesus," they have no practical value. In these arguments we frequently find the phrase *the soul is immortal*: it occurs four times on p. 95, and not less than twenty times in the whole dialogue. Moreover, its meaning is indisputable. Plato uses the phrase to assert that every human soul, by its very nature, will continue in conscious existence for endless ages.

This teaching is put to noble moral use. On p. 107, we read: "If the soul is really immortal, what care should be taken of her, not only for this time only which we call living, but for all time. And the danger would seem to be awful if one shall neglect her. For if death were an end of all, a fortunate thing it would be to the wicked when dead to be quit of the body, and at the same time of their wickedness along with the soul. But now, since the soul is manifestly immortal, there is no other escape or salvation from wickedness except for it to become as good and as wise as possible. For the soul takes nothing else with her into Hades except education and nurture, which are said very much to help or injure the dead man straightway at the beginning of his journey thither."

At the conclusion of the work we read that those guilty of great crimes will be cast into Tartarus, whence they will never go out; that those less guilty will be cast into Tartarus for a time, and then if their victims take pity on them they will be allowed to escape; and that the righteous will go to the mansions of the blessed.

The same teaching, clothed in the same language, is found in Plato's *Republic*. The writer argues, in bk. x. pp. 108-110, that vice cannot destroy the soul, and that therefore nothing else can. "Do the injustice and other evil of the soul waste and consume the soul? do they by inhering in her and clinging to her at last bring her to death and separate her from the body? Certainly not. And it is

unreasonable to suppose that anything can perish from without through external operation of evil, which could not be destroyed from within by internal corruption." Lower down he says, "But the soul, which cannot be destroyed by evil inherent or external, must it not be something always existing, and if always existing immortal? Certainly. And if so, the souls must always be the same: for they will not become fewer, if not one perishes; nor more." Here again we find frequently the same phrase, *the soul is immortal*. The book concludes with a tremendous vision of judgment, in which all men good and bad receive beyond death exact retribution according to their works.

Similarly in Plato's *Meno*, p. 81: "The soul of man is immortal, and at one time has an end which they call dying, and then again is born, but never perishes: ἀπόλλυσθαι δ' οὐδέποτε. We must therefore live our life in the most holy way. . . . The soul then, as being immortal and having been born again many times," etc. We have the same phraseology and teaching in the *Phaedrus*. On pp. 245-6, we read, "Every soul is immortal. For that which is always in motion is immortal. . . . But if that which is moved by itself is declared to be immortal, he who says that this is the essence and description of the soul will not be put to confusion. For the body, as being moved from without, is soulless: but that which is moved from within has a soul, this being the nature of the soul. But if this be so, that which is self-moved being no other than soul, necessarily the soul must be unbegotten and immortal."

The immortality of the soul is discussed at great length in bk. i. of CICERO'S *Tusculan Disputations*. He admits the wide diversity of opinion on the subject. So in art. 9: "Some imagine death to be the departure of the soul from the body: others think that the soul and body perish together, and that the soul is extinguished in the body. Of those who think that the soul departs, some think it to be

immediately dissipated, others that it continues for a time, others that it continues always." We frequently meet the phrase *immortalitas animorum* or "immortality of souls," or other equivalent phrases, *e.g.* arts. 11, 14, 16, 17. In art. 16, we read that "Pherecydes, a Syrian, first said that the souls of men are eternal"; that his disciple, Pythagoras, held the same opinion; and that Plato was said to have come to Italy and there learnt the Pythagorean teaching about the eternity of souls. In art. 32, Cicero speaks of the Stoics as saying that human souls survive death, but not for ever. He accepts Plato's metaphysical arguments for the endless permanence of the human soul; and indeed quotes at full length the passage from the *Phaedrus* given above in part. But of Plato's conspicuous and noble teaching of moral retribution beyond death, he has but slight hold. He rather looks upon bodily life as an evil, and death as release from it; thus contradicting Plato. Of the moral issues involved, he seems to have thought little.

That Pythagoras taught that the *soul* is *immortal*, is also asserted by Diogenes Laertius (bk. viii. 19) and by other ancient writers. The same phrase, that man's soul is immortal, is used by Herodotus, bk. ii. 123. This proves that the phrase and thought were earlier than Plato.

To what extent the doctrine of the immortality of the soul was accepted by the masses in ancient Greece, we do not know. But in later days the popularity of Plato made it widely known, as matter for discussion, among educated Greeks and Romans.

THE EGYPTIANS.

We turn now to teaching about the soul much earlier than the earliest Greek philosophers whose opinions have come down to us.

Throughout THE BOOK OF THE DEAD, recently published in English by Dr. Wallis Budge, curator of Egyptian anti-

quities in the British Museum, immortal and endless life beyond the grave, with all good things, very much like the good things of earth, is promised to the righteous on condition of observance of certain religious duties. So chap. xxxi. rubric: "If this chapter be known by the deceased, he shall come forth by day, he shall rise up and walk upon the earth among the living, and he shall never fail and come to an end, never, never, never." But this immortality of blessing is never supported, as are the rewards for which Plato looked, by any teaching about the indestructible nature of the soul. Its permanence is always represented as a reward of righteousness and religion. About the fate of the wicked little is said. But apparently their doom was annihilation.

In Dr. Budge's Introduction to *The Book of the Dead*, p. cvii., we read: "The evil heart, or the heart which had failed to balance the feather symbolic of the law, was given to the monster Ammit to devour; thus punishment consisted of instant annihilation, unless we imagine that the destruction of the heart was extended over an indefinite period." The judgment scene here referred to is depicted, from the famous papyrus of Ani, now in the British Museum and also published by Dr. Budge, as frontispiece to his edition of *The Book of the Dead*. The man being judged stands before scales in which his heart is being weighed. The god Thoth records the result. Behind him stands a monster ready to devour him if in the balance his heart is found wanting.

In an admirable little book, of which a translation is published by Grevel, Wiedemann's *Egyptian Doctrine of Immortality*, we read: "Nowhere are we clearly informed as to the fate of the condemned who could not stand before the god Osiris. We are told that the enemies of the gods perish, that they are destroyed or overthrown; but such vague expressions afford no certainty as to how far the

Egyptians in general believed in the existence of a hell as a place of punishment or purification for the wicked; or whether, as seems more probable, they held some general belief that when judgment was pronounced against a man his heart and other immortal parts were not restored to him. For such a man no re-edification and no resurrection were possible. The immortal elements were divine, and by nature pure and imperishable; but they could be preserved from entering the Osiris, from re-entering the hull of the man who had proved himself unworthy of them. The soul, indeed, as such did not die, although personal annihilation was the lot of the evildoer in whom it had dwelt. But it was the hope of continued individuality which their doctrine held out to the Egyptians; this it was which they promised to the good and in all probability denied to the wicked. After judgment the righteous entered into blessedness, unchanged in appearance as in nature; the only difference being that, while the existence which they had led upon earth had been limited in its duration, the life of the world to come was eternal."

The above is confirmed by Canon Rawlinson in his *History of Ancient Egypt*, vol. i. p. 318: "Ultimately, after many trials, if purity was not attained, the wicked soul underwent a final sentence at the hands of Osiris, Judge of the Dead, and, being pronounced incurable, suffered complete and absolute annihilation."

Herodotus reports (bk. ii. 123) that the Egyptians "were the first who taught that man's soul is immortal"; using the phrase soon afterwards so common in the writings of Plato. Indisputably the Egyptians anticipated Plato by teaching that beyond death exact retribution awaits all men good and bad. But, as we have just seen, they did not base this doctrine, as did Plato and probably Pythagoras, on the endless and essential permanence of all human souls. We need not wonder that Herodotus, a Greek stranger visiting

Egypt, did not find out this important difference between teaching familiar to him and the belief of the Egyptians.

Herodotus also says that some Greeks borrowed from the Egyptians the doctrine of the transmigration of human souls into the bodies of various kinds of animals. But Plato taught, as do the Hindus, that this transmigration is strictly retributive. The Egyptians looked at the power to assume various forms as a reward given to the righteous.

In all ancient literature, so far as I know, the phrase *every soul immortal*, or phraseology equivalent, is found only in the school of Greek philosophy of which Plato is the most conspicuous representative. Doctrine equivalent to that conveyed by these words of Plato underlies the religion of the Hindus, but is not, so far as I know, found in any school of thought which influenced the Jews of our Lord's day or the early Christians. Common to Plato and the Hindus, whatever be the link of connection, is also the doctrine of retributive transmigration; which also is, I believe, unknown elsewhere in ancient literature.

THE JEWS.

That all human souls are immortal, or that they will think and feel for ever, is not taught or implied in the Old Testament. That man was made in the image of God, by a definite act, and in fulfilment of a deliberate purpose of God, is conspicuously taught in Genesis i. 26, 27, ii. 7; and reveals the infinite superiority of man to the lower animals. But this by no means implies that he will necessarily continue to exist for endless ages after the moral purpose of his existence has finally failed and when existence has become an unmixed curse. Certainly these passages are a very unsafe basis for dogmatic assertion that all human souls good and bad will exist for ever.

In Ecclesiastes xii. 7 we read that at death "the spirit will return to God who gave it." But this return to God

implies only (see *v.* 14) the judgment of the dead, not necessarily their endless permanence. In Daniel xii. 2 we read that "many who sleep in the dust of the earth will awake some to eternal life and some to shame, to eternal abhorrence." This last word does not necessarily imply eternal consciousness, but only the lasting effect on others of the doom of the lost. So Isaiah lxxv. 24: "they shall be an abhorrence to all flesh." That retribution beyond the grave, so important an element in Christian teaching, occupies so small and indefinite a place in the Old Testament, in contrast to its large place in the religion of ancient Egypt and in the teaching of Plato, is one of the most perplexing facts in Old Testament theology.

After the close of the canon, retribution beyond the grave became more definite in the thought of Israel. So Judith xvi. 17: "The Lord Almighty will take vengeance on them in the day of judgment, to put fire and worms in their flesh; and they shall wail, feeling the pain, for ever. In Wisdom ii. 23 we read that "God created man for incorruptibility." But this does not imply that in all cases this purpose will be accomplished. For it is equally true that God created man in order that he might love and serve his Creator. Are we then to infer that in all men this purpose also will be attained? The writer continues in chap. iii. 1-4: "The souls of righteous men are in God's hands; and torment shall not touch them. They seemed, in the eyes of foolish ones, to be dead: and their departure was reckoned an injury, and their journey from us a calamity. But they are in peace. For, even if in the sight of men they be punished, their hope is full of immortality."

In the book of Enoch we read of a resurrection of the dead, of destruction and torment by fire for the wicked, and of eternal life and endless days for the righteous. So chap. li. 1: "Sheol will give back that which it has received, and hell will give back that which it owes." Also chap. liii. 2:

“Sinners will perish before the face of the Lord of Spirits and will be removed from off the face of His earth, continually for ever and ever.” And chap. liv. 6: “And cast them on that day into a burning furnace, that the Lord of Spirits may take vengeance upon them.” Also chap. lviii. 3: “And the righteous will be in the light of the sun, and the elect in the light of eternal life: there will be no end to the days of their life, and the days of the holy will be without number. And they will seek the light and find righteousness with the Lord of Spirits: and there will be peace to the righteous.” But we have no definite teaching about the endless permanence of the soul.

A few references to the immortality of the soul are found in the voluminous theological writings of Philo, an Egyptian Jew, an older contemporary of Christ. In his work on *The Creation of the World*, § 46, in a comment on Genesis ii. 7, we read: “One may rightly say that man is on the boundary line of a mortal and an immortal nature, partaking so far as is needful of each; and that he has been born both mortal and immortal, mortal as to the body, but as to the mind immortal.” Similarly, *On Dreams*, § 22, where men good and bad are spoken of as “incorruptible and immortal.” But the writings of Philo are permeated by the philosophy of Plato; and cannot therefore be appealed to as embodying independent Jewish thought.

Josephus reports, in his *Wars*, bk. ii. 8, 11, that the Pharisees believed that the “bodies are indeed corruptible and their substance not abiding, but that the souls continue immortal always”; that the souls of the righteous pass the ocean to a place of rest and blessing, but that the wicked go to a subterranean abode “full of ceaseless punishments.” This teaching, Josephus compares with that of the Greeks. He attributes similar teaching to the Essenes. Also in his *Antiquities*, bk. xviii. 1, 3, 5, he says that the Pharisees believed that souls have “immortal strength”; and that

the Essenes "make souls to be immortal." But these statements of Josephus cannot be accepted as decisive evidence that the Jews of his day accepted the natural immortality of the soul. For, like Philo, he wrote in Greek, was familiar with Greek philosophy, and was eager to call attention to elements common to this last and the Jewish Scriptures. On the other hand, this doctrine of Plato would be welcome to the Pharisees, as in later days it was welcomed by Christian teachers, because of the support it rendered to the all-important doctrine of retribution beyond the grave, which was common to the Pharisees and to Plato. Moreover, we must remember that for three centuries before Christ the Jewish nation had been either under Greek rule or at least in close contrast with Greek thought. We may therefore not unfairly attribute to Plato and his school, of whose influence in the age preceding that of Christ Cicero affords abundant proof, the doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul so far as it influenced Jewish thought. In other words, we have so far found no trace of this doctrine outside the school of thought of which Plato is the best-known representative. And we are unable to determine how far this school of thought was prevalent among the Jews of the Apostolic age.

JOSEPH AGAR BEET.

THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY.

AMONG the clauses of the Apostles' Creed there is one which is very trying to the modern mind, and often closes the lips of conscientious people: "I believe in the resurrection of the body." In spite of that merciless saying of Strauss, "the last enemy which shall be destroyed is the belief of man in his own immortality," there is no hope which nestles deeper in the human heart, and none which in our day has had more wistful expression. Among a thousand people there will not be one who does not wish to cast himself with all his heart and mind into this inspiring belief, and declare his conviction, if he can, that death is not the end of all his labours, his sorrows, his endeavours, his victories, his love, but that he, a complete human being—not soul only but body and soul—will enter into fulness of life when he passes from this world into that which encompasses us on every side. Apart, however, from every other difficulty, he is apt to be hindered through the conventional reading of this Article, by which the body is understood to be that body of flesh which we have inhabited in this present life, which is buried in the grave, and which sees corruption. When any one is asked to believe that this body will be raised up and be in a future state the dwelling-place of the soul, a demand is made on faith which, with most people, it cannot bear, and an almost insuperable difficulty is thrown in the way of that belief in a future life which all men desire to possess, and which is the strength of the life which now is. No article of faith so tempts an honest man to insincerity, none is rejected with such profound regret, as that which declares the resurrection of the body.

It is a case where the heart and the reason are in conflict, so that one cannot believe what he wishes to believe; it is

also a case where a double strain is put upon reason, so that one is asked to believe, not only what is above reason, but what is contrary to reason. With the exception of Christ's trial at the hands of Pontius Pilate and His crucifixion, together with His death and burial, all the Articles of the Apostles' Creed, although it be the simplest of the three Catholic creeds, touch on profound mysteries where reason must give place to faith. But in such cases reason is simply superseded, it is not outraged. It is one thing to believe, upon good evidence of the fact, that Deity and Humanity have met in the person of Jesus Christ, although it be impossible to understand the conditions of the union and quite another to believe that a dead body, whose particles have been scattered and passed into the most various shapes, shall again be collected and form the same body. This belief raises questions, which are not only difficult, but which also have become childish, so that even a theologian like St. Augustine forgets himself and loses his intellectual sanity when he seeks to explain the literal resurrection of the body. It is impossible to indicate the unreasonableness of this idea without falling beneath the dignity of the subject, but if one can believe that his scattered dust will be reclaimed from every quarter into which it has wandered, and restored from every form into which it has passed, he is able to believe anything, and he must not say that reason in this matter has called in the resources of faith, and that they work together in loyal companionship—as, for instance, in the doctrine of the Incarnation—for in this case reason has been dethroned, and silenced, lifting up her voice all the time and protesting against the insult.

This attachment to our present body is all the more strange because most of us regard with horror every effort to preserve it after death and every religious use to which it may be put. The tabernacle in which any one has lived whom we love is dear to us, and we would not allow it to

be treated with disrespect, and yet we hasten to bury it out of sight, and we are careful to remind ourselves that the person whom we knew, and whom we shall never forget, has not in any sense been buried with his body. It seems to us an act of ghastly irreverence to embalm a human body, and to make it imperishable, so that long centuries after some monarch of ancient Egypt died his poor body is unveiled and exposed to the vulgar gaze. Protestants have perhaps even too little patience for their Roman brethren when they cherish the remains of saints and believe that the bone of one long dead will cure diseases and restore the dead to life. As a matter of fact we regard the body from which the soul has departed as so much dead matter, which ought to be restored to the earth without delay, and we are of opinion that the sooner it is dispersed amid the dust from which it originally sprang the better for the living; and we are learning to regard the city cemeteries as a danger to the community.

So intimate is the relation between the soul and body in this life, that of necessity we have a tender care of our body, which is both the habitation and instrument of the soul, but it has not served us so well that we should be sorry to pass into a new house. When one remembers how often the body has been a hindrance rather than a help, and what he has suffered in it, both through pain and through weariness, it is not a cheerful prospect to have the same partner in the life to come. It was with keen feeling that St. Paul, with his thorn in the flesh and his many infirmities, referred to the body of humiliation, and it was with gladness that he looked forward to the body of glory, which would accomplish whatsoever his soul desired, so that he could imagine no high endeavour but this perfect servant would carry it into action. Many of the chief saints have been diseased and infirm men, exhausting in their body the punishment of sins which were committed by their fathers, and they will

see this frail tabernacle, unsightly as well as frail, taken down and laid aside for ever, without regret. It is also another argument against the resurrection of the present body that it could have no place and fulfil no function in the future life. As we understand it the body is the means by which a person is connected with his environment, and this present body is in perfect touch with this present world, and just as it fits into the arrangements of this world it would be a stranger amid the circumstances of the other. While we cannot imagine those circumstances, and speculation on the matter is altogether futile, we know that they will be very different from those amid which we have lived here. The action of our senses in this life and our physical experiences are no indication of our life after death. We may therefore take it for granted, and any other view is incredible, that when we part from this world, we part from our present body; and when we become citizens of the new world, we obtain its new body.

The argument against the resurrection of this body is indeed so strong at every point and so convincing that piety has only evaded its course by falling back upon the miraculous. The impossibility of a literal resurrection are to be met by the prodigal exercise of Almighty power. The scattered dust of Saints is to be disentangled and restored from earth, and sea, and air, from vegetation, from the bodies of beasts and men, into which it may have passed, and be re-created in its original shape. The body which was constructed for the physical ends of this universe is to be so changed as to be perfectly adapted for that other state where "men neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God." Although the body be the same, the very dust laid in the grave, the entail of weakness, disease, corruption, sin which was inherent in that flesh shall cease and disappear, and corruption shall be made to inherit incorruption, and flesh and blood the kingdom of

God. Granted that the power of God has no limits, yet are we not bound to believe that there must be a certain economy in the miraculous, and that in this matter also wisdom ought to be justified of her children? Why should miracle be added to miracle in order that the body which we have laid down with relief should again be annexed to our souls, and that we should begin life in the world to come with a body which was created for the world that has passed away?

Nothing would justify this belief, which crosses both our wishes and our thoughts, except the positive teaching of Jesus and His Apostles. If our Lord declared plainly that our present bodies were to be raised at the last day from their graves, and be again the habitation of the soul, or if, in his silence on the resurrection, St. Paul were to affirm this doctrine, then those who believe that Christ is the Son of God, and that His Spirit inspired the Apostle, would accept the literal resurrection, bidding their own hearts and their own reason be still. It is, however, a remarkable circumstance that this is what neither the Lord nor St. Paul does teach, but that so far as one understands they teach the opposite; that the resurrection is not a distant event, and will not be of this body, but that the resurrection takes place at death, and is the resurrection of a spiritual body. When Martha said unto Jesus, "I know that he (Lazarus) shall rise again in the resurrection of the last day," Jesus did not confirm this belief of hers, nor set His seal to it, but He taught a very different truth, saying, "I am the Resurrection and the Life; he that believeth in Me, though he were dead, yet shall he live; and whosoever liveth and believeth in Me shall never die." And in St. Paul's great deliverance on the same subject he pours contempt upon persons who believe that this body is to be the body of the future, and who ask vain questions about how it is to be raised up. This body is "natural," and will disappear; the

body of the future will be a "spiritual" body, and has not yet been seen. While he uses the image of a sowing, so that the present body is like the seed which dies and the future body the kernel of life within, and while he also employs the Jewish illustration of a trumpet sounding to celebrate the great change, one thing is evident, that he does not believe that anything more will ever be seen of the present body, but does most firmly believe that the body of the resurrection life will be spiritual. It is fair, then, to conclude that when one joins with the Catholic Church in declaring his faith in the resurrection of the body, he means that the life of the individual will continue on the other side, and that he will consist both of soul and body, a complete and conscious person, but that the body will not be this present one.

It is inevitable that we should speculate about this spiritual body, which is to take the place of the other at the resurrection and be the dwelling-place of our soul unto the ages of ages, and such speculations are most fascinating, and not altogether unprofitable, but all the knowledge that we possess is gathered from two quarters, and the first is physical science. Science suggests that as the seen universe is composed of matter, the unseen is composed of ether, and at every point of investigation we "are led from the visible and tangible to the invisible and intangible"; and science also concludes that the visible universe will in the end be swallowed up by the invisible, and this world disappear as a "species of matter out of date." The body of the future cannot therefore be material, but is likely to be ethereal, a body to which matter could offer no obstacle, and whose mobility would be incalculable. It is evident that a body of this substance would be much more akin to the soul, a more flexible instrument and a more transparent veil, so that while the body of matter hides the inner self the body of ether would be its revelation.

This suggestion of science seems to be confirmed by our only other evidence, which is the Resurrection Body of the Lord. When our Lord left the grave and showed Himself to His disciples, He was the same person that they had seen crucified, but He was living under different conditions. He appeared and disappeared at will; walls and doors were no obstacle to Him; He was indifferent to time and space. There was a certain identity between His present and past bodies, for He showed unto His disciples His hands and His feet, and He invited Thomas to thrust his hand into His side, but His new body was lifted above physical need and limitations, and He moved at liberty in an unseen world which seemed to include and penetrate the visible world and from which He could at any time reveal Himself. The physical body of the Lord must have been as much finer than ours as His soul was holier than our soul, for there was in it no taint of sin, and His body did not suffer corruption. As ether absorbs the energy of this material world and gathers it into itself, so on the Lord's resurrection His physical Body, which was incorrupt and entire, would pass into the ethereal body in which He moved and showed Himself during the days of His resurrection life on earth, and in which He ascended to the heavenly places.

As the ethereal body—if this indeed should be its form—is to be the continuation of the physical, so that the experiences of the past are to leave their trace upon it and the identity of the individual be secured, and as either penetrates matter and is in the midst of it, is it not likely that the future body is already within the present, the close envelope of the soul, and its spiritual shape? May not the soul, which has so poor a mastery over matter, and is more often mastered by its intractable environment, be gathering to itself its new dwelling-place, and out of this more delicate stuff be expressing her spiritual character? Within the coarse scaffolding of matter the nobler temple may be

growing year by year, and then some day the scaffolding will be taken down suddenly and be swept away, stuff only for the burning, and the perfect inner shrine be revealed. This might indeed be called a resurrection, as if that had risen in a moment which had been preparing for a lifetime, but it would rather be a revelation when that which was hidden had been unveiled and set free.

Should it be the case that the soul had become in this way so perfectly embodied that its covering is now its character, then the moment of death would be the moment of judgment, for the soul would carry with it as it were its whole history, and show the deeds done in the body. We have, indeed, I think, a hint and prophecy of this correspondence between body and soul when before our eyes a face of perfect shape grows unsightly through pride and lust, and a countenance that once was repulsive becomes attractive through the beauty of the soul. If the soul in her sin or in her loneliness can so far mould to her will this stubborn matter, what may she not do with a finer material? And so we may be writing our own books of judgment, recording every high endeavour and every base passion upon the sensitive and eternal body of the soul.

Should this idea of the future body be correct—that it is the envelope of the soul, to be revealed at death when the outer body is abandoned and restored to the dust—then that long and futile discussion about the intermediate state is closed, for there need not be any such place. If the soul is separated temporarily from the body at death, and the body we have had in this life is to be raised up at some future time, and the soul and the body reunited in preparation for the grand assize, after which soul and body will go either to heaven or hell, then there must be some place where the soul can be kept, neither in heaven nor hell, while it has no body, and is waiting for the judgment. What this place is Scripture does not tell us. Jesus does

not seem to have known anything about it, nor the Apostles, and theology has given so many different views of it that it is evident theologians are quite as ignorant. Whether it be a place of purification, or a place of unconsciousness, or a shadowy, dreary place of existence, nobody knows. There is something else also no one can imagine, and that is a human being without a body, and, so far as we can judge, this would mean the loss of identity, so that the person who had lived here would cease to exist. St. Paul felt deeply the burden of his earthly body, but he did not desire to be "unclothed," for then he should have been found "naked," but to be clothed upon with his heavenly house. Nothing could be more unthinkable, and no idea is more ghastly than an underworld of ghosts, where saint and sinner must wait through long ages, till the body and the soul be reunited—the souls called from the vast deep, and the bodies from the dust of the earth.

The view which any one may take of the Resurrection will be much influenced by his reading of the Second Advent. If he believes that the Lord will come literally on the clouds of heaven attended by the angels, and will literally sit upon a judgment seat with the whole human race before Him at some unknown date, then it follows that those who die before that date must be kept somewhere and somehow in preparation for the judgment. If one believes that the coming of the Lord is spiritual and for ever going on, and that we are ever standing before the judgment seat of Christ, then our death will be for us Christ's Second Advent, and our entry into His unveiled presence at our death will be our judgment, and we shall pass at once, judged and newly embodied, into our future life. Whether the literal reading with its scenic display or the spiritual reading with its intense reality, is more in keeping with the mind of Jesus and the principles of His religion, is for each Christian to decide. If he be led to accept the spiritual reading, he will be relieved

from many difficulties regarding both the Advent and the Judgment which beset reason and are a burden upon faith.

While the Bible treats the unseen state with much reserve and does not encourage a license of speculation, it takes care to give no sanction to the middle state, although art and tradition have laid out its geography and shown us its inhabitants. When the Lord was transfigured on the Mount, and two saints of the past spake with Him, Moses and Elias were not ghosts, neither to be seen nor recognised, but, on the contrary, those two great men, first of the law-givers and first of the prophets, were so perfectly embodied that the Apostles who knew their character identified the men, and they who through the past centuries had been following the history of Israel, not from the gloomy place of the dead, but from the heights of Paradise, held fellowship with the Lord and spake with Him concerning the great exodus He was to accomplish at Jerusalem. When Jesus loosed the sin of the penitent thief, and received him into the mercy of God, He did not send him to purgatory nor to the shades of the dead, but He assured him, with the seal of His "verily," that that very day he should be with the Lord in Paradise. And to say that by Paradise our Lord intended something else and something lower than the Christian heaven, seems to be a mere quibbling with words, for Jesus, with His accustomed wisdom and grace, used the language for the state of the blessed which the man would most readily understand, and He declared plainly that the man would go to the place where He was Himself, and where Christ is must be heaven. When Jesus was comforting His disciples before His departure, and bidding them be of good heart in face both of life and death, He assured them that if He was leaving them He was going to prepare a place for them, and it was hardly necessary for Him, surely, to prepare Sheol. It was His Father's House that He was

going to make ready for His friends, and He assured them that since He was going to do so much, He would do still more, for He would come and receive them to Himself, that where the Lord was His servants might also be. But it is not from the twilight of the underworld that the Lord will come, nor to its ghostly shades He will receive His disciples. When St. Stephen laid down his life for the word of his testimony and the Kingdom of God's sake, he saw Jesus standing to receive him, and Jesus was at the right hand of God. And when St. Paul, worn out "with labours and sufferings, desired to depart, it was to be with Christ," which is "far better." We know little of the other world and nothing of the underworld, but we dare to say the bars of that underworld would need to be strong if, after the Roman sword had delivered Paul from this present life, they could keep the servant at a distance from the Master whom he so loved. A swift stroke of the blade, as when one cuts a thread and the Apostle of the nations and the slave of Jesus Christ had slipped and left for ever the body of humiliation, and stood before his Lord delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God, in a body made like to the body of Christ's glory, but which would bear upon it for ever the marks of the Lord Jesus.

JOHN WATSON.

CHRISTIAN PERFECTIÖN.

"I am the Almighty God; walk before me, and be thou perfect."—*Gen.* xvii. 1.

"Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect."—*St. Matt.* v. 48.

THESE are two utterances, divided from each other by centuries of time, yet essentially one in their teaching. We do not know, and cannot imagine, what is signified by the Lord's "appearing" to Abraham. It need hardly be said there could be no such appearance. No vision vouchsafed to any human eye could ever contradict the words of the Evangelist, "No man hath seen God at any time." Yet in several passages of the Old Testament we find language used which implies this possibility. It was used, no doubt, to mark with emphasis the greatness of the occasion, the momentous nature of the crisis, the arresting importance of the truth, to which it is the preface. It is not the first time in Abraham's history that the Lord is said to have appeared to him; but there could be no *vision* of God. Again and again the Lord is said to have "spoken" to him; but there could be no *voice* of God. Why, then, use this language? We must remember the time was the dawn of religion. Here was a man who, with many a failure and backsliding, yet appears to us, and no doubt appeared more plainly to the rude tribes among whom he dwelt, to be one whose life was swayed by other motives than theirs, ruled by some principle beyond their comprehension. It was a higher life with higher aims than theirs. Surely this man had relations with an Unseen Power which were denied to them. It was easy to believe he had heard voices to which their ears were deaf, and seen visions to which their eyes were sealed. And so the legend grew; yet all the while there was a deep reality in

it for the patriarch. With his clearer insight he had discerned, above the golden sun and the shining host of heaven to which other men bowed down, the all-controlling power of one supreme Being. He had heard, with the inner ear, a voice that in the divine silence of thought and prayer revealed to him the idea of a perfect life. It is this revelation and the character of it that are enshrouded in all the mystery and solemnity of this vision and utterance of the Lord appearing and speaking to His servant, who, alone of all those whose records stand for us beside his, was able to rise to the great governing ideas of true religion—the unity of God, and the moral basis of life. *One God*—"I am the Almighty"; the *aim and end* of all life that is worth the living—Perfection: "Be thou perfect"; the *means of reaching this perfection*—conscious and constant reference to a Divine presence and power: "Walk before Me."

Some theologians are fond of enlarging upon the harmony between the religious standards and sentiments of the Old Testament and those of the New. But a great deal of the Old Testament exhibits no such harmony. That much of it was written, or compiled, by men whose standpoint was utterly removed from the New Testament's, is plain. The blessing of the Lord represented as following the mean and selfish trickeries of Jacob; the praise accorded to the cruel treachery of the wife of Heber the Kenite; the ruthless extermination of men, women, and children in the early Hebrew wars, narrated not only without any repugnance, but ascribed to the direct command of God; the arbitrary and vindictive character often set forth as His—all show the wide difference that separates the religious ideas of writers in the early books of the Old Testament from those of the Evangelists and Apostles of the New. But this difference only brings out into more vivid relief the fact that however far the popular religious ideas might lie apart, in the distant centuries, from such as gained a

hold of men's minds after the Captivity, the essential elements of religion were always the same—that all men of spiritual insight, and earnest heart, and Godward instinct, felt themselves to be the subjects of a kindred revelation; had the same vision of the one Almighty God; the same call to walk in the light of the same Presence, to the goal of the same Perfection.

Yet not absolutely the same. The early conception was that of the unity and power of God; of One who could say, "I am the Almighty"; who could give the command, "Live and act as under My eye. Whither shalt thou go from My spirit? Whither canst thou flee from My presence? Walk before Me, and be perfect. Keep My law as thou hast understood it; do My will as thou hast learned it. So shalt thou reach forth unto perfection."

Thus the inner Voice spoke to the ear of Abraham. Thus his idea of God shaped itself—the idea of an Almighty Being, whose power encircled his life, and whose will demanded his obedience. The root of all true religion was there, in his sense of the infinite and almighty, in his consciousness of a relation thereunto, and of the necessity of a moral obedience to a supreme Will and Law.

We pass over many ages. We find we breathe a fresher air. The mists of the morning have passed away, and the light is shining in its strength. A new Voice speaks to us, but with a deeper tone and a clearer message. It says, "Be ye perfect, *as your Father in heaven is perfect.*" Its burden still is perfection, but the perfection is defined as it was not before. The one God has got a new name: not the Almighty, but the *Father*. The perfection is to be such as His.

Now, observe here that the character of the demand to which the conscience answers is the same as before. It is a moral demand *to be perfect*. We may say there are many types of perfection: the perfection of power, of

beauty, of knowledge. It is manifold; but what we are told to strive after here is perfection in *character*, and that can only be a *moral* perfection. We are told to be perfect as the Divine Father is perfect. Perfect in power as the Almighty? in knowledge, as He who sees the end from the beginning, and from whom no secret is hid? in any beauty or outward gift that the eye can see or the heart conceive? Not so: but in that in which human creatures are most alike when rising to the noblest heights of their humanity, they feel the links between their own lives drawn closest, and are conscious of an affiance with the Eternal and Unseen that has become to them an anchor of the soul, sure and steadfast,—perfect in that which “casteth out fear,” the love which is the very element in which the Eternal Father has His being. In gaining this we gain some measure of the Divine likeness. To be perfect as the Father is perfect implies a likeness to the Father, a likeness in that in which alone the human can resemble the Divine, the finite stretch out its hand to the Infinite without being sent empty away—a likeness in these moral constituents of character of which love is the highest.

But is not this talk of a Divine likeness vague and fanciful? Where are we to see the Great Original? Is it a thick darkness, or is it an excellent glory that hides it from our sight? “Oh, that I knew where I might find Him!” cried Job of old, believing yet perplexed and groping for the light. “Oh, that I knew where I might find Him! that I might come even to His seat!” So many are crying still. But the answer, if they would but listen to it, is in the words of the same Teacher who laid down the principle, “Be perfect, as your Father in heaven is perfect.” “He that hath seen *Me* hath seen the *Father*. I and the Father are one”—words veiling their full meaning in that mystery which no human mind can penetrate, but in which we can discern this clear message, “He, whom I call the Father, is

infinite, is unseen, is in Himself unknown ; but I am His Revealer. What it is possible to "know of Him you can behold in Me." So then we come to this, that the likeness of the Father dwells in Jesus Christ ; that if the human would be like the Divine, it must strive to be like *Him* ; that the method of perfection is the imitation of Christ.

I have said that the human likeness to the Divine must consist—only can consist—in these moral characteristics, of which love is the highest—is the element, as it were, in which all others live and move. We see this if we look into the character of Christ. We find that character occasionally depicted, or interpreted, as if awaiting in some of the *strong* features, that make characters influential through their manliness and independence, their courage and resolution. But it is a very partial and one-sided conception of the character of Jesus Christ that dwells only on its tender gentleness and submissive humility, on what may appear its softer and more loving qualities. Yet who could be bolder with the stoutest moral courage than He, when He denounced the pretentious religious leaders of His day with their insincere formalities and hypocrisies, when He drove out of His Father's house those who were making it a den of thieves ? Who could show a calmer bravery when He faced the insults and brutalities of the cruel Jewish mob and Roman soldiers, and the shameful cross itself, rather than fail in fulfilling one iota of the obedience that He knew His Father's will required ? And yet we feel, as we consider it all, that alike in His times of conflict and of peace, when teaching His disciples, when rebuking sin, when comforting the sorrowful, and helping the helpless and needy, the element of His life was Love ; that He thought of others, not of self ; that He bore other burdens besides His own ; that even His anger was but the wrath of love finding itself rejected and its will to bless thwarted and set at naught. So that we may say that it is in proportion to our

ability to gain this high quality, this "altruism"—to use the modern phrase, not half so good as the old "charity" of the New Testament—this all-comprehending principle of self-abnegation, of vast pity, of divine tendency, of generous goodwill towards all—even the unthankful, the evil and unworthy—it is in proportion as we can gain this that we come nearest Him, the Son of man, the Son of God, who was able to say, "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father." The farther we get from self the nearer we get to Him. The more fully we realize that our true life is the *filial* life—the life of the Son of God—the farther do we advance on the good and perfect way, on the path which the lion's whelps have not trodden and the vulture's eye has not seen, but which leads to the shining gates of the city of the Great King.

"Ye are the sons of God." "Be perfect, as your Father in heaven is perfect." Be like Him, as His likeness is disclosed in One who was the First-born of many brethren—the Elder Brother of the whole family of redeemed mankind. It is this belief that we are the sons of God, and that, as such, we can attain to some measure of the Divine character, that more than aught else gives meaning and dignity to human life. The ideal of humanity is the likeness of the Man Christ Jesus—never attainable in all its features, and therefore the only ideal that leads us ever onward and affords the amplest scope to moral effort and spiritual aspiration.

In Him is the motive of our higher life; in Him the moral stimulus, the spiritual power, which enables us to strive after it, and in some degree to reach it. In some degree—but in that only—spiritual death awaits any one who gains a point at which he imagines that he may say, "Enough; I need strive no farther. I have seen the full vision of the glory to be revealed. I have laid hold of the whole of the hope set before me. I have learned the whole

secret of Christ. I have attained to the Divine likeness and the recompense of my reward." But the full reward is never *gained*. It is nothing that is bestowed on a man from without. It is something that grows up within him as he strives. It is the inward strength and knowledge and capacity of endurance that are bred of his earnest effort. It is the richer manhood, the diviner love that beautify and sanctify his character. It is the uplifting consciousness that rises in his soul to sustain him, as he follows on to know the Father's will and to copy the Son's example ever more and more faithfully, that though the fulness of complete possession never may be his, he yet does well to cherish in his heart that sublime ideal.

But to speak of the Ideal to those who are engaged, day by day for many a toilsome year, in the labours and cares and studies and burdens of our life, may seem delusive and discouraging. Why mock us with counsels of perfection? "Who is sufficient for these things?" But the Ideal is, after all, not a mere vision of a cloudland, "far off, unattained and dim." It is but the Real looked at through the light of Christ. In that light the ideal life is seen to be the life of *duty*, duty that does not lie within formal lines of definition, duty that is the son's function, not the servant's. Its voice is not the voice of law, of regulation, of prescription. It is an inward spiritual call—like Abraham's—to strive after a perfection of which each man has his revelation, according to his light and his capacity for receiving it, if the light that is given to every man be not in his case darkness, because he has suffered it to be quenched by the foul air of his own carnality and worldliness. It is the call to each to be and to do his best, whether his place be one of command or of obedience, of toil of hand or of head, of the scholar or of the teacher, of bold adventure or of patient watching, among those who also serve, though they only stand and wait. It

is the call that always is heard by each who has done his most and best, saying, "Friend, come up higher." Come up higher, because each step gained in the steep ascents of life opens to you an ampler horizon, and discloses broader fields that stretch, at last, to the utmost bounds of the everlasting hills.

R. H. STORY.

SCIENTIFIC LIGHTS ON RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS.

I.

THE MODERN FIGHT OF FAITH.

IT is a familiar aphorism of our day that the battle of life has become more arduous than it was in the days of our fathers. We are told that in every department it is more difficult to live than it used to be—it is harder to make rich at home; it is less easy to make rich abroad; it is impossible to make money go so far anywhere. And what is said of our material finances is with equal pertinacity maintained of our spiritual capital. The cry is something like this: “Men required less faith long ago; a less expenditure of faith would purchase more commodities. It has become more difficult for religion to live upon its original income. The universe on which it speculated has increased in value. To the later centuries Nature has become larger, God smaller. From his place at the centre Man has been driven into a corner—a very remote corner—where he can see nothing and cannot be seen. Instead of being the focus of interest to a Divine Spirit, he has been compelled to view himself as a single grain of sand on an absolutely boundless shore. God, if God there be, is no longer in contact with his spirit. He has been separated from him by an iron chain called Evolution—a chain whose links hold close together so as to preclude the possibility of any Divine intervention. It is of this dread power we must henceforth say what the Psalmist said of the God of Israel, ‘Thou hast beset me behind and before, and hast laid Thy hand upon me.’”

Now, I have always doubted the justice of this complaint

as to the increasing difficulty of spiritual subsistence. I do not think the conditions of modern scientific knowledge are more unfavourable to faith than was the condition of scientific ignorance. Nay, let me put it stronger. I think that, to a mind already religious, the modern field of Evolution presents incentives to faith which were wanting to previous fields. Whether in the exchange or in the church, faith is an act of speculation—a trust reposed previous to knowledge. I think that, keeping to the light of Nature alone, there is more ground for such a trust under the new régime than under the old; and I shall try as briefly and clearly as possible to set forth the reasons which have led me to this conclusion.

And first, let me direct attention to a preliminary point. It is generally assumed as an axiom that the trend of modern thought has been to widen man's conception of the outside spaces. That is not my opinion. It has certainly magnified tenfold his sense of the number of objects *in* space; but it has not increased his imagination of space itself. We are apt to reason thus: "The ancients had a very limited view of the mechanism of the starry heavens. Was not Anaxagoras persecuted for saying that the sun was as large as the Peloponnesus! What a blessed world for the religious mind to dwell in! How near man must have felt to the Source of his being, how close to the eye of God!" In point of fact, he did not so feel. His farthest star was indeed at a measurable distance; but his universe remained infinite. Behind his farthest star there was an immensity of space—space that wing had never traversed, space that thought had never compassed, and in one of whose inaccessible recesses dwelt the infinite God.

This is, in point of fact, the prevailing universe of the old world—even of its populace. The ordinary Greek never dreamed of reaching the top of Olympus—the paradise of the gods; it was too far away; his dead were sent to an

under-world. The Indian beheld his deities through such vast spaces that his own personality sank before them. The later Jew himself saw a universe of space so immense that the secret of God's pavilion became unreachable, and he was compelled to seek intermediaries. It was his imagination of the vastness of that space dividing him from the Object of his worship that drove him into the reverence for angels. His sense of the unpassed and impassable chasm between himself and God led him to invoke lower helps than that of the Supreme. The hero of the Book of Job is a man absolutely crushed by the problem of physical infinitude. His world embraces a very small number of *stars*; but he is appalled by the boundlessness of the silent *spaces*. He says of the God of Nature, "How little a portion is *heard* of Him!"—what vast tracts of unoccupied immensity He inhabits, alone! It is this sense of physical vastness that makes him refuse any theological explanation of his sufferings. What was *he* that the great God should single him out for retribution! Even had he sinned above his kind—which he had not—what hurt could he have done to a Majesty so far removed from a moth's wing! Was he even worthy of being such an object of interest as to be *punished* by heaven! Could the creature so break the peace of the Creator as to draw His thunderbolt! Could an atom in the boundless void loom so large in the sight of the Infinite as to be made the subject of a special decree, the object of a particular retribution! Surely to say so was to exalt the pride of Man!

This is the thought which, in my opinion, permeates the greatest book of the Old Testament. You will see how little the belief in the earth's centrality served as a counterpoise to this humility. Why should it! What advantage is it to be the centre of a small cluster of stars if, beyond every one of these stars, there is a universe of immeasurable spaces, at whose greatest conceivable distance reposes in

isolation the Spirit of the Great God ! If I am thus far distant from the original Source of my being, it matters not how central I am to the rest of the universe. In vain you make sun, moon, and stars revolve round my world if, beyond sun, moon, and stars, and separating each from the fountain of their light, there is interposed a field of blank space compared with whose immensity all united existing objects are but a single wavelet on the surface of a fathomless sea ! It was the contemplation of such a universe that produced in the fulness of time the creed of Epicurus—a creed whose keynote was, not the denial of God, but the nothingness of Man. There might, it said, be powers above, but they must be *exercised* above. Earth had no place for them ; Man had no sphere for them ; human history was unworthy of their contact. To this deep note of humility, spite of the central point in which they thought their world to dwell, had the minds of men sunk in the days of the Roman Empire.

Now, consider in what respects our modern universe differs from theirs. It differs in two—the filling of the blank spaces with objects, and the surrounding of these objects with a chain. I begin with the former. We say habitually that modern science has extended our view of the universe. It has not ; it has extended our view of the material objects *in* the universe. The ancients saw as wide a space as the moderns ; but the moderns have filled the space. There is no difference in the size of the room ; but to the old world the room is empty, to the new it is full of furniture. It is not merely that the latter sees a hundred stars for every ten witnessed by the former. The most remarkable furnishing of the room is precisely in those parts of it which still look empty. Tell the modern scientist that he has come to the end of the planets, the end of the comets, the end of all suns and systems, he would still see beyond them a furnished, not an unfurnished, room. The

space which once was thought blank is, for him, filled with ether. It is the home of multitudinous forces pulsating and vibrating with the promise and potency of life. Mr. Huxley treads the same spaces which were trodden by the writer of the Book of Job. What does he see? What change has taken place in the interval? Has there been an increase of territory? No; the modern scientist beholds, I think, no wider precincts. But within the old precincts he beholds a vast growth of population. The voids are filled; the deserts are vocal; the places once waste are ringing with the sound of many voices.

Now, what does this mean to the religious life? It means something of great importance. It involves nothing less than a new facility for faith. Supposing the belief in God to exist already, it ought to be strengthened by the filling of waste places. For what does that imply? Simply this, that we can no longer speak of a God *behind* Nature. In these modern times we can imagine nothing behind Nature—nothing where the ether is not, nothing where force is not. The solitudes have all been inhabited—so far, at least, as imagination can travel. Therefore, no more can Man imagine a solitary God. No more can he picture a Deity outside of the material framework. As long as there were void spaces, he could. But now that the void has, to fancy's eye, been filled, there is no vacant recess for God. Henceforth Man must seek Him, not behind Nature, but in Nature. He must seek Him, not where energy pauses, but where energy reigns—not in the scene of isolation, but in the place of contact. Imagination can never again picture God as taking rest. We can never again view Him as reclining in a field behind all physical forces. There is no such field known to science, and therefore there is no such field known to modern fancy. It ceases to be pious to think of God as dwelling apart from the order of the world.

Piety, then, has found in modern times a less distant sphere. If my God exists anywhere, He is not behind Nature—where the Indian sought Him, where the later Jew sought Him. The strain upon faith is lessened. The range of its flight is contracted. It is no longer required to soar beyond the clouds of materialism. It is no longer asked to seek a home where physical forces end, nor even to believe in such a home. It is told that if its God be found anywhere, it will be *within* that circle—in the *heart* of Nature, in the *midst* of the physical forces. The question between the theist and the atheist has altered. It is no longer whether there be a Power outside of Nature; it is, What do you consider the power you call Nature to be? Is it living, or is it dead? Is it thinking, or is it unintelligent? Is it blind, or is it purposeful? That is the question, and the only question. “I do not believe in anything but matter and force,” wrote an eminent author to a friend of mine. I could have devoutly answered, “Neither do I.” I have seen *one* compound of matter and force—personality, and wish for nothing more effectual at the head of the universe. It is not the limitation of my belief to matter and force that makes me an atheist; it is the meagre notion I have of the *powers* of matter and force. Faith has no need to seek a new object. Let it *go on* believing in matter and force; but let it believe in them more fully. Let it give Nature credit for larger powers than those of mere mechanism—for wisdom, foresight, benevolence. Faith’s modern problem is easier than its ancient one. That was to find God *beyond* the veil of sense; this is to find God imprinted *on* the veil of sense. To modern faith the universe has grown smaller instead of larger, for it seeks the object of its worship in the things that are seen and temporal.

But there is another respect in which to the religious eye the world of our day has supplied an aid to faith. This

new and thickly-populated modern universe has been seen to be encircled by a chain. That chain is familiarly known by the name, Evolution. It denotes the fact that every object in nature and every event in life is linked to some foregoing object and some former event. I have said that it has supplied an aid to faith. In truth, it has supplied by a reality the loss of a delusion. In those ancient days when God was supposed to dwell in the depths of unpeopled immensity, men felt keenly their distance from Him. It seemed to them that He was too far removed to be interested. They tried, as we have seen, to span the gulf by believing a fiction. They persuaded themselves that the earth was in the middle of the universe, that it stood there fixed and stationary, and that all the suns and systems were moving round it. The belief seemed to offer some slight hope that from out the depth of creation the eye of God might light on the needs of Man. How little practical influence that hope possessed we have already seen; yet it was really the offspring of an effort to stem the tide of religious despair. But, as to Man's eye the population of the universe thickened, the central position of the earth began to disappear. With the Middle Ages the earth *ceased* to be the middle; it became only the centre of the *Solar System*. With Copernicus, even that light went out, and dense darkness reigned. Man was wheeled back; his world became a speck; his interests seemed nowhere. The chariots of the heavenly host appeared to pass him superciliously by. The sun smote him by day with its greater glory; the stars smote him by night with their brilliant indifference. In the many mansions of the Father's house there seemed no place prepared for *him*. The old cord was broken which bound him to celestial worlds, and the new cord had not yet been found. He felt himself unregarded by heaven; and history proves that he became reckless of earth.

Newton made *some* bridge over the void between man and the universe. He discovered in the principle of gravitation something which constrained the worlds to keep together, which prevented them from travelling too far apart. But that was after all a very slender compensation to the shattered faith of Man. It was the assertion that he and the universe had a common limit. Man wanted more than that. It was not enough to know that the stars as well as he were denied an absolute liberty. The common prohibition did not imply a common importance. It did not alter the fact that Man was a speck in the void. It did not give him back the comforting sense of being the centre of the universe. It did not compensate him for the proud delusion that Earth was the capital of Creation, and that all other parts of Creation were only the provinces. It did not reduce the size of Jupiter or Saturn or Mars. It did not obviate the fact that the light of the nearest fixed star would take three years and a half to reach the human eye. It did not remove the fear that somewhere there might be a *real* metropolis, a veritable city of God, for whose sake alone the realms of space existed, and whose inhabitants were as far above the earth as the spirit of a Shakespeare is above the life of an amœba.

It was while Man was thus brooding that there broke upon his sight that dread system of Evolution which is supposed to have raised new barriers to the religious life. The question whether these new barriers are real I will for the present leave in abeyance. But what I here wish to emphasize is the fact that, whatever *new* difficulties the doctrine of Evolution may have raised, it has supplied the solution of an old one. It has answered the question of the Psalmist, "When I consider the heavens, what is man?" It has answered it in a more effectual way than did the delusion which it has superseded. Man has lost the faith that he is the metropolis of Creation; he can no

longer view himself as the centre of a Divine plan. But, in the light of Evolution, he has gained more than he has lost. He is still denied a distinctive central position; but why? Not because the central position has been given to another, but because it has been equally shared by every one. Evolution says, "If you are not the centre, it is not because another centre has been found, but because there is a centre everywhere." Evolution has abolished the distinction between the centre and the circumference, has annulled the difference between great and small. We can no longer distinguish between "the essence and the accidents." There are no accidents. In this modern scheme every event is not only of the utmost importance but of equal importance. You see a ripple on the surface of a lake; you witness an explosion in the heart of a comet. The one, you say, belongs to our little earth; the other is a part of the universal plan. No, says Evolution, they are both parts of the universal plan; they are both equally parts of that plan. The ripple on the lake was not a whit less inevitable, not a whit less involved in Nature, than the explosion of the comet; on any providential scheme which professes to be a scientific scheme, the one belongs to the cosmos as much as the other.

In past centuries it has been quite a common thing for men to argue thus: "You theologians exaggerate your position in the universe. You manifest an extraordinary pride by your doctrine of sin and redemption. How can you imagine that any little fall of yours, supposing it to have taken place, or any little rise of yours, supposing it to have happened, should have been of any interest whatever to the great Power whom you believe to rule the universe! Is not your theological science founded on the perceptions of a magnifying glass which exhibits your earth and you under false proportions!"

I do not think any scholar would use that argument now;

I am convinced that no evolutionist would. From the standpoint of modern science, there is not on this earth a purely earthly incident—an incident which had not its root in times and worlds far away. The events transacted here were not born here. They had their parentage in a nebulous fire-cloud before the mountains were brought forth or the dry land appeared. It is vain to speak of exaggerating our local surroundings. We have no local surroundings; the peculiarity of our surroundings is that they are not local. The brain-wave which originated our temptation had its birth in a movement of the fire-cloud; the stream of life which set us free was folded in the primitive forces of the universe. When the foundation of the heaven was laid, Man was there—inevitably, inextricably. He was there in his promise and in his potency. He had as sure a place in the constitution of the heavens as the belt of Orion or the signs of the Zodiac. The modern psalmist is no longer overwhelmed by the starry spaces. He feels to them as the transplanted shell would feel could it view from afar the parent sea. He recognises in these spaces the cradle of his birth. They do not inspire him with a sense of nothingness. Rather do they meet him as home memories—remembrances of a life to which he is kindred, and from which he has come out to seek a larger destiny.

And, then, consider the modern doctrine of the unity of species; what a new light this throws upon the dignity of Man! It is so often associated with human degradation that we have lost sight of its elevating side. Yet it has an elevating side. What *is* the doctrine of the unity of species? It is not the belief that the man is kindred to the animal and the animal to the plant; that is a mere symptom of the doctrine, an illustration of its working. To the thoroughgoing evolutionist the unity of species means more than that. It is the averment that man, animal and plant alike are kindred to the forces of Nature which lie

behind them. The process of Evolution is not simply a process by which the man is built upon the animal and the animal upon the vegetable. It is a process by which man, animal and vegetable have been successively evolved by the natural forces themselves. The real kinship, therefore, is not between man and the animal, but between man and all things. The unity of species claimed for him is, in its deepest sense, not a unity with the beast of the field, but a unity with those mighty forces which existed from the foundation of the world.

What, then, of the Force at the back of these—that primal Force which Mr. Spencer calls the Unknowable? On scientific principles, *can* it be the Unknowable! Shall the unity of species break down at the last moment! After claiming a common life for man, animal, plant, crystal, and the whole system of so-called physical forces, is it conceivable that in its final step modern science should desert its favourite doctrine! Is it conceivable that in its last ascent it should deny that unity of species which, all up the ladder, it has strenuously maintained! Shall all the forces of Nature be kindred but the primal Force! Shall this alone be of a different species—of a species so different that it is “unknowable”! Shall the trunk and the leaves and the branches of life’s tree be allied, but the root be alien to all! If so, evolution has denied itself—has at the eleventh hour expelled from its vineyard those who have borne the burden and heat of the day. It has abandoned within reach of the goal that consummation for which it has laboured.

But, if Evolution should carry out its original principle—if it should make the primal Force akin to all forces, how great then will be Religion’s gain! The first doctrine of the creed of science will be the first doctrine of the old creed of Creation—that Man is made in the image of the universe. It will no longer, doubtless, be an *unshared* privilege; but

it will not be less sweet on that account. If you assume the existence of God in Nature and carry out the principle of evolution in science, you will reach by stern logic a conclusion devoutly to be wished. You will decide at the close of many centuries what a primitive writer inferred in the dawn of history—that Man bears the likeness of the primal Force of Nature. It is a conclusion which has often been scouted as a survival of the savage state, which is still stigmatised by the hard name “anthropomorphic.” But it is a conclusion at which you will arrive by no savage instinct, a judgment to which you will be led by no want of culture. You will come to it through the science of the nineteenth century, through the latest phase of that science—Evolution, through the carrying out of that Evolution to its utmost boundary—the complete adoption of the unity of species. It will be on the ground of this final step that you will revert substantially to the doctrine of the old book of Genesis—that the breath of the Creator has been breathed into the creature. An alien power at the head of the universe will, to the developed scientific consciousness, seem a contradiction in terms. It will be a thought at variance with the unity of species. It will be itself an idea which marks the survival of savagery, and therefore to be rejected by every cultured mind. Even so, by the unlikeliest of all roads—that road which to many has appeared the broad way leading to destruction—we may expect to find the Promised Land. We may expect to regain that belief which tradition regarded as the belief constituting Paradise—the faith that to the heart of Man there throbs a responsive Pulse at the heart of the universe.

G. MATHESON.

HISTORICAL COMMENTARY ON THE EPISTLES TO THE CORINTHIANS.

XXXV. THE IMPERIAL POLICY AND THE PAGAN CLUBS.

IN order to complete the subject, it is necessary to notice certain difficulties and objections which may perhaps be suggested in reference to the interpretation advocated in §§ XXXI.-XXXIII.;¹ and the consideration of these will at the same time bring out more clearly the nature of the question involved and its great importance in early Christian history.

We have seen in the case of Trajan (p. 432) that Augustus in particular, and the Imperial policy generally, were opposed to the associations: how then could these be so numerous and so strong as we have represented? Considering how much stress we have laid on the analogy between the Pauline and the Imperial attitude towards the associations, this objection must be examined.

The Imperial Government might regard the clubs with disfavour; it might forbid or restrict the formation of new associations, when the proposal was formally laid before it (as in the case quoted under Trajan's reign); but it was out of its power to destroy all associations, nor was the attempt ever made.

Julius Cæsar and Augustus had seen in the great Civil Wars that the centres of disturbance and the chief causes of disorder lay in the political clubs. Hence they discouraged them, and dissolved many in Rome, examining all, and allowing those only to continue that rested on positive enactments by the State or on prescriptive right. The most recently formed had been the most dangerous; and the Imperial policy watched jealously over the institution of new clubs. The Senate scrutinized each case for a

¹ By a mistake in order § XXXIV. was placed too early. It ought to follow § XXXVIII.

new club, and gave permission only after receiving Imperial authorization.¹ The necessary condition was that the new society must serve some useful purpose in the State. As all clubs had a religious character, each being bound together in the rites of a common worship, the Senate, as holding the control over the public religion, had to be consulted.

Moreover, the tendency to form associations was far too deep-rooted in Græco-Roman society to be eradicated by even the Imperial power. No government can change the engrained customs and ways of living among a people. The spread of Græco-Roman civilization, which was the unvarying aim of the Imperial policy, carried with it the institution of the clubs. It was where that civilization was least influential, where rusticity and ignorance and Orientalism were supreme, that the clubs were least important. Græco-Roman society was hardly possible without clubs. A revolution in the customs of society was needed before clubs could be abolished. Augustus, therefore, preferred to take this essential feature of society into the service of the State: it was a powerful element in society, and might be used to serve his purposes. Now, one of his aims was to renovate and strengthen the religious spirit in the State. This he could not achieve, as ancient society was constituted, except through the clubs: the spread of an ancient religion always proceeded through the institution of clubs to practise the worship in new places. Thus Augustus spread his new State religion—the worship of Rome and the Emperor as the God incarnate in human form on the earth. He founded associations which met in the practice of the State religion, and in that way he enlisted them in the support of his policy. So, for example, he formed those clubs in the Italian towns called *Augustales*, or *Cultores Augusti*.

In the same way the religions of the East spread over the

¹ *Auctoritas Augusti*.

Greek and Roman world under the form of religious clubs or associations (*collegia*). The *synagogues* of the Jews and the congregations of the early Christians were inevitably regarded by the Pagans as clubs for the practice of religion. Lucian calls a Christian congregation (*Peregr.* 11) a *θίασος* or religious association; and Celsus termed the Christians *θιασῶται*, members of a religious club (see Origen *c. Cels.*, iii. 23).

The early Emperors regarded religious clubs with varying mind. Augustus kept Isis outside of Rome: the reason was obviously political: Egypt and Egypt's queen were the great public enemy in the earlier part of his reign: therefore the religion of Egypt must be kept out. But he permitted the Jews to flourish, and did not exile other religions from Rome. Tiberius was hostile to the Jews and to foreign religions generally, while Caligula was more friendly. Claudius founded the first society of *Dendrophori* in the religion of Cybele; but in his later years he was opposed to the Jews. Nero, under the influence of Poppæa, favoured the Jews, and his action against the Christians was due to an accidental and personal cause, not to any objection in principle to that class of religious associations.¹ The opinion was formerly entertained, also, that he founded those loyal clubs called *collegia iuvenum*, which afterwards became so important, connecting the Imperial religion with the physical training of young men and the strong human interest involved therein.² This institution, however, was in the strictest spirit of the Augustan policy, and older than Nero; but he encouraged such clubs.

The whole system of Roman benefit societies, called

¹ See Maue's treatise, *Praefectus Fabrum*, p. 27: most of this paragraph is simply abbreviated from him.

² Maue, *loc. cit.*, repeats that wrong statement. See Rostovtsew in *Revue Numismatique*, 1898, p. 282 f. Nero dissolved certain clubs in Pompeii, but that was because they had misdirected their fellowship and aims and had fostered disorder: Tacitus, *Annals*, xiv. 17.

collegia tenuiorum, may perhaps be as old as Augustus. They were permitted to hold monthly meetings for the purpose of a monthly subscription, and such other meetings as they needed for religious purposes. Tertullian says, *Apologet.* 39, that the Christian congregations also collected monthly subscriptions, not, however, fixed in amount, nor obligatory like those in Pagan *collegia*, but purely voluntary; and he contrasts the Christian use of the money for charitable purposes with its employment for feasting and sensuality in the Pagan clubs.¹

This sketch brings out clearly how far removed the Imperial policy was from abolishing clubs, though Trajan enforced so strictly in Bithynia the general principle that no club dangerous to public peace and order could be permitted, and regarded any new club as an evil or likely to become so. But Bithynia then had been in an exceptional and disturbed condition, and exceptional strictness was needed in preventing or removing all possible causes of disorder.

Yet even in that province Trajan recognised the right of Amisus to maintain its *collegia*, so long as they did not produce dangerous or disorderly results, because Amisus was a free city and enjoyed its own laws. That introduces us to another principle of the Imperial policy. In the eastern provinces the Emperors did not press the Roman law so strictly as in the west. They allowed the Greek laws great scope.² Especially was this the case in the senatorial provinces, such as Asia and Achaia, in which the government was conducted not by the Emperor's own representatives, but by officials sent by the Senate.

Only in the case of soldiers was the Imperial policy resolute against clubs. No military clubs were permitted. The soldier must not be allowed to come under any bond

¹ See Maue, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

² *Hist. Comm. Galatians*, §§ XVII. ff. and XXIII. ff.

except that to the Emperor, nor to belong to any association except his regiment; and the regiment had its own religious bond, the religion of the Emperors and the regimental Gods.

In fact, while the membership of the clubs was not restricted to the upper classes in society, yet, beyond all doubt, the institution was far more important among those who were at least moderately well off, who made some pretensions to education, good breeding, and knowledge of the world.

The spirit of ancient society was represented in its most concentrated form in the associations. To hold aloof from the clubs was to stamp oneself as a low-class person, as a curmudgeon, almost an enemy of society, alien to every generous impulse and friendly feeling towards neighbours.

The question, then, before St. Paul was whether Christianity could be permitted to grow up in the forms accepted by ancient society, whether it could adapt itself safely to those forms, and let them guide¹ its outward social development, or whether it must reject the prevailing forms absolutely. The latter alternative meant, with an energetic and progressive body like the Christians, that they must recreate ancient society after new forms.

In this statement we have the answer to an objection which might be taken to St. Paul's judgment. It might perhaps seem that he was led too far by the analogy which he evidently makes between the Common Meal of the Pagan clubs and the Sacrament of the Christians, and that, from an exaggerated and almost superstitious regard for the sanctity of the Sacrament, he discouraged any participation in a ceremony which had a strong superficial resemblance to it. But we now see that in this subject there was involved the momentous issue, whether or not it was possible to clothe Christianity in the robes of existing society.

¹ This guidance was what Paul feared (1 Cor. xi. 21; below, § XXXVIII.).

If I may venture on such a subject to state personal impressions, I must confess, on the one hand, that no reconciliation was possible at that time between Christian principles and present social forms. No dispassionate student of history, who refuses to be misled by the glamour and charm of ancient civilization, who studies society as it existed in its reality, can come to any other conclusion.

But, on the other hand, I must also confess that a strong inclination attracts me to the side of those who were trying to effect the reconciliation, and to combine Christian spirit with the existing institutions of society and civilization. That this was impossible we may allow, and yet sympathize with those who were bent on the attempt, and who soon became almost a definite and recognised sect, spread widely among the cities of the Ægean lands, under the title of Nicolaitans.¹

In another work² I have described a similar attempt, made at a later time, when success was not so impossible amid the changed circumstances of the third century. In the scanty evidence the probability seems to be that the first Christian city, the Phrygian Eumeneia, had effected successfully such a reconciliation; and that the auspicious result was destroyed in the blood and fire of Diocletian's persecution. But the strength of the Christian feeling among that people, who had gone to considerable lengths in the direction of the old Nicolaitans, was proved by the facts: they all chose death, and were burned with their church, "appealing to the God over all."

¹ The origin of this name is unknown: its connotation is clear: the Nicolaitans claimed the right to remain in ordinary Pagan society and to continue to be members of the clubs.

² *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, ii. pp. 502-508; see also *Contemporary Review*, September, 1896, p. 435 ff.

XXXVI. IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION IN THE EARLY GENTILE CHURCHES.

The subject treated in §§ XXX.-XXXV. was a most serious question in the development of Christian society and religion. It is of such importance for the New Testament writings and the early Christian times generally that we may profitably follow it further, and notice some other references to it.

It may, perhaps, have seemed that on p. 431 f. we were too hasty, when we set aside the theory which explained "sitting in an idol's temple" (1 *Cor.* viii. 10) as referring to participation by Christians in the ordinary regular celebration of the public and recognised Pagan ritual. There were afterwards, of course, certain sects which went to great lengths in their attendance upon Pagan religious ceremonies; and it might be, and has been, maintained that we have here in germ the principle which was carried out by those later sects. We have, however, been convinced that there was no such fully developed tendency in Corinth to false principle. There was thorough good intention to abide by Paul's teaching in the great principles; and that was absolutely inconsistent with overt participation in idolatrous worship for its own sake.

But, apart from the question whether that interpretation of viii. 10 offers a sufficient explanation of the words there used and the situation there described, it can hardly be doubted that that interpretation does not suit the paragraph x. 14-22, which obviously alludes to the same acts of Corinthian Christians. Let us consider that paragraph fairly in its context.

An explanatory paragraph (x. 1-11) leads up to it. The experiences of the Jews our fathers are intended to be an example, so that we Christians may learn wisdom.

x. 1-4: Just as you are now all brought out of Paganism,

and become members of the Christian Church, sharing in all the opportunities and privileges which it offers, so the whole body of our fathers the Jews were brought out of Egypt and equally favoured. They were baptized in sea and cloud, as you have been baptized. They all were fed with spiritual food: they all were given to drink of spiritual drink: as you receive the spiritual food and drink of the Sacrament. 5-11: But some of them slipped back into the idolatrous practices of the Pagans, and into the impure life of the tribes around them; and were punished with death on that account. Their action and its results are typical for us Christians.

x. 12, 13: Take warning from that example. Be not over-confident. You are now tempted, as our fathers were tempted. But God does not permit the temptation to be too strong for you; with the evil and the danger He has given the antidote and preservative; but you must be careful, for the temptation is pressing hard on you.

14: Be careful, then, always to avoid and keep far away from idolatry. 15: I put the case to you as reasoning, prudent men, that you judge for yourselves as to what you should do. 16: The Cup of the Blessing,¹ over which we say the word of blessing and thanks every time we celebrate the rite—does it not constitute our fellowship in the blood of the Christ? The Bread which we break—is it not our fellowship in the body of the Christ? 17: Because the Bread (which we share, and break, and divide) is one, we, the many members, are one body and one brotherhood. 18: Look (you who are the spiritual Israel) at the nation of the Jews (the natural, fleshly Israel): does not their common ritual bind them together in a fellowship whose close cohesion is the marvel of the Greek and Roman world? is not that intimate union due to their taking part in the common sacrifice?

¹ "The Blessing" from the first institution still accompanies it.

19: But what is my meaning (you may here object)? Do I mean that an idol is a real thing, or that idol-sacrificed meat is a real category (*i.e.* different in character from meat not so sacrificed)? 20: Certainly not; but I mean that what the Pagans sacrifice, they sacrifice to Dæmonic Powers and not to God, and I do not wish that you should enter into a fellowship cemented in and through Dæmonic Powers. 21: It is impossible and contradictory to drink the Cup of the Lord and the Cup of Dæmonic Powers, or to partake in the Table of the Lord and the Table of Dæmonic Powers (you must choose one or other). 22: (If we try to combine these two mutually contradictory rites), we merely provoke the Lord, who refuses to share with Dæmonic Powers in your devotion; and that, of course, we are resolved not to do, are we not? We do not imagine—do we?—that we are stronger than He.

It is peculiarly unfortunate that the critical expression in *v.* 20, though fully explained in 21, is mistranslated, in both the Authorized and the Revised Version, "communion with devils" ("dæmons," in margin). Canon Evans's notes ought to be carefully read. It follows beyond question from what he says, that a Pagan ceremony is meant, which was not merely a performance of a religious rite, but was felt to be the cementing of a fellowship or communion in and through a ritual meal. No other explanation of this passage seems possible except that which we have proposed.¹

Further, our explanation restores consistency, coherence, and reason to Paul's opinions about the eating of sacrificial meat. It is not possible without it to gather any clear

¹ I had the advantage of discussing 1 *Corinthians* viii. and x. for several days with my friend Prof. Sayce, in the end of October. The run of the thought long puzzled us. With his usual insight he pointed out that the heart of the question lay in the "communion of daimonia, x. 20." When at last the suggestion was made that the sacrificial meal of the Thiasoi was meant, everything seemed to us to become clear forthwith.

conception of what was his position on that question: after apparently protesting in the most vehement and impassioned terms against eating it in x. 20-22, he proceeds, in 23 ff., to discuss it in a cool and almost indifferent tone, as an act which might be done without hesitation, except that kindly feeling towards some weak and rather painfully scrupulous Christian impels one to abstain from an act which in one's own judgment is quite indifferent. But now we see that Paul is distinguishing two radically different acts: (1) he is resolutely bent against the partaking of the ritual meal of a Pagan society: (2) he regards as a trivial matter the mere eating in ordinary life of the meat of an animal which at a previous time and in different circumstances had been offered to an idol.

As a third argument, we observe that, on our explanation, the disagreement, which has often been commented on with astonishment, between St. Paul's teaching and the attitude of *Revelation* on this subject entirely disappears. It has been sometimes thought that the horror of *idolothytia*—meats offered to idols—expressed in *Revelation* by John is in the sharpest contrast to the easy and almost indifferent tone of Paul; and no satisfactory explanation of the contrast seems possible on the ordinary explanation of his judgment. But on our interpretation John and Paul will be found in perfect harmony on this subject.

As it chanced, I began to write the present section immediately after writing on Sardis, Smyrna and Thyatira, as the result of a careful study of the seven messages in *Revelation* ii., iii.; and the atmosphere and spirit of those messages brought out the meaning of Paul's words far more perfectly than I had conceived them when writing the preceding sections of this Commentary. The messages to Pergamus and Thyatira seemed to spring out of and to develop logically the opinions expressed by Paul. This demands a special paragraph.

XXXVII. ST. JOHN AND ST. PAUL ON ASSOCIATIONS
AND IDOLOTHYTA.

Like Paul, so John points his treatment of the subject by an example taken from Hebrew history. *Revelation* ii. 14 corresponds to 1 *Corinthians* x. 1-11, but a marked interval has occurred; the method has become familiar and customary; and what would have been to Paul a type and an example becomes in John's mouth a designation and a category.

Paul might have said, "As Balaam taught how to seduce Israel from the right path, so you are being led astray by false teachers towards the same kind of practices." But John says, "Some of you hold the teaching of Balaam."

Further, we saw that there is the strongest contrast between the first 23 and the following 10 verses of 1 *Corinthians* x.: in 1-23 Paul treats with horror the eating of the ritual Pagan meal; in 24-33 he treats certain other forms of eating sacrificial meats with comparative indifference. Now the tone of *vv.* 1-23 is exactly the tone of John in the *Revelation*. Surely we must infer from this that the question with regard to the actions discussed in 1 *Corinthians* x. 24-33 was closed for ever. Paul's decision was final. The case was no longer up for judgment when the *Revelation* was written.

But the other class of acts, the sharing in the ritual meals, was still a serious danger. It had to be inveighed against, and denounced in the most uncompromising terms. Ephesus had been well taught, and "hated the works of the Nicolaitans." Smyrna was the most free from fault (thanks greatly to the persecution and poverty which were its lot) of all the Churches. But the distant Pergamus and Thyatira, farthest away from St. Paul's teaching, were still in the same danger as Corinth had been when Paul was writing this letter. In both Pergamus and Thyatira some

of the Christians still clung to their membership of the Pagan associations and shared in the fellowship of the ritual meal; and, if that evil were not burned out, the whole loose spirit of Pagan society, its impurity and its idolatry, would continue to rule in the congregation.

The question, however, continued to be treated and named from the point of view adopted by the Corinthian officials at the first. It was called the question of *Idolothytia*, things offered to idols. But the most serious and grave matter involved in it was whether the Christians might continue to take part in those societies which were united in a fellowship of Pagan ritual. A common ritual is a great power over the minds of men; and the three great Apostles¹ were unanimous in refusing to permit Paganism to exercise that power over the minds of the young converts.

Perhaps a new light is thrown by our theory on the words of *Revelation* ii. 22: "Behold I do cast her [Jezebel] into a bed, and them that commit adultery with her into great tribulation." It is usual to take "into a bed" and "into great tribulation" as parallel to one another: the "tribulation" is the lot of her partners; her punishment and that of her children is different. Adultery and *πόρνεια* here mean "Idolatry and the low tone of morals which is inseparable from it."

There seems a distinct awkwardness in this; and the whole sentence (though susceptible of defence) fails to satisfy one's feeling for symmetry and completeness in thought. A different interpretation seems to spring naturally from our view of the action meant. The expression is full of bitter, almost savage irony: "See what a feast I will give them! I set her on a couch [*i.e.* the couch on which a guest at a banquet² reclined], and with her her

¹ See the following section.

² The vase paintings, with their frequent scenes of revel at such banquets, will occur to every reader's mind.

idolatrous partners; and the fare provided for them is—tribulation.”¹

That places us in the midst of the scene in Thyatira. One section of the Christian Church clings to the social life of the city: they cannot resolve to cut themselves off entirely from the bright and joyous customs of society: they take them with their idolatrous accompaniments and their sacrificial meals. “But I will give them their festal meal: I throw their mistress and prophetess on a couch at their table, and them along with her, to enjoy—the punishment that I have in store for them.”

It is true that the word *κλίνη* (used in *Revelation*) has only the sense of “bed” elsewhere in the New Testament; but there is little opportunity for mentioning a couch at a feast. The custom of reclining at supper was adopted from the Greek and Roman fashion, and became usual in Palestine. People sat in meetings and in the temple, etc., but reclined at meat. The Last Supper was eaten reclining, not sitting, as is clear from the words of Matthew, Mark and Luke,² though even the Revised Version maintains the false translation, and uses “sit” (but in the margin the proper term is given). The couch at supper must therefore have been well known; and, without doubt, the ordinary Greek name *κλίνη* was used, and the author of *Revelation*, therefore, had to employ it if he wished to speak of the couch.

Moreover the question may be asked whether we ought not to take *κλίνη* as a “couch” in Luke xvii. 34: “There shall be two men on one couch (at supper); there shall be two women grinding together.”

¹ *εἰς θλίψιν* does not correspond to *εἰς κλίνην*: *εἰς* has a different but quite usual sense in each case. I throw her on a couch and her partners beside her [on their couches], with a view to (give them) much suffering.

² *ἀνέπεσεν*, Luke xxii. 14; *ἀνέκειτο*, Matt. xxvi. 20; and so in Luke xxii. 27, *ἀνακείμενος* (compare Mark xiv. 18, xvi. 14). John uses both words freely.

XXXVIII. ST. PETER, ST. JOHN AND ST. PAUL ON
THE SACRIFICIAL FEASTS.

The description of the false teachers in 2 *Peter* ii. 1 ff. contains many traits recalling the doctrine of the Nicolaitans and the followers of Balaam and Jezebel in the *Revelation*, and also the arguments advanced by the Corinthian officials who wrote to Paul. A glance at that chapter will illuminate the nature of the issues on which Paul had to pronounce judgment in 1 *Corinthians* x.

Peter¹ speaks of those teachers in the future tense: "There shall be among you also false teachers." But the whole character of the chapter shows that he is describing a class of teaching which was already powerful among the Christians, while it was likely to grow even more dangerous.

Just as Paul in the opening of 1 *Corinthians* x., so Peter begins chapter ii. by quoting as an example and warning the history of the Jews: "There were false prophets also among the people (of Israel)."

The greed and ambition of our false teachers stimulates their teaching: they have personal ends to gain by making themselves the leaders of the congregation and imposing their policy and ways of living on all. But they will be destroyed like the fallen angels, like the ancient world at the flood, like Sodom and Gomorrah,—for God can punish the guilty, and especially vicious and unruly persons like them.

10b: [They have the qualities characteristic of the richer classes in a Greek city, where there was no real aristocracy, no class ennobled by the public services or the abilities of their ancestors, and preserving a certain tradition of

¹ The name is used for brevity's sake, without implying a theory. As in the *Church in the Roman Empire*, p. 492 (in later editions), I still think that the Epistle was written by a follower of St. Peter (even more full of Roman ideas than the author of 1 *Peter*), who considered that he was expressing Peter's opinions. It is not impossible that this may have been done under Peter's own instructions. I am disposed to think that the Epistle is earlier than I formerly allowed; see below.

nobility—for such a class had almost wholly perished from the “progressive” Greek cities]. “They are audacious, obstinately self-willed, they have no respect for authorities¹ in their ribald talk, where even angels would shrink from expressing a defamatory opinion if they were bringing a charge before God. They pride themselves on living the free life of nature, like the wild beasts, ignorant of moral law and restraint, born to perish. And they shall perish.”²

13b: Finding their pleasure in luxurious revelling during the day,³ blots upon life,⁴ indulging in luxury at their love-feasts (Agapæ) as they revel in your company, the vicious soul gleaming in their eyes: they bring into Christian rites the Pagan licence (1 Cor. xi. 21 f.). [The scathing picture of a Komos, a drunken revel, as it is shown in Greek vase pictures and in literature, cannot be mistaken; see *Hist. Comm. Galatians*, p. 453 f.].

15: They have forsaken the right path and have gone astray, following the path of Balaam, who loved the pay of wrong-doing (though even the ass corrected him). [The allusion to Balaam, bribed to teach vice and luxury to the Israelites, has become stereotyped.]

17: They are untrustworthy; they merely cheat the dupes among the young converts, whom they mislead with their boastful, self-confident language, promising them liberty while they are themselves slaves to their vices.

It seems beyond question that this description is drawn

¹ We take *δόξας* as a rendering of *honores*, offices, positions of authority and trust, *i.e.* in the Church.

² In the following phrase, if we read with the great MSS. *ἀδικούμενοι μισθὸν ἀδικίας*, the only reasonable sense seems to be “deprived (after all) of the pay of their wrong-doing.” They bargained for certain pay, and are cheated of it. The Revised Version, “suffering wrong as the hire of their wrong-doing,” seems self-contradictory, for they are not said to suffer wrong, but to suffer right.

³ The practice of beginning to feast in the daytime is often alluded to by Roman writers either as the extreme of unprincipled luxury (see Juvenal, i. 103, *ab octava Marius bibit [hora]*), or as a pardonable stretch of liberty on a holiday (Horace, Od. iii. 3, *partem solido demere de die*).

⁴ *σπίλος*, like Latin *macula*.

from the same class of persons who are alluded to in the messages to Pergamus and Thyatira, and whose action in Corinth prompted Paul's allusions in viii. 10, xi. 22, and produced the evils at the Agapæ which he denounces in xi. 20 ff. The method of treatment of the subject has been fixed by Paul; the temptations of Israel are taken as typical of the temptations that beset the new Christians. Balaam (as he is described in *Numbers* xxxi. 16, and Josephus, *Ant. Jud.*, iv. 6, 6) gave the advice to tempt the Hebrews by means of the Midianite women; and a mere allusion to "the way of Balaam" in 2 *Peter* ii. 15, "the error of Balaam" in *Jude* 11, is sufficient to recall the familiar illustration. In both those places the allusion is evidently a current and stereotyped formula.

In *Revelation* ii. 14 the allusion is introduced with greater appearance of originality and is fully explained. But one cannot, from that single case, argue that *Revelation* ii. is earlier than 2 *Peter* ii.; for it lies in the nature of all moral exhortations sometimes to state in explanatory detail a traditional type. On the whole the tone of the messages to Pergamus and Thyatira in *Revelation* ii. perhaps suggests a more developed stage than 2 *Peter* ii., after that special temptation or tendency had become a recognised form of thought and life, but still within the Church.

We observe a steadily growing body of accepted principles. The judgments of Paul are assumed as fundamental by the authors of 2 *Peter* and *Revelation*. A question that has come before him and been decided is not permitted to come up again for discussion. What has been permitted by him is a part of ordinary Christian life. What has been denounced by him becomes a curse to those who practise it; and the teachers who permit it are teachers of falsehood for whom destruction is gaping.

It is true that a distinct difference of spirit is perceptible between the attitude of St. Paul and that of St. John

towards the Roman State. The former does not despair of, in fact he hopes for and strives after, peaceful development of the Church under the protection which the existing government gives to all orderly and contented citizens: "the Christians should avoid, so far as is consistent with religion, the appearance of interfering with the present social order: the proper rule of life is to accept the world's facts, not as in themselves right, but as indifferent, and to waste no time and thought on them":¹ only religious duty must not be violated, *i.e.* there must be no complicity with idolatry.

On the other hand, John has become convinced of "the absolute and irreconcilable opposition between the Church and the Empire": he has "no thought of the possibility of bringing the State to a milder policy by convincing it of the harmlessness of Christianity."²

But in the same pages where that difference was pointed out it was also shown that the change of spirit was due, not to any real difference in the principles of the Christian leaders, but to the change of policy on the part of the State. Paul wrote while the early policy of Nero, *i.e.* the policy of Seneca, guided the action of the Government. John wrote after that policy had been abandoned, and the Government had resolved to regard all Christians as out-laws and enemies.

We now see that Paul, even while he was instructing his converts to respect, so far as possible, the existing facts of society, was as firmly persuaded as John that the Christians must keep themselves apart from the present fabric of society: there was no possible place for them in the most characteristic and universal social institutions. The necessary inference was that these must all be destroyed, and society must be re-established on a Christian basis.

¹ From the *Church in the Roman Empire*, p. 246, where the context states the principle more fully.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 296 f.

Paul was neither bigoted nor intolerant. He appreciated the value of education. "He advised his pupils to learn from the surrounding world everything that was worthy in it."¹ He did not think that they must go out of the world; they may and should continue in the world.² But his opinion was unhesitating that Pagan society was so leavened and impregnated by idolatry that it must be broken up before it could be reconstituted in a form reconcilable with Christian principles. Christians may remain in the world, use its teaching, profit by its opportunities. But they must not be of the world, as a part of its society.

The more closely we scrutinize the words and acts of the leading Apostles, the more clearly does their perfect harmony in all essential points appear—amid some slight and purely superficial differences—and the better do we understand what is implied in *Galatians* ii. 2 and 9: Paul laid before James and Cephas and John the Gospel for the Gentiles, and they perceived the grace that was given him, and gave him the right hand of fellowship. This implies that they were all from the beginning in complete agreement as to what should be the position of the Gentiles in the Church and in the State.

W. M. RAMSAY.

BIBLICAL DIFFICULTIES.

I.

THE title of this short series of papers is designedly vague. The writer thought, in the first place, of problems arising out of the Massoretic text; all our elaborate historical conclusions are based upon that text, and yet no adequate, thorough examination of it has been made. Textual criticism, as has been said already in the *EXPOSITOR* (March, 1899), is passing into a new phase, and since it may be some time before commentators, hampered by the

¹ *St. Paul the Traveller*, p. 149.

² *1 Cor.* v. 10.

manifold requirements of their readers, take due account of this, it is essential that magazines concerned with exegesis should promote the general progress by giving some space to the new critical school. Following the precedent set by the writer,^c Prof. Budde (than whom no German critic is better qualified) has undertaken the consideration of "psalm-problems" of this order in the *Expository Times*; it is excusable that the writer should feel increased confidence in his ability to serve the public by throwing what new light he can on the problems which Prof. Budde leaves to him. But there are other Biblical Difficulties on which, if not often, yet upon occasion, he will be ready to speak. And one such meets us directly, when Prof. Budde or any other scholar points out the often far-reaching corruptness of the Massoretic text, great as the fidelity of the Massoretic editors has been. For we can hardly doubt that the text of the Psalms presented much of this corruptness in the time of Jesus Christ, and yet our Lord certainly regarded the Psalms as inspired. Well, and what, pray, does the inspiration of the Scriptures mean? Surely, as Robertson Smith long ago expressed it, not merely that they "contain," but also that they "convey," the word of God. And it is this fact of experience that we ought to start from—that the Scriptures, or let us here say the Psalms, convey a true and direct message from God to the Church and each of its members. No one says that the text of the Psalms is so corrupt that no true conception of its meaning can be found; all that is asserted by advanced critics is that the details of the traditional exegesis are often incorrect, largely in consequence of the corruptness of the text. But it remains true that even corrupt passages can be interpreted according to the analogy of passages which are certainly correct, and God, who overrules all things, can even so order it that, through a perfectly incorrect representation of the meaning of the original verse or phrase, a message

radiant with beauty and truth can be conveyed to believers. So it is to-day; so, too, it has always been. The Septuagint, the versions of Jerome, of Luther, of the Authorized Translators, are all full of indubitable errors, but all, through their close connexion with the inner life of the Church and its members, acquired, as it were, a special inspiration, even where they are least correct, relatively to those who used them as authoritative. As the present writer has expressed his meaning elsewhere, "for Jesus Christ, the Psalms, in the form or forms in which they were correct, had, no doubt, a special inspiration, not only because there was no other worthy hymn book known to Him with which they could be compared, but because they were already becoming ancient; and devotional forms which have long expressed the inner experience of the Church, even now, almost in spite of ourselves, seem to us to be specially inspired." That the Psalms as originally written were, in the eyes of the psalmists and of Jewish believers, inspired, is beyond question, though this inspired quality was not such as forbade authorized persons to deal freely with them by processes which were already familiar to ancient editors.

The Psalms, then, may convey the Word of God even in a very imperfect text. That they "contain" the Word of God is also a true and an important statement, because it allows us, in the light of the indwelling Spirit of God, to discriminate between those parts of the Psalter which are in the direct line of progress towards the Gospel and those which are reactionary rather than progressive, relics of the past rather than anticipations of the future. We may now pass on to the consideration of three very instructive corruptions of the true text of passages of the Scriptures; the third, it will be seen, has to be taken in connexion with an undoubtedly corrupt passage of the recovered Hebrew text (if I may call it so) of parts of Ecclesiasticus.

I. Job xiii. 28 :

וְהוּא כְרָקָב יִבְלֶה
כְּבִגְדֹת אֲכָלוּ עֵשׂ

A.V. And he, as a rotten thing, consumeth, as a garment that is moth-eaten.

R.V. Though I am like a rotten thing that consumeth,
Like a garment that is moth-eaten.

The Revised Version shows a tender consideration for those who have to read the Old Testament poetry aloud. The preceding verses are a vividly impassioned expostulation with God for so inexorably and so excessively afflicting Job, who naturally speaks of himself in the first person. Then, suddenly, he seems to fall into the third person. Dillmann and Davidson think that וְהוּא can mean "and such a one," preparing the way for the next chapter, in which Job speaks of the sad lot of the race, without special reference to any individual. That this is not a satisfactory explanation is clear; therefore critics who are less opposed to alterations of the traditional text either transfer it to some other position in which it seems to read more plausibly (*e.g.*, after xiv. 2, line 1, or after xiv. 2, line 2, or after xiv. 3) or transfer xiv. 5, line 2 (R.V.), so as to stand between xiii. 27 and 28, an unnatural expedient, which produces a poor result, and for which I must refer to Duhm. Budde, however, prefers to suppose that xiii. 28 is an interpolation due to a later writer who had but a limited mastery of Hebrew style. Budde's characterization of the style of xiii. 28 as poor is certainly justified. Not only the pronoun is a stumblingblock, but the use of כְּרָקָב, which Dillmann and others quite unwarrantably render (like A.V. and R.V.), "that which is eaten by worms," whereas elsewhere כְּרָקָב means "rotteness," and is specially used as a synonymous parallel to עֵשׂ, "the moth." Abraham Geiger long ago pointed out another and a more plausible escape from the difficulty than that of Dillmann, and more recently both

Prof. Beer (*Text des Buches Hiob*, p. 83) and Prof. Nestle (in Stade's *Zeitschrift*, 1900, p. 172) have suggested the same solution, viz., to take רִקֵב in Job xiv. 28 as an Aramaic loan-word meaning "skin bottle" (so LXX., Targ., Pesh., Arab., Barhebræus). The objection is (1) that there are four good Hebrew words for "skin bottle" (see *Encyclopædia Biblica*, s.v. "Bottle"), and (2) that since the parallel line contains עֶשׂ, "moth" (or, at any rate, the word for some equally destructive insect), it is most unlikely that the writer would have courted misunderstanding by seeking out an Aramaic word composed of the same letters as רִקֵב, "rotteness"; parallelism would seem to most readers to necessitate the meaning "rotteness." The only remedy, as it seems to me, is carefully to consider what errors the scribe was likely to fall into while transcribing the original words, having regard to the context. Certainly the true context is xiv. 1, 2, or, at any rate, xiv. 1, that supremely melancholy verse—

Man that is born of a woman
Is of few days and full of trouble.

But can we simply transfer xiii. 28 to a position after xiv. 1? Surely not. "And he," i.e., "And such a one," would be a very unsatisfactory substitute for "Like a flower he cometh forth." It is the descriptive style that we expect, and the figure "like a flower" seems the predestined introduction to v. 2.

Yet criticism is rigorous, and we must not waive it aside. In xiv. 2, כִּצִּיץ יֵצֵא is not quite satisfactory; we expect יֵצֵא. Prof. Beer would emend יֵצֵא into יֵצֵא. Several other words, however, are also suspicious. It is possible that צִיץ has arisen out of an accidental repetition ("ditto-graphy") of יֵצֵא in יֵצֵא or יֵצֵא. Then, too, וַיִּבְרַח, "and flees," is no proper parallel to יֵצֵא or יֵצֵא, "springs up." Lastly, the figure of the shadow belongs more properly to the

“days” of unhappy man than to man himself (see cii. 11, cxli. 4; Eccles. vi. 12, viii. 13).

Now let us turn back to xiii. 28. It sometimes happens that various forms of the same phrase, or even verse, are given side by side. Suppose xiii. 28 was originally a variant to xiv. 2. At once the probably true reading appears underneath the false. Read—

וְהוּא כְּפֶרֶחַ יִבֵּל Such an one is like a blossom that fadeth,
כְּנֶפֶן אֲכָלוּ חֲסִיל Like a vine which caterpillars have eaten.

פֶּרֶחַ for רֶקֶב, and יִבֵּל for יִבְלֶה are quite normal emendations. Then we want a parallel for פֶּרֶחַ, “blossom.” Remembering Joel i. 4, 7, 12, we correct כְּבִגְד, “like a garment,” into כְּנֶפֶן, “like a vine,” and עֵשׂ, “the moth,” into חֲסִיל, “the caterpillar” (a kind of locust is meant). Now it becomes possible to bring xiv. 2 nearer to the true reading. Read—

כְּפֶרֶחַ יֵצֵחַ וְיִמָּל Like a blossom which appeareth and fadeth,
כְּתִמָּר אֲכָלוּ חֲסִיל Like a palm tree which caterpillars have eaten.

כְּפֶרֶחַ underlies וְיִבְרַח; כְּצִיץ יֵצֵא represents יֵצֵחַ. וְיֵעֲבֹד has probably arisen out of תִּכְמֹר, *i.e.* כְּתִמָּר. וְלֹא represents אֲכָלוּ. כֶּצֶל represents חֲסִיל. That there has been well-meant editorial manipulation may be granted; this accounts for the misplacing of words, and for the ingenious misinterpretation of the passage. As it stood, the passage was presumably too corrupt to be translated; some manipulation was therefore indispensable; no blame can properly be imputed to the ancient editor of Job. The result is that xiii. 28 may be omitted, and that xiv. 2 should take the form suggested above, with a various reading in the margin, כְּנֶפֶן, “like a vine,” for כְּתִמָּר, “like a palm tree.”

II. Psalm cix. 23 :

כָּצֵל כְּנִטּוֹתַי נִהְלַכְתִּי
גִּנְעִיתִי בְּאַרְבֶּה

A.V. and R.V. I am gone like the shadow when it declineth; I am tossed up and down like the locust (cf. Tristram, *Natural History of the Bible*, p. 315).

The passage is full of difficulties. נהלכתי, "I am made to go," a most improbable word; הלך in the Nif'al occurs nowhere else. Not less improbable is the parallel word ננערתי, which most render "I am shaken off" (so Driver in the *Parallel Psalter*). To this we may add that there is no parallelism between a shadow and the locust, and that elsewhere (as we have seen) it is not man, but his "days," that are likened to a shadow. The remedy is plain. כַּחֲסִיל should be כַּחֲסִיל, "like caterpillars"; a very similar corruption is noticed above in Job. כְּנִשְׁתֵּי should be בְּנִדְרוֹת, "on the fences." The locusts collect, in cold weather, on fences, as Nahum (iii. 17) tells us. For נהלכתי read, of course, נִלְקַחְתִּי, "I am taken away." For ננערתי read נֶאֱגַדְתִּי, "I am gathered (for removal)." Render therefore—

Like caterpillars on the fences I am taken away,
I am gathered (for removal) like locusts.

The speaker is no mere individual, but the suffering community of Jewish believers after the Exile.

III. Ecclesiasticus xiv. 15; Psalm xlix. 11 (E.V. 10).

Dr. Schechter and others have rightly commented on the extreme imitateness of Ben Sira, as exhibited in the fragments of the Hebrew text of Ecclesiasticus. One of the passages of the Psalter on which Ben Sira occasionally bases his own work is Ecclesiasticus xiv. 15, which runs in the Hebrew text, as at present known to us (*Wisdom of Ben Sira*, edited by Prof. Schechter and Dr. Charles Taylor, p. 9),—

הלא לאחר תשוב חילך Shalt thou not leave thy riches to another,
ויגיעך ליודי גורל And thy labour to them that cast lots?

The original passage (part of Ps. xlix. 11) is thus given in the Received Text and Revised Version,—

יחד כסיל ובער יאבדו The fool and the brutish together perish,
ועובו לאחרים חילם And leave their wealth to others.

The passage in Sirach comprises the idea, which a careful study of the psalm seems to me to suggest, that the reference in the psalm to the wise and the foolish as sharing the same fate is due to corruption of the text, and having found that חסיל (a kind of locust) has to be restored in the text of Job xiii. 28, Ps. cix. 23, it is natural to suspect that כסיל may be a corruption of חסיל, and that אחרים in the parallel line, אחר in the first, and יורי גורל in the second, of the parallel lines of Ecclesiasticus xiv. 28 come from words descriptive of some other kind of locust. I would therefore propose to restore the two passages (Ecclus. and Ps.) in this way,—

חל לארבה תשוב חילך	Shalt thou not leave thy riches to the swarming locust?
ויניעך יאכל הרגול	And thy labour the leaping locust shall eat.
ישך חסיל צבוריו	The caterpillar gnaws his treasures,
ועשוב לארבה חילו	And he leaves his riches to the swarming locust.

I am afraid I must add that another familiar passage (Ps. xlix. 14), supposed to contain a reference to the triumphing of the righteous over the wicked on the morning of the great day of the Lord (or on the morning after the long night of trouble), really, in all probability, does but reiterate the statement that the “treasures” (R.V., “heaps”) of the wicked rich man pass into the possession of the locust (לרבך for לארבה). If this should turn out to be right—and if sound methods of criticism and exegesis be applied, it is not difficult to form an opinion on such a point—we shall not be at all the losers, for to see what a psalmist really meant is surely an adequate compensation for the shock occasioned by the discovery that our old interpretation was wrong. I venture to add that I have further evidence for the explanation of this “Biblical Difficulty,” but fear to encroach too much on the editor’s space. I hope to give it in my new work on the Psalms.

IV. Ecclesiasticus xliii. 20.

צִינַת רוּחַ צָפוֹן יִשִּׁיב The cold of the north wind he causeth to blow,
 וְכִרְקֵב יִקְפִּיא מְקוּרוֹ And congealeth his spring (*marg.*, the pond) like
 rottenness (?).

The Oxford editors naturally show some hesitation in rendering "like rottenness," which is not at all appropriate. Several attempts have been made to correct the text of the second line, but not quite satisfactorily. Dr. C. Taylor, after recording these attempts (*Jewish Quarterly Review*, April, 1898, pp. 471 f.), expresses the opinion that כִּרְקֵב means the same thing here as in Job xiii. 28, and seems half inclined to adopt the explanation considered above, and substitute "skin bottle" (ἀσκός) for "rottenness." "Ice or water being compared in the next line to a breast-plate, it was suggested that in verse 20 it is compared to the skin of a leather bottle" (*Wisdom of Ben Sira*, p. lxiv). I confess, I do not see any parallelism between Job xiii. 28 and Ecclesiasticus xliii. 20, nor do I think a lover of Biblical Hebrew would have gone out of his way to find an Aramaic word for "skin bottle." There must surely be corruption, but the corrupt word is here, as so often, not the word which critics think of in the first instance. In accordance with numerous analogies, I venture to restore the second line thus, וּבִרְכַּת יִקְפִּיא מְקוּרוֹ, "and he congeals ponds by his cold." T. K. CHEYNE.

TRUTH IN JESUS: THE REVELATION OF CHRIST
 AND THE EXAMPLE OF CHRIST.

A STUDY IN THE EPISTLE TO THE EPHESIANS.

"Τμεῖς δὲ οὐχ οὕτως ἐμάθετε τὸν Χριστόν· εἶγε αὐτὸν ἠκούσατε καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐδιδάχθητε, καθὼς ἐστὶν ἀλήθεια ἐν τῷ Ἰησοῦ."—*Eph.* iv. 20, 21.

IN arguing against a relapse into pagan immorality, St. Paul definitely reminds his readers of what they had been taught in the synagogues of Asia, and more especially, perhaps, in

the lecture room of Tyrannus (Acts xix. 9). And in particular he is showing that that teaching is inconsistent with the former profligacy, which as Christians they have abandoned. The special and central phrase in this passage, "truth in Jesus," is used as a kind of touchstone to serve as test and standard in conduct and belief. And although the expression is found here only in the New Testament, it may well be understood as underlying the whole argument of the Epistle, and indeed may be thought to summarize and recall the entire range of the Apostle's teaching in Asia. There is a brevity and lack of explanation about the phrase which seem to suggest its use as a formula familiar to his disciples.

In the immediately preceding context (vv. 18 and 19) the Apostle notes the cause and source of the sensual indulgence (*ἀσέλγεια*) and impurity (*ἀκαθαρσία*) into which the pagan life had sunk. He traces the awful corruption to an intellectual rather than to a moral source. "The Gentiles," he says, "are walking in the vanity of their mind, having been darkened in their intellect (*διανοία*), alienated from the life of God, because of the ignorance that is in them (*διὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν τὴν οὖσαν ἐν αὐτοῖς*), because of the hardening process (*πώρωσιν*) going on in their hearts, who being past feeling gave themselves up to sensuality with a view to (*εἰς*) working all uncleanness with greediness." Then turning to his converts, the Apostle says emphatically, "But *you*"—no longer pagan—did not so learn the Christ, *i.e.* learn what the Christ is in nature, office, life and revelation, "if indeed ye heard Him and were taught in Him"—the Christ being the central point (*ἐν αὐτῷ*) of instruction—"even as truth is in Jesus."

The words which follow sum up briefly the substance of the instruction in Christ referred to: "that ye put off once for all (*ἀποθέσθαι*), according to the former manner of life, the old man, who is being gradually destroyed in the way

of the lusts of deceit, but be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on once for all (*ἐνδύσασθαι*) the new man, who was created according to God in righteousness and holiness of the truth."

The passage as a whole may be regarded as St. Paul's summary of Christian education on the basis of "truth as it is in Jesus"; and the most noticeable point in this summary is the stress laid by the Apostle on the perfecting and sanctification of the intellect. The ultimate cause of corruption lay in the vanity of mind, the darkness of the intellect and inherent ignorance, and the alienation from the life of God. We have the same teaching in Romans i. 21-23, where the expressions are almost verbally identical. There was indeed a recognition of God (*γινόντες τὸν θεόν*) but they were stultified in their reasonings (*ἐματαιώθησαν ἐν τοῖς διαλογισμοῖς αὐτῶν*), and their senseless or unintelligent heart was darkened (*ἐσκοτίσθη ἡ ἀσύνετος αὐτῶν καρδιά*). In 2 Corinthians iv. 4, the god of this world is described as blinding the thoughts of the unbelieving (*ἐτύφλωσεν τὰ νοήματα τῶν ἀπίστων*). In chap. v. 15 of this Epistle the expression *ἀκριβῶς περιπατεῖν* implies a kind of scientific precision in the Christian life.

This conception of intellectual blindness helps us to understand the words which we are chiefly considering. If intellectual aberration and estrangement from the life of God has been the cause of corruption and consequent misery, the return to the higher life must be through an apprehension of absolute truth, *i.e.* truth as exemplified in the Person of Jesus, and a resumption of the image of God obscured or lost by sin. The expression *μαθεῖν τὸν Χριστόν*, to learn the Christ or the Messiah, has no exact parallel in the New Testament; it is, however, sufficiently illustrated by the words of Euripides cited by Cremer, *ᾧ ψ' ἐμάθεθ' ἡμᾶς ὅτε δ' ἐχρῆν οὐκ ᾔδετε* (Eur. Bacch. 1345). And light may be thrown upon it by such expressions as

τοῦ γινῶναι αὐτόν (Phil. iii. 10), κηρύσσειν τὸν Χριστόν, and the proverbial phrase γινῶθι σεαυτόν. It is further explained and expounded by the words which follow: ἡκούσατε, . . . ἐδιδάχθητε ἐν αὐτῇ—ἡκούσατε referring to the first preaching of the Gospel and the response to it;¹ ἐδιδάχθητε to the subsequent catechetical instruction (comp. Luke i. 4).

This instruction we know St. Paul to have carried on in Ephesus first in the synagogue and afterwards for three years in the lecture-room of Tyrannus (Acts xix. 9). It must be remembered that in doing this St. Paul was following a line of teaching with which his Jewish hearers were familiar, for the character and mission of the Messiah was a frequent subject both of speculation and of preaching in the Rabbinic schools. In this sense both Jew and proselyte among St. Paul's converts had already "learnt Christ." In preaching Christ, then, St. Paul brought fresh light to an old subject. With him Messianic teaching had ceased to be theoretical or speculative. His teaching consisted in proving that "Jesus is the Christ" (Acts xvii. 3, xviii. 5; comp. v. 42, xviii. 28). And consequently henceforth to know Jesus is to know the Christ. In other words, the only interpretation of the Messiah is to be found in Jesus. St. Paul says in effect to his disciples: "If you can only grasp truth as exhibited, illustrated and taught by the life, acts and words of Jesus, you will know the truth about the expected Messiah of the Jews."

The word *καθώς*, "even as," "in accordance with," denotes a rule or principle of teaching and interpretation: "truth in Jesus,"² then, is the rule and principle of all Christian education.

¹ *ἀκούειν* is not merely to hear, but to hear and understand. For instance, when Jesus says *ἀκούσατε τὴν παραβολὴν τοῦ σπείροντος* (Matt. xiii. 18) the meaning is "learn or apprehend the interpretation of the parable."

² The expression "in Jesus" finds a parallel in Acts iv. 2, where the Apostles are said to have proclaimed or preached the Resurrection in Jesus, i.e. proved the fact and possibility of resurrection by adducing the fact of the Resurrection of Jesus. So here "truth in Jesus" is truth as set forth in His person and doctrine.

We may here note that the rendering of the A.V., *the* truth, as if it meant the truth of the Gospel, both narrows and obscures the meaning of this profound and important phrase. *Ἀλήθεια*, used without the definite article, signifies truth in its abstract and general sense, and includes every aspect of truth, both in regard to intellectual and spiritual verities and to righteousness of life and conduct. On the one hand "truth in Jesus" is a revelation of the nature and pre-existence of the Christ, of the relation of the finite to the infinite in Him, that is, of the secret of humanity in relation to the Divine; and, on the other hand, it is the example of Jesus which is the criterion of Christian morality and teaching.

The expression "alienated from the life of God" is of great importance in the interpretation of the whole passage, and especially in regard to the phrase we are considering. The indwelling life of God is, as the Apostle teaches us, the secret of all morality and holiness. But righteousness and holiness belong to and are part of that truth which teaches the true relation of God to man (*κτισθέντα ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ὁσιότητι τῆς ἀληθείας*, Eph. iv. 24). If, then, ignorance and alienation from the life of God are the sources of corruption, instruction in Christ on the lines of truth as manifested in Jesus, and a recognition of the indwelling Christ, are the correction and remedy for pagan error.

Thus regarded, "truth in Jesus," proved to be the Christ, has an infinite range. It touches every part of human life and intelligence, and purifies and illuminates all that it touches. It is the underlying and connecting thought of the whole of this Epistle to the Ephesians.

1. First "truth in Jesus" is a *revelation*. It is a revelation of the nature and existence of Christ, and of the true relation between the finite and infinite. The profound statement in chap. i. 4 of this Epistle lies at the root of all

Christian morality and teaching: "Even as he chose (ἐξελέξατο) us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blemish before him in love: having preordained (προορίσας) us unto adoption as sons through Christ unto himself." This mystic union between God and man, then, is a truth known primarily by revelation; but it is a truth to which there is a response in the human consciousness. Prof. Caird has shown¹ that not only does the human sense of limitation prove the existence of the Divine element within us, but that it is to the conscious falling short of an infinite standard that the pain of ignorance and error is due. It is the sense of

"A presence that disturbs us with the joy
Of elevated thoughts" (Wordsworth).

And when Shakespeare speaks of man as "infinite in faculties, and in apprehension like a god," he expresses the same consciousness of the Divine indwelling, and of the truth revealed in Jesus.

2. *Truth as perfection or completeness of humanity.* This aspect of the "truth in Jesus" follows as a necessary consequence the revelation of the true nature of man. Perfection of humanity is found in Jesus Christ alone. He alone is perfect man. But the believer is described as a divine creation (ποίημα, chap. ii. 10), fashioned in Christ Jesus, and therefore faultlessly perfect in intention and aim. True human education is continually tending towards this completeness: εἰς ἄνδρα τέλειον, εἰς μέτρον ἡλικίας τοῦ πληρώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ, iv. 13. As Christ is the perfect revelation of the Father, and the perfect pattern of life, as He is "He that is true" (Rev. iii. 14, ἀληθινός more than ἀλήθης), so in Him the believer can be "perfect even as the Father in heaven is perfect." And at every step and stage in this progress to perfection the apostolic formula of "truth in Jesus" is the test and standard of advance.

¹ *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, i. 181.

No act of Jesus Christ as Son of Man was self-centred. Each had reference to the whole of humanity, and was therefore, in the Aristotelian sense, not only good and wise, but in a profound sense true, as expressive of human nature in its perfect operation.¹ Here then also "truth in Jesus" is the test and model of all true and beautiful action. When Jesus calls a simple act of devotion *καλόν*, He recognises in it that which is not individual but catholic. It was good and true to that higher spiritual nature of man which makes the whole world kin; therefore, "Wheresoever the gospel shall be preached throughout the whole world, that also which this woman hath done shall be spoken of for a memorial of her" (Mark xiv. 9).

3. *Truth as harmony and right adjustment of parts.* But if "truth in Jesus" signifies exact conformity with the highest conception of human nature as revealed in Christ Jesus, it also implies harmony and co-operation in the working of the several parts of our nature as a whole—spirit, will, intellect, all energies of mind and body—working together in perfect harmony and in due relation to one another.

Transferred to the mystical body of Christ, of which all believers are members, the thought of perfect harmony and co-operation of the members for a common end is used to explain and enforce the need of unity in the Christian Church. Disunion is another word for hostility, and union is another word for peace. But the effect of the Incarnation was essentially to make peace. In a profound sense, Christ is our peace. Hostility or disunion was slain through His Cross (ii. 16), on which Jew and Gentile were made one in Christ. Then variety of function is no more a violation of Christian unity than variety of function in the members of the body impairs its unity. On the contrary, such variety is essential to the highest conception of unity,

¹ See Muirhead, *Chapters from Aristotle's Ethics*, p. 206.

as St. Paul explains in vv. 15 and 16 of chap. iv. Where the close connexion between truth and harmony of co-operation is brought out in the phrase ἀληθεύοντες ἐν ἀγάπῃ, that is not only "speaking the truth" (although that is included), but doing the truth, bringing to pass that completeness of harmony and adjustment in operation which is essential to every perfect organization and to all spiritual and physical healthfulness.

4. *Truth as correspondence of belief with reality.* Closely linked with oneness, or truth of co-operation, is oneness or truth in belief, exact correspondence between that which exists and that which is thought to exist. Here the relation between truth and faith is close. Truth holds what faith sees. St. Paul shows that the object and result of diversity in ministry is the achievement of unity of faith, and full knowledge (ἐπίγνωσις) of the Son of God. The full-grown and perfect man, who has reached the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ (iv. 13), is no longer like a child swayed and carried about with every wind of doctrine (ii. 14). Here "truth in Jesus" is truth in the faithful witness (Rev. iii. 14), who testifies that which he has seen with the Father (John viii. 38).

5. *Truth as correspondence of word with fact, truth in statement.* This is the truth which sweeps away the discrepancies between fact and speech which even the heathen poet laments:

φεῖν· φεῖν· τὸ μὴ τὰ πράγματ' ἀνθρώποις ἔχειν
φωνὴν ἢ ἦσαν μηδὲν οἱ δεινοὶ λόγοι.

—*Eur. Hip.*, fr. ix. 2. 2.

"Alas, that things done have not a voice for men in order that fine words might have counted for nothing."

As in the last section "truth in Jesus" signifies the truth of the testimony as to things invisible and eternal, "seen with the Father," so here "truth in Jesus" is truth

resting on the testimony as to earthly things of Him who is Himself the truth, who is "the faithful witness," possessing absolute knowledge and absolute veracity, never swerving one hair's breadth from that "golden and narrow line" of truth which, as Ruskin taught, "the very powers and virtues which lean upon it bend" (*The Seven Lamps of Architecture*, chap. ii.). St. Paul shows that righteousness and holiness (iv. 24), which belong to the truth, necessarily repudiate falsehood, which is inconsistent both with the character of God and with the oneness of the members of Christ.

6. *Truth in achievement of aim.* Another sense of truth is correspondence between achievement and aim, and between the purpose for which an instrument is intended and the use made of that instrument. In Christ Jesus there was perfect achievement of purpose, and in all His acts and in the working of all His powers there was precise adaptation to the end designed. It is this depth of meaning which we may read into the last mysterious word of the Christ—*τετέλεσται*. The work hath been accomplished at the predestined moment of time (*εἰς οἰκονομίαν τοῦ πληρώματος τῶν καιρῶν*, chap. i. 10), and by the means purposed before the foundation of the world (*πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου*, chap. i. 4). Therefore it is inferred that the sanctified members of the mystical body of Christ will here also recognise "truth in Jesus," and as exact and scrupulous imitators of Him will use and regulate all their faculties of mind and will and passion in accordance with their natural and intended purpose and not in the service of sin and profligacy (compare Rom. vi. 13), or of untruth.

7. *Truth in education and in controversy.* St. Paul has shown in this Epistle to the Ephesians how penetrating is this principle of truth in Jesus. It was the criterion of the Apostles' teaching in the School of Tyrannus and elsewhere. And it is the foundation on which must rest all Christian

teaching on history, art, the nature of man, religion and ethics. It is the principle which should rule all controversy, and especially religious controversy. Truth in Jesus is, as we have seen, partly a revelation, partly an example. But it is a revelation within limits (Matt. xxi. 36). All controversy, therefore, should pause on the threshold of the unrevealed, and be content to wait. And if we remember that the chief root of controversial bitterness is dogmatism on the unknown and mysterious, it follows that "truth in Jesus," regarded as a limitation of human knowledge, ought to be a message of peace. ARTHUR CARR.

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

II.

THE TEACHING OF CHRIST.

IN a former paper we found abundant proof that Plato taught retribution beyond the grave, blessing for the righteous and terrible suffering for the wicked; and that he supported this teaching by endeavouring to prove that the soul of man is in its very nature indestructible, that it will never finally cease to think and feel. We found also decisive evidence that, long before the time of Plato, the ancient Egyptians lived in hope of endless life beyond the grave for the righteous and religious, and expected apparently extinction for the wicked. We found proof that during the three centuries before Christ the godly Jews looked forward to "eternal life," and warned the wicked of punishment awaiting them beyond death. A Jewish contemporary of Christ, a student of Plato, accepts the teaching of this last about the immortality of the soul: and Josephus, a later contemporary of Paul, says that the same teaching was held by the Pharisees and Essenes of his own day.

Retribution beyond the grave is implied clearly in the

teaching of John the Baptist recorded in Matthew iii. 10-12. For the reward and punishment there described can have no place in the present life. The same is implied in the teaching of Christ in the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. vii. 19-27). Earlier in the same discourse (vv. 13, 14), we read of two paths, one leading to *destruction* and the other to *life*.

In a parable recorded in Matthew xiii. 30, explained in vv. 39-43, Christ declares that at the completion of the age, at His bidding, the wicked will be cast into "the furnace of fire," where "shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth," and that then "the righteous will shine as the sun in the kingdom of their Father." On this teaching, emphasis is laid by its repetition in vv. 48-50. Similar teaching, at an important turning-point in the life of Christ, is found in chap. xvi. 27: "The Son of Man will come in the glory of His Father with His angels: and then He will give back to each according to his action." A vision of judgment is given in chap. xxv. 31-46, where "all the nations" are gathered before Christ sitting on a throne of glory, and receive their award from His lips. He receives "the righteous into eternal life," and dismisses others, under a curse, "into eternal punishment." The above teaching is confirmed by other passages in the First Gospel, and by parallels in the Second and Third Gospels.

In John iii. 16 we meet with the alternative, "may not perish but may have eternal life." In chap. v. 28, 29, Christ announces that at a definite "hour" He will summon all the dead to a resurrection of life or of judgment.

In Acts xvii. 31, Paul is reported to have said at Athens that God has fixed a day on which He will judge the world by a Man whom He has marked out for that honour by raising Him from the dead. Before Felix, as we read in chap. xxiv. 25, Paul reasoned about "the coming judgment."

These scanty references in addresses of Paul are abun-

dantly confirmed by his Epistles. In Romans ii. 6-12 we read that God "will give back to each according to his works," in close accord with Matthew xvi. 27; including glory, honour, peace, and eternal life for the righteous, and for the wicked anger and fury, affliction and helplessness, and destruction. So chap. xiv. 10: "We all shall stand at the judgment-seat of God." Exact retribution is conspicuously announced in 2 Corinthians v. 10: "All of us must needs be made manifest before the judgment-seat of Christ, in order that each may obtain the things done through his body, whether good or bad." It is announced with equal definiteness and solemnity in Galatians vi. 7, 8: "Be not deceived; God is not mocked. For whatever a man sow, this he will also reap. Because he that sows for his own flesh shall, from the flesh, reap corruption. But he that sows for the Spirit shall, from the Spirit, reap eternal life." In Philippians iii. 19, we read of some "whose end is destruction." This can only mean destruction beyond the grave: for destruction of the body by death is the lot of all men, good and bad. In 2 Thessalonians viii. 9, we read of Christ "giving just punishment to them that know not God and obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus, who shall pay penalty, even eternal destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of His strength." On the other hand, in 2 Timothy iv. 7, 8, at the close of his life the Apostle writes, "I have fought the good fight, I have finished the course, I have kept the faith. Henceforth there is laid up for me the crown of righteousness which the Lord, the righteous Judge, will give me in that day; and not to me only, but to all them that have loved His appearing."

The above passages refer evidently to a retribution beyond the grave; and, with others similar, they leave no room to doubt that this was an important element in the teaching of Paul.

In 1 Peter v. 4, we read of the unfading crown of glory awaiting faithful shepherds of the flock of Christ.

A more tremendous vision of judgment is found in Revelation xx. 11-15: "I saw a great white throne, and Him that sat upon it, from whose face fled the earth and the heaven, and place was not found for them. And I saw the dead, the great and the small, standing before the throne: and books were opened; and another book was opened, which is the Book of Life. And the dead were judged from the things written in the books, according to their works. And the sea gave up the dead in it: and death and Hades gave up the dead in them. And they were judged, each according to their works. And death and Hades were cast into the lake of fire. This is the second death, the lake of fire. And if any was not found written in the Book of Life, he was cast into the lake of fire."

The above quotations, which represent teaching running through the entire New Testament, are complete documentary evidence that retribution beyond death for all actions done on earth was an important and conspicuous element of the teaching of Christ and His Apostles.

The reward awaiting the righteous is in Matthew xix. 16, 29 and its parallels, in chap. xxv. 46, Luke x. 25, seventeen times in the Fourth Gospel, eleven times in the addresses and letters of Paul, and six times in the First Epistle of John, described by the term *eternal life*. The word *eternal*, αἰώνιος, from αἰών, an *age* or lifetime, may be literally rendered *agelasting*. In Proverbs xxii. 28, xxiii. 10, "Remove not eternal landmarks which thy fathers set," it describes a boundary which has stood for ages. Similarly Psalm lxxvii. 5, where "*eternal* years" are parallel to "ancient days." But much more frequently it refers to the future. The ordinances of the Levitical ritual are very frequently—*e.g.* Exodus xii. 14, 17, 24, Leviticus xxiii. 14, 21, 31, 41—described as eternal statutes, νόμιμον αἰώνιον.

Similarly, in Genesis xvii. 8, xlviii. 4, Canaan is promised to the seed of Abraham "for an eternal possession." This use in the Septuagint, where the word is found some one hundred and fifty times, must have influenced the meaning attached to it by the writers and early readers of the New Testament, who frequently quote the Septuagint. It forbids us to interpret the word *eternal* in the New Testament as in itself equivalent to *endless*. For no Christian will claim endless permanence for the Levitical ordinances. But this use of the word casts no shadow of doubt on the absolute endlessness of the life promised by Christ to His faithful servants. For this rests on grounds independent of the word before us. For, as we read in John iii. 16, God gave His Son in order that they may not perish: and cessation of the life promised to them would be perdition. In Luke i. 33 we read that of the Kingdom of Christ "there will be no end": and of that Kingdom they are citizens. The inheritance awaiting them is, in 1 Peter i. 4, said to be incorruptible and unfading. So is the crown of glory: chap. v. 4. But cessation of blessedness would be both decay and corruption. That the life promised by Christ to those who put faith in Him and obey Him is absolutely endless, is still further removed from all possibility of doubt by the immortal life of Christ Himself, which His human brethren will share: see John xiv. 19, Romans viii. 17, 35-39, Revelation iii. 21.

This "promise of life in Christ Jesus" and the hope of endless blessedness thereby evoked in us rest securely on the word of Christ confirmed by Him who gave His only begotten Son in order that every one who believes in Him may not perish but may have eternal life, and raised Him from the dead, so that our faith and hope may be in God (1 Pet. i. 21). For no historic fact is more certain than that Jesus of Nazareth promised to all who put faith in Him a new life of devotion to God on earth, and endless blessedness beyond the grave.

In awful contrast to this blessed *life* stands, throughout the New Testament, the *destruction* of the wicked : ὅλεθρος, ἀπώλεια, ἀπόλλυμι. These words are found in the New Testament in this technical theological sense more than thirty times. They are rendered in the R.V. *destruction* and *destroy*, *perdition* and *perish*, *lose* and *lost*; and convey in Greek the combined significance of these English equivalents. They denote neither suffering nor extinction, nor do they exclude these ideas, but simply *ruin*, the loss of all that gives worth to existence, whether the ruined object ceases to be or continues in a worthless mode of existence. These words, and their cognates and equivalents, are frequently used by Plato to denote the extinction of the soul. But, while thus using them, he puts his meaning beyond doubt by careful circumlocution: see my former paper, p. 50. On the other hand, they are frequently used in Greek literature in cases in which there is no thought of extinction, but only of utter ruin. So Luke xv. 6, 9, 32, where the *lost* was afterwards found : ἀπολωλὼς καὶ εὗρέθη.

In addition to this loss of endless blessedness, we find in the teaching of Christ recorded in the Synoptist Gospels and in the Book of Revelation pictures of actual and acute suffering; e.g., Matthew viii. 12, xiii. 42, 50, xxii. 13, xxiv. 51; Luke xvi. 23-25.

It is worthy of note that by Christ and the Apostles this promise of blessing and this threatening of punishment are never directly or indirectly supported, as the hope of reward after death is conspicuously supported in the writings of Plato, by any doctrine of the essential and endless permanence of the human soul. Both phraseology and thought of Plato are altogether absent from the New Testament. The word *immortality* is found there only in 1 Corinthians xv. 53, 54, in reference not to the soul but to the body, which though mortal must put on immortality; and in 1 Timothy vi. 16, as an attribute of God. An equiva-

lent term, *incorruptibility* (*ἀφθαρσία*), or absence of decay, is found in reference to the body in 1 Corinthians xv. 42, 50, 53, 54; and in other references in Romans ii. 7, Ephesians vi. 24, 2 Timothy i. 10. The cognate adjective is used as an attribute of God in Romans i. 23, 1 Timothy i. 17; as a description of the reward of the righteous in 1 Corinthians ix. 25, 1 Peter i. 4; of their risen bodies in 1 Corinthians xv. 52; and in other references in 1 Peter i. 23, iii. 4. The infinite value of the soul is recognised by Christ in Matthew xvi. 26. But the New Testament never asserts or implies its essential and endless permanence; or, in other words, that, in virtue of its own nature or by the will of God, every human soul will think and feel for an endless succession of ages.

The above denial will find presumptive support in a later paper, where I shall refer to the absence of any direct appeal to the Bible in various modern theological works which maintain the immortality of the soul.

It is worthy of note that whereas, as we saw on p. 53 of my first paper, Plato taught that the soul of man is immortal (*ἀνώλεθρον*) and imperishable, Christ asserts or implies the possibility of its destruction. So Matthew x. 28: "Fear Him that is able to *destroy* both body and soul" (*ψυχὴν ἀπολέσαι*). Similarly chap. xvi. 25: "Whoever desires to save his soul will *lose* it" (*ἀπολέσει αὐτήν*). The word destruction, used frequently in the New Testament to describe the doom of the wicked, is quite alien to the thought and phrase of Plato. In this respect, modern popular Christian eschatology is much nearer to Plato than to Christ. On the other hand, Christ's promise of life eternal for the righteous and His threatening of destruction for the wicked were anticipated in a remarkable way, as we saw on pp. 55-58 of my last paper, in the teaching of the ancient Egyptians.

It has been suggested that the endless permanence of

all human souls, even of the wicked, about whom alone there can be any question, may be inferred from the descriptions, in the Synoptist Gospels and the Book of Revelation, of the actual torment of the lost, implying continued existence, without any suggestion that their sufferings will ever cease. This inference would be legitimate if the endless suffering of the lost were taught clearly and without contradiction by the various writers of the New Testament. But, in this case, the immortality of the soul, as an inference from the endless suffering of the lost, could not be appealed to, as has frequently been done, in support of this latter doctrine. Otherwise, we should be arguing in a circle. But, as I shall show in a later paper, the doctrine of the endless suffering of the lost is supported by at most some six or seven passages of Holy Scripture, and these by no means decisive; and against these must be set a still larger number of passages quite as definite which seem to assert or imply the ultimate extinction of sinners or of evil. This doctrine also lies open to most tremendous, and to many minds insuperable, moral objection. A doctrine itself resting on a foundation so unsafe cannot be made a safe foundation for another doctrine so important as the immortality of the soul.

On the other hand, since in the New Testament life beyond the grave is reserved for the righteous, and the wicked are said to be destroyed, it has been inferred that the punishment of the wicked will be ultimate extinction. This inference also is unsafe. For the life referred to is much more than existence. It is the normal and blessed state of a rational creature of God. And the loss of this life may be fitly described as destruction, even though the ruined ones continue to exist: for it is the loss of all that gives worth to existence.

We have now seen that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, *i.e.* the essential and endless permanence of

all human souls, so prominent in the teaching of Plato, has no place in the teaching of Christ and His Apostles. The difference is significant. In the absence of an historic revelation, Plato appealed, in proof of a retribution beyond the grave—a most important element in morality and religion—to the spiritual nature of the soul. But Christ claimed to be a Teacher sent from God to announce eternal life for all who put faith in Him. And, in support of His claim and of His gospel of life eternal, His followers appealed to His resurrection from the dead. To appeal now to the immortality of the soul in support of the Christian hope, is to illumine the light of the gospel with the dim torch of Greek philosophy.

JOSEPH AGAR BEET.

THE ENMITY IN HIS FLESH.

EPHESIANS ii. 14, 15.

THE three parallel clauses of the passage quoted naturally arrange themselves thus:—

- | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---------------|--|
| (α) τὸ μεσότοιχον τοῦ φραγμοῦ | λύσας. | |
| (β) τὴν ἔχθραν ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ αὐτοῦ | } καταργήσας. | |
| (γ) τὸν νόμον τῶν ἐντολῶν ἐν δόγμασιν | | |

“For He is our Peace, He who made Jew and Gentile one and destroyed the middle wall of the barrier, having rendered inoperative the enmity in His Flesh the law of the (Mosaic) commandments contained in decrees.”

(α) is connected by *καὶ* with the main idea of the passage *ὁ ποιήσας τὰ ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἕν*, but probably by way of explanation of it: all three clauses, in fact, enforce the main idea by expressing its obverse side. The New Covenant (Heb. viii. 13) of the Lord made the Mosaic and National Covenant an anachronism. The union of Jew and Gentile in Christ involved the repeal of the Law which fenced about God's chosen people.

The three phrases τὸ μεσότοιχον τοῦ φραγμοῦ,
τὴν ἔχθραν ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ αὐτοῦ,
τὸν νόμον τῶν ἐντολῶν ἐν δόγμασι,

accordingly form a series of increasing emphasis: the defining genitive of (*α*) is succeeded by the equivalent variation, ἐν with dative, of (*β*), and (*γ*) combines the two, to mark the climax.

If this arrangement is not accepted, if (*β*) and (*γ*) only are taken as parallel—(*α*) being joined with the preceding words or amalgamated with (*β*)—we have the alternative rendering, “having annulled the enmity in (or ‘by’) His Flesh, the law of the commandments in (or ‘by’) His decrees”; and this construction has the support of the early Greek Fathers. Thus Origen explains: The “middle wall” is the separation between man and God arising from sin and disobedience to the Law, which was intended to be a *φραγμός* or fence to guard the Elect Race: ¹ this perversion of the Law (cf. Rom. vii. 7 ff.) results in the enmity between man and God, which is dissolved by the Incarnation (διὰ τοῦ ἐνηθρωπηκεῖναι τὸν Σωτῆρα ἡμῶν). In order to explain ἐν δόγμασι as the instrument, like ἐν τῇ σαρκί, Origen has recourse to the Ideal Heavenly Law, of which the Mosaic Law is but a copy (cf. Heb. ix. 1 with ix. 11, and especially ix. 23 f.): to the copy belong the “commandments,” to the heavenly original “the decrees”; and the law of the commandments is annulled by the manifestation of the δόγματα which underlie its own commandments, *i.e.* the philosophic principles on which they were based.

Chrysostom notes that the text involves a sharp distinction between δόγματα and ἐντολαί, and explains δόγματα either as the dogmas of the faith or as the commands of Christ (παραγγελία) to His disciples, contained in the Sermon on the Mount and elsewhere.

¹ Cf. Eccles. xxxvi. 30: οὐδ' οὐκ ἔστι φραγμός διαρπαγῆσεται κτήμα.

So Severian, ἐν δόγμασι τοῖς ἰδίοις καταργήσας, ὧν ἔστιν· οὐ τὰ εἰσπορευόμενα κοινοῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον.

The construction ἐν with dative = instrumental is Hebraistic;¹ but the great objection to this interpretation is based on the meaning of δόγμα in St. Paul. In the New Testament we find δόγμα παρὰ καίσαρος (Luke ii. 1), τὰ δόγματα τῶν ἀποστόλων: and this use was early extended to the words of our Lord (Ign. ad Magn. 13. 1, τοῖς δόγμασιν τοῦ κυρίου κ. τῶν ἀποστόλων; cf. Ep. Barn., ad init.). The implied metaphor of an imperial or authoritative decree suited well the words of Him who spake ὡς ἐξουσίαν ἔχων: and so the word acquired a definite connotation as the Lord's sayings were regarded more and more as the Law of the Church (cf. St. Paul's phrase, ἐπιταγή, ἐντολή τοῦ κυρίου).

But in Philo and the Apocrypha δόγμα had already a special sense, "the requirements of the Jewish law" (cf. 3 Macc. i. 3. Δωσίθεος, τὸ γένος Ἰουδαῖος ὕστερον δὲ μεταβαλὼν τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τῶν πατρίων δογμάτων ἀπηλλοτριωμένος: Philo Alleg. Legg. i. § 16, διατήρησις τῶν ἀγίων δογμάτων: and the New Testament use of ὁ νόμος and even νόμος): and St. Paul's use of the word seems to reflect the special rather than the general sense of "decree" (cf. the parallel passage Col. ii. 14: τὸ καθ' ἡμῶν χειρόγραφον τοῖς δόγμασιν). And if this be so, it was inevitable that the word should have a depreciatory meaning in his writings (cf. δογματίζεσθε, Col. ii. 20). Even the general usage must have been repugnant to one with his high ideal of Christianity as the life of spiritual freedom, the life of Christ within the Christian. But the common view of Christianity as a law of life, new indeed and spiritual, but still a law, established the word as a technical term in the Christian vocabulary, and that fact determined the exposition of the Greek Fathers. They treat their text as a modern English reader often treats the Authorized Version, as if it were a contemporary writing, as if the writers of the New Testa-

¹ Cf. Blass, *Grammar of N.T. Greek*, pp. 116 f.

ment were the heirs and not the creators of the Christian vocabulary. And this was natural enough, for their aim was practical—not exegesis, but edification; historical and homiletical expositions were not yet distinguished; they wrote and taught to satisfy the present needs of their hearers, not to ascertain the strict meaning of the writer.¹

If, then, Pauline usage, and not that of the sub-Apostolic Fathers, is to decide, we must reject this second view—at any rate, so far as *ἐν δόγμασιν* is concerned.

The third view, which seems to be supported by the consensus of modern editors, renders (γ) “the law of commandments expressed in decrees” (Abbott), but follows Origen with regard to (β), on the ground that *τὴν ἑχθραν τὴν ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ αὐτοῦ* would otherwise be required (Abbott). But the objection, though perhaps decisive for the interpretation of an Attic writer, is hardly so for St. Paul (cf. *e.g.* Gal. iv. 14); and, further, this view refuses to recognise the parallelism even of (β) and (γ), which probably influenced the patristic explanation of (β).

Indeed, Dr. Abbott finds no difficulty in taking (γ) as one phrase, and compares 2 Corinthians vii. 7.

If, then, we return to the first view of the passage suggested by the natural arrangement of the clauses, is there any reasonable interpretation which takes “the enmity in His Flesh” as one phrase? Dr. Abbott mentions two—humanity in general or the Jews (cf. Rom. xi. 14). Both seem far-fetched; the obvious meaning is “in the Lord’s own flesh, or mortal body”; and Galatians iv. 14 gives a clue to a third. Put side by side, the two phrases seem to be exactly parallel.

τὴν ἑχθραν ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ αὐτοῦ.

τὸν πειρασμὸν ὑμῶν ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ μου.

¹ Hence their allegorizing: every line of inspired Scripture must necessarily yield some food for the soul.

In each there is an abstract term—the enmity of the Jews and Gentiles, and the temptation of the Galatians—made definite and concrete by the same qualifying words. In Galatians, *loc. cit.*, St. Paul refers to the visible effects either of his persecutions or of his “thorn in the flesh” (cf. Gal. vi. 17 : τὰ στίγματα τοῦ Ἰησοῦ).

In Ephesians the reference is primarily to the enmity between Jew and Gentile : first, reconciliation of man to man, then reconciliation of both, of all, to God ; so in 1 John *passim*, man’s love of man is at once the preliminary condition and the visible sign of man’s love of God. What, then, was the outward token, the sacramental sign (so to speak) of this enmity ? One answer alone can be given. The great cleavage of the ancient world was at first preserved within the Christian Church, and the titles and watchwords of the two parties were “The Circumcision” and “The Uncircumcision.” Only by submission to this rite could the Gentile enter the commonwealth of Israel and so draw near to God. In that rite was summed up the enmity between Jew and Gentile. Our Lord Himself submitted to it, “fulfilling all righteousness, and so becoming a minister of circumcision” (Rom. xv. 8). He “fulfilled” this rite as He “fulfilled” the law, and the fulfilment involved the annulling of both rite and law, for both were types and prophecies. He hallowed His people through His own Blood (Heb. xiii. 12), purifying heart and conscience, making the whole man sound (cf. John vii. 22–24). The Incarnation and Passion accomplished what was impossible for the law.

Moreover, the respect with which this rite was regarded by Jews and Judaizers alike as the essential condition of acceptance with God, justifies the place which our phrase occupies. For it alone the Sabbath was broken (John, *loc. cit.*) ; and in it the whole law was involved. The great crime attributed to St. Paul was that he taught the Jews of the Dispersion to neglect it (Acts xxi. 21) : had he enforced it,

his loyalty to Judaism would have been unquestioned (Gal. v. 11; cf. v. 3).

To St. Paul ἡ περιτομή and τὸ σταυρὸν τοῦ Χριστοῦ stood over against one another as the great alternatives (Gal. vi. 11-16), summing up respectively Judaism and Christianity, the gate of the "Israel after the flesh" and the gate of the new Israel, the heavenly Jerusalem.

Turning to our passage, we find, then, a series of metaphors emphasizing the completeness of the union effected by Christ by dwelling on the strongholds which He had overthrown.

(α) The *τροφακτόν*, the pillar which marked the bounds of the Court of the Gentiles, and threatened death to any who trespassed beyond it. (Note the accusation of Acts xxi., that St. Paul had taken Trophimus *the Ephesian* into the Holy Place).

(β) The *σφραγίς* or *στίγμα* of Judaism,¹ the circumcision which stood for the law and for Jewish exclusiveness (*ἀμιξία*): cf. 2 Macc. vi. 6, Gal. v. 3.

(γ) The law itself defined with great fulness—either to bring out its grandeur (*δόξα*), or to point out its limitations (cf. added definition of Apoc. ii. 24: τὰ βαθέα τοῦ Σατανᾶ), as "letter," not "spirit"; condemning, not life-giving (2 Cor. iii. 5 ff.).

All these barriers are overthrown by the Christ, Ascended and Glorified (for the vision of the Damascus road always dominates St. Paul's thought). Τέλος νόμον Χριστὸς εἰς δικαιοσύνην παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι . . . οὐ γάρ ἐστι διαστολή.

I have found no authority for this interpretation, either ancient or modern: but the Fathers were busy with the problems of their own time. The Judaistic controversy was already ancient history, laid to rest by the life, imprisonment and death of St. Paul: and Origen thinks only of

¹ This interpretation would justify the connexion with *καταργήσας* rather than with *λύσας*: the latter would be more natural if τὴν ἑχθραν were taken apart from ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ αὐτοῦ.

the enmity between man and God. Ancient exegesis is largely determined by the contemporary language and also by the contemporary problems of the Church; and its influence has been far-reaching.

The commentary of Ephrem affords a good illustration of this influence of the age and country in which the Fathers wrote:—

“Ipse enim est pax nostra, id est ipse fecit pacem inter *Hebræos et Gentiles*: quoniam fecit utraque unum testamentum et solvit in carne sua medium parietem inimicitiae, insaniam videlicet idolorum . . . et legem terrenorum mandatorum spiritualibus decretis suis evacuavit ut duos, Ethnicos videlicet et Hebræos, condat in semetipso in unum novum hominem.”¹

J. H. A. HART.

THE SOCIAL TEACHING OF JESUS.

THE social teaching of Jesus is a subject of which it would be absurd to attempt to dispose in an article, if the intention were to enter into particulars; for the half of the words of Jesus could be included under such a designation. But the object of this article is not to deal with details, but to discover the principles which move the mass of our Lord's sayings on social subjects. These do not lie on the surface, and may be missed even by those who have often read all His words. It will tend to clearness if they are contrasted with modes of speculation on such subjects which are at present familiar to all.

I.

Everyone remembers the idea in *Ecce Homo*, that the originality of Jesus consisted in the creation of the Church.

¹ I owe this quotation to Dr. J. Rendel Harris, who adds: “It is interesting to note how Ephrem, living away from a time when the dividing line was circumcision, projects back the worship of idols as the barrier between Jew and Gentile.”

Jesus was not a mere teacher or philosopher, but the founder of an institute, in which virtue was to be taught by a new use of man's social instincts. As these are used in an army with such astonishing effect that men, as soldiers, will do without hesitation what they would never do as individuals—for example, shoot down their fellow-creatures or even expose themselves to be shot—so Jesus invented a social system in which the influence of the environment should tell with similar effect, but for different ends—for the formation of character and the generation of benevolence. This may be called the thesis of *Ecce Homo*, which is by far the most original book in the whole literature on the Life of Jesus produced in the nineteenth century. But, like a great many other things in that book, it lacks demonstration in the actual words of Christ Himself. It is much more a philosophy of Christianity, as it has actually existed, than a deduction from the record. In point of fact, the place of the Church in the teaching of Christ is a very insignificant one: a score of lines would exhaust all He said on the subject; and His sayings present anything but a complete image of the organization of the Church. Of course it is open to us to believe that He spoke much more on the subject than has been recorded, or thought more about it than He said; but it is certain that, far from being the essence of the evangel, as He preached it in Galilee, this hardly had a place in His discourses at all, the thoughts with which He attracted the multitudes and won the hearts of His disciples being of a totally different order.

There are many at the present day who think of Christianity somewhat in the same way as the author of *Ecce Homo*, with this difference, that in place of the Church they would put a Christianized society. They may be to some extent alienated from the Church, but they think of Christianity mainly as an institution, embodied in social arrangements and customs, and acting on the individual from without. The triumph of Christianity would be to

make of society a well-formed and kindly matrix in which the individual should be born into a pure atmosphere, while, as he grew up, he would be encouraged by good examples and supported on every side by the steady pressure of influences favourable to his moral development. The environment, it is taken for granted, makes the man, and it ought, therefore, to be the primary consideration.

There can be no doubt that this view is one for which a great deal can be said ; but there is just as little doubt that it was not the view of Jesus. To Him the individual was primary, and to produce in His hearers a belief in the wonder and glory of the soul, first in their own interest and then on behalf of others, was His main object from first to last. The fact is, that, although to a generation accustomed to the excessive individualism of the Evangelical Revival the suggestion that the thought of Jesus was primarily social has an attractive air of novelty, this would not have been original at all in the mouth of Jesus, because the primacy of some form of society was the belief of all antiquity before Him. In Greece the state was supreme not only in the practice of the Greek race but in the speculation of the loftiest spirits it produced ; and, in the Hebrew Scriptures, when salvation or progress is spoken of, it is the nation which is in the thoughts of prophet or psalmist. Only by slow degrees, and in isolated passages of Jeremiah and Ezekiel, does the perception begin to dawn that the individual, apart from the state or the Church, has an importance of his own. But in the teaching of Jesus this is the prevailing conception all the time. He puts no bounds to His language when describing the grandeur of the soul ; He appeals directly to the individual to make his own choice and secure his own salvation ; and it is in doing the same that Christianity is most obviously imitating its Founder.

An argument for the social as distinguished from the

individual nature of the Gospel has been found in the use by Jesus of the conception of the Kingdom of God; and His use of this phrase was so frequent as to make this argument appear conclusive. But the fact is, there is nothing in the entire record of our Lord's teaching so dubious as His use of this idea, so difficult is it to determine what it means, or what is its value. Frequently as He employed it, it is doubtful whether it can really be called His own, or whether it was imposed on Him by the necessities of His historical position. He, at any rate, did not invent it, and the Apostles very soon allowed it to fall into desuetude. As you try to grasp its signification, it eludes your pursuit, and it changes like a chameleon.

At first it seems to have a political meaning. It is certain that the predecessors and contemporaries of our Lord used it in this sense; and, when He began to employ it without any explanation, it was natural to suppose that He used it in this sense too. His royal entry into Jerusalem seems to prove that to the very last, or almost the last, He still entertained the hope of being a king, in which case the realm over which He ruled would naturally have been the Kingdom of God. On the other hand, in His temptation, He appears decisively to have rejected the ambition of an earthly kingdom; He subsequently treated with indignation the proposal to make Him a king; and He said before Pilate, "My kingdom is not of this world." Sometimes, again, the Kingdom of God seems to be identical with the Church; but He thought and spoke of the Church so seldom, and of the Kingdom so constantly, that they must be different: at least, the essence of the Kingdom must be something anterior to the Church as an outward organization.

There is one saying of Jesus the translation of which is among the most disputed of His utterances—"The kingdom of God is within you." The preposition *ἐντός* may

mean not "within" but "among," and the statement would be, in that case, not the mystic and overawing thought that the Kingdom of God is in the breast of the individual, but that the beginnings of the Kingdom, as an outward organization, were already in the midst of the hearers. I hold that the right translation is "within," which seems to me to be far more in accordance than the other with the surrounding ideas. But, even if it were not, I should say that the mistranslation expresses the very essence of what Jesus intended by the Kingdom of God. The best guide to our Lord's meaning is to be found in the parables of the Kingdom; and some of the finest and most characteristic of these, like the Sower, the Pearl of Great Price, and the Leaven, all point to the experiences of the individual rather than to the fortunes of an organization. The Kingdom is, in short, the supremacy of the spiritual nature in the individual, and the victory of the spirit over the world, and St. Paul did not misapprehend the meaning of his Master, when he said: "The kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost."

This is the first point at which, in following the teaching of our Lord about the Kingdom of God, you obtain firm footing. The Kingdom exists wherever there is a human being in whom the lower nature has ceased to rule and the spirit has gained the supremacy; and the Kingdom grows as one is added to another of those in whom this experience has taken place. The deeper and more singular this experience is, the more completely are those who have passed through it separated from the world and identified with one another. Thus their unity is provided for, but not thus only. This experience transforms the whole aspect of humanity to him who has enjoyed it, because he sees in every other human being the possibility of all that has happened to himself. There is in this spiritual birth a

propagandist instinct. It is joyful in its nature, and joy radiates. It transforms the environment, penetrating the material of daily existence with its own spiritual glow; as we see in Home Mission work, where one of the difficulties actually arises from the fact that those who have been spiritually awakened so inevitably rise above their squalid surroundings and migrate to a more congenial neighbourhood.

But, when the experience of this spiritual change becomes rare and dim, and the progress of the Kingdom by the process of adding soul to soul is slow, then men begin to dream of wholesale ways of expanding the Kingdom, which comes to be regarded as something else than the communion of redeemed souls. At one time it is a Holy Roman Empire, at another the Christian nation of the Broad Churchman's imagination, at another the baptismal regeneration of the High Churchman, at another some philanthropic panacea, like popular education or the housing of the poor. But the distinctively Christian achievement is the power of summoning the soul out of its bondage to the flesh and the world. The test of Christian effort is not the expenditure of time and money, but the amount of resilience it awakens in the lost and the power it lends them of helping themselves. As has been said by one of the foremost philanthropists of this generation, whose special sphere of labour has been the housing of the poor, the problem is not to find better houses for the people but better people for the houses.

II.

Another interpretation of Christianity, also inspired by the social passion characteristic of our time, is that which makes it out to be the service of man, this being sharply contrasted with the service of God. Through long cycles of the history of the past mankind have lavished on the service of God all the strength of their emotions, considering no offering too expensive to propitiate the favour of Deity. But the proper object of passionate love and devotion, so

long supposed to reside in the distant heaven, is really at our side in this world: it is our brother man. The gods do not need us, but our fellow-men do. To take pride in the grandeur and achievements of man, to pity his failures, to forecast and to further his progress—this is the true employment for the tenderness and enthusiasm which have been thrown away on imaginary beings. While it may be conceded that the worship of God and the faith of Christ have paved the way for the service of man by at least saving the unselfish emotions from the atrophy of absolute disuse, yet the ladder of religion, having served its purpose, may now with advantage be kicked away. We can now love man, not because God commands us to do so, or because the supposed incarnation of the Son of God has lent to the race a borrowed interest, but because man's own value has been discovered.

In this extreme and doctrinaire form the magnifying of the service of man belongs to those who are more or less direct adherents of the Comtist philosophy; but there are many who, without going so far, agree on the whole with this attitude of mind. They believe that the service of man is the essence of Christianity, and that whatever else it may contain is trivial in comparison. Jesus Himself, they contend, taught the priority of morality to religion—"If thou bring thy gift to the altar and there remember that thy brother hath aught against thee, leave there thy gift before the altar, and go thy way; first be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift." In His great picture of the last day, in which mankind are represented as sheep and goats, deeds of brotherly kindness are accepted as an equivalent for all services to Himself. And, in the parable of the Good Samaritan, untutored human nature does the deed of magnanimity required, while the priest and the Levite—the men whose natural impulses have been perverted by the influence of religion—pass by on the other side.

It cannot be denied that there is a certain kind of service of God with which the service of man may be justly placed in contrast. The religion prevalent in Christ's own day was an instance in point. It was a religion in which the worshipper was kept far from the object of worship, the transaction at the altar being a performance of the priest in his stead. Everything depended on the punctual observance of ritual; and, the more gorgeous the display and the more frequent the celebration, the more acceptable was the worship supposed to be in the eyes of the Deity. So meritorious was the service of God that it released the worshipper even from the obligation to support his parents. This quantitative estimate of the value of worship has always been characteristic of the heathen religions, and in many an age, it cannot be denied, it has clung to the Christian faith. The Holy Eastern Church has been buried under mountains of ceremonial almost since its birth; and the Church of Rome will not easily purge itself of the reproach of trafficking in merit accumulated by mechanical acts of divine worship.

Against a service of God of this sort the entire life of Christ was a protest. He believed that it blinded men to the duty which they owed to their fellow-creatures by begetting in their minds an overweening estimate of their own relation to God. God is far less interested in ceremonial flattery paid to Himself than in helpful service rendered to His creatures. It is a terrible satire to think that in the name of Christ so much religion of this sort has prevailed and still prevails in the world. I do not think that Harnack, in his recently published book on *The Essence of Christianity*, goes too far when he says that the religion called by the name of Jesus has often been identical with the religion in opposing which He sacrificed His life.¹

¹ "Wo ist in der Verkündigung Jesu auch nur eine Spur davon zu finden, dass man religiöse Weihen als geheimnisvolle Applikationen über sich ergehen lassen soll, dass man ein Ritual pünktlich befolgen, Bilder aufstellen und

But, while thus dissociated from so much that has passed among men under the name of religion, Jesus lived and moved and had His being in the religion of the heart. His Father's name was constantly on His lips, and He seized every opportunity of escaping not only from His toil but from His popularity, that He might refresh His spirit by communion with Him. This religion, which is not a tribute paid to God, but a means of obtaining advantages for man, was the supreme blessedness of Jesus Himself, and He communicated it as the secret of blessedness to others. There has recently been a remarkable consensus among scholars of different schools in identifying as the one among His sayings which most adequately expresses His consciousness of Himself and His mission these words of purely religious import: "All things are delivered unto Me of My Father, and no man knoweth the Son but the Father; and no man knoweth the Father save the Son, and He to whomsoever the Son will reveal Him"; and the popular mind has always, by a sure instinct, regarded as the most significant of all His teaching the parable of the Prodigal Son, which is an account of how the lost soul and the lost race are brought back to God.

Such an accentuation of the service of God may appear to draw away attention from man; but it has really a direct bearing on human interests. The fatherhood of God has for its sequel the brotherhood of man. Jesus constantly lifts up the example of our Father in Heaven as a guide and spur to the service of man. "Be ye therefore merciful, as your Father in Heaven is merciful"; "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God"; "Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which de-

Sprüche und Formeln in vorgeschriebener Weise murmeln soll? Um diese Art von Religion aufzulösen, hat sich Jesus Christus ans Kreuz schlagen lassen; nun ist sie unter seinem Namen und seiner Autorität wieder aufgerichtet" !—*Das Wesen des Christenthums*, p. 148.

spitefully use you and persecute you; that ye may be the children of your Father who is in heaven; for He maketh His sun to shine on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust." But it is evident—though it is frequently forgotten—that the force with which the example of the Father will tell depends upon the religious condition of those to whom the appeal is made. It will have no effect whatever on such as are unreconciled to God, unacquainted with Him, and unaccustomed to pay any regard to His will. Its force is reserved for those who have come back to Him as prodigal children and are finding their blessedness in His fellowship. The Father's view of the world will gradually become that of His children, and His wishes about the condition and the destiny of mankind will be reproduced in their aspirations. What His concern is for the welfare of mankind in all its aspects, no reader of the words of Jesus can have any doubt; and the same concern must spring up in the hearts of all who, by prayer and other forms of spiritual worship, are cultivating His intimacy.

Similar to the effects of such intimacy with the Father, is that of intimacy with Jesus Himself. The most obvious attempt at social organization which He made was the formation round Himself of the circle of the Twelve. This is the most undeniable proof which can be quoted of the importance attached by Him to social influences; and I suppose it may be looked upon in some sense as the prototype and the justification of all Christian organizations since. One of the objects He had in view in bringing the Twelve together, there can be no doubt, was that they should impress one another; and it would not be difficult to show that the play upon one another of so many diverse individualities, and especially the influence of the finer and more prominent spirits, had a very great effect in making the Twelve the figures they have become in the history of the world. But it is still more evident that this was

entirely subordinate to the impression made on them all by their Master, and that what they gave to each other was, for the most part, derived from Him. Their social value, in fact, was due to their connexion with Him. And this is the permanent law in the Kingdom founded by Christ in this world: the value of its members to the social system is measured by the closeness of their connexion with Him. When they ardently love and profoundly revere the Son of God, they see their fellow-creatures through His eyes, feel for them the sentiments of His heart, and cherish His aims on their behalf. Jesus made Himself the Friend of publicans and sinners, because, as the farmer sees the harvest in the seed and the gardener the glory of the summer in the root which is at present without form or comeliness, so He foresaw what they might become through His saving activity; and Christians, in so far as they possess the mind and spirit of Jesus, see in the humblest and even the wickedest of their fellow-creatures those who may yet reflect the perfect image of the Son of Man and shine as the stars for ever and ever.

George Eliot used to resent the idea that we should require any other motive for caring for our fellow-men but their own dignity and necessities. But it is by no means certain that man, if stripped of all connexion with higher beings, will command honour and sympathy. If he is only an ephemeral creature with no divine origin and no immortal destiny, what does it matter whether he suffers or is happy, whether he does well or ill?—it is by no means certain that this would not be the practical conclusion drawn by the general mind from the premises of unbelief. It is not more moral precepts we want: the world has always been well supplied with them. Even Christ's own, though by far the best, are not what we want supremely. The desideratum is a set of motives which will act so as to cause the precepts to be obeyed. This was why Jesus taught men the love of God and gave them such good

cause for loving Himself; for the future of the world is assured if men and women are learning to have the same mind and heart for their fellow-creatures as the Father and the Son have for them; and this new source of motive power is the grand contribution of Jesus to the solution of the social problem.

III.

The most outstanding product of the social passion characteristic of our age is undoubtedly Socialism itself; and it will help to bring out what is distinctive in the teaching of Jesus to compare its spirit with that of socialism.

There is a preliminary difficulty in the way, due to the extreme variety of ideas embraced within the name. Even in a book like Mr. Kirkup's there reigns a most irritating vagueness, which, however, is to be attributed not to his lack of the power of exposition, but to the indefiniteness of the systems which he has to expound. Everyone has felt how difficult it is to attach any distinct meaning to what is called Christian socialism; and the happy confusion of the general mind is well indicated in the remark of an eminent statesman, that, in one sense or another, we are all socialists nowadays.

But the pith of socialism lies, I fancy, in the importance it attaches to the economic basis of life. Man has certain natural rights; and the first of these is the right to live. Until the material basis of existence is assured, man is a nomad, in whom the social virtues cannot be developed. If you wish him to give his mind to his own improvement, or to impersonal aims or immortal hopes, you must first set him free from engrossing care about the satisfying of his hunger and the defence of his person from wind and weather. Nature, in her bounty, has provided enough for all, but it is ill-divided, the share of a few being too large even for their own good, while the share of the majority is miserably inadequate. The *status quo* is sanctioned by law and custom, but there is a vast difference

between law and equity. A redivision of the goods of the community is necessary, that all may share and share alike, or that, at least, there may be some tolerable approximation to equality.

The heart of socialism is the sense of the indispensable-ness and value of material comfort; and the doctrine may be stated in true and reasonable forms. But too frequently the soilure of earthiness clings to it. While the propertied classes are attacked for the greed which engrosses more than their own share, there is, too often, obvious in the very terms in which they are assailed the same spirit as that for which they are blamed; only in the one case it is the smug and complacent greed of those who have, and in the other the impotent and envious greed of those who have not. I have sat for a whole day in a convention of the International, when orators from all the great cities of Germany were haranguing a crowd of working men. The speeches were of remarkable oratorical excellence, but there was not in them one word to make a working man take any interest or pride in his work for its own sake, the string on which everyone harped being denunciation of the plutocracy for making away with more than their own share of the spoil, or dismal moralizing on the lot of those who have to slave in the sweat of their brows to keep up the fabric of a society by which they are despised and pillaged.

The economic contrasts in the society of Palestine in Christ's day do not seem to have been less cruel than they are at present; and His sayings abound in reflections on the lots of rich and poor. His sympathy for the poor is overflowing, and there is an edge of indignant severity in His references to the rich. He had compassion on the multitude; He fed the five thousand; in the company of the Twelve a bag was kept for the relief of the poor; while, on the contrary, in parables like the Rich Man and Lazarus and the Rich Fool He drew lurid pictures of the judgment of Heaven on the wealthy.

When, however, these sayings of Jesus are closely examined, it becomes apparent that they are not more in harmony with the spirit of socialism than they are with conventionality and plutocracy.¹

One contrast, especially, springs at once into notice—namely, the eschatological colouring of all Christ's teaching. Socialism is a doctrine of this world, and it is impatient of any mention of a world to come. To encourage the poor to seek an inheritance in heaven is to cheat them of the heritage to which they are entitled on earth: it is only a device of the wealthy, and of a Church which fawns upon wealth, to distract attention from the spoliation by which the poor are exploited. Jesus, on the contrary, always spoke as one native and familiar with the world to come. Not infrequently the statement may be read that it was for this world He legislated, and that He said comparatively little of another world. But the reverse is the case. Not only do His directly eschatological statements form a large proportion of all His sayings, but the eschatological atmosphere is in His teaching from beginning to end.

He pitied the poor, but chiefly because their excessive engrossment with what they were to eat and what they were to drink had made them oblivious of their heavenly destiny. His remedy for anxiety about food, clothing and shelter was, "Your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things," and He taught all to pray for daily bread. He even said, "Blessed are ye poor," on the ground that the lack of earthly possessions might prove a stimulus to seek a better heritage in heaven. His indignation at the rich was not more due to their oppression of the poor than to their folly in preferring for themselves the gratifications which would last only for a day to those which would last forever; and the motive by which He con-

¹ "No teaching has been more potent in forcing the strong to yield to the weak, the rich to the poor, the noble to the lowly. But none the less is it true that Jesus is far less interested in the rights than in the obligations of men." —SHAILER MATTHEWS, *The Social Teaching of Jesus*, p. 177.

strained the wealthy to make a benevolent use of their means was that the poor whom they assisted would welcome them into everlasting habitations.

Yet, though Jesus was thus apparently indifferent to points of view which to many in our day appear paramount, He really produced the most effective of all solutions of the social problem; and it is found precisely in that doctrine of another world which to many appears so irrelevant.

His doctrine of the Last Judgment puts a check on the selfishness and extravagance of the rich, for it teaches them that they will have to appear before a Judge who has no respect of persons and pays no regard to anything but character. They are but stewards of their means; and the one damning fault at His bar will be to have done nothing with their talents. In every poor person whom they have left unclothed, unfed and unvisited they will, on the great day, be made to recognise the Judge Himself. So much for the influence of the doctrine of the judgment on the minds of the wealthy. He does not promise to the poor, on that day, a corresponding reward for their poverty, except it has been incurred through suffering for His sake; but the doctrine of immortality itself is the most animating and elevating of all influences ever introduced into the minds of the poor. A poor man who believes in his own immortality cannot be a slave: he is able to stand up against the proudest tyrant, whose superior he may easily be in the judgment of Heaven. On the judgment day the positions will be reversed and all injustices redressed.

It is on this self-consciousness of man as man—as a spiritual, godlike and immortal being—that Jesus relies to alter the inequalities of society and at length to leaven the whole lump. For man in this character, however lowly be his lot, He challenges the respect of the mightiest. But especially He strives to evoke the latent powers and activities of the poor themselves. Their present blessedness in God and their prospect of immortal life, while rendering

them comparatively indifferent to the distressing elements of their earthly lot, yet impart to them a moral strength that overcomes the world. After all, as some one has said, the lever that moves this world has its fulcrum in the other world; and an individual or a class penetrated with faith in the value and the immortality of the soul, and in the Fatherhood and the judgment of God, is on the pathway even to earthly independence and prosperity.

The conclusion of the whole is, that the essence of the social teaching of Jesus lies in its supernatural elements—the value of the soul, the love of God, the immortality of man. The tendency of the present hour is to let these slip out of sight, if not to deny them, and to seek short cuts to human amelioration. In place of the awakening and the sanctification of the soul there is substituted the moulding influence of society; in place of the passion for human regeneration, due to the experience of redeeming grace, there is substituted a vague enthusiasm for humanity; and in place of the honour and glory surrounding man as an heir of immortality there is substituted the self-respect of an assured economic position. These ideas may, on account of their novelty, excite in some minds more enthusiasm than those of the Gospel; and, in spite of objectional elements, if they wish to baptize themselves with the name of Christ, they ought not to be forbidden, on the principle laid down by Christ Himself—he that is not against us is for us. Earnest Christians may even be stirred up to emulation by the sympathy and zeal of those who hold comparatively little of the Christian faith. Yet the old motives reach far deeper down than the new. Christianity will wither in the long run, if it tries to live on ideas derived only in a secondary sense from the Gospel; but the way to ensure that it will bring forth much fruit is to keep its roots continually steeped in the most native and characteristic ideas of its Founder. JAMES STALKER.

SOME RECENT LITERATURE ON THE OLD TESTAMENT.

THE most important contribution recently made by English scholars to the criticism of the Old Testament is the *Oxford Hexateuch*.¹ As the present writer's share in this work was almost entirely confined to some suggestions as to the analysis of *Joshua*, which were not always accepted, his commendation is entirely disinterested. The analysis was made by a committee of the Oxford Society of Historical Theology, and a special feature is the statement of reasons for the detailed division of the material. But the book is mainly important on account of the introduction by Prof. J. Estlin Carpenter and Rev. G. Harford Battersby, which gives a more complete statement of the evidence for the modern theories of the composition of the Hexateuch than any yet accessible to English readers. An interesting section supplies examples of works similarly composed. Much capital has been made by opponents of the modern view out of the supposed absurdity of the theory that the Hexateuch was pieced together out of independent documents. In chap. i. § 2 the editors show that there are numerous documents which are certainly known to have been composed by that method; *e.g.*, Asser's *Life of Alfred*, the Saxon Chronicle, Codes of Early English Laws, Indian Sacred Literature, *Chronicles* (the Old Testament book), and the *Diatessaron* of Tatian.

There are also to hand two new volumes of the *Cambridge Bible*. Archdeacon T. T. Perowne's *Proverbs* is more elementary, especially in the introduction, than most recent volumes of the series. He explains "virtuous woman," in xxxi. 10, as "woman of might, or power, or capacity," and yet maintains that "no better English

¹ *The Hexateuch*, etc.: Longmans, Green & Co., 1900, 2 vols. pp. xii. 279, 359, 368.

representative of the Hebrew word could probably be found "than virtuous." But, according to his own showing, this word misleads the English reader. The present writer has elsewhere suggested "the capable woman," perhaps "notable" would be better still. Dr. W. E. Barnes' *Chronicles* is a useful volume. Prof. R. W. Moss's *From Malachi to Matthew*¹ is a careful and succinct history of Judea from B.C. 440 to B.C. 4. Apparently the author's critical views excluded any reference to *Daniel* and other portions of the Old Testament now commonly assigned to this period. In *The Christian Use of the Psalms*,² Prof. Cheyne makes another contribution to the series of works in which he shows how the results of criticism may be applied to spiritual edification. He discusses the use of the Psalter in the Anglican liturgy, with special reference to the "Proper Psalms" appointed for Christmas Day, Ash Wednesday, Good Friday, Easter Day, Ascension Day, and Whit-Sunday. He pleads for some rearrangement of the services which will relieve minister and people from the necessity of reciting the imprecatory Psalms as an act of Christian worship. He thinks that the proper Psalms were selected "on principles of interpretation which in no other field of literature would be tolerated for a moment" (p. 24), *i.e.*, apparently, because these Psalms were understood to be Messianic in a crude and mechanical sense. Prof. Cheyne thinks that, to a large extent, the liturgical use of these Psalms with reference to Christ may be defended on a suitable understanding; *e.g.*, "So then I am of opinion that as we read Ps. ii. 7 ['He hath said to me, Thou art my Son; this day have I begotten Thee'], we may, at least in the congregation, fitly think of the early spiritual crisis of Jesus, and call to mind that wondrous equipment with the Divine Spirit which lifted Him above the greatest of His race, and baffles the powers

¹ C. H. Kelly, pp. xiv., 255, 2s. 6d.

² Isbister, pp. 273, 5s.

of language worthily to describe" (p. 49). On the other hand, he says, with regard to the use of Psalm cxxxii. on Christmas Day, "We ought not to withhold the confession that we regard that appointment as a misfortune" (p. 271). We must acknowledge that we are distressed to be told, on such high authority, that "Anglicans are but half-hearted lovers of the Bible" (p. 22).

In the two volumes¹ of *The Messages of the Bible* series on the *Earlier* and *Later Prophets*, Prof. F. K. Sanders, of Yale, and Prof. C. F. Kent, of Brown University, have achieved a considerable measure of success in their attempt at a popular exposition by means of chronological arrangement, analysis, and free paraphrastical rendering. The books are written from the standpoint of modern criticism. In *Israel's Messianic Hope*,² Prof. G. S. Goodspeed, of Chicago, gives an interesting popular account of the development of the Messianic hopes of Israel, *i.e.* the growth of those ideals and expectations of blessedness and righteousness which were ultimately fulfilled in Christ. He traces these throughout Jewish literature from their first beginnings in the Old Testament till the Advent. Mr. Tyler has published a new edition of his notable commentary on *Ecclesiastes*.³ The book is rewritten, but chiefly in order to maintain more forcibly, and with additional evidence, the positions advocated in the first edition in 1874, especially the "Manifest Influence of Greek Philosophy" upon the author. With most modern scholars he assigns the book to the Greek period, dating it about B.C. 200; but, unlike many, he defends its substantial integrity.

Part ii. of Mr. C. G. Montefiore's *The Bible for Home Reading*⁴ contains a judicious selection of passages from the Wisdom literature, the Prophets, the Psalter, and the

¹ James Clarke, pp. xv., 304, xx., 382. ² Macmillan, pp. 315, 6s.

³ Nutt, pp. xi., 168, 6s. net.

⁴ Macmillan, pp. xxviii., 799, 5s. 6d. net.

Apocrypha. The "comments," etc., preserve the high standard of excellence reached in part i., bearing in mind that the book is written for Jewish parents and children.

We have also received *Jacob at Bethel, an Essay in Comparative Religion*,¹ by Dr. A. Smythe Palmer, an interesting collection of illustrations of the Bethel narrative from other religions; *The Original Hebrew of Ecclesiasticus xxxi. 12-31, xxxvi. 22-xxxvii. 26*,² by Rev. G. Margoliouth, text, translation and notes; *The Book of Psalms*,³ containing the Prayer-Book Version, the Authorised Version, and the Revised Version, in parallel columns; *The Psalms in Verse*,⁴ by the Rev. R. J. Spranger, intended for devotional use; *The Student's Deuteronomy*,⁵ by the Rev. R. B. Girdlestone, written from the traditional standpoint; *Genesis an Authentic Record*,⁶ by the Rev. G. Greenwood; *The Unity of the Book of Isaiah*,⁷ by Letitia D. Jeffreys, with a preface by Dr. Sinker; *Two Sermons*,⁸ on the material and the spiritual creation, by Rev. C. B. Waller; and the *Gospel of Genesis*,⁹ three sermons by the Rev. G. Witherby. The author should note that "higher criticism" does not, as he supposes, describe the views of advanced critics, and imply a claim to superiority. "Higher" in this phrase has the same value as in "Higher Algebra." Mr. Spurgeon, when he discussed the date and authorship of the books of the Bible, was as "high" a critic as Prof. Cheyne.

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¹ Nutt, pp. 187, 2s. 6d. net.

² Williams and Norgate, pp. 35, 2s. 6d. net.

³ Cambridge University Press, pp. 220, 2s. 6d.

⁴ Vol. i., Rivington's, pp. lvi., 670, 7s. 6d.

⁵ Eyre and Spottiswoode, pp. xxxii., 92.

⁶ Church Printing Society, pp. xvi., 240.

⁷ Deighton Bell & Co., pp. xiv., 56, 2s. 6d.

⁸ Unwin, pp. 24, 6d.

⁹ Skeffington, pp. 69, 1s.

ZWINGLI'S DOCTRINE OF THE LORD'S SUPPER.

THERE are many good reasons which call for an investigation of Zwingli's doctrine of the Supper, an enquiry whether the popular and current impression on the subject is correct. It is not only what is due to historical accuracy, and to the reputation of a man whom the Reformed Churches hold in high esteem ; it is called for also in the interest of the true Reformation doctrine of the Sacrament. On the one hand, that doctrine is made to bear the reproach of certain views which are commonly ascribed to Zwingli ; and on the other, certain defective views of the Sacrament which from time to time threaten to invade the Church are prone to shelter themselves under Zwingli's great name. Inasmuch as Luther, Calvin, and Zwingli are rightly regarded as a kind of triumvirate of Reformers, of nearly, if not quite, equal authority, it is easy to represent each of the three theories of the Eucharist, which commonly pass under their respective names, as having an equal claim to recognition by the Churches of the Reformation. If a man does not follow Luther or Calvin in his doctrine of the Supper, he is apt to defend himself by asserting that he follows the third of the Reformation Fathers, giving to a view which is really Socinian or Remonstrant the name of the orthodox Reformer of Zürich. The question is, Is he historically justified in so doing ?

It will not be necessary to spend any time in expounding what is commonly understood to have been Zwingli's view of the Lord's Supper. It is usually expressed in the phrase "mere commemoration," and as it is generally represented, at least from outside, it sets the Sacrament on a level with

a modern "memorial service." Theologically it connotes the idea that the elements are *nuda signa*, and denies any specific grace in the Sacrament, any specific presence of Christ and any specific communion with Him.

Now the only official documents in which this view is set forth are not of Reformed but of Socinian origin. It appears, for example, in the Socinian Catechism of Cracow: "Coena Domini est Christi Institutum, ut fideles ipsius panem frangant et comedant et ex calice bibant, mortis ipsius annuntiandae causa."

"Annuntiare mortem Domini est publice ac sacrosancte Christo gratias agere . . . Nonne alia causa, ob quam coenam instituit Dominus, superest? Nulla prorsus."

From this even the early Arminian view differs by a shade, inasmuch as the Remonstrant Confession recognises in the Supper not only the commemoration, but the testifying of "vivificam et spiritualem communionem cum ipso Jesu Christo." What I have called the impression of Zwingli's view may include this latter point, but at any rate it does not go farther.

Neither will it be necessary to show at length that Zwingli did hold and teach that the Holy Supper was a commemoration feast, a feast in commemoration of the death of Christ. For this is the Scriptural basis of all views of the Sacrament whatever. But it may be useful to set forth some at least of the passages in which he has most clearly defined this part of his doctrine.

In his Treatise, *De vera et falsa Religione*, he writes: "Est ergo eucharistia sive coena dominica nihil aliud quam commemoratio, qua ii, qui se morte Christi firmiter credunt patri reconciliatos esse, hanc vitalem mortem annunciant, hoc est, laudant, gratulantur et praedicant."

Similarly, in his Commentary on Exodus, when dealing with the institution of the Passover, he says:

"Quis non videt eucharistiam nostram aliud nihil esse

quam pro morte Christi gratiarum actionem, dominumque pane et vino nihil aliud voluisse quam ut beneficentiae suae nobis signa in manus et oculos poneret? ”

And, in the same connection: “Hic sole clarius videtur, quid prosint signa ut vocant sacramentalia: non enim fidem interiorem, ut plerique somniant, confirmant, sed sensus exteriores admonet ac solantur.” But even here he adds a sentence which invites a closer examination of his view, “Dicit ergo Deus per Mosem populo: ‘Fiet autem quum haec exteriora ob oculos versabuntur et in manibus tractabuntur, ut tibi potentia, gratia et misericordia mea innoventur.’ ”

But perhaps the strongest statement of his view on this negative side is that found at the end of his reply to Jakob Strauss: “In order that the simple-minded man who does not quickly see what is contained in high discourse may be in less danger of being misled, I will indicate three points in which Strauss and his party go wrong; for they have no word of God for these.

1. “ ‘Der Leichnam Christi werde hier leiblich doch unsichtbarlich gegessen: und Christus sei leiblich hier, doch unsichtbarlich,’ reden sie nicht allein ohne sondern wider Gottes Wort.”

2. “ ‘Der Leichnam Christi leiblich gegessen, befestige den Glauben: gebe das wesentlich das man predige und glaube ’ reden sie ohne Gottes Wort.”

3. “St. James teaches that men should anoint the sick and pray for them. If now the Apostles had believed in the confirming power of the corporeal feeding on the Body of Christ, as these assert, then St. James would have said before all else, ‘Bring to him the bread of the Sacrament’; for one in peril of death requires above all else the confirmation of his faith.”

Passages such as these—and there are plenty of them scattered throughout his works—explain, and go far to

justify, the account which is commonly given of Zwingli's view of the Lord's Supper; for they not only assert the commemoration, but they appear at least to deny explicitly every other aspect of the rite.

These passages all belong to what may be called the middle part of his brief career as a Reformer, say between 1524 and 1528. And if we turn, in the first place, to examine his utterances in an earlier stage, we shall find many of a different kind, which must also be taken into account in arriving at Zwingli's doctrine of the Supper.

So far as Zwingli's published works are concerned, his criticism of the Romish system began with a denial of the specific value of fasting and an appeal against the enforced celibacy of the clergy. The sermon on *Die Freiheit der Speisen* was published in 1522, but it was both preceded and followed by other sermons which have not been preserved, but evidently made a deep impression. These were directed against the doctrine of the Mass, but more especially against the conception of the Mass as propitiatory sacrifice. One result of these sermons and the discussion they caused was the First Zürich Disputation, which is important for our purpose. In view of this conference Zwingli had prepared, as he says, a digest of the purport and contents of his speeches and sermons in Zürich in the form of some seventy propositions or articles. Of these, the eighteenth concerns the Mass, and it runs thus: "Christ offered Himself once for all, and is for ever a sufficient and redeeming offering for the sins of all believers; hence we conclude that the Mass is not an offering, but a commemoration of the offering, and guarantee of the redemption which Christ hath procured for us." ¹

In the *Exposition* of these articles, published in the same year, Zwingli interprets the words of Institution thus: "Observe this among yourselves in such a way that you

¹ *Op. ed.* Schultens, i. 154.

eat and drink my body and blood for a memorial of Me; that is, that you renew with commemoration the benefit which I have procured for you."

Again in the same *Exposition*, "It remains therefore established by Holy Writ that though 'das heilig Mal der Seel' is not a sacrifice, it is a commemoration and renewal of that which, having once taken place, is for ever effective, and precious enough to make satisfaction for our sins to the righteousness of God."

"On this account I have for some years called the enjoyment of this Meal (*diese Speis niessen*), a commemoration of the suffering of Christ and not a sacrifice. But for some time past Martin Luther has entitled this Meal a Testament, a name with which I willingly concur; for while he has named it according to its nature and property, I have named it according to its use and employment; and there is no contradiction between the two names." And, in general, Zwingli gives in the same exposition a solemn assurance to the simple-minded "that there is no dispute as to whether the body and blood of Christ are eaten and drunk, *for no Christian has that in doubt (denn daran zweiflet kein Christ)*, but the dispute is whether it is a sacrifice or only a commemoration (of the Sacrifice)."

In this article, therefore, and Zwingli's exposition of it we have to observe two things. (1) as Dorner says (*Hist. Prot. Theol.*, p. 300): "The characteristic thing in all Zwingli's writings prior to 1524 is his opposition to the conception of the Supper as Sacrifice or Mass." (2) He distinctly represents the Supper as commemoration and more. It is in some sense an eating and drinking of the body and blood of Christ; it is not only a commemoration of the sacrifice of Christ, but in some sense a renewal of the benefit of that sacrifice.

The second disputation of Zürich was specially concerned with the questions of Pictures and the Mass (1523, August). There we find Zwingli saying: "Touching the Mass, how-

ever, I declare thus: in the first place let all men know that neither my speech nor that of my brother Leo tends or will ever tend to suggest that there is any kind of deceit or falsehood about the body and blood of Christ; but all our effort is directed to showing that it is not a sacrifice, which one can offer for another. . . . But according to its first name it is a sacrifice, that is, a ransom (*bezahlung*) for our sin, which God Himself hath offered for our sins" (*Op.*, i. 498).

A passage to the same effect will be found in his *Kurze christliche Einleitung* of the end of the same year: "Whatever may be said about the Mass, we must first of all make clear, in order that none may be offended (*verletzt*) that no one has any intention of doing away with the body and blood of Christ, or disparaging it, or teaching that it is naught, or that the Mass has any other meaning than the participating (*niessen*) in the body and blood of Christ" (*Op.*, i. p. 562).

Again, "Das sacrament nûts anders ist weder das niessen des lychnams und blut Christi" (*Op.*, i. p. 564).

Further evidence to the same effect is found in the so-called *Canon Missae*, drawn up by Zwingli in 1523 for use in the Reformed Congregation of Zürich. It is there laid down that the bread and the wine are to be given to the communicants with the words, "Corpus Domini nostri Jesu Christi; Sanguis Domini nostri; prosit tibi ad vitam aeternam." And in the prayers we find such phrases as these: "ut ad hoc sacrosanctum filii tui convivium accedamus, cujus ipse et hospes est et epulum." "Da ut quotquot ex hujus filii tui corporis sanguinisque cibo participaturi sunt."

It is plain from these and many similar passages which might be quoted that at this period of his activity as a Reformer Zwingli held and taught that the Supper was more than mere commemoration, that it was a means of

grace by which a positive benefit might be received (though he might not have said "may be conferred"), that he recognised in it a true partaking of the body and blood of Christ.

If we now recur to the point from which we started, the strong assertion that the Eucharist is "*nihil aliud quam pro morte Christi gratiarum actionem*," and the like, when we seek for an explanation of what seems a glaring inconsistency, it appears most simple and natural to suppose that Zwingli's views on this subject had developed or changed in the direction of finding less meaning in the Sacrament than he had done at the outset. And I suppose that is the explanation with which those have been contented who have traced his thought thus far.

But surely some other explanation must be sought in face of the fact that in the third and last period of his short career as a Reformer (1528-1531) there is again abundant evidence of the same positive elements in his teaching.

It would be tedious to go through the report of the famous conference at Marburg, in which Luther and Zwingli met for the only time in their lives. But any one who takes the trouble to do so will not only see reason to admire the courteous and conciliatory spirit of Zwingli in his genuine desire to find a common formula, but will confirm the judgment of Bullinger on the whole matter—"that the two parties were at one with one another in all the Articles, except in regard of the degree of the presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Sacrament (*ohne in der Mass der Gegenwärtigkeit des Leibs und Bluts Christi*). The Article on which they agreed was as follows: "*quod Sacramentum altaris sit sacramentum veri corporis et sanguinis Jesu Christi, et spiritualis istius veri corporis et sanguinis sumptio præcipue unicuique Christiano sit necessaria.*" They further agreed that the purpose of the Sacrament was "*ut infirmas conscientias ad fidem et dilectionem excitet per Spiritum Sanctum.*" The only point on which Zwingli

differed from Luther was whether the true body and blood of Christ were present "*corporaliter in pane et vino.*"

To this we have not only the testimony of the Articles themselves, but that of the interesting letter of Luther to his wife, written the same day as the Articles were signed. "I do want you to know that our friendly colloquy at Marburg is at an end, and that we are agreed in almost every point, except that the opposite party wants to have only bread in the Lord's Supper, and acknowledge the spiritual presence of Christ in the same."

No one can honestly charge Zwingli with truckling to Luther on this occasion. On some points, *e.g.* on Penance and Invocation of Saints, he showed a stubborn independence; and if at Marburg he accepted, as he must have done, a non-"Zwinglian" view of the Sacrament, it clearly follows that he did not regard such a view as either inconsistent with Scripture or inimical to the faith of the Reformed Church.

Again, this positive side of Zwingli's teaching on the Supper appears very clearly in his Confession addressed to Francis I. three months before the Reformer's death. "Christum credimus vere esse in coena immo non esse Domini coenam nisi Christus adsit. . . . Adserimus igitur non sic carnaliter et crasse manducari corpus Christi in coena, ut isti perhibent, sed verum Christi corpus credimus in coena sacramentaliter et spiritualiter edi, a religiosa, fidei et sancta mente, ut Chrysostomus sentit."

We have here the assertion of the real presence of Christ in the Supper, and of that presence as essential to its validity; further, the assertion that the body of Christ is eaten in the Supper "sacramentally and spiritually." In fact, we have a doctrine closely approximating to that of Calvin,¹ of Cosin and Overall, of Jeremy Taylor and Hooker

¹ Valuable confirmation of the view here maintained as to Zwingli's doctrine is found in Calvin's recognition of it as consonant with his own. He did not

in England. There seems no reason to doubt that Zwingli would have assented *ex animo* to the view stated by Overall for example: "In Sacramento Eucharistiæ corpus et sanguis Christi, adeoque totus Christus adhibetur digne recipientibus, non per modum transubstantionis nec per modum consubstantionis, sed Spiritu Sancto per fidem operante."

For Zwingli did connect the presence in sacramental sense with the bread. Thus, in his letter to the German princes, he writes: "Diximus (de consecrato pane) quod nullo modo volumus Papistarum sensu capi quasi panis sit conversus in corpus Christi reale aut naturale, sed in sacramentale. Puta si quotidianus panis sanctificatur per verbum et orationem, multo magis ille panis qui mutatur ut sacramentale corpus Christi nunc sit, qui prius vulgaris erat, sanctificatur et consecratur ut jam divinus panis sit et sacer."

It will not be necessary to point out how widely this view of the Sacrament differs from that commonly ascribed to Zwingli. It is in fact what might be called the Reformed Catholic view.

It might be more pertinent to enquire how this grasp of the objective value of the Sacrament is to be reconciled with the statements to which I referred at the outset. The explanation may be sought along one, possibly along all, of three lines. 1. Zwingli differed from the other leaders of his time, and especially from Luther, in his intense desire to preserve the unity of the Visible Church Reformed. His object was to go as far as possible with his opponents on either side, to emphasize points of agreement rather than points of difference. This tendency might well be interpreted to his discredit, as every attempt to "be all things to all men" can be. But such a charge is fully met by the stubbornness

deny a difference, but he saw that it was only a difference of emphasis. His defence of Zwingli and the "Zürich doctrines" is chivalrous, but it is evidently sincere. And no one who knows Calvin and *his* doctrine will suspect him of tolerating a doctrine of "mere commemoration." See Calvin's *Tracts*, II. pp. 196, 207, 252, and, indeed, the whole of his Second Defence against Westphal.

and consistency with which he resisted, on the one hand, the doctrine of the Mass as propitiatory sacrifice and other Romish notions, and on the other the anti-sacramentarian views of the Anabaptists and others.

2. The apparent ambiguity or inconsistency might arise from want of clear thinking or dialectic power in himself. I should be prepared to give weight to this, at least, to the extent of recognising that Zwingli was not the equal of Calvin, for example, in profound constructive thought, and that most of his published work consists of controversial tracts thrown off in the heat of conflict and in great haste. But comparatively little weight needs to be assigned to either of these explanations, when due weight is allowed to the third, viz., that the object of his criticism was not the Roman doctrine of the Eucharist as a whole, but only a few, practically only two points in it. These were the Mass as propitiatory sacrifice and the presence of the Body of Christ *in* or *sub* the consecrated bread *corporaliter* or "leiblich." In spite of the copiousness and frequency with which the subject is treated by Zwingli, his criticism is really narrowed to these two points; but against these he is so vehement and insistent that in not a few passages his denials sweep away more than he intends.¹ The only opponents whom he had to meet on this side were those who asserted that the Body of Christ was "wesentlich und leiblich gegessen." And where he seems to surrender a partaking of any kind, he must be corrected by his own indubitable testimony to himself. He appears himself to have been conscious of the danger of misunderstanding, as when he says: "And I have called it a commemoration in accordance with the Word of God in order that I might overthrow

¹ This is plainly the explanation adopted by Calvin, who says, *e.g.*, in his Second Answer to Westphal: "Æcolampadius and Zwinglius, at the commencement of the dispute, from being too intent on refuting superstition, did not speak of the Sacrament in sufficiently honourable terms." Compare also Calvin's *Short Treatise on the Lord's Supper*, §§ 56, 58.

the view of those who make of it a sacrifice," and adds that "Christ beyond all doubt (*zu sicherheit*) has given his flesh and blood "zu einer Speis so dick wir die Speis niessen werden, den Tod, das ist das erlosen und aufopfern Christi auskundend und danksagend" (*Op.*, i. 249).

If any one were to start from Zwingli's positive doctrine as I have now collated it, and were patiently to bear in mind the narrowness of the field towards which his criticisms are directed, I venture to think that he would find little difficulty in harmonizing even those passages which seem so negative with the non-Zwinglian view which I have claimed for him.

One other point seems worth adverting to. Throughout his works, and especially in his controversy with Luther, we find Zwingli appealing, and that with great confidence, to Augustine. "Nobiscum sentit Augustinus," he says to the Emperor Charles V. To the German princes, "sed ne nimis longus sim, . . . in hac de sacramentis et eorum virtute controversia ad arbitrum aut sequestrum Augustinum rejici me patiar." And at Marburg Luther candidly admits that it is so. "Augustinum et Fulgentium habet ihr auf euer Seiten."

Does this point to a misunderstanding of Augustine on the part of Zwingli and Luther, or to an ambiguity in the teaching of Augustine himself, such as Canon Gore points out? (*Dissertations*, p. 232). "Augustine's language, as a whole, is certainly susceptible of being interpreted in the sense of an objective spiritual presence in the elements; or it may fairly be interpreted on a receptionist theory like Hooker's: it is in fact somewhat inconsistent." There is certainly more in common between Augustine's view of the Sacrament and Zwingli's than has been generally supposed; and if there is some inconsistency or ambiguity about Zwingli's teaching also, he too may perhaps be pardoned and not dubbed a "Zwinglian."

C. ANDERSON SCOTT.

THE THEOLOGY OF THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.

II.

THE DOCTRINE OF SIN.

THE central theological conception of the Epistle to the Romans is that of the righteousness of God. The righteousness of God, however, as the sum and substance of the gospel, is essentially related to sin, and we follow the Apostle's order in making sin our first subject of study.

It will not be questioned that the Epistle to the Romans contains a doctrine, or, at least, much of the material for a doctrine, on this subject. The Apostle speaks continually in it of "sin" in the singular, and in all sorts of relations. Out of forty-eight cases in which the word *ἁμαρτία* is used in the Epistle, only three are in the plural; and of these, two (chaps. iv. 7, xi. 27) are quotations from the Old Testament. In the synoptic Gospels, on the other hand, the word is never found in the singular, except in Matthew xii. 31, where *πᾶσα ἁμαρτία* does not form a real exception; it is not sin, but sins, of which Jesus speaks. This of itself is sufficient to show that St. Paul's attitude is that of one who is generalizing on the subject; what Jesus addresses Himself to in the concrete, as it comes before Him in its particular workings in the lives of individual men, His Apostle is trying to grasp in its nature and significance as a whole.

This does not mean that in St. Paul there must necessarily be some loss in truth or reality. A generalization is only unreal to a person who approaches it from the outside; it is not unreal, empty, or unimpressive, to the person who has digested his experience and observation into it. This last is the case in the Epistle. There is no abstract doctrine of

sin in it; everything it contains is written out of the Apostle's heart; it is profoundly, even passionately, experimental. It is proper to insist on this, because it is sometimes overlooked. The process of generalization is a difficult one, and the forms in which the mind makes its first attempt to express its perception of a universal truth may not be quite adequate to the burden laid on them. One of the most obvious of these forms is personification. Wishing, for instance, to say something which is true not of this or that sin, but of sin in general, the mind projects sin, as it were, to a distance at which it can focus it, and then makes its assertions *as if* sin actually had such an independent existence of its own. It generalizes by the simple process of writing Sin with a capital S, and lending it a quasi-personality. St. Paul himself often does this. He does it, possibly, when he says that Sin entered into the world; he does it certainly when he says that Sin reigned in death, or that there is such a thing as a Law of Sin—a law which Sin enjoins as opposed to the law enjoined by God. But it is a misconception of his mind altogether—a failure to appreciate the psychological conditions under which he worked—when we distinguish on this ground, as many scholars do, an “objective” as opposed to a “subjective” doctrine of sin in certain passages of the Epistle. Perhaps these are words one ought not to use at all; but if they are to be used, we ought to recognise clearly that an “objective” which is not also “subjective” does not belong to science or to experience, but to mythology. Now there is nothing about sin in St. Paul (as I hope will become apparent) which cannot be verified in experience; and the places in which there is even the appearance of an objective conception of Sin, as a power *in rerum natura* but not in this or that human will, are only those in which the Apostle, *on the basis of experience*, generalizes by the primitive method of poetic personification. It is needlessly rash to

say that in these cases he did not know what he was doing.

Yet everything is not made clear when we say that St. Paul's doctrine of sin was experimental. The question is at once raised, What was the experience in which he gained the insight generalized in this Epistle into a doctrine of sin? Was it his experience as a Pharisee in quest of a righteousness of his own? or his experience as a Christian in possession of the righteousness of God? Or can we perhaps distribute it between the two stages of his life, and maintain that he learned some things about sin by being a sinner, and others only by being saved? The true answer to such questions depends on a perception of what experience is. It is not a *quantum*, but a process, and what it amounted to at any particular moment, supposing it could have been arrested there, changes meaning and value and aspect continually as life moves on. It is not at the instant of doing anything that we know what we have done; it may only be long afterwards, and in the light of very different experiences. This has to be considered especially in such a writing as the Epistle to the Romans. The writer is a Christian Apostle. He cannot be anything else; we cannot even imagine him for an instant divesting himself of this character. When he writes of sin, he writes, of course, on the basis of experience; no honest man could do otherwise. But he does not write his autobiography. He does not tell that he stole apples, like Augustine, or that he blasphemed, like Bunyan. He only tells the universal truth about sin, as through experience he has come to know it. But the experience is that of a saved man. At a later point we shall have occasion to consider the teaching of the Epistle about sin and the Christian life, and the attempts to distribute some things the Apostle says of sin between the unregenerate and the regenerate man; here it is sufficient to point out that it is the regenerate

man who is speaking all the time, and showing us what sin in the light of God universally and essentially is. The doctrine of sin, in other words, is Christian, not pre-Christian or Pharisaic; the whole meaning and issues of sin are not discovered at the feet of Gamaliel, but at the cross of Jesus. Hence St. Paul's writings, intensely personal as they are, do not enable us to reconstruct the Pharisaic consciousness of the man; we know only his Christian consciousness, and how sin and other things were seen and understood there.

St. Paul nowhere gives a formal definition of sin: it was so well known in all its modes to need that. But it is apparent from such passages as Romans iii. 20 (*διὰ γὰρ νόμου ἡ γινώσις ἁμαρτίας*) and v. 13 (*ἁμαρτία δὲ οὐκ ἐλλογεῖται, μὴ νόμος*) that it has to be defined in the first instance by relation to law. "I had not known sin," he says elsewhere (chap. vii. 7), "except *διὰ νόμου*." No doubt, if we go back to St. Paul's experience as a Pharisee, and the failures of those days (which are surely not excluded by the boasting of Philippians iii. 6, "touching the righteousness which is in the law blameless"), the law referred to here is the law of Moses. It was in the form of the law of Moses that law first proved a reality for the Apostle. Not, we may suppose, because it was Moses' law; on the contrary, it was the law of God.¹ Formally, Paul made no distinctions in it: he was under obligation to God to keep it all. What we call ritual and what we call moral were alike binding on him. But if we confine ourselves to the Epistle

¹ A curious attempt is sometimes made to represent Paul as disparaging the law, the reason alleged being that he never expressly connects it with God as he does the promises. This is very misleading. It is natural for Paul to speak of the promises of God with the emphasis he uses, because it is on the fact that the promises are God's that their inviolability, for which he is arguing, depends. It is natural, too, because as manifestations of His grace the whole explanation of the promises lies in God. But the law has another, though not a less divine, standing. It belongs not to God only, but to the whole constitution of things. It is the law of man and of the world as well as of God.

to the Romans, we see that for the conscience of the Christian Apostle—for the doctrine of sin, as it is of interest to a Christian man—that which is moral alone comes into view. The ceremonial part of the law has, in point of fact, lapsed: on what principle it is not here needful to enquire. Sin means the violation of the commandments in which the law is unfolded, the neglect or the transgression of its “Thou shalt” or “Thou shalt not.” In particular, or so at least it seems on the first retrospect, it means doing what God in His law has forbidden.

To define sin, however, simply as the violation of the law given by Moses would have carried the Apostle but a little way in his vocation. He had such a conception both of sin and of righteousness as impelled him to preach the gospel to all men, Gentiles as well as Jews. He brought against all the charge that they were under sin (chap. iii. 9). But if sin can only be defined by relation to law, and is, in point of fact, defined for Jews by relation to the Mosaic law, then, in order to put Jews and Gentiles on the same footing as sinners to whom a righteousness of God is essential, Paul must be able in some way to strip law in its Mosaic embodiment of all that is accidental to it; he must be able to generalize the conception of law, and to show that all that is vital in it, everything in virtue of which sin has to be defined in relation to it, has existence among, and validity for, Gentiles as well as Jews. In the Epistle to the Romans this is definitely, though it might seem incidentally, done in various ways.

It is done, for instance, in the passage beginning with chap. i. 19, “That which may be known of God is manifest in them.” Here the Apostle argues that, in the constitution of nature and in man’s relation to it, there is such a revelation of God given as puts man under religious and therefore under moral obligations to God, and renders him inexcusable—we may even say, from the theological stand-

point of the Apostle, was meant to render him inexcusable—if he failed to satisfy these obligations. It is true that the word *law* is not used in this section. But when we are confronted with a revelation of God's eternal power and divinity, binding man to a life of adoring gratitude, and when we see that infidelity to that revelation issues in unutterable moral debasement, how else can we describe the conditions under which men live than by saying that they live under law? True, it is not the Mosaic law. It is not an institution or a code. But it is a Divine law, and the Mosaic law can be no more. It connects the life of men as effectively as the Mosaic law with responsibility to God. It produces as surely in the conscience the conviction that they who live in wanton defiance of it are unworthy to live at all (i. 32). Hence the Gentile understands as well as the Jew that the wages of sin is death. This is no survival of primitive mythology, but a spontaneous and universally intelligible expression of the one truth on which all morality rests. The man who is not good—the man whose being does not respond to the revelation of God and fulfil the law involved in that revelation—has no right *to be*. But I repeat, to say this is to say that Law is real for all men.

It is a more explicit generalizing of the idea of law which we find in chap. ii. 14 ff.: "When Gentiles who have not law (or the law) do by nature the things of the law, these having not the law are a law to themselves," etc. An attempt is made by Feine, in his treatise *Das gesetzesfreie Evangelium des Paulus*, to show that this passage can only refer to Gentile Christians, who are a law to themselves because they have received the Spirit of Christ, in which the law is sublimated and made more potent than the flesh; but both *φύσει* in v. 14 and *κατηγορούντων* in v. 15 are inconsistent with such an idea. The Jew rested on his Law, and the point of this passage is that what the law ought to have produced among the Jews and did not was

sometimes produced among the Gentiles, where the law of the Jews had never been heard of. The only possible explanation of this is that the law must have some other mode of being besides that with which the Jew was familiar. It must be written elsewhere as well as on the tables of stone or the parchments of the scribes. It must speak from other shrines as well as from the ark or from the cloud on Sinai. It must, in a word, belong to Nature, as well as to history : it must be universal as well as national. This is what Paul is explaining here. There are Gentiles who do "by nature" the things of the (Jewish) law. They have "the work which the law prescribes written on their hearts." They have a conscience which passes judgment on their actions—a conscience which assents to the law of God. Their life is full of moral exercises ; their thoughts bring accusations against each other, or make defences. Paul cannot interpret the phenomena of Gentile any more than of Jewish life without subsuming it under the category of Law ; but in the very act of doing so, Law loses its limited, Jewish, historical character ; it becomes a conception of universal import.

It may also be said that the passage at the end of chap. ii., in which Paul distinguishes the Jew outwardly from the Jew inwardly, rests upon this enlarging and spiritualizing of the conception of Law. The Jew inwardly is in truth a person to whom that which is simply Jewish in the law has no longer importance ; it is not its historical but its eternal content, not its national but its divine and human significance, which has justice done to it in his life. The same justice, however, may be done to it in the life of the Gentile : and accordingly, so far from Law being that which separates the Gentile from the Jew, it is, in this its true and abiding meaning, the ground on which Jew and Gentile meet. All men without distinction have such a revelation of God as implies moral obligations toward Him—that is,

all are under law. All men, also, have failed to meet these obligations—that is, all are under sin. It is from the last proposition St. Paul starts, and it is in working out its presuppositions that he attains to the universal conception of law.

Nothing is of greater importance for the understanding of the Apostle's theology than a correct estimate of this conception. It underlies all his thinking. The moral world would be to him an unintelligible and incoherent place without it; to be more accurate, there could be no moral world without it at all. To banish this generalized conception of law from the relations of God and man is to make religion and morality impossible together. This truth is often overlooked, and the doctrine of the Apostle, in consequence, misrepresented or misread. It is asserted that Paul inherited from Pharisaism a certain legal conception of the relations of God and man, a conception essentially false, and that, though he rose above this conception in his spiritual experience, he was never able dialectically to transcend it in his thoughts. In his theologizing, it is said, he always starts from a forensic and judicial basis. It is this leaven of Pharisaism which puts out the maturer Christian at every turn. It is this which necessitates the peculiar Pauline theory of the atonement—a theory which is but an unreal answer to a question which would never have arisen if Paul had started in his thinking with a Christian instead of a Pharisaic idea of the relations of man and God.

I venture to say that this whole line of thought is both unjust to the Apostle and untrue in itself. It is unjust to the Apostle, for it has been shown above that the historical Jewish conception of the law was not that on which his theology was based. That conception, in the form it had assumed in the Rabbinical schools, might fairly be said to represent the relations of God and man as “forensic.”

The case between them could be stated in terms of statute, and decision given by reference to the code. But Paul, we have seen, had clearly transcended this conception even intellectually. He had been able to generalize the idea of law as something determining the relations of man and God universally, something without which the moral life of man cannot be construed at all. But in this generalized sense law is not open to be characterized by those invidious epithets with which we are so familiar. It is not "forensic," it is not "judicial," it is not even "legal." These question-begging epithets, as Bentham calls them, are irrelevant to it. It is universal, it is human, it is divine. As the form in which the will of God presents itself to the consciousness of man, it has an inevitable, searching, individualizing power of self-application to persons and circumstances to which there is nothing analogous in the "judicial" or "forensic" sphere. As the moral obligation to which man's consciousness bears witness in the presence of God, it is free from that element of the arbitrary and conventional which attaches to the noblest statutes and institutes of man. It is quite unreal to contrast *legal*, as is habitually done, with *personal*, and to say that the relations of God and man are personal, not legal. It is true they are not "legal" in the question-begging sense referred to above, but they are at once personal and determined by law. Apart from their determination by law, which introduces into personal relations a universal element, these relations would be a mere caprice, having no moral meaning or value. It is the determination of the personal by something having universal significance—the combination, in other words, of personality and law—which constitutes the ethical, and it is this on which St. Paul builds. The relations of God and man are ethical—this is his fundamental truth; they are personal relations which live and move and have their being in eternal law; if it were not so,

nobody could think of them, and it would not be worth while for anybody to speak of them. But because it is so, law in the universal sense to which Paul has raised it in the interpretation of his gospel is something from which we can never escape. It is the permanent element in all religious dispensations, to which justice must always be done. It is the only principle of moral valuation which the Apostle knows. We may exclude from Christianity with the utmost decision all that is legal and Pharisaic, all that is statutory, forensic, judicial, or otherwise opprobrious, but the fact remains that the chief end of Christianity itself is that the righteousness of the law may be fulfilled in us (chap. viii. 4). It is not robbing God of His freedom or of His grace, it is not exalting an abstraction of our own minds above the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, to say that God Himself must in all things do right by this law. He must do right by it even when He works the moral miracle of justifying the ungodly; He must be just Himself in justifying believers in Jesus. And He must do right by it again, and surely will, when He judges men at last according to their works, *i.e.* according to the manner in which they have in their life responded to and satisfied that law in virtue of which their relation to Him is capable of having moral worth.

JAMES DENNEY.

SCIENTIFIC LIGHTS ON RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS.

II.

THE SCIENTIFIC POSSIBILITY OF REVELATION.

IN my previous study I came to the conclusion that the modern doctrine of the unity of species has tended to make Man more at home in Nature—has given back to him much of that importance which he lost by the eclipse of the old astronomy. If there is only one kind of life in the universe—if man, animal, plant, crystal, the dynamical powers of Nature, and the great Primal Force which is behind them, is each a form of the same existence, it follows that there is no reason for Man's appalling sense of humility. In the acceptance of such a doctrine—and evolution demands its acceptance—we shall receive the impression which men often get by far travelling—that the world is small.

But I am disposed to claim more for this doctrine of the unity of species. Not only does it redeem Man from his sense of insignificance; it furnishes the first ground for a Divine revelation. It is popularly thought that the old theory of separate creations was more favourable to the belief in communion with God than is the new theory of unity of species. I am convinced it is the reverse. There is no reason whatever why a creator should have any intercourse with the thing he has created. Unless the created thing is made in the creator's image, the fact of creation does not bring it one whit nearer to its maker. If I could, this moment, form a stone out of nothing, that stone would be no nearer to me by reason of my act than any stone of the quarry. But if, without any new creation at all, I should disconnect a portion of my life and surround it with a separate wall—in other words, if I should become the father of another living soul, there would be between me and that soul a possibility of the deepest communion. The stone, which was supposed to come by creation, would be

outside of me; the child, which confessedly came from evolution, would sooner or later be in daily communion with my spirit.

The truth is, unless we have such a clause as "made in the image of God," there is far more religious comfort in the doctrine of Evolution than in the doctrine of Creation. And why? Because the doctrine of Evolution gives more hope of Divine *communion* than the doctrine of Creation. Creation implies inequality. If I have been created by the Spirit of Nature, that is an argument rather against than in favour of my *fellowship* with that spirit. Fellowship demands a common level; it can only exist on some point where two beings are united. But a creator and his creatures are on different levels. They may be united *in spite of* that relation, but never by reason of that relation. The creator is at the top of a ladder; the creature is at the foot of it. That fact is in itself a disqualification for communion. It may be supplemented by future facts which bridge the gulf, but in itself it *is* a gulf. Religious communion implies that God and Man are, for the moment, standing on equal ground; creation implies that they are standing on *unequal* ground. If Man had no doctrine but the belief in creation, there would not exist even the basis for a religious worship.

But now take the other alternative. Let us suppose that Man is not created by, but evolved from, the Spirit of Nature: what will then be his position as regards the hope of Divine fellowship? It will be one of exceeding brightness. If creation by the Spirit of Nature implies inequality with that Spirit, evolution *from* the Spirit of Nature does not. Evolution implies a common element. If I have *come out of* Nature, I am entitled to call Nature my father. If I am merely *created* by Nature, I am not. I am not made the father of a stone by creating that stone, because to create a thing does not make that thing resemble me. But I become the father of a child by giving life to

that child. And why? Precisely because that life is not created. It is a part of myself. It is the transmission of my own nature, the reproduction of my essence in a separate form. What makes this child a possible object of communion with my soul is the fact that it has not been created out of nothing, but evolved out of my life.

So is it with Man's claim to the fatherhood of God. It has a more sure footing in the doctrine of Evolution than in the doctrine of Creation. If God is my Father, it is not because He has created me, but because I bear His image. I am more likely to bear His image on the principle of evolution than on the principle of creation. Creation makes me a new product—new even to God. If I am new to God, how can I assume that there will be a congruity between His Spirit and mine! But if I have come from evolution, I have a right to expect that congruity. I am already, in that case, a part of the Primal Force which lies at the basis of all things, and which is of one species with all things. I am in constitutional sympathy with the life of Nature. I have sprung from that life—I have not been created by it. It is not merely the author, it is the fountain, of my being. It bears the same relation to me as I do to my child. It ought to have a life kindred to mine, a soul tuned to mine, a sympathy responsive to mine. I cannot think of the Primal Force as alien to me. It belongs to the same species. I am a part of the original ocean, an arm of the great sea. Doubtless I am an environed part—hemmed in by limits, encircled in creeks and bays. But the water is the same. Shall I not have converse with the parent sea! Shall I not hear the echo of the outside waves! Shall I not receive the breezes from the mighty main! Shall I not be refreshed from time to time by wafted drops of spray from the bosom of the infinite deep!

So may well ask the believer in evolution! His claim to revelation, Divine communion, the reception of the spray-

drops from the ocean, rests, so far, on a sure foundation—a foundation more sure than can ever be afforded by the mere belief in God as a creator. His faith in the power to catch the spray-drops rests on a belief which belongs specially to the doctrine of Evolution—the conviction that that arm of the sea which he calls his life is composed of the same materials as those which constitute that vast deep called the Life of Nature. If he catches the spray-drops, if he receives the breezes, if he hears the rolling of the outer waves, it is because the water of his life, though enclosed in creek and bay, is already one in essence with the waters of that mighty sea on which these forces play.

So far all is clear. So far the evolutionist would seem to have a religious advantage over the creationist—to be nearer to the possibility of a Divine revelation. But now there comes up that qualifying clause, “enclosed in creek and bay.” Conceding that the little arm of the sea I call my life is one in essence with the parent ocean, there remains the fact that it *is* enclosed. However much it may be identical in essence, is it not separated in space! Has it not become land-locked, walled in, barred from its native breezes! It is here that the real religious difficulty of the evolutionist is supposed to lie. We say to him: “There is a barrier between you and the great sea. However much the waves of your individual life may be identical with the waves of outside life, the fact remains that these *are* outside and yours inside. There is a chain dividing your waters from the waters of the vast ocean—a massive chain, a closely-riveted chain. How is the spray to leap over? How is the barrier to be surmounted? Where is there to be found an opening by which a breath of the great outside ocean can pass to a region so inland, to a life so cribbed, cabined, and confined? Must not your voice be ever the hopeless cry, ‘Behind the veil! behind the veil!’”!

But the evolutionist can answer, No. For you will

observe that in this question of ours there is an assumption. We assume that the spray can only reach the evolutionist by leaping over the chain. In other words, we take it for granted that, if a revelation is to be made from God to Man, it can only be by breaking some of the links of Nature. There is no need that the evolutionist, of all men, should admit this. The revelation which he seeks is not one which shall come through a *gap* in the chain. It is a message which shall be given through a *link* in the chain. The communion he seeks is not something which is to come from behind the veil. His God is *not* behind the veil; the veil is a part of Himself—a phase of His Divine existence. Not by escaping the physical forces does he desire to find his God. He would find Him *in* these forces—in the light, in the heat, in the electric current. The veil of Nature is for him a misnomer. Nature is the sum of existence. If there be a Spirit of Nature, that Spirit must be within it, not beyond it. If there be a message from the Spirit of Nature, that message must come *through* it, not by a leaping of the wall. The spray of the vast ocean, if it come at all, must be wafted by no magical influence, but must be borne on the wings of those very forces which men call physical, and which are supposed to constitute the limits of Man.

Now, I have no hesitation in saying that this demand of the evolutionist is not only scientific, but profoundly in harmony with the ripest development of religious faith. For, in these modern days, there is an ever-growing conviction that even Man's *immortal* hopes lie not behind the veil. He has always thought of his dead as passing into the unseen; but in past ages the unseen was the unphysical. The place of the departed was for him, in the old time, a place above the heavens. At the very least, it was above *our* heavens. If it had material conditions, they were conditions very different from those now in operation. "Realms

of light beyond the sky" was the phrase that familiarly expressed the view commonly entertained. The impression was that everything within sight was thoroughly known to Man. It was no use to seek a home for his dead within the present circle of things. Did he not know all about that circle! Had not his telescope swept its stars and traversed its spaces! Was not this emphatically the seen world, the manifested world, the world of sight and sense! So thought and said our forefathers. But their descendants have had an awakening. A change has come over the spirit of our dream. This so-called world of sense has revealed itself to be a mystery. We have made a discovery. We have found that to seek the unseen we do not need to picture "realms of light beyond the sky." We have found that the unseen exists within reach of our hand, within sound of our voice. This region in which we dwell is itself the Silent Land, the unknown country, the bourne which sends no traveller to visit our shores. We are living every day, every hour, every moment, in the heart of a physical world to which we are deaf, dumb, and blind—are surrounded by forms which we perceive not, encircled by voices which we hear not, touched by influences which make no impression on any of our existing senses.

There are, then, actually around us, within range of our eye, nay, within stretch of our hand, manifestations of Nature of which we have no conception. We know that at the present moment there is beating on every atom of our body what I can only describe as a rushing, mighty wind. We call it Ether; but this is a mere metaphorical name. We know not what it is; eye has not seen it, ear has not heard it, heart has not conceived it. We only discern its *effects*—as we should discern in the morning the effects of a nightly storm which we had not witnessed. Let me speak of it just now under the metaphor of a storm, as that will best express my present meaning. I will say,

then, that this storm one day began to beat against that house we call "the body." This house had originally neither door nor window; and the tenant knew nothing whatever of the outside world, not even that an outside world existed. But, as the ether storm kept vibrating, it began to bore apertures—little openings through which the tenant could look out. In proportion to the strength of the vibration was the size of the aperture, and in proportion to the size of the aperture was the tenant's view of the world outside. By degrees there were made five little openings, popularly called the five senses. In the course of long ages this is all the progress the tenant has made in a knowledge of the outside world. That is a metaphorical but a perfectly scientific statement of the case. We are waiting for the ether storm to make more apertures, to give us a wider view of the world in which we dwell. *That* is the revelation we ask from God. It is no lifting of a mystical curtain; it is no lifting of a curtain at all. The curtain is raised already. The banquet is already spread before us. What we want is a wider view of the table. We want the opening of additional apertures through extended vibrations of the ether storm.

To drop the metaphor, these vibrations of the ether are the vibrations of that very chain which we have so much dreaded as an obstacle to the possibility of revelation. The ether is precisely that chain which binds all things. Nothing can get in from the outside; that must be admitted. In truth, there is no outside; the chain includes everything, heaven and earth alike. Yet so far is this from being an *obstacle* to revelation that it is actually the hope of revelation. It is on the links of the ether chain that all revelation has hitherto moved; it is by the vibrations of that chain that all messages have hitherto been transmitted. We have seen that messages *have* been transmitted. We have seen that originally the tenant of the

house did not know that there was "an outside world at all. We have seen how, gradually, little apertures were opened giving him an ever-increasing glimpse of what science calls Nature, what religion terms the Face of God. And what has opened these apertures? It is the vibrating of the ether chain. What has made me cognisant of the touch of another hand? It is the vibrating of the ether chain. What has taught me the taste of a peach or the odour of a flower? It is the vibrating of the ether chain. What has wakened me to the voices of a great multitude which no man can number? It is the vibrating of the ether chain. What has revealed to me the presence of starry worlds—the existence of many mansions in the house of the Father? It is the vibrating of the ether chain.

The truth is, Nature, as interpreted by the modern scientist, is essentially a revealing medium. The greater part of it is doubtless still in shadow; but where the shadows have been dispelled the dispelling has been effected by herself—by her own ether chain. Nature has never kept her secrets. The ether tells everything—wireless telegraphy proves that. Nature has not even kept her secrets among the things which to us are still in shadow. They are in shadow, not by reason of her reticence, but by reason of our present incompetence. The vibrating ether has not yet succeeded in making a sufficient number of apertures to give the tenant a perfect view. The telegrams are already waiting for us if we had the eyes to read them. The difficulty of getting a message from the Unknown does not lie with Nature. In fact, the message is already given—transmitted on the links of the ether chain. Nature has done *her* part—to put it religiously, God has done His part. The obstacle lies in *me*; science and religion are alike agreed about that; and it is a great thing to be agreed about. It is an admission which lifts the weight of responsibility from the laws of Nature. It forbids us any longer

to murmur against the evolutionary chain—to say that the desert is keeping us from the Promised Land. Let me examine the point for a moment.

If a man announced to-day that, standing in broad daylight and in his full waking consciousness, he clearly saw mingling with the stream of the living a multitude of men and women who were known to have departed this life, the statement would be at once greeted as a hallucination. To credit it would be stigmatized as the belief in a miracle, and therefore unscientific. Now, I will concede at once that it would be the averment of an abnormal experience; and in this light I am quite willing to call it the proclaiming of a miracle. But the question which I ask is this, Where would the miracle lie? Not in the thing seen, but only in the seeing it. It would be no miracle that such a spectacle should be manifested by *Nature*, but only that Man should have a faculty to discern the manifestation. No scientific man in the world would say that such a revelation was beyond the powers of Nature to make; the most he could say would be that it was beyond the powers of humanity to receive. It is scientifically certain that you and I are at this moment in the presence of myriad natural existences of which we have no cognisance. It is scientifically probable that among these existences there are forms of life and intelligence. It is scientifically possible that among these forms of life and intelligence there are some of those whom we call "the dead." There may be, nay, there is, a population of our terrestrial atmosphere of which we are as ignorant as we are of the population of the planets. Its presence is a fact; its nature is a mystery. There is a multitude of unseen forms around us, physical or vital. They are thronging us, they are touching us. Compared to their number, all the united objects of the visible earth are but as a single wave on the heaving breast of ocean. Nature has done *her* part in the revealing

process; she is "waiting for the manifestation of the sons of God."

Will she wait in vain? will she wait for ever? That is the remaining question. Our limit to knowledge does not lie in the boundaries of Nature; it lies in the faculties of the human soul, in the paucity of those apertures which the ether has as yet effected. Will it ever effect more? Will the time ever come when the powers of Man will do Nature justice, when the enlargement of his mental endowments will enable him to behold the richness of that feast which the bounty of the universe has already spread before him?

It might seem at first sight that this is a question before which science must be dumb—a question which religious faith alone can answer. And yet it is precisely the question on which evolutionary science should, of all sciences, be the most optimistic. What is that power which in the past has enlarged the faculties of man? It is Evolution. The history of Evolution in the region of life is simply the history of a process of enlargement. Every step has been the unfolding of a fresh power of communion with that Nature which to the Theist is the voice of God. At every stage of life's journey a new door has opened. It is a long stretch from the sensitive plant to the sentient man; how has it been compassed? Simply by the opening of these new doors. Every man of science has been the witness of an Apocalypse more remarkable than that which John of Patmos saw. He has seen life imprisoned at first in a rayless dungeon and unconscious of a world outside. He has seen life waking to its earliest sense of a region external to itself, becoming aware that there is something on the outside, lying at the door. He has seen life coming to the knowledge that there are things *beyond* its contact—things which it cannot touch, but with which none the less it can commune. He has seen life widening from time to time the range of its vision, beholding ever-expanding circles—

the individual, the family, the tribe, the nation, the continent, the world, the multitude of other worlds, the conception of a physical universe. All these gates into the kingdom have been unbarred by the principle of Evolution.

Now, do you think it scientifically likely that Evolution stopped there? Do you think the thing called spiritual aspiration is not the beginning of another of these openings into a real outward kingdom? All the previous avenues have been such openings. Every feeling has revealed the presence of an external counterpart. Shall the aspiration after a Christ—a moral ideal—be the one blind alley of the universe! Shall the impulse towards perfect beauty, perfect purity, perfect love, be the one impulse which has nothing outside of it! Everything that hitherto has been evolved *by* Nature has been evolved *for* Nature—for the sake of a real world. Has moral aspiration not been evolved by Nature! Would the scientist, of all men, deny its common origin! But, if the aspiration after God and truth has a common origin with all things, has it not a common destiny also! Shall this be the only product of Evolution which has no marriage with reality! Is it scientific to say so! Is it progressive to say so! Is it in accordance with the spirit of the age to say so! Surely, in sympathy with that spirit, we must hold that the moral aspirings of the soul are entitled to a response from the system of the universe!

And what of the future? Is it scientifically likely that Evolution has no more doors to open! Our sidelights have revealed only a fragment of the stage; it is the business of Evolution to reveal the whole stage. Do you think it will stop at the sidelights! Do you think it will even pause at the sidelights! Is it scientific to think that it will! Is not the work great and the time precious! I do not believe that the process of revelation is pausing. I believe that now, as ever, a door is being opened in the perceptions

of the organism. We are looking in a wrong direction for that opening. The Christian longs for the Second Advent; the man tormented by doubt would fain see the First. But both are seeking their revelation in the air—in the parting of a cloud, in the descent of something new. There is no *need* for the clouds to be parted. That which we seek is already here. It is within the brain that the veil must be rent. One little aperture added, nay, one smallest widening of an existing window, might fill our eyes with glory; and the completed stage of individual evolution would probably raise the cry, “The kingdom of God is come!”

G. MATHESON.

*THE PROBLEM OF THE ADDRESS IN THE
SECOND EPISTLE OF JOHN.*

ONE result of the disinterment of the rolls and fragments of papyri which lie amongst the sands of Egypt and the ruins of her almost-forgotten cities has been the illumination which they cast upon existing texts and the increased power which they give us of interpreting them. If no single discovery of lost literary documents had been made at Oxyrhyncus or elsewhere, and we had merely collected the stray papers and letters belonging to the common life of a certain number of centuries, we should still have been abundantly repaid for all the trouble of excavating and exploring, and the toil of decipherment, by the introduction which such papers would give us into the every-day life of the Greek world, especially when we are busied with the history of periods and movements concerning which we are deficient in the ordinary apparatus for interpreting what was happening and what was being thought.

The reaction of what has been recovered upon what has been imperfectly understood is conspicuous in the New Testament, and, above all, in those parts which are most popular in character, the epistolary sections. It has been shown, for instance, in this journal, that we can detect in St. Paul's letters a conventional element, which would perhaps never have been suspected if the parallels had not been presented to us in the papyri; and that the manner of composition of these letters, especially where they are replies incorporating the language of previous communications, is often so transparent and so characteristic as to require that whole sections of standard commentaries should be rewritten, and that the criteria of genuineness or falsity should themselves be judged by the parallels which can be produced from recovered documents.

I was interested recently in noticing that a composition as small and insignificant as the second Epistle of John was capable of further elucidation from the study of extant papyri, and that it was possible for us not only to definitely settle the long-disputed question as to whether the letter was written to a woman or a church, but also to make important suggestions as to what manner of woman it was (for it certainly is a real letter written by a real man to a real woman) to whom the missive was sent. That is to say, one more step can be taken in the abstraction of the Epistles of the New Testament from the region of theology and their translation into the (not always adjacent) region of humanity.¹

There are certain letters in the New Testament which may correctly be described as love letters, even though the lovers should be an apostle and a church. If I remember rightly, I once pointed out how Paul, in writing to the Philippians, had stolen the lover's vocabulary, and called his people "loved and longed-for, joy and crown," and the like. But in such expressions Paul is no monopolist; it was a time of fervent charity, and what affected one large-hearted saint may easily be found amongst the other great-hearts of the period; or if, in consequence of the documents being scant, the general proofs of apostolic tenderness and sympathy are incomplete, the imagination, acting under instructions from what is extant, will fill in the blanks

¹ Dr. Westcott, in his commentary on the Epistle, regards the problem upon which we are engaged as insoluble. In his opening sentences he observes, "Whatever may be the interpretation of the individual address in *vv.* 5, 12, the main part of the letter is addressed to more readers than one." Later on he says, "All these notions of a personal address, moreover, are unsupported by such allusions in the letter as might be expected to mark an individual relationship"; and sums up the results of his investigations as follows: "On the whole it is best to recognise that the problem of the address is insoluble with our present knowledge. It is not unlikely that it contains some allusion, intelligible under the original circumstances, to which we have lost the key. But the general tenour of the letter favours the opinion that it was sent to a community and not to one believer."

and supply for us what is lacking to the portrait of the Christian man of the first period.

The second Epistle of John is, like the Epistle to the Philippians, a love letter; that follows from the language throughout; whether it be a friend or a church, whose affection is sought and to whom reciprocity is promised; it can be deduced from the words, "I beseech you (it is not a new command, but the old one which we had from the first) let us love one another." Given such a statement, and a resolute desire not to reduce it to mere platitude, how would the extant papyri elucidate the statement and assist our determination to understand the sentence as it was meant to be taken by the writer? The text of the Epistle from which we were quoting runs as follows:

καὶ νῦν ἐρωτῶ σε, κυρία, οὐχ ὡς ἐντολὴν γράφων σοι καινῇ,
ἀλλὰ ἣν εἶχαμεν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, ἵνα ἀγαπῶμεν ἀλλήλους.

Here the revising translators give us, "And now I beseech thee, lady," with an American note added suggesting a marginal reading of "Cyria" instead of "lady." But neither of the two boards of revision seems to have suspected that Kyria was a term of endearment, and neither a title of dignity nor a proper name; so far from its being translatable in the elevated sense of "Madam," the papyri tell quite a different tale, and explode completely the two notions that the letter is addressed either to a church or to a prehistoric Countess of Huntingdon.¹

For instance amongst the Oxyrhyncus papyri, there is one (No. cxii.) in which a gentleman invites a lady friend (probably a relative) to come from Oxyrhyncus and attend a religious festival. She is to send word whether she will come by donkey or by boat, and arrangements will be made to fetch her. Here is the letter:

¹ The perplexity is, as might be expected, reflected in the text of extant MSS., which suggest at the close of the letter to read ἐκκλησίας for ἐκλεκτῆς, and some of which add "in Ephesus."

Χαίροις, κυρία μου Σερηνία, παρὰ Πετοσείριος. Πᾶν ποιήσον, κυρία, ἐξελθεῖν τῇ κ' τοῖς γενεθλίοις τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ δῆλωσόν μοι ἢ πλοίῳ ἐξέρχῃ ἢ ὄνῳ ἵνα πεμφθῇ, σοι· ἀλλ' ὅρα μὴ ἀμελήσῃς, κυρία. ἔρρωσθαί σε εὖχομαι πολλοῖς χρόνοις.

How should we translate this thrice-repeated *κυρία*? Should it be the dignified “lady” of the Bible, or the marginal “Cyria” of the American board? The latter is excluded by the fact that the lady’s name is Serenia. And as to the former, let us see how Messrs. Grenfell and Hunt would translate it for us.

“Greeting, my dear Serenia, from Petosiris. Be sure, dear, to come up on the 20th for the birthday festival of the god, and let me know whether you are coming by boat or by donkey, in order that we may send for you accordingly. Take care¹ not to forget. I pray for your continued health.”

There can be no doubt that this is the right way to translate the letter; and if that is the correct method for an Oxyrhyncus letter of, say, the third century, why should a different method be adopted in St. John and in the first century?

But here is another example from the same collection (No. cxxiii.) somewhat more colourless, where a father writes to his son on some official business. I give the translation, only adding the Greek of expressions that might be doubtful.

To my son, Master Dionysotheon, greeting from your father (κυρίῳ μου νίῳ Διονυσοθέωνι ὁ πατὴρ χαίρειν).

As an opportunity was afforded me by some one going up to you, I could not miss this chance of addressing you. I have been very much surprised, my son, at not receiving hitherto a letter from you to tell me how you are. Nevertheless, sir (δέσποτά μοι), answer me with all

¹ The word “dear” has been omitted, accidentally as I suppose.

speed, for I am quite distressed to have heard nothing from you. Please go to my brother Theodorus and make him look after Timotheus, and tell him to get ready for going in to attend. Already the notaries of the other towns have acquainted their colleagues, and they have come in. Let him remember when he enters that he must wear the proper dress, that he may enter prepared. Take care they do not allow us to fail in coming to an understanding with each other, as we know that the same rule applies to all. For the orders which we received were, to wear cloaks when we entered. Therefore let Timotheus, when he comes, come prepared to attend. I salute my sweetest daughter Macaria and my mistress (τὴν δεσποίνην (*sic*) μοι) your mother and all the family by name (καὶ ὅλους τοὺς ἡμῶν κατ' ὄνομα). I pray for your lasting health, my son (ἔρρωσθαί σε εὖχομαι πολλοῖς χρόνοις, κύριε υἱέ).

The writer of this letter is evidently a stickler for proprieties; his "little brief authority" as a scrivener, or whatever it was, is reflected in the letter; he not only is punctilious himself, but wishes his son to acquire the characteristic and make it permanent. How should we translate the expression κύριε υἱέ at the end of the letter? Should it be "sir son," or "honoured son"? That would harmonize with the elevated δέσποτά μοι, of the middle of the letter, and with the expression "my lady your mother"; but it is difficult to believe that the writer would express himself so stiltedly in the closing salutations, where affection has clearly got the better of propriety. And I should close the letter with the words "my dear son," in seeking for the nearest English equivalent. And we should then read the opening words, not as in Grenfell and Hunt, "To my son, Master Dionysotheon" (for κυρίῳ belongs with υἱῷ, as the close of the letter attests), but "To my dear son, Dionysotheon," etc.

We thus obtain a parallel to the second Epistle of John,

which opens with ὁ πρεσβύτερος ἐκλεκτῇ κυρίᾳ, and returns to the κυρία (of endearment) lower down in the letter; while the parallel is reinforced by the letter to "dear Serenia," from Pctosiris, in which the same phenomenon occurs. The reader will have noticed, in passing, the epistolary parallels to the Johannine letters, which are furnished by the closing salutations of the letters referred to.

It may, perhaps, be thought that we have not done full justice to the formalism of the tabularius whose letter we have quoted, and that in conceding the fondness for dignified speech we have practically allowed that the old gentleman might call his son by the title κύριος without betraying any affection. There are parallel cases in our own language where affection is lost in formality. For instance, Macaulay speaks of the letters of Warren Hastings to his wife as being "tender, and full of indications of esteem and confidence, but at the same time more ceremonious than is usual in so intimate a relation. The solemn courtesy with which he compliments 'his elegant Marian' reminds us now and then of the dignified air with which Sir Charles Grandison bowed over Miss Byron's hand in the cedar parlour."

In order to dispel this lingering fondness for a ceremonious interpretation of κύριος, the best way is to reinforce the evidence. Here is another specimen from the recently published Fayum papyri, belonging to the third century, and peculiarly rich in epistolary parallels to the New Testament.

Μύσθης Σεραπάμμωνι τῷ ἀδελφῷ πλεῖστα χαίρειν. Πρὸ
μὲν πάντων εὐχομαί σε ὑγιαίνειν, καὶ τὸ προσκύνημά σου ποιῶ
κατ' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν παρὰ τοῖς ἐνθάδε θεοῖς· γεινώσκειν σε
θέλω, κύριέ [μου ὅ]τι κτέ.

Then, after a salutation to Eunice, τὴν ἀδελφήν σου, καὶ

τὸν πατέρα σου, he ends with ἐρρῶσταί σε εὐχομαι πανοικεί, κύριέ μου.

Here, then, is a case in which a man addresses his own brother as κύριέ μου, and this time there is no suspicion of an artificial elevation of the speech, so that the expression must be affectionate rather than official.

We shall conclude, then, that κυρία in 2 John is a term of endearment, and should be so translated. At the least it should be "dear lady," rather than "lady," and perhaps "dear friend" would be better. It is very nearly equivalent to ἀγαπητός in the parallel sentence of the third Epistle, evidently written at the same time. That is conclusive against any other interpretation of the Epistle than that it is a real letter to a real woman. The Church (at Ephesus or anywhere else) is not to be thought of. Dr. Westcott's ambiguous solution of an insoluble problem may be banished.

But if it was a real woman that was addressed, is there anything that can with reasonable probability be affirmed of her, over and above the obvious statements about her children, and her sister, and her sister's children?

I do not know whether it has ever been noticed that this Epistle, small as it is, is streaked with a quotation from the Old Testament. In v. 8 the writer says, "βλέπετε ἑαυτοὺς ἵνα μὴ ἀπολέσητε τὴν ἡργασίαν, ἀλλὰ μισθὸν πλήρη¹ ἀπολάβητε.

The writer is quoting from the blessing of Boaz to Ruth, as may be seen by comparing his language with Ruth iii. 12.²

ἀποτίσαι κύριος τὴν ἔργασίαν σου γένοιτο ὁ μισθός σου
πλήρης παρὰ κυρίου θεοῦ Ἰσραήλ.

¹ We should probably restore the indeclinable πλήρης, for which there is some stray manuscript authority.

² The parallel is given in Westcott, *ad loc.*, but not so as to identify a quotation, and in the Westcott and Hort New Testament the words are printed in ordinary type.

The parallel would be suggestive if we had merely the allusion to a certain "full reward" or "wages in full," which occurs in the two passages; but the added parallel between *ἐργασίαν* and *ἡργασάμεθα* renders it certain that the writer is drawing on the language of the Septuagint. Now I think we may take it for granted that in such a simple composition as this letter, which is altogether spontaneous in its expressions, except where custom had prescribed the forms of salutation and address, there was nothing to provoke quotation from Ruth, except the provocation of the people involved. The lady addressed must have been a second Ruth, and the writer is addressing her much as Milton did a lady to whom one of his sonnets was dedicated:

The better part with Mary and with Ruth
Thou chosen hast.

Ruth is the typical female proselyte, and the blessing of the full reward is the blessing upon a proselyte, for it is "a full wages from the God of Israel under whose wings thou art come to trust." From which we infer that what provoked the parallelism of the language in the Johannine letter was the fact that the person addressed had come into the fellowship of the Church from without, and was a Gentile Christian. And although we might be tempted at first to suggest (looking at the matter from a modern point of view) that all Christians come into the Church from without, we must remember that this is not the case in the early Church. Here there was a wide gulf for a while between the believing Jew and the believing Gentile, and it took years of teaching and quite a number of oracles to set even the Apostles right on the truth that there was in Christ Jesus neither Greek nor Jew. So that we must not be surprised if the converts amongst the women in the early Church, who had come from without, should be

reminded of their Moabite origin long after they had obtained a place in the fellowship of Israel. "Ye were once Gentiles," says St. Paul to the Ephesians; and Paul was the last man to have unnecessarily remembered or made such a distinction. If he made it, it was because the distinction was commonly recognised.

We infer, then, that St. John's dear friend in the Epistle belonged to the tribe of Ruth, and that this is the reason for the coincidence in language between the Old and New Testaments to which we have referred. May we go a step further, and say that the anonymous lady was not only a Gentile proselyte, and so of the tribe of Ruth, but that she was also, like Ruth (a fact which we easily forget), a widow, and has on this account a second mark of tribal affinity? In favour of this belief there is a concurrence of evidence from two sides: (1) that her children are mentioned, (2) that no allusion is made to her husband, who is not even referred to in the salutations. We can scarcely evade the conclusion that the husband was dead, unless we elect to find him in the beloved Gaius of the third Epistle (an Epistle which certainly was written at the very same time). But against this alternative we have to set the evidence of the salutations, which in the first of the pair of Epistles do not mention Gaius, and in the second Epistle of the pair do not include any greeting from the sister's children to the one who might be assumed to be their uncle. From which it seems a fair inference that the anonymous lady is not the companion of Gaius, but a widow with a family. That is as far as our investigation takes us.

We shall be content if we have shown, or rendered probable, that the anonymous lady was a real person, a Gentile proselyte, and a widow who brought up her children in the faith that she had herself embraced. If she is not to remain anonymous, perhaps she may be called Electa. But in that case a difficulty will arise as to the

“elect sister” who is referred to at the end of the Epistle. Perhaps the word ἐκλεκτῆς is out of order at this point, though it is omitted, as far as I know, in only a single cursive.

But, in any case, we are not making an exhaustive discussion of the Epistle and its difficulties, and may leave some of the problems to others—a few berries, at least, in the top of the olive tree.

J. RENDEL HARRIS.

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

III.

IMMORTALITY IN THE EARLY CHURCH.

IN my first paper we saw that Plato taught that the soul of man is immortal, *i.e.* that, for good or ill, immortality is its inalienable attribute; in contrast, as we saw in my second paper, to Christ and His Apostles, who taught that incorruptibility—*i.e.* a state without decay—and eternal life are the reward awaiting the righteous, whereas destruction awaits the wicked. We shall now consider what the early Christian writers, living in an intellectual environment greatly influenced by the teaching of Plato, said about the immortality of the soul and about the eternal life promised by Christ to the righteous.

The earliest Christian writers reproduce the thought, and in large measure the language, of the New Testament, and say nothing about, or reject, the immortality of the soul. CLEMENT OF ROME, in his *Epistle To the Corinthians*, chap. 35, speaks of "life in immortality" as a gift of God to the righteous. So IGNATIUS, *To Polycarp*, chap. 2, "Be sober, as God's athlete: the prize is incorruptibility and life eternal." He writes *To the Magnesians*, chap. 20, about "the medicine of immortality, an antidote so as not to die but to live in Christ Jesus always."

In JUSTIN'S *Dialogue with Trypho*, chaps. 5, 6, we have a conversation of the writer with an aged Christian about the immortality of the soul as taught by Plato. This doctrine, both speakers repudiate on the ground that the soul has been begotten, and therefore cannot be immortal. The old man continues, "I do not say that all souls die: for that were truly a piece of good fortune for the wicked." (This means, apparently, that they do not die when the body dies.) "The souls of the pious remain in a better

place; while those of the unjust and the wicked are in a worse, waiting for the time of judgment. Thus some who have appeared worthy of God never die; but others are punished so long as God wills them to exist and be punished. . . . Now the soul partakes of life, since God wills it to live. Thus then it will not even partake of life when God does not will it to live. For, to live is not its attribute, as it is God's; but, as a man does not live always and the soul is not for ever joined to the body, since whenever this harmony must be broken up the soul leaves the body and the man exists no longer, even so, whenever the body must cease to exist, the spirit of life is removed from it and there is no more soul, but it goes back to the place from whence it was taken." The whole dialogue leaves no room to doubt that Justin did not hold Plato's doctrine of the endless permanence of all human souls.

THEOPHILUS *To Autolycus*, book ii. 27, writes: "But some will say to us, Was man by nature mortal? Certainly not. Was he then immortal? Neither do we affirm this. But one will say, Was he then nothing? Not even this hits the mark. He was by nature neither mortal nor immortal. For, if He had made him immortal from the beginning, He would have made him God. Again, if He had made him mortal, God would seem to be the cause of his death. Neither then immortal nor yet mortal did He make him, but, as we have said above, capable of both; so that if he should incline to the things of immortality, keeping the commandment of God, he should receive as reward from Him immortality, and should become God; but if, on the other hand, he should turn to the things of death, disobeying God, he should himself be the cause of death to himself. For God made man free, and with power over himself. That, then, which man brought upon himself through carelessness and disobedience, this now God be-

stows on him as a gift, through His own kindness and pity, when men obey Him. For, as man, disobeying, drew death upon himself, so, obeying the will of God, he who desires is able to gain for himself life eternal. For God has given us a law and holy commandments; and every one who keeps these can be saved, and, obtaining the resurrection, can inherit incorruptibility."

Somewhat later IRENÆUS writes, in book ii. 34. 3, that "The Father of all imparts continuance for ever and ever on those who are saved. For life does not arise from us, nor from our own nature, but is bestowed according to the grace of God. And therefore he who shall preserve the life bestowed upon him and give thanks to Him that imparted it, shall receive also length of days for ever and ever. But he who shall reject it and prove himself ungrateful to his Maker, inasmuch as he has been created and has not recognised Him who bestowed the gift upon him, deprives himself of the privilege of continuance for ever and ever. And for this reason the Lord declared to those who showed themselves ungrateful to Him, If ye have not been faithful in that which is little, who shall give you that which is great? indicating that those who, in this brief temporal life, have shown themselves ungrateful to Him who bestowed it, shall justly not receive from Him length of days for ever and ever."

On the other hand, in book v. 4. 1 (cf. 7. 6), Irenæus speaks of the soul as one of the things "which are by nature immortal, and to which it belongs by their own nature to live." This apparent contradiction reveals the influence of two contradictory lines of thought."

At the close of the second century CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA writes, "Let us observe God's commandments and follow His counsels: they are the short and direct way that leads to eternity," *i.e.* to eternal existence; and again, "When baptized, we become enlightened; enlightened, we

become sons; as sons we become perfect and immortal." See *Pæd.*, i. 3, 6.

Up to this time, so far as I know, except the passing references in Irenæus just quoted and two writers now to be mentioned, no Christian writer speaks of the soul of man as immortal or as continuing in endless existence, or of immortality as other than a reward of righteousness.

In the middle of the second century TATIAN writes, in his *Address to the Greeks*, chap. 13: "The soul is not in itself immortal, O Greeks, but mortal. Yet it is possible for it not to die. If indeed it knows not the truth, it dies and is dissolved with the body, but rises again at last at the end of the world with the body, receiving death by punishment in immortality." About the demons, he says, in chap. 14: "That which is now their chief distinction, that they do not die like men, they will retain when about to suffer punishment: they will not partake of everlasting life so as to receive this, instead of death, in a blessed immortality. And as we, to whom it now easily happens to die, afterwards receive the immortal with enjoyment or the painful with immortality, so the demons who abuse the present life to purposes of wrong doing, dying continually even while they live, will have hereafter the same immortality, like that which they had during the life they lived, but in its nature like that of men, who actually performed what the demons prescribed to them during their lifetime." The phrases *punishment in immortality* and *the painful with immortality* deviate from the phraseology of the New Testament. For there the term *immortality* and its equivalents *incorruptibility* and *eternal life* are used only to describe a state of blessing. Thus Tatian approaches the language of Plato, with whose writings he was familiar.

We turn now to a very able treatise on *The Resurrection of the Dead* by ATHENAGORAS, an Athenian philosopher

who became a Christian in the latter half of the second century. He writes in chap. 13 that God "made man of an immortal soul and a body"; in chap. 24, of "man possessing an immortal soul and a rational judgment"; in chap. 20, of "the soul as incorruptible"; and in chap. 23, of an "immortal nature." Here for the first time probably in Christian literature we find the favourite phraseology of Plato: and, remembering that the writer was a student of Plato before he became a Christian, we cannot doubt the source from which it was derived.

The writer's aim is to prove the resurrection of the body: and in his effort to do this he shows much skill. His main argument is that the creative purpose of God included both soul and body; that each of these is an integral part of the man, is concerned in his actions, and therefore must share his judgment and final destiny. Some of his arguments seem to imply that the creative purpose must necessarily be accomplished; and he tells us, in chap. 25, that the end of an intelligent creature is to delight in contemplation of God. But he admits that many men fail of this end. He does not discuss the ultimate fate of the lost; and leaves us in uncertainty whether or not all will finally be saved. His one point is to prove that in the destiny of man the body will share. In this he differs widely from Plato, who claims immortality only for the soul.

We come now to TERTULLIAN, who, in North Africa, wrote in Latin at the beginning of the third century. He accepts from Plato the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. So in chap. 3 of his treatise *On the Resurrection of the Flesh*: "Some things are known even by nature: the immortality of the soul, for instance, is held by many; the knowledge of God is possessed by all. I will use, therefore, the opinion of a Plato, when asserting, Every soul is immortal." But, as a Christian, he rejects the theory of the uncreated pre-existence of the soul. So his treatise *On*

the Soul, chap. 4: "When we acknowledge that the soul originates in the breath of God, it follows that we attribute to it a beginning. This Plato refuses, representing it as not born and not made." In chap. 10 he says, "It belongs to firm faith to say with Plato that the soul is simple, *i.e.* uniform in substance." Throughout these two works, Tertullian constantly speaks of the soul as immortal in Plato's sense of the word, and sometimes of the wicked as in endless suffering. So *Resurrection of the Flesh*, chap. 34: "We so accept the soul's immortality as to believe it lost, not in the sense of destruction but of punishment, *i.e.* in Gehenna." Also in chap. 35: "If any one supposes that the destruction of soul and flesh in Gehenna refers to an annihilation and end of both substances, as if they were to be consumed, not punished, let him remember that the fire of Gehenna is announced to be eternal, for eternal punishment, and let him recognise that eternity of killing is more to be feared than anything temporal which man could inflict." He argues, in chap. 14 of his treatise *On the Soul*, that, since the soul is simple, not composite, it cannot be dissolved or cease to be.

No one can read these two treatises of Tertullian, and compare them with earlier Christian literature, without feeling that this impulsive African has introduced into Christian literature, or given greater prevalence to, two new and lower elements, the natural immortality of the soul and the endless torment of the lost. In the sufferings of these last he exults with fiendish delight: *On Public Exhibitions*, chap. 30. But I forbear to quote his awful lines.

Somewhat later, in a far different spirit, ORIGEN, the earliest Christian Biblical scholar, accepted the immortality of the soul, and from it inferred that all souls will ultimately be saved. In his *First Principles*, book iii. 13, we read: "It is not without reason then that he who is abandoned

is abandoned to the Divine judgment, and that God is long-suffering with certain sinners; but because it will be for their advantage, with respect to the immortality of the soul and the unending world, that they be not quickly brought into a state of salvation, but be conducted to it more slowly, after having experienced many evils. For as physicians who are able to cure a man quickly when they suspect that a hidden poison exists in the body, do the reverse of healing, making this more certain through their very desire to heal, deeming it better to retain the patient for a considerable time under inflammation and sickness, in order that he may recover his health more surely, rather than to appear to produce a rapid recovery, and afterwards to cause a relapse and thus that hasty cure last only for a time; in the same way God also, who knows the secret things of the heart and foresees future events, in His longsuffering permits certain events to occur, and by means of those things which happen from without extracts the secret evil, in order to cleanse him who through carelessness has received the seeds of sin. . . . For God governs souls not with reference, let me say, to the fifty years of the present life, but with reference to the limitless age: for He made the thinking principle in its nature immortal and kindred to Himself: and the rational soul is not, as it is in this life, excluded from cure."

In the above quotations we see two practical and opposite consequences of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Tertullian inferred from it the endless suffering of the lost; Origen inferred the ultimate salvation of all men. Each of these inferences seems to me legitimate; and each is prevalent now. They reveal the greatness of the issues involved in the doctrine before us.

Very perplexing is the following apparent contradiction between two closely related works of ATHANASIUS. In §§ 32, 33 of his treatise *Contra Gentes*, he speaks several

times of the *soul* as *immortal*; and argues that, "just as the senses of the body, it being mortal, contemplate mortal things, so the soul, since it contemplates and takes into calculation immortal things, must necessarily also itself be *immortal* and live always." He thus reproduces the phrase and thought of Plato, as accepted by Athenagoras and Tertullian.

On the other hand, in his famous treatise, *On the Incarnation of the Word of God*, he writes as though the lost would sink into the non-existence from which originally the Creator called them. So § 4: "For the transgression of the commandment was turning them back to their natural state; so that, just as while not existing they have begun to be, so also naturally, in course of time, they may undergo corruption into non-existence. For if, being once by nature non-existent, by the coming and the philanthropy of the Word they were called into existence, it was a consequence that men, having been emptied of thought about God and having turned away to things non-existent—for the evil things are non-existent and the good things existent, since they have come into being from the Existent God—should be emptied even of existing always. This means that they be dissolved, and remain in death and corruption. For man is by nature mortal, having come into being out of things not existing. But, because of his likeness to Him that exists, if he guard it by his contemplation of Him, he would disarm the corruption by nature and remain incorruptible."

Similarly, in § 6 he speaks of men, though made in the image of God, as disappearing and being *destroyed* in consequence of sin; and gives this as a reason for the mission and gift of the Son to save man. "It was unfitting that beings once made rational and partakers of His Word should *perish* and turn again, by corruption, into non-existence."

The only explanation of this contradiction which I can suggest is that the above incompatible statements of doctrine reflect different types of teaching prevalent in the Church in Athanasius' day, each going, in my opinion, beyond the teaching of the Bible, viz. (1) the essential permanence of all human souls, and (2) that the destruction threatened to those who reject salvation involves ultimate loss of existence. The incompatibility of these types of teaching had apparently not arrested the attention of the youthful theologian destined to mould so greatly and so beneficially the theology of the Church of Christ.

The prevalence, in the West, of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, in the sense of its essential and endless permanence, is due probably to the immense influence of AUGUSTINE. This great father was familiar with the systems of the Greek philosophers; and among them gives the palm to Plato. But he contradicts Plato's teaching that human souls are pre-existent and without beginning; and meets an argument that whatever had a beginning must also have an end. His whole teaching about the future punishment of sin rests on the assumption that the human soul is immortal. So his *City of God*, book xiii. 2: "The human soul is truly affirmed to be immortal . . . it is said to be immortal because in some way it does not cease to live and feel." Similarly book xxi. 3: "Death will be eternal; since the soul, through not having God, will not be able to live, nor by dying to escape the pains of the body." So a little lower: "The soul can suffer pain and cannot die. Here is found a thing which, since it has sense of pain, is immortal." And much more of the same sort.

To sum up. The phrase, *the soul immortal*, so frequent and conspicuous in the writings of Plato, we have not found in pre-Christian literature outside the influence of Greek philosophy; nor have we found it in Christian literature until the latter part of the second century. We have noticed

that all the earliest Christian writers who use this phrase were familiar with the teaching of Plato; that one of these, Tertullian, expressly refers both phrase and doctrine to him; and that the early Christian writers never support this doctrine by appeals to the Bible, but only by arguments similar to those of Plato. We have learnt that by this phrase Plato and the earliest Christian writers who use it asserted the endless and essential permanence of all human souls, and appealed to this doctrine in proof of retribution beyond the grave. But we have failed to find any trace of this doctrine in the Bible. On the other hand, Christ and His Apostles teach clearly and frequently retribution beyond death, and eternal life with God for all who put faith in Christ. The hope of immortality, however, rests, in the New Testament, not on the nature of the soul, but on the "promise of life in Christ Jesus."

The doctrine of the immortality of the soul differs further from the immortality promised in the New Testament in that this last is not for the body only, as Plato taught, but for the whole man, body and soul.

Doubtless the doctrine before us was welcome in the early Church, as in a still earlier day to some devout Jews, because of the support it renders to the all-important doctrine of retribution beyond the grave. But, as we have seen, it is altogether alien, both in phrase and thought, to the teaching of Christ and His Apostles.

In my next paper I shall consider the teaching of some modern theologians on the doctrine before us.

JOSEPH AGAR BEET.

THE BABYLONIAN NOAH'S ARK.

THE Ninevite recension of the Babylonian version of the Deluge story has been well known, since the discovery in 1872, by George Smith, of the tablets relating to it, in the Library of Ašurbânipal. It has been published in the original cuneiform in the Fourth Volume of Sir H. Rawlinson's *Inscriptions of Western Asia*, second edition, p. 43 f.; and by Professor P. Haupt, as the eleventh tablet of the *Nimrod-Epos*, pp. 95-150. The latest renderings are by Professor H. Zimmern, in Gunkel's *Schöpfung und Chaos*, p. 423 ff., and by Professor P. Jensen, in the Sixth Volume of Schrader's *Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek*, p. 228 ff.

The ark which Atrahasis, Pir-napišti, or Xisuthrus, whom I will call Noah, was commanded to build, seems to have been 600 cubits long, 120 cubits wide, and 120 cubits deep; at least such is the estimate of the probabilities of the readings now possible of the tablet as given by Professor Haupt, in the *American Journal of Philology*, vol. ix. p. 419 f. These are only conjectural, however, in the case of the length, as the sign expressing 600 is no longer completely preserved, and therefore not certain. The divergence from the Biblical account may be reduced if we assume, with Professor Oppert, that the sign *û* does not represent the cubit, but a half cubit. Both accounts would then make the length 300 cubits, but the other dimensions do not agree. However, Professor Jensen's renderings do not take the 120 ells in the mere sense of width and height. He gives, "According to its plan, its walls were 120 ells high, the sloping of its roof was correspondingly 120 ells." Reducing these lengths, according to Oppert's view, we have a height of 60 cubits, and a measure over its sloped roof of another 60 cubits. According to the Ninevite recension the ark was a house on a boat; it had a door,

and a window or embrasure to open. If we suppose that the heights of the two walls are taken together, we have an exact agreement with the Biblical account, each was 30 cubits high to the spring of the roof. It is clear that the boat or raft on which the house stood was larger than the house.

Professor Haupt, *Nimrod-Epos*, p. 121, has published a fragment of the same story, but in Babylonian script, and probably of much later date. This also has a doubtful 600, but confirms the figures 120 for the above measurements. It would be very singular if these versions should give exactly the same figures for each dimension; and it may well be that the discrepancies observed are due to the measurements given referring to dimensions reckoned in different directions.

The interest of the subject has induced me to make a further communication, which I believe bears upon it. In 1893, when copying "lists of animals," etc., for the Second Volume of my *Assyrian Deeds and Documents*, I came upon a singular tablet, K. 1520, described in the *Catalogue of the Cuneiform Tablets in the Kouyunjik Collection of the British Museum*, as a "list of animals, of certain dimensions, etc., probably an incomplete draught of a historical inscription." Although I could not regard it as such a list of animals, sold or entrusted to certain officials, as the lists published in *Assyrian Deeds and Documents* usually are, yet, after some consideration, I decided to publish the cuneiform text as No. 777 in my work. On page ix. of my preface, I stated that "No. 777 seems to give an estimate of the dimensions of Noah's Ark and a list of the animals in it." Professor Jensen, when he read this and had examined the text, expressed himself greatly interested, and suggested that it deserved to be given a wider publicity.

The tablet itself is a long oval, something like a pressed fig, about $4\frac{1}{2}$ inches long by 2 inches wide, and nearly

1 inch thick. One side is quite flat, the other very convex. Contrary to the general rule in Assyrian tablets, both sides are written the same way, along the length of the tablet. The scribe did not, as usual, "turn over" from top to bottom, but as we do, from right to left. The script is Ninevite Assyrian of the 7th century B.C. The present inscription appears to have been written over, and partly upon, a previous inscription, of which some wedges remain and render a few characters difficult to read. The colour is a dark brown. The tablet is written throughout in ideograms, the Assyrian equivalents of which are not all known from the existing syllabaries and explanatory lists. But for the most part they are of common occurrence in well-known texts, and there with such a variety of contexts, that their meanings at any rate are perfectly certain. It is usual now to transcribe such ideograms in capitals, and this must not be understood to express any opinion as to their pronunciation. For the most part these signs are here denoted by their names rather than their sounds.

In the first line of the tablet we have 390 $\underline{\text{u}}$ long. Here the $\underline{\text{u}}$ is a measure, generally taken to mean a cubit, by Professor Oppert a half cubit. In the next line, we have 160 $\underline{\text{u}}$ broad, in the third line 660 $\underline{\text{u}}$ high. These are not likely to be the dimensions of any real building, still less the measurements of the dimensions of any animal. The sign which I have rendered "high" is used also to denote the length of the long side of a field or building. It is 60 $\underline{\text{u}}$ in excess of the conjectured length in the Ninevite recension above. Now the Assyrian kings usually built upon a platform, whose dimensions exceeded those of the building erected on it. Hence, if the ark was a house on a boat, or raft, we might expect the dimensions of that raft to be given. In line 4, we have 510 *suklum rabiti* SAK-KI; in line 5, 788 *suklum rabiti* MU-LU-U. These are exactly the terms in which the kings describe the dimensions of the

platform on which they build. The *suklum rabiti* is usually supposed to be the same length as the *ḡ*. Hence we have a box-shaped house, 660 long, 390 wide and 150 high, reposing on a raft, 788 long and 410 wide. That is, of course, a very well conceived plan. Any tapering of the ends, or sloping of the roof, which may be needed to make the dimensions tally with other estimates, is not necessarily excluded, as these measurements would be "over all." Beyond the extravagant size, we have as yet no reason to suppose Noah's Ark intended, but we should note that the dimensions are not at all unlike those given above.

The enumeration of the animals follows and with noteworthy characteristics. There are no numbers given. If the building had been intended for a menagerie, we should expect the number of animals to be given, for which accommodation had to be provided. Actually we get "camels, dromedaries, horses, mules, asses," and some other animals which appear among the lists of working animals, but which, being always denoted by ideograms, are not yet identified. Some breed of pony may be intended, or a draught horse may be regarded as distinct from the chariot horse or the charger. Each sort is accompanied by its female; and though several animals are put in the plural, it is evident that they are in pairs. These are the animals which are "man's helpers" in his work, and all probably "unclean."

On the reverse the list commences with oxen, of which three sorts may be taken as in pairs while one is female only; hence we have seven of the bovine race. We are not yet able to say with certainty what the ideograms denote, but the "draught ox," the "ox for food," the "ox for breeding," may be some of the meanings. Horned and hornless cattle may be intended. Sheep and goats come next, and here too we can discern a sevenfold division of the ovine species. The antelope, gazelle, some sort of

buck, and the hare are then named, and were clearly in pairs. One at least of these animals was sacred to Ištar, who plays such an important part in the Ninevite recension. Thus far we have just the animals that might be found on an Assyrian farm. They however include such wild animals as would not be likely to be kept in captivity. There are no ferocious beasts: the lion and jackal are absent, as well as the elephant.

Then follows a list of birds, nearly all of unknown kinds, but such as were offered in sacrifice to the gods. The list ends very significantly with, "the dove, the swallow and the raven." Whatever may have been the case with the dove, the swallow and the raven were not kept for food. In the Ninevite recension, it is precisely in this order that the Babylonian Noah, when the waters began to abate, sent forth from the ark, "first the dove, then the swallow, then the raven."

Hence, on a review of the whole case, I am inclined to think that my surmise was correct. We have here an estimate of the dimensions of Noah's Ark. No building in brick or stone was so large; even the tower of Babel is only estimated to be 80 cubits high. But, for some unexplained reason, this estimate of the size of Noah's Ark, enormous though it seems, is a persistent tradition of little real variation in its dimensions. This estimate accounts for the raft on which the house or ark proper was supported. The list of animals is too domestic to be intended for a menagerie, where elephants, lions, apes, etc., would surely have appeared. The "clean" food animals, cattle and sheep, appear in such a way as might easily lead to their enumeration by sevens. The animals "unclean," or not eaten, as the horse, the camel, the ass, etc., appear in pairs. The animals are, however, not all domestic: such wild animals are included as were sacred to the divinities most concerned in the story; and lastly, while the birds

include those offered to the gods, and therefore probably also used for food, they also include those named in the story, and which must accordingly find a place in the ark. It is difficult to see what other connexion could have prompted the inclusion of the swallow and the raven.

This is not the place to enter into a discussion of the ideograms, nor to pile up references to parallel passages: that I may reserve to my notes on the text in the Third Volume of my work; but it seems likely that this bare statement may be of service to those who are weighing the connexions between the Babylonian and Biblical traditions of the Deluge.

C. H. W. JOHNS.

HISTORICAL COMMENTARY ON THE EPISTLES TO THE CORINTHIANS.

XXXIX. THE EPISTLE AND ITS PARTS.

As we have seen, Paul in this Epistle often recurs to a former topic after an interposed discussion of another topic. Thus, in order to understand chap. viii., we have had to discuss chap. x. along with it, so closely are they connected. Chap. ix. rises out of chap. vii. The Eucharist is the topic in x. 14-22 and xi. 17-34. This characteristic is so marked, that we must seek some explanation; and we shall find it in the way in which the letter was written.

It is obvious that this letter was not composed continuously at a sitting (and the same remark applies to *2 Corinthians*). It is much too long for that; and, moreover, as we read it and compare it with the Epistle to the Galatians, we feel that, whereas the Galatian letter was thrown forth, as it were, in one single effort from the volcano of his mind, this letter to the Corinthians was written in a succession of shorter efforts, separated by intervals of thought and meditation.¹ Thus the same topic is taken up again after an interval, when reflection showed Paul that he had not exhausted what ought to be said about it.

In observing the nature of these intervals, and the signs of them in the thought and style, we must, of course, bear in mind the nature of the document. It is not a treatise, where continuity of style is a law of the work. It is a

¹ This remark also applies to the second Corinthian Epistle, in which these halts and fresh starts are so obvious that they have attracted much attention; and some scholars have been led to the erroneous idea that the parts have been put together in the wrong order; or rather, that the Epistle is not a single letter written in parts at intervals, but contains two or more distinct letters, of which the one now placed last was written first. Against this theory we shall attempt to prove that *2 Corinthians* was a letter, sent to Corinth as it has come down to us, but that considerable intervals elapsed between the composition of the parts.

letter, where frank, unfettered utterance of the momentary tone of mind and spirit is right. A letter ceases to be a letter, if the laws of correct style that govern a formal treatise are applied to it. The perfect naturalness and spontaneousness of Paul's letters is among their most marked characteristics. The thoughts in his mind seem to crystallize in words, almost unbidden, according to the mood of the moment : pleasure, grief, thankfulness, horror, gratitude, mould the style by turns.

When we speak of intervals, we need not, of course, maintain that these are necessarily always intervals of time. Sometimes they may only be changes of emotion ; but doubtless they often corresponded to breaks of time. On the other hand, we need not maintain that *Galatians* was written actually without a moment's interruption ; but it was written in an absolutely unbroken sweep of emotion, and we may be quite certain that the vehemence of emotion prevented any noticeable interval of time from intervening between the beginning and the end.

We shall, therefore, speak of the intervals between the parts of the Corinthian Epistle without insisting that they all necessarily imply appreciably long lapses of time. But some of them, at any rate, correspond to real intervals of time, during which much thought and meditation occurred ; and also we may be quite confident that the composition of this Epistle lasted over some considerable number of weeks, possibly some months. We cannot suppose that Paul withdrew himself for a time from his work in Ephesus in order to devote himself entirely to Corinth. His Ephesian work was heavy, continuous, exacting. He could only snatch from it short intervals for other work. Yet, at the same time, the care of Corinth lay always in his mind. Even while he was teaching and preaching in Ephesus, the thought about Corinthian needs was incubating and maturing in his heart. But the Epistle was composed by parts—

not in one volcanic eruption like *Galatians*—and it was dictated in parts, so that certain topics were treated, set aside, and recalled again for completion, as we see in the Epistle which lies before us.

We do not mean that, whenever any thought recurs after the lapse of a certain number of verses or chapters, one of those intervals (as they have been defined in the last two or three paragraphs) must have intervened between the two occurrences of the thought. On the contrary, there are what we have already described as dominant thoughts, which tend constantly to recur. Those dominant thoughts spring out of the most pressing dangers to which the Corinthians were exposed. Such, for example, was idolatry, with the inevitable low standard of life and thought connected with it.¹ The pressure of pagan surroundings and pagan habits was a continuous force tending to lower the Corinthian standard of conduct; it allied itself with everything else that was hostile to truth; and therefore the thought of this danger recurs in the Epistle very often, and is sometimes latent even where it is not clearly expressed.

We must, then, think of the Epistle to the Corinthians as lying for some considerable period beside Paul, and receiving additions from time to time, before it was sent away. It may be regarded as rather a series of letters than a single letter, though it was sent to Corinth as one. Its parts sprang separately from his mind, as the thoughts of his anxious and provident spirit demanded instant expression.

The proof of this view lies in the demonstration of the parts, and of their significance when regarded separately. This is contained in the following sections, in which, particularly, the formal proof is given that an interval of time occurred between the first and the second part.

But, first, the question arises why he did not send away

¹ Thus the thoughts of *πορνεία* and *ειδωλολατρεία* tend to pass into one another.

each part as it was written. If his care for Corinth forced him to write a few pages, would it not also force him to send off the letter immediately, that the remedy might be applied as quickly as possible? We must, for example, think that the Galatian letter, when written, was despatched immediately. We cannot imagine Paul waiting a day needlessly after writing it. Some parts of the Corinthian letter are also extremely urgent and impassioned. Why should they be written and laid aside for weeks before being sent away?

The circumstances of Pauline epistolography furnish a ready explanation.

XL. LETTER-WRITING IN EPHESUS.

Several excellent contributions have been made in recent years to the better understanding of the New Testament Epistles through a comparison with the ordinary epistolary customs of the time. The writings of Prof. Deissmann and Prof. Rendel Harris deserve special recognition in this respect. We shall try to build on their foundation.

The want of a regular postal service seems to have exerted some influence on both the Epistles to the Corinthians. Letters could not be sent to a distance, except when the writer found some chance of safe conveyance. As to the frequency of such opportunities, we are apt to get an erroneous impression from Cicero's correspondence—especially with Atticus, which was sometimes carried on by daily letters. Atticus, as a great business man and financier, engaged in large provincial operations requiring constant communication, had at his command a considerable body of regular letter-bearers, *tabellarii*. Cicero also maintained a large establishment of slaves. When they were resident in different parts of central Italy, they could easily keep up a daily system of messengers. Moreover, Cicero, from his high position, could often avail himself of the public couriers,

who were constantly going back and forward on government service; and he seems to have done so a good deal, as, for example, when he was in his Cilician province.

Paul was in an entirely different position. He had no slaves in Ephesus to act as letter-carriers. Moreover, it is highly probable that he never entrusted his letters to any but confidential messengers, Christians, often his own subordinates and coadjutors in mission work, who could supplement the letter by verbal instructions, and might bring back to Paul reports of what they had seen. In the winter and spring of A.D. 55-56,¹ within which period *1 Corinthians* must have been written, not many opportunities can have presented themselves for sending letters to Corinth from Ephesus. The season was unfavourable to direct voyages across the open sea, where the rocky Ægean islands offered few harbours and generally dangerous coasts. It is not to be understood that the direct passage between Corinth and Ephesus was entirely closed during the winter season. The Greeks were not such timid sailors as that would imply. But regular communication and ordinary trade were broken off, though, undoubtedly, some government vessels and occasional trading vessels watched a favourable wind and ran across. In the scarcity of vessels offering a passage—for government vessels would not be at his service—and the rarity of suitable messengers, Paul might have to wait a long time in the winter for an opportunity of sending a letter.

Now, how are we to conceive Paul to have acted? Would he wait until a suitable messenger was found ready to start, and then write a letter to be sent off with him the moment it was written? Such is apparently the general view, for the date when this Epistle was written is discussed commonly with the tacit assumption that the composition

¹ Some say a year or two earlier or later. All are agreed that the season of the year lay within those limits.

was a matter of a few days at most. For example, many modern scholars say that it must have been written at Passover—an assertion against which we have already protested on other grounds, and against which we now raise this new objection. We have seen that the composition of the letter must have lasted over a considerable time.

Paul wrote as his heart prompted, but had to wait until an opportunity occurred of sending the letter. In the meantime, new thoughts demanded expression. Thus 1 *Corinthians* was a series of shorter letters; and soon after it was despatched, 2 *Corinthians* was begun and continued in the same way.

Examples occur even in Cicero, with his abundant postal opportunities, of this kind of composite letter. In letters to his ordinary correspondents they can rarely occur, for he was not so much interested in them as to find relief in expressing his mind to them. But occasionally, in writing to Atticus, he keeps a letter beside him, and adds to it as the humour prompts him.

XLI. INTERVALS AND PAUSES IN THE EPISTLE.

The following intervals, marked by change in emotion and change in style, have come before us in the Epistle, so far as we have yet proceeded.

The first four chapters have all the appearance of perfect continuity, with an unbroken sweep of emotion. It will be shown in the following sections that Paul had actually brought his letter to an end here and arranged for its transmission, when his plans were interrupted.

Chaps. v., vi. were written immediately on receipt of some disastrous and unexpected news from Corinth. The emotion is in marked contrast with the preceding and the following chapters. The contrast is most sharply expressed

in vi. 5, "I say this to move you to shame," as compared with iv. 14, "I write not these things to shame you."

A feeling of horror pervades these two chapters, v., vi. In chap. v. this feeling rises naturally out of the subject; but it continues through vi., where the first fault rebuked is rather an error of judgment than a crime; and it soon draws back the writer's thought to the repulsive side of life, on which he was dwelling in chap. v.

Throughout these two chapters those sentences which are expressed in the first person singular are sharp and imperative in tone. They are a command.

On the other hand, in chaps. vii., viii., error of judgment, lack of sympathy and brotherliness, are implied among the Corinthians; but quiet, dispassionate reasoning and argument is Paul's method of treating their case. Where the first person singular comes in, it is either to mention Paul's own example and opinion, confidently reckoned on as likely to influence their minds, or it is an appeal to the universality of custom and law in the Churches. It states a deliberate opinion, but rarely issues a command. Even where the subject requires that a rule be laid down, it is done in a less imperative tone than in chaps. v., vi.; and the manner quickly returns to argument and statement of opinion. The two main topics of vii. and viii. are treated in a similar spirit, and end on the same note, viz., Paul's opinion and example.

Then comes a marked interval; and in ix., x., in a warm emotional tone, Paul takes up again the two topics which he has just treated.

The interval between chaps. v.-vi. and chaps. vii.-viii. is marked as clearly in style as in emotion. In the latter, Paul seems to have begun with the intention of taking up and discussing one by one the points on which the Corinthians had consulted him. Hence the orderly method, as if he were counting them one by one on his fingers.

- vii. 1. *περὶ δὲ ὧν ἐγράψατε.*
 8. *λέγω δὲ τοῖς ἀγάμοις.*
 10. *τοῖς δὲ γεγαμηκόσι παραγγέλλω, οὐκ ἐγώ.*
 12. *τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς λέγω ἐγώ.*
 25. *περὶ δὲ τῶν παρθένων.*
 viii. 1. *περὶ δὲ τῶν εἰδωλοθύτων.*

Now contrast that manner with the paragraphic connexion in the preceding chapters. Notice the abrupt, excited question with which chap. vi. begins,—

Dare any of you?

and the sharp, astonished expression in the opening of chap. v.,—

It is actually reported that —

It is difficult to think that the person who dictated chaps. v.–vi. to his secretary proceeded immediately to the sober, orderly enumeration of chaps. vii.–viii. An interval of time, bringing with it greater calmness of feeling, must have occurred.

But an interval is equally well marked between chaps. viii. and ix. The style changes, and the emotion becomes far more vehement. The orderly progress of the reasoning ceases, to be resumed again in chap. xii. But in chap. ix. Paul opens with a series of questions, “Am I not free? Am I not an Apostle?” and so on. He considers that he is being examined, that he is making his defence, and that the judges who are examining him have little right to be assuming that position (ix. 3); and then his defence again turns into a further series of almost indignant questions.

We notice, too, that the sequence of thought is broken by chap. ix. The views about sacrificial meats, begun in chap. viii., are not continued till we come to chap. x.; and then the subject is taken up afresh, and treated in a far deeper way, and also in a more emotional tone. I cannot think that, if Paul had already had chap. x. in his mind, he

would have written chap. viii. as it is. In fact, x. 23 ff. repeats in a more precise way what is already said in rather confused fashion in chap. viii.

As we notice the superior clearness of x. 23 ff., we remember that chaps. vii. and viii. as a whole never strike a clear and penetrating note.¹ They lack the sure insight of the prophet and lawgiver who goes to the heart of the question. They show much good sense, taste, sympathy; but they are rather uncertain in their treatment, and leave a blurred image on the reader's mind. It is as if Paul had begun to answer the Corinthian questions before he had fully thought out the situation, and then, leaving off for a time, had returned, in chaps. ix.-x., to the same topics, with a clearer conception of the Corinthian intention in putting the questions.

That is most patent, as we compare chap. x. with chap. viii. Some may think that chap. ix. does not stand in a similar relation to vii. But our view is that, even here, the same relation holds good, though it is less clear.² As Paul thought over the Corinthians' questions, he became more clearly conscious that their suggested cure for society—viz., the urging of marriage as a duty on all Christians—was personal to himself, making the first stage, which must culminate in open questioning of his authority over them and his apostolic rights. Hence arises the personal character of chap. ix. An emphatic statement of his authoritative position towards the Corinthians was necessary.

The strength and personality³ of Paul's repeated claims to authority in this Epistle, his repeated injunctions that the Corinthians should imitate him, may easily offend the modern reader. In truth, it needs some effort before one

¹ See § XXI., p. 284; § XXIV., p. 387; § XXV., p. 294 f.

² See § XXV., p. 293.

³ iii. 10; iv. 15, 16, 21; vii. 7, 8, 40; viii. 13; ix. 1 ff.; x. 33; xi. 1, 2, 34; xiv. 18; xv. 1 ff., 31, etc.: also the frequent "I order, I give my judgment," etc.

can reconcile them with the ordinary humility, candour, and freedom from egotism or self-assertion of Paul's character. They give the occasion for the accusation which some scholars make against him, that he was excitable, irritable under opposition, unable to endure any difference of opinion or independence of judgment in those with whom he was brought into relation, surrounding himself with creatures of moderate abilities, who would obey him without questioning and follow him without murmur.¹

The reason and the need for the assertiveness of this Epistle lies in that failing of the Corinthian character (and of the Greeks generally), which we have often had to mention—their incapacity to obey, and their weakness in recognising and acting on general, moral, and legal principles. We have pointed out why Paul could not counsel the Corinthians to obey their constituted officials; but repeatedly he impresses on them the duty of obedience to their spiritual father. He felt strongly that this was a prime necessity in the present state of the Corinthian Church; and in urging it on them he is unconscious of the seeming egotism. That appearance of egotism was a minor consideration; and Paul always sacrificed all minor aims in the effort to attain the great end. On this subject, see further § XLIII.

Yet he gives a full explanation of this apparent egotism. They are to obey and imitate him, not for himself. He came to them not trusting in eloquence or in philosophy, but in the power of God, which spoke through him, ii. 1, 4 f. Personally, he had been weak, anxious, fearful. But they can safely follow implicitly what he said, and imitate what he did, because it was not his own power and skill that spoke to them.

The frequent repetition of the order "to imitate me"

¹ See, for example, Mr. Baring Gould's *Study of St. Paul*, *passim* (pp. 206, 263, etc.).

implies that it was much needed. This may seem inconsistent with the emphatic declaration in xi. 2, "I praise you that ye remember me in all things, and hold fast the traditions, even as I delivered them unto you." But it has been rightly recognised (*e.g.* by Prof. Findlay in *EXPOSITOR*, June, 1900, p. 402) that this really contains a quotation from the Corinthians' letter to himself: it means, "I am glad to hear from you that ye remember me in all things."

XLII. THE FIRST LETTER CONTAINED IN FIRST CORINTHIANS.

As we have seen, the first four chapters of the Epistle are written in one sustained, continuous tone and emotion. They were dictated at one time—or, at least, at very brief intervals—under the influence of the same overmastering thought and purpose, and form as perfect a unity as the Galatian Epistle. They come to a distinct climax and conclusion. The paragraph iv. 14–21 reviews and sums up the purpose of the short letter in a pointed, emphatic way—as was Paul's custom—and states his intentions for the future. He is sending Timothy at the present moment.¹ Soon he will himself come. They should so act, as not to need rebuke when he reaches them. At this point the final greetings, which commonly lead up to the benediction, might come in with perfect propriety.

We have in these chapters a perfect little letter, a model of a religious and hortatory, warning and friendly Epistle.

The occasion of that letter was evidently the news received from the agents of Chloe (i. 11 : see § IX., p. 104). It is filled with the thought that the Corinthian Christians are spending their time and energy in discussing the merits of rival preachers, backing their favourites in the true

¹ ἐπεμψα epistolary: I am sending Timothy, who will recall me to your memory when he reaches you.

Greek spirit,¹ and thus tending to fall into rival parties wearing, as it were, the badges of their respective favourites. It explains his method of teaching, stage by stage, according to the progress of his pupils.

At the same time, the letter speaks not for himself alone, but for all the Apostles. All are agreed. All stand or fall together. To balance one against another is to miss utterly the true and perfect unity that reigns among them all. Their other teachers and favourites also adapt their teaching to the stage at which they find their pupils. But all are aiming at the same result : all would try to prevent the Corinthians from this folly of pitting one teacher against the other (iv. 6).

The remedy lies in faithfulness to the first and effectual teaching, through which they had been converted.

XLIII. THE SINGLE STANDARD AND THE MONARCHICAL BISHOP.

The stress which Paul lays on the necessity of a single standard for the congregation deserves special note. Many teachers have come, and many will come, for one teacher at the beginning was not sufficient. But all are not to be trusted. There must, therefore, be some standard by which to test them.

That standard should be sought in the original teaching, viz., the teaching of the Founder of the congregation. His teaching was the true, Divine message ; for it came in power (ii. 4 f. ; iv. 20 ; ix. 2). The existence of a Church in Corinth is the proof that Paul's message was the right and the standard teaching. Paul had laid the foundation, " which is Christ " (iii. 10 f.).

Other teachers do well when they try to build on that foundation ; but their superstructure will be tried and tested by fire, whether it is vital and true. The proof

¹ See § V., p. 28 ff.

of their teaching will be the same as the proof of Paul's. The power to last is the ultimate test.

In iii. 11-15 Paul is saying anew what he said to the Galatians (*Gal.* i. 6-9): "If any one else, if even I myself, should preach unto you any other gospel than that which I and Barnabas preached unto you, let him be anathema." But in that place Paul was looking from the opposite point of view. He was thinking of teachers who were building on his foundation a building inconsistent therewith. Here he is thinking of teachers who are building on his foundation what is in harmony therewith.

But the congregation needs to try the new teachers at the present moment; and it finds a standard in the first teaching, which has proved itself to be vital and enduring. The congregation itself is the living proof that the first teaching was true; and it must reject all that does not agree with that standard. To the Galatians and the Corinthians alike that is the principle which Paul urges. Even if he himself came giving a second and different message, they must reject him. His first, effectual message is the only true one.

Their standard, then, must be single. They must look to one guide alone; and that guide is their father. Many teachers will come to them; many servants will keep watch over them in their childhood:¹ but they can have only one father, Paul himself. Him they should look to and imitate.

Looking to the creative sense, the feeling for precedent in law and organization, which are evident in the growth of the early Church, we can hardly hesitate to say that here we have the germinating idea out of which grew the monarchical bishops of the following century.

¹ πολλοὺς παιδαγωγούς (iv. 15): see *Hist. Comm. Gal.*, § XXXIX., p. 381 ff.: the sentence on p. 385, which (as is there said) "may perhaps be fanciful," seems now to me to be so.

The difficulty was how this principle should be carried out after the Apostles had passed away. Paul was succeeded by the author of First Peter, and he by the author of *Revelation* i.-iii. But who should succeed later? Elsewhere I have attempted¹ to show the external causes under pressure of which one of the *Episkopoi* or *Presbyteroi* was obliged to become a president and representative of the congregation. That president-*Episkopos* was, among other things, charged with the duty of communicating with other congregations, with which is closely connected the duty of entertaining visitors and messengers from other congregations. Now from the beginning the idea is clearly discernible that the general opinion of the whole Church is Divine and right. Obviously, the person in each congregation who could best learn what the Church as a whole thought was the official charged with communication. He was the link connecting the congregation with other congregations: the sum of the scattered congregations, separated in space, makes up the Church universal: the letters, visits, and other communications are the device whereby space is annihilated, and unity attained. Thus communication between the scattered parts was the life of the Church, and the official charged with communication was obviously presented as the heir to the authority of the Apostles. So far the argument has been already stated; but we ask when and how this development was first recognised as a necessity.

Paul undoubtedly had the idea that the single authority, necessary for his Churches, must not perish with himself. In his first letter to Timothy there is latent the idea that Timothy is his delegate and representative in Asia. From the idea of delegation to that of succession the development is natural and necessary. How far Paul had foreseen that development we are denied any information. But, in fact,

¹ *The Church in the Roman Empire before 170*, p. 429 ff.

it seems beyond doubt that the president-Episkopos became the heir to the monarchical authority; and all reasonable probability is in favour of that inheritance having been contemplated by some of the Apostles themselves.

The Third Epistle of John takes us into the time before that inheritance was settled. It is addressed to Gaius, who was evidently charged with the duties of hospitality in his own congregation (v. 5). His congregation was situated on one of the great lines of communication along which Christianity spread towards the Gentiles.¹ To his care Demetrius is recommended in this letter of introduction. But a certain Diotrephes discourages and opposes the welcoming of visitors from other congregations, whom Gaius extends to them; and he also resists the authority of the writer, who evidently claims the same general authority which Paul and Peter had exercised. Diotrephes, who "casteth them out of the Church," is evidently understood to be an official; and the situation implied is one of division and contention between rival influences in a congregation, such as showed the urgent need of a single standard of authority in it. He was one of those "head-strong and self-willed persons" who "kindled sedition" in Corinth² (Clem. i. 1), and beyond doubt in many other congregations.

XLII. PLANS FOR A SECOND VISIT TO CORINTH.

The fact that the composition of the Epistle extended over a considerable period affords a complete explanation of the variation between Paul's statements about his second visit to Corinth; and, at the same time, a comparison between his different statements proves conclusively that one

¹ It is needless to point out how well all this would suit the Gaius of *Rom.* xvi. 23, "mine host and (host) of the whole Church" in Corinth, on the great route between the East and Rome. The name, however, was a common one.

² See the preceding note.

of the intervals in the composition of 1 *Corinthians* must lie between chap. iv. and chap. v.

When Paul wrote the concluding paragraph of this short letter (iv. 14-21), he was sending Timothy to Corinth, and was intending to come himself shortly. 17: "For this cause have I sent¹ unto you Timothy, who shall put you in remembrance of my ways. . . . 19: But I will come to you shortly, if the Lord will." Now, if we compare this passage with the similar ones in *Philipp.* ii. 25, *Coloss.* iv. 7-9, *Eph.* vi. 21, it becomes clear that Timothy is here commissioned as a special envoy to Corinth. The four passages are exactly to one another. Timothy is to go direct from Ephesus to Corinth, carrying instructions and a letter. Epaphroditus is sent from Rome to Philippi with a letter,² "that when ye see him again, ye may rejoice." Tychicus (with Onesimus) was sent from Rome to Colossæ and Ephesus bearing two letters, "that ye may know our estate, and that he may comfort your hearts." The same word and tense is used in all four cases (ἐπέμψα, πέμψαι).

The parallel between 1 *Corinthians* iv. 17-19 and *Philippians* ii. 19-25 is even closer. In both cases Paul intimates an ulterior plan, using the same word "shortly" (ταχέως). He sends Timothy now, and will himself come shortly. He sends Epaphroditus now, and will send Timothy shortly.

But these intentions, as mentioned here, were partly frustrated, and were carried out in a different way from what is here intimated. Timothy did not go direct to Corinth; and hence Paul says in xvi. 10, "If Timothy come," in a tone of uncertainty,³ which contrasts markedly with the assured "I have sent Timothy to you" of iv. 17. The facts are left obscure for us in the Epistle, while the

¹ Epistolary tense: in English it ought to be expressed by a present.

² See Prof. Rendel Harris's paper on *Epaphroditus, Scribe and Courier*, in the *Expositor*, Dec., 1898, p. 401 ff.

³ ἐὰν ἔλθῃ, not εἰ ἔρχεται.

march of events had made them clear to the Corinthians ; but Luke explains them in *Acts* xix. 22. Timothy was, after all, not sent directly to Corinth, but went round by way of Macedonia.

The reason for the change remains uncertain ; but probably it was due, in part at least, to the winter season, and the difficulty of getting a passage direct across the open *Ægean*. Macedonia needed Timothy at the moment ; and it was resolved that he should go there first, and afterwards, if circumstances were suitable, go on to Corinth.¹ Then Paul kept the letter which he had intended to send by Timothy, and reserved it for another opportunity and another messenger.

Nor did Paul carry out exactly his intention, here announced, of shortly going himself to Corinth. He alludes to his change of intention in *2 Corinthians* i. 15 ff. : " I was minded to come before unto you for a second visit to confirm you, and thereafter to visit Macedonia and return to you again, so as to be ready to start from Corinth for Jerusalem in time for the Passover of the coming year " (*i.e.* March, A.D. 57) : he apologises for the change of plan, and explains that the change was not due to fickleness and wavering uncertainty of mind on his part, but was made in kindness to the Corinthians themselves. Paul did not wish to come to bring them sorrow. He wished to come to bring them happiness. He preferred to send a letter conveying his severity and reproofs, and to come later in more pleasant circumstances.

Surely, then, the reasonable interpretation of this passage must be, that Paul had intended to go direct to Corinth from Ephesus, and had intimated his intention. But bad news came. He learned that the conduct of the Corin-

¹ See preceding note. Timothy did not go on to Corinth until he accompanied Paul thither. Paul found him still in Macedonia (*St. Paul the Trav.*, p. 276).

thians required severe reproof. He resolved to reprove them by letter, to postpone his visit; and to go first into Macedonia.

Such is the sequence of events, as we gather it from 2 *Corinthians* i. 15 ff. It agrees precisely with what we see in 1 *Corinthians* iv. ff. Paul intimates his intention of soon going direct to Corinth. The visit is intimated in a kind, not in a severe tone. Paul anticipates that it will be a pleasant visit: there is not a trace of sternness or severity in the short letter i.-iv., though, of course, there is that admonition which young human converts always need—"not to shame you, but to admonish you as my beloved children." But the tone of chap. v. is completely changed. This new chapter is full of horror and stern rebuke. Evidently here begins the letter of severe reproof. Paul has heard the terrible news. He at once abandons all thought of an early visit to Corinth, and instead writes the letter which begins with chap. v.

But he had still beside him the letter of chaps. i.-iv., which he had intended to send by Timothy, but had retained when Timothy had to go by way of Macedonia. Paul did not destroy that letter. He sent it, but first he lengthened it by adding a long and outspoken expression of his horror and astonishment at the laxity of moral feeling in the Corinthian Church.

The lengthened Epistle had to wait for a suitable messenger and an occasion. The visit of Stephanas and Fortunatus and Achaicus, who brought the letter from the Corinthians, probably lasted some time, as they either had come on some business purpose or took the opportunity of combining business with their duty as envoys.¹ Paul

¹ One sees numerous cases in which the envoys of cities (*πρέσβεις*) in this period did the same. Persons were often selected as *Presbeis* either in order to give them the opportunity of visiting Rome, or because they were going to Rome on their own business.

worked on the letter at intervals, until some time in the spring; and in chap. xvi. 3-8 he states his final intention, regardless of the discrepancy with iv. 19. He will wait in Ephesus till Pentecost, 9th May, A.D. 56. Then he will go to Macedonia, and thereafter he will visit Corinth, whence he will either go to Jerusalem (in spring of 57) or send envoys thither.

He makes in this Epistle no explanation of, or apology for, the change of plan. Probably he, at the moment of writing, did not think of the inconsistency between iv. 19 and xvi. 3 ff. He was so absorbed in serious topics that minor discrepancies did not affect him. But soon after he remembered, and, as he was now beginning to compose *2 Corinthians*, he apologised in the opening paragraphs for the change and the discrepancy. In the interval, however, other changes had occurred. He was unable to remain in Ephesus till Pentecost. The riot of Demetrius compelled him to retire for the time, as freedom to speak was no longer in his power. Probably he had not waited till the three messengers were ready to return to Corinth; but had sent Titus as his envoy,¹ with instructions as to how he should address the erring Corinthians and orders to bring back a report to Paul. Titus, aware that Paul was to travel from Ephesus by way of Troas and Macedonia, returned that way; and in the coasting system of ancient travel there was no danger that the two should miss one another, inasmuch as each was on the outlook for the other. They met in Macedonia (*2 Cor.* vi. 6 f.).

It seems strange that, considering the obviously close connexion between the latter part of First Corinthians and the early chapters of Second Corinthians, many commentators attempt to interpose a long interval between them. It is obvious that the beginning of the Second Epistle was

¹ *St. Paul the Traveller*, p. 284 (at the foot of the page read "winter or spring" instead of "autumn").

written before Titus returned,¹ and there is every reason to think that he would not stay long in Corinth or linger on the road, considering Paul's extreme anxiety about the state of that Church. The Second Epistle was continued after Titus met Paul and relieved his mind.

The first part was evidently written in Troas,¹ the second in Macedonia (probably Philippi).

It is remarkable how many erroneous statements have been made by modern scholars about this simple matter—all the result of an inveterate habit (a legacy from the "Tübingen School") of beginning by framing an ingenious and tempting theory, and then squeezing Paul's words to suit it.

One writer² infers rightly from 2 *Cor.* ii. 3 that Paul had written to the Corinthians that he was not coming to them, and proceeds, "he did not write this in any extant letter. In the First Epistle he still declared categorically that he would come. It can only be inferred that he wrote it in a letter subsequent to the First Epistle, and that must have been the letter carried by Titus." This argument fails to catch the point of Paul's statements. The contradictory intentions which Paul in 2 *Cor.* i., ii., implies that he had intimated to the Corinthians were not "I will come to you," and "I will not come to you": they were "I will come direct to you before I go to Macedonia" and "I will go to Macedonia first, postponing you to a later time." Both these intentions are intimated in the First Epistle (iv. 17 and xvi. 5); and the direct contradiction between them is not there explained or apologized for. Thus, as Paul feels, he has sent the Corinthians a word (*i.e.*, a letter) that is at once "Yea" and "Nay"; and he apologizes and explains.

¹ 2 *Corinthians* ii. 12, the perfects ἀνεψιγμένῃς and ἔσχηκα, "though a door has been opened unto me, I have found no relief," prove this. The epistolary tense, ἐξῆλθον ἀποταξάμενος, is used of his departure from Troas.

² In the *Commentary on the Bible*, edited by Rev. F. C. Cook, 1881.

It would, however, be endless to go over all the difficulties that have been needlessly and unjustifiably invented, and the incorrect inferences that have been drawn from the passages bearing on Paul's intended and postponed visit. One alone must be briefly noticed, inasmuch as it is especially unreasonable, viz., the theory which would place the composition of the latter chapters of the Second Epistle before the early chapters. It is clear that in *2 Corinthians* i. 15 Paul explains why he had not paid a second visit to Corinth as he had once intended, and that in *2 Corinthians* xii. 14, xiii. 1, he is looking back over his first visit forward to a third. The full explanation of this must be left to the Commentary on the Second Epistle. But, at least, the difference proves clearly that the final chapter of the Second Epistle was written later than the opening chapter.

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THE FIRST GALATIAN MINISTRY.

THE successful ministry of Paul and Barnabas in southern Galatia was the next material step after the foundation of the Church of Antioch towards the conversion of the Greeks. Besides adding three sister churches, consisting mainly of Greek converts, in the heart of Asia Minor to the kingdom of Christ, it drove a wedge deep into the centre of an idolatrous population and established a valuable outpost for further advance into European and Asiatic Greece. I propose to exhibit the importance of this Galatian ministry by tracing the slow progress of Gentile Christianity during previous years, and glancing, on the other hand, at the favourable prospects open to the gospel in Asiatic Greece; and then to call in the aid of the Epistle to dissipate some obscurity that hangs over the circumstances of its opening in consequence of the brevity with which it is recorded in the Acts.

1. The earliest home of Greek Christianity was the Syrian borderland between Jew and Greek: Cæsarea was its birth-place, Antioch the cradle of its infancy. The hereditary animosity of the two races set up a formidable barrier against their union in a single church, and the inveterate prejudices of religious Jews would have rendered the admission of the uncircumcised to full membership of Christ by baptism impossible without Divine intervention. The futile attempts of Greek monarchs to impose their own religion on their Jewish subjects had provoked the Maccabean revolt, and so bequeathed to subsequent generations a permanent legacy of bigoted intolerance. God, however, manifested His will so distinctly by a threefold revelation,

first to Cornelius, bidding him make enquiry of a Christian Apostle; secondly to Peter, warning him to accept without scruple those whom God had cleansed; and thirdly, by pouring out His Spirit on Cornelius and his friends, that conviction was reluctantly forced on Peter. He dared not refuse to baptize those on whom God had already bestowed His Spirit: and the assembled Church, on appeal being made to their decision, solemnly ratified the validity of his act. Thenceforward the right of believing Gentiles to Christian baptism became a fundamental law of the Church, sealed to them in perpetuity by a Divine charter which none could question. Abundant opening was left indeed for future controversy about the consequent position and obligations of these uncircumcised members of the Church, but the principle was decisively settled for all time that the doors of the Church should be as freely open to them as to their Jewish brethren. The comprehensive change in Christian doctrine, by which a Jewish sect was eventually transformed into a world-wide religion, was established in theory, when the baptism of Cornelius was ratified by the unanimous decision of the assembled Church.

Circumstances, however, for some time obscured the importance of this revolution. No sudden influx of Gentile converts flooded the existing churches: they only grew insensibly by the continual adhesion of individual Gentiles or groups of Gentiles to older congregations of Jewish Christians. The process of conversion was too silent and gradual to exercise material influence over the prevailing spirit of the community, or to remodel its ministry and organization. In spite of fundamental differences in regard to the person of Jesus, Christian teachers in those early years retained the stamp of its Jewish origin, partly because the Hebrew Scriptures continued to be its only written canon of faith and practice, though it had learned to interpret them in a new spirit, but still more because the

Apostles and all the older disciples had grown up to manhood before they had known Jesus, had accepted the Law for their rule of life, and drew their inspiration from the writings of Hebrew prophets; they prided themselves on their descent from Abraham and the patriarchs, and rested on God's ancient covenants with Israel; above all they fixed their hopes on the glorious advent of the national Messiah; and the promise of His coming had a deeper significance for them than for other Jews because their faith was concentrated on the person of a living Lord, who had risen from the dead and ascended into heaven. Again, the outward environment of the Church was no less Jewish than the spirit of its teaching, for the synagogue was still the only centre of public ministry open to Christian teachers. Thither the brethren resorted regularly for reading of the Scriptures, for united prayer and praise, as well as religious instruction: there they delivered addresses to mixed congregations of Jews and Christians, basing their doctrine on the Hebrew Scriptures. They claimed, in fact, to be a reformed branch of the ancient national Church, and were long regarded by the Greek world as a purely Jewish sect.

Under these circumstances the conversion of the Gentiles made of necessity slow progress: few but those who had already become regular attendants on the worship of the synagogue came within touch of the Christian ministry. These devout Gentiles seem to have clustered freely round Jewish colonies in Greek cities; they were not proselytes, for they shrank from circumcision with all the ceremonial bondage and social exclusiveness which it entailed, but they had learned from Jewish teachers the value of their Scriptures, their theology, and their moral law, and in consequence of these antecedents were in general predisposed to listen gladly to a gospel which taught the brotherhood of all mankind and placed the love of God and man above ritual and legal observance. But these Greeks had no

rights whatever in the Jewish congregation. Though their attendance was tolerated, if not encouraged, they were only admitted on sufferance; and after having occupied so subordinate a position in the synagogue they were at first content to fill a like secondary place in the Church, and acquiesced willingly in the leadership of Jewish Christians.

These considerations account for the tardy growth of Gentile Christianity. For several years it lingered along the eastern coast of the Levant without an attempt to raise its voice in Asiatic or European Greece.¹ Antioch continued for a long time to be its only important centre, and even there Greek Christians were slow to vindicate their independence of Judaism. The prompt response, however, of that Church to the call of the Spirit for special labourers in the Lord's vineyard, by which it gained the proud distinction of becoming the mother city of Greek Christianity, attested the growing strength of their spiritual life and their hopeful confidence in the future of the Kingdom. It was Greek enthusiasm for the conversion of their fellow-countrymen that stirred this newborn zeal for church extension. Hitherto the diffusion of the faith had been due more to the force of circumstances than to spontaneous effort. Refugees, driven from their homes by persecution, had carried their faith with them in their flight to distant cities. But the mission of Barnabas and Saul was a purely missionary enterprise conceived for the express purpose of extending the gospel to the islands and coasts of the Mediterranean. The two Apostles were necessarily invested with wide discretion as to the further scope of their mission. It was hardly possible to determine their route in advance,

¹ More than thirteen years elapsed between the conversion of Saul and the apostolic council at Jerusalem. The baptism of Cornelius belongs to the beginning of this period before Christian refugees from Jerusalem had settled in Cæsarea, or Philip had taken up his abode there. The mission of Paul and Barnabas belongs, on the contrary, to its closing years; for the special object of the apostolic council was to allay the heartburnings aroused among Jewish Christians by their success, and to restore the peace of the Church.

since it depended on the future openings that might present themselves. It was therefore left in large measure to their judgment. But the direction in which it was originally launched clearly intimates the desires and hopes by which its authors were animated: it turned its back on Palestine and the East, and set its face towards Asiatic Greece and the famous centres of Greek civilization in the West.

2. The condition of Asiatic Greece at that time offered an exceptional promise of success to Christian Apostles. Thanks to the universal peace and settled order which the Cæsars had established throughout the empire, that province had attained a high pitch of industrial activity and commercial prosperity; and in spite of the social corruption and luxurious vices which riches brought in their train, the consequent exuberance of life, social, intellectual and religious, afforded a favourable opening for religious reform. The region had been in former centuries a frequent battle-field between Greek and Asiatic races, and still formed a borderland between eastern and western thought. But the religion which the people had inherited from ancient times was more Oriental than Greek, and its degraded type of sensuous worship could hardly satisfy the conscience even of a heathen community to which the influences of western civilization had penetrated. Greek philosophy and Roman morality combined to create a nobler ideal of human duty and Divine government than could be reconciled with the popular religion, so that all the better feelings of educated men and women were stirred into revolt against the debasing superstition of the masses.

The religious ferment produced by this collision was specially aggravated in Asia Minor by the multiplication of Jewish colonies in the principal cities, systematically planted and fostered long ago through the wise policy of Syrian kings for the encouragement of trade and promotion of intercourse between these two races of their subjects. These

settlements were particularly thriving in southern Galatia, along the direct line of communication between Antioch and Ephesus, which was in Greek as well as Roman times the only safe route by land between those two capitals. Nowhere else could be found such conspicuous traces of their religious influence over the surrounding population. They formed, of course, distinct communities of their own, divided from the Greeks by unsociable habits as well as ritual obligations and religious scruples. Yet their scriptural teaching proved so attractive to seekers after God that a considerable number of citizens frequented their weekly services in the Pisidian Antioch and in Iconium, and were thus, like the devout Gentiles everywhere, predisposed to give a cordial welcome to the preaching of Christ. Accordingly it was in those cities that His Apostles gained their first conspicuous success : there Asia Minor first awoke to the call of the gospel, and the firstfruits were reaped of an abundant harvest. It was perhaps inevitable that this hearty reception of the new doctrine by Greeks should provoke intense jealousy on the part of the Jews, and arouse bitter opposition from them. The vehement appeal of Paul to his Gentile hearers at Antioch brought that opposition to a head, and stirred the passions of both parties to fever heat. The Jews heard the impotence of their law for salvation denounced in their own synagogue, the Gentiles heard the offer of a new way of salvation by repentance and faith in Christ alone.

3. From that hour both alike recognised in that Apostle the foremost champion of Gentile rights, and the most formidable adversary of Judaism. It is time, therefore, to turn to his personal history and review the chain of circumstances which landed him with his colleague in the interior of Asia Minor. The record of the joint mission during its first few months was uneventful : they traversed Cyprus from end to end, preaching in all the synagogues by the

way without achieving any success worthy of record. Barnabas, himself a native of the island, naturally took the lead in virtue of his older standing in the Church and of his superior position in the church of Antioch as the chosen representative of the Twelve, but failed apparently to elicit any enthusiastic response. It was not till they reached Paphos, the western port and the seat of the Roman Government, that the spirit of Paul was stirred within him to carry his appeal to Gentile hearers. He procured by some means an audience of the proconsul, successfully encountered Elymas, who had hitherto exercised a pernicious influence at his court by the aid of mystic arts, and, after dooming him to temporary blindness by a signal manifestation of his spiritual power, finally converted the proconsul himself. This success was fruitful in results; it established Paul's virtual leadership in the mission; and Barnabas, though he retained the nominal dignity of head, was content to submit the guidance of its policy to the more determined counsels of his energetic colleague.¹ A new spirit of enterprise speedily manifested itself in their proceedings. *Paul and his company* (as they are designated), after crossing to the mainland, struck at once across Pamphylia and the Pisidian highlands into the interior. Meanwhile John Mark, of Jerusalem, though warmly attached to his cousin Barnabas, refused to accompany them any farther in his capacity of minister, and on reaching the coast at once returned home alone.² We are not told how far he was

¹ It appears from the historian's adoption at this point of the Greek name *Paul*, instead of the Hebrew *Saul*, that he dates from that time his entrance on the apostleship to the Gentiles. The narrative of the voyage from Paphos ignores Barnabas altogether, and the subsequent history assigns him a secondary part. His position is aptly illustrated by the language of the Lycaonian populace, who evinced their sense of his superior dignity by identifying him with Jupiter, but called Paul Mercury because he was the chief speaker.

² The actual separation of Mark from the party did not take place before their arrival in Pamphylia, but the future policy of the mission was obviously settled at Paphos before their departure, and the Apostles proceeded to carry

daunted by prospects of fatigue or danger, or how far his secession was due to lack of sympathy with their enthusiasm for the conversion of the Greeks; but it is certain that Paul for a long time continued to condemn his fainthearted desertion of the party at a critical moment as disloyal conduct. So the Apostles pursued their way alone to the Pisidian Antioch.

4. There, however, a mysterious change came over their plans. Instead of pushing on, as they had done hitherto, with all speed, they settle down for months in the three cities Antioch Iconium and Lystra successively, with such determination that imminent danger or threats of actual violence alone availed to put them to flight. Even then they do but take refuge in the neighbouring city Derbe for a while, and thence retrace their steps to the coast, revisiting by the way the three churches they had planted. The character and history of Paul forbids any suspicion that this outward inaction can have been due to caprice or irresolution on his part: still it presents a strange contrast to the determined energy of onward movement that preceded it, and the suddenness of the change excites a reasonable curiosity as to its occasion. Their motive for lingering in the neighbourhood after their expulsion from Antioch creates indeed no difficulty in the mind of the reader. Having formed the nucleus of a considerable church in one city, they were naturally reluctant to forsake it in its infancy, and were encouraged by the success of their first ministry to attempt the formation of sister churches in the same region. But the real problem is to reconcile the sudden arrest of their onward journey at Antioch with the resolute spirit which had induced them to undertake a tedious if not dangerous journey thither across the mountain passes of

it out immediately on their landing. It was therefore presumably at Paphos that Mark decided on withdrawal: he only crossed with them to Perga in order to secure a passage eastwards along the coast, which was his readiest means of returning, and there took leave of the Apostles.

Pisidia. Why did they plunge so eagerly into the interior of Asia Minor, if they proposed merely to fix their residence in a second-rate city? and what did Mark find so alarming in the prospect as to deter him from continuing his ministry? They were certainly not tempted to linger there by the immediate success of their first efforts; for however fruitful proved the Apostle's final appeal to his Greek hearers in that city, the whole tenor of his address betrays his disappointment with the result of his previous ministry to the Jews. Besides bitterly denouncing the Jewish rulers and people for the murder of Jesus, and solemnly warning unbelievers of their deadly peril, it proclaims the utter inadequacy of the Law to justify, and makes a final appeal from Jewish prejudice to the universal conscience of mankind on the basis of repentance and faith in Christ alone. Now we know how steadfastly the Apostle adhered everywhere to the principle of offering the gospel *to the Jew first* in spite of the constant persecutions he endured at their hands. It is morally certain, therefore, that he had on this occasion made prolonged but fruitless efforts to touch the consciences and win the hearts of his fellow-countrymen before he turned away from them in despair to a wider circle of conscience-stricken hearers. His address seriously tested the capacity of the gospel to satisfy Greek aspirations after God, and its cordial reception opened a new prospect of unlimited expansion before the Christian Church. For the first time an Apostle had ventured in a synagogue to throw himself avowedly on Greek support in defiance of a majority of unbelieving Jews. He put before Greeks a new reading of the Hebrew Scriptures, passing over circumcision as an unessential ordinance of temporary value, while he enlarged on God's provision of a Saviour better fitted than the Law to meet the needs of sinful man, and taught them to seek salvation through Him only. The Greeks to whom he appealed, being already instructed in the Scriptures, gathered round

him and Barnabas, beseeching them to repeat this doctrine of the grace of God in Christ, and crowded to hear their next address. The result was seen in the rapid formation of a congregation in which, owing to Jewish opposition, Greek converts had from the beginning an overwhelming preponderance over Jews and proselytes. The effect of this success on the career of Paul was decisive: he had found the right key to the hearts of Greeks, and was emboldened to carry the same message with confident hope throughout the Greek world. No less remarkable was its effect on the Church in general: Jewish Christians in Syria and Palestine soon realized that a new power had arisen within the Church, and began to challenge the orthodoxy of Paul and Barnabas. But the success reacted on those churches also by imparting to their Greek members a new weight in the counsels of the Church. In the crisis which ensued Paul and Barnabas pleaded the cause of Gentile liberty before the Apostles and elders at Jerusalem, and found no argument so effective as the manifest blessing of God on their Galatian ministry.

5. To return to the history of their mission. We have seen how strongly the tenor of Paul's address suggests the failure of his preceding ministry to convert or conciliate the Jewish majority. The enthusiastic adhesion of the Greeks, however, on that occasion, and even of many Jews and proselytes, proves that he had not spent his previous labour in vain. Beyond these hints the narrative throws no light on the preceding period; its silence leaves an entire blank.

Can we then find in the Epistle to the Galatians any means of bridging this gap? I believe that we can, and that the two accounts, absolutely independent as they are without any apparent connexion, do nevertheless dovetail into each other with so nice a harmony that their combination supplies all the material for a lucid and consistent

account of the apostolic policy and proceedings. In Galatians iv. 13 the Apostle writes: "*Ye know that because of infirmity of the flesh I preached the gospel unto you the first time.*"¹ Taking these words by themselves, they admit of two different interpretations, either that Paul repaired to Galatia in consequence of previous illness elsewhere, or that he was detained in that country by illness in spite of his own desire to proceed without delay to some ulterior destination. The context presents insuperable objections to the former. If he had made up his mind before his attack not to preach the gospel in Galatia, how came he then to approach its immediate neighbourhood at all? And how came the Galatian Christians as a body to be familiar with plans which he had altogether abandoned before his arrival? Even supposing that illness induced him to prefer their climate or their country to some other, what possible cause could his Galatian converts find in this for offence? The Apostle distinctly alleges that they had good reason at the time of their first intercourse to feel aggrieved at some apparent slight that he had put upon them: is it reasonable to fix the occasion 'of the personal slight at a time when neither party had met or thought of meeting the other? If, however, we adopt the other interpretation and conceive the Apostle to have been involuntarily detained by illness on his way through Galatia, all difficulties disappear at once. If he merely rested there in the first place like any other casual visitor to recover from the fatigue of his previous journey before resuming his onward pilgrimage, without the least thought of undertaking a Christian

¹ The rendering of the Revised Version here adopted, "*because of infirmity,*" rightly lays stress on the causal force which belongs to the Greek preposition according to the usage of the Greek Testament as well as classical authors. The English phrase "*first time*" is less explicit than the corresponding Greek, which specifies the *former* of the two visits which the Apostle had paid to Galatia; but as that was also his first visit, the difference is immaterial for our present purpose.

ministry in that place, his converts could not fail in after times to remember the eventful circumstances which had issued in their conversion: they would not be likely to forget either his first introduction to them as a passing stranger, or the sudden illness which had incapacitated him for further travel, and, by throwing him on their hospitable care, had so endeared them to each other and issued in a lifelong union of affection and faith. He too on his side was sure to feel some qualms of self-reproach when he recalled the indifference which he had originally manifested towards his Galatian hosts, and to cherish intense gratitude for the devoted kindness with which they had nevertheless ministered to his sufferings. It is obvious that the malady ran the whole of its subsequent course under the eyes of his Galatian converts; for he assumes their familiarity with its repulsive symptoms, and expresses grateful recollection of their tender sympathy. It further appears that it lasted a considerable time: for whereas he broke down before he had attempted to make a single convert, he found himself before its close surrounded by a devoted band of friends who were zealous to make any sacrifice for his relief. How many of the devout Gentiles, who eventually formed the bulk of the first Galatian Church, owed their conversion to their attendance on his sick-bed, is not recorded; but it is certain, from the pathetic reference here made to the intimate affection that grew up between the Apostle and his attendants, that at least the foundation of a Church was laid before his recovery; and we can perceive how impossible it had become for him at that stage to tear himself away from the infant Church, whatever he had before meditated.

6. This view cannot possibly be reconciled with the theory of a northern site for the Galatian churches. Northern Galatia lay quite away from the recorded track of the Apostle, and even those who still cling to their belief in that site in spite of Prof. Ramsay's researches in Asia Minor

can hardly imagine that he intended to travel beyond it to some still more distant field. Southern Galatia, on the contrary, was traversed from end to end by a great highway on which he is known to have travelled four times ; and on this were situated his three churches, the Pisidian Antioch Iconium and Lystra. *Primâ facie* their position satisfies the essential conditions of an interrupted journey. It is well, therefore, to place the historical record of their foundation side by side with the state of facts described independently in the Epistle, and compare the two accounts in order to ascertain their mutual harmony or divergence. The first result of this comparison is distinctly to identify the scene of the illness with the Pisidian Antioch. It lay just within the southern border of the province, and was therefore the first Galatian city reached by Paul and Barnabas on their northward journey from the coast, and the first in which they took up their abode. The narrative of their journey terminates abruptly with their arrival at Antioch : and the history, without assigning any reason for its sudden termination or noticing the commencement of their ministry, passes over an indefinite period in silence, recording only the final stage of their ministry. The Epistle completely explains this sudden halt, and fills up the mysterious gap, by incidental reference to a serious illness which attacked Paul immediately after his arrival and evidently lasted for a considerable time. According to the Epistle he won the hearts of many Galatians, whom he numbered either then or afterwards among his converts, and became permanently bound to them in heart and spirit. The historian maintains his habitual silence about these personal details, which belong more properly to a biography than to a history of the apostolic Church. Again, the comparison reflects a needed ray of light on the original policy of the mission : for whereas it is difficult in the Acts to reconcile the prolonged sojourn in Galatia with the determined energy of their

start, which alarmed the less courageous Mark and carried the party as far as Antioch without a break, the Epistle supplies the information that Galatia was not the original goal of the expedition, and that the Galatian ministry was really due to a subsequent attack of illness. This chain of minute coincidences in minor details, which could only be known to contemporary writers, establishes the close connexion of the events recorded and strongly attests the veracity of the two narratives : their combination results in a graphic picture of the Apostle's early ministry in Galatia, and it is interesting to notice how decisively, in spite of his far-sighted policy and his energetic resolution, his career was shaped on this, as on many other occasions, beyond his own control, by the providence of God.

7. Finally, since the two narratives agree in suggesting that Antioch was not the real goal for which the Apostles started, and that the journey thither was only the first stage of their proposed expedition, it is worth while to enquire whither they were really bound. The position of Antioch goes far to determine the answer to this question. It was a Roman colony planted by Augustus Cæsar on the main road which ran from Syria to the western coast of Asia, and linked the eastern provinces of the empire with Greece and Rome by way of Ephesus. For the security of that imperial highway, and the pacification of the Pisidian highlands adjoining it, he constructed a system of military roads converging on Antioch from the south, and connecting it with a kindred group of Roman colonies generally known as the Pisidian. By this means safe communication was established with Pamphylia and Cyprus, and the safety of the road itself was effectually secured, so that the Apostles were able to reckon on reaching Antioch by that route.

Once at Antioch, they had the option of proceeding along the main road either eastwards to Iconium and Lystra, or westwards to Ephesus : for an expedition northwards by local

roads into the heart of Phrygia was clearly out of the question. And since the Epistle distinctly states that Paul had no intention before his illness of preaching to any of the Galatians, they had no alternative but to follow the westward road into the province of Asia. The insight thus afforded us into the mind of the Apostle is full of interest. It appears that at this early stage of his career he was already bent on adding Ephesus and some of the famous cities on the Asiatic seaboard to the kingdom of Christ. The project might well seem to Mark at that time a chimerical dream ; but it was at last accomplished, though many years passed before he was permitted to achieve this crowning triumph. Throughout those intervening years his Christian ambition pointed steadily in that direction. The very next time that he found himself in a position to resume his missionary labours he formed once more the design of proceeding along this same road to the province of Asia after revisiting his Galatian churches, but his design was a second time overruled by the intervention of a higher Power ; the Spirit warned him to turn aside into the road to Troas, and from thence he was summoned over to Macedonia. Yet in spite of these two successive disappointments in Galatia he did not abandon his fixed purpose : no sooner did he complete his ministry in Corinth than he hastened to prepare the way for the new campaign at Ephesus to which the seven Churches of Asia owed their birth.

It may perhaps be urged against this view of the apostolic policy that if Paul and Barnabas desired to proceed from Paphos to Ephesus, their most direct course was by sea : there is, however, good reason for dismissing this objection as futile. Since the Levant was closed to navigation all the winter, it may be taken for granted that the expedition originally started from Syria in the spring that they might have the summer season before them.

They probably spent all the summer months in traversing Cyprus, preaching everywhere, and did not reach Paphos before the autumn. It was by that time impossible for them to reach the *Ægean* by a sea voyage on account of the persistency and frequent violence of the *Etesian* winds which blew from a north-west quarter out of the *Ægean* sea all the autumn. It was difficult and dangerous for even well-found vessels like the Alexandrian ship which conveyed Paul from Myra to attempt to round the promontory of Cnidos at that season. The coasting craft which frequented Paphos, though sufficient to carry the Apostles across to the mainland, would certainly not have ventured to face the risk of encountering those adverse winds and stormy seas. There were in all probability only three courses open to them, to turn their faces homewards, to linger along the coast of the *Levant*, or to strike across by way of Perga and Antioch into the great land route which led to the western coast. They chose the last and boldest course ; and though their enterprise was cut short half-way by the illness of one Apostle, their courage was rewarded by the addition of three Galatian churches to the kingdom of Christ, and they were enabled to plant the banner of the cross firmly in the centre of Asia Minor.

F. RENDALL.

FEW THINGS NEEDFUL.

“ And Jesus answered and said unto her, Martha, Martha, thou art careful and troubled about many things : but one thing is needful ; and Mary hath chosen that good part, which shall not be taken away from her.”—*Luke* x. 41, 42.

THE Lord Jesus was on His last fatal journey to Jerusalem. Many forcible and beautiful sayings are connected by St. Luke with this period. Often it is not easy to be sure that the connexion is historical ; but we may assume that even in the Evangelist's time a strictly historical arrangement

would have been impossible. There is, however, something more important, and even for us, so long after the time of Christ, not unattainable, viz., to endeavour to understand the sayings in relation to the general position of the Master, and to apply them in no narrow or mechanical way to the circumstances of our own time.

The setting given by Luke to the above saying is singularly beautiful. Jesus had just uttered the immortal parable of the Good Samaritan, which gives a classic example of what we may call the life of active piety. Luke now supplements this imaginative picture by a narrative which he gives as historical, exemplifying that kind of piety which is sometimes said to prefer contemplation to action, but which is more correctly defined as that which declines an activity not based on deep personal conviction. As they went on their way southward, Jesus and His disciples arrived, probably towards evening, at a certain village where it was natural for travellers to halt. Here there dwelt a woman named Martha, who honoured Jesus as a divinely sent Teacher and a Benefactor of the people, and, having a house of her own, she gave Him a hospitable welcome. She is stated to have had a sister residing with her, whose name was Mary, but we are not told by Luke whether the two sisters formed the entire family, or whether there was also a husband or a brother; nor does the Evangelist say how many of the disciples were allowed by Jesus to accompany Him into the house. At any rate, the Master found encouragement to discourse concerning the kingdom of God, regardless of the claims of nature for physical and mental repose. And there was one fresh, and, no doubt, enthusiastic disciple, seated, as was fitting, at Jesus' feet, who drank in His words. That disciple was Mary.

The preparations for the meal were now being hurried forward, probably in another apartment, and Martha—as

the mistress of the house—was nothing less than “distracted,” as Luke reports, “with much ministration.” She was solely intent on showing respect to the great Teacher in the traditional manner, which regarded the abundance and variety of dishes as essential to a feast of honour. But, like so many other people with a keen sense of propriety, Martha felt aggrieved when her sister ventured to deviate from social tradition. She came up (*ἐπιστᾶσα*) to Jesus and said, “Sir, dost thou not care that my sister has left me to minister alone? Bid her therefore help me.” How does the Master meet Martha’s request? Our texts differ. The Cambridge editors give this as the best supported reading of His answer, “Martha, Martha, thou art careful and troubled about many things: but there is need of few things, or of one; for Mary has chosen the good part, one which will not be taken away from her.” The received text, however, to which Tregelles and Tischendorf both adhere, gives the central words in a different form, which by familiarity has become so dear to us that we would gladly leave it uncriticised, “Thou art careful and troubled about many things: but there is need of one thing,” that is, of only one thing. My own conviction is that this reading is incorrect, and that it probably originated in that quasi-æsthetic sentiment which appears to have dictated not a few early alterations of ancient texts. It is, in fact, from the point of view of Christian supernaturalism, strictly true that only one thing is needful; by supernaturalism I mean that form of piety which delights in minimizing the claims of the present world and directing the attention of the Christian almost exclusively to those of the world to come. And if this form of piety was really recommended, absolutely recommended, by Jesus, it appears to be inconsistent in a Christian to devote time and energy to making the present stage of existence cheerful and beautiful. The present world being only a passage to that

which is to come, contemplation of the glories yet to be revealed is the ideal occupation, and Martha deserved severe censure for letting anything prevent her from listening to Him who could speak as never man spake concerning these glories. Only one thing was needful, and that the poor troubled hostess had neglected.

To say that a reading cannot be the original one exposes me to the charge of critical subjectivity: I am not dismayed at the prospect. The text of the Old Testament is a colossal example of the subjectivity of editors and scribes; that of the New, though doubtless much better, cannot be considered free from specimens of the same quality. There is no advantage in preferring the ill-regulated subjectivity of ancient scribes to the trained subjectivity of a methodical modern critic. The words "or of one" are analogous to many similar and unexpected insertions which are plainly marginal notes, and the original reading, according to my judgment, ran thus, "there is need of few things."

It remains to interpret the strongly marked antithesis between the many and the few things. What is the unexpressed substantive? Did the Master really say that He had only expected to be entertained with a few dishes? Many Greek and some modern interpreters have supposed so, but surely such a saying as this was not striking or significant enough to be preserved by tradition. The "few things" must be those of which our Lord speaks in the Sermon on the Mount, and of which He says that they are not to cause us any anxiety; He refers to the relatively few material necessities of a modest human existence. According to this view, the first part of the reported speech of Jesus is not at all a censure of Martha either for preparing so many dishes or for not seating herself at His feet, but simply a gentle reminder that man's earthly wants are few, and that, having a Father in heaven, we need not be careful for these to the point of anxiety, the application

of which principle, with tactful consideration, Jesus leaves to His entertainer. And the "many things" about which Martha is so unwisely anxious are neither the dishes of the feast, nor food and clothing in general, but all the complicated prescriptions of social custom among the Jews at that time.

As for the second part of the traditional saying, it is important to notice that, according to the Codex Bezae, it constitutes almost the whole of the Lord's saying, which becomes, as this manuscript presents it, "Martha, Martha, thou art disturbed; Mary hath chosen the good part, one which will not be taken away from her," with which the Sinaitic Syriac palimpsest very nearly agrees. Now, I willingly admit this reading to be the product, not so much of literary, as of moral or religious criticism, the reference to a few things as necessary having probably been a stumbling-block to many minds, and yet I think that, upon purely literary grounds, the omission of either the first or the second part of the saying is fully justifiable. I mean that what Jesus said after "Martha, Martha" was, probably, given variously by tradition, sometimes in this form, "Thou art careful and troubled about many things; but there is need of only few things"; and sometimes in this other form, "Mary has chosen the good part, one which will not be taken away from her," where the phrase "the good part" means, not "the food which is truly excellent—the food of the spirit," but a share in the kingdom of God, respecting which the Psalmist enthusiastically says, "The lot is fallen unto me in a fair ground; yea, I have a goodly heritage."

To decide between these two sayings is beyond the critic's capacity. Neither of them would we willingly miss. The first seems to open a window in the heart of Martha, the second in that of her sister, and both Martha and Mary are typical persons. Not only now, but always,

it was Martha's temptation to be anxious about many things of purely conventional value, and to forget that, if the first objects of her aspiration were righteousness and the kingdom of God, all needful things of earth would be "added unto" her. At the same time we need not doubt that, with whatever inconsistency, Martha (according to the narrator) was indeed a seeker of the true righteousness. See with what affectionate concern Jesus speaks to her. He knows that she is "distracted" in a fuller sense than she herself thinks; she is trying to serve at once God and social tradition, and while Jesus appreciates her desire to honour Him, He regrets the superfluous and injurious anxiety which it involves. She is not far from the kingdom of God; why should she not actually enter into it?

Mary, on her side, was not an unloving sister, even though she cared far less for social custom. If she did not spring at once to help her sister, it was because of the peculiar circumstances in which she found herself. Like Martha, she honoured in Jesus of Nazareth a Teacher come from God; but, unlike Martha, she also considered that now or never was her time to penetrate into the Master's secret. We cannot doubt that it was of the kingdom of heaven that Jesus discoursed to Mary, and that He enjoined, on the one hand, absolute devotion of the heart to God, and, on the other, a fearless confidence that God would so rule and overrule the affairs of life that nothing really needful should be wanting to His children. It was not selfish in Mary to seclude herself for a time from earthly business. She realized intensely what Jesus said, that the kingdom of heaven was near at hand, and that men should be on the watch lest its appearance should find them unprepared. She hungered and thirsted after this kingdom, and placed herself under the influence of its Herald and Revealer in order to receive in her degree that rich foretaste of it which He Himself enjoyed. She chose

that best of portions—to reign with God for ever, and the Master recognised this. Jesus (if we adopt the second of the two sayings) would not let Martha blame her sister; His new disciple had shown that strength of imagination, that capacity of realizing the future, which is the basis of the higher prudence. Soon there would be no more hunger and thirst, cold and nakedness; soon the children of the kingdom would be called in to the coronation feast of the King. Then, what comfort would it be to those left outside to remember that all social traditions had been duly deferred to, and that no religious teacher had passed their door without being invited to partake of a feast of honour?

“Few things are needful”; “Mary has chosen the good part.” Both sayings are closely connected with a fundamental idea of the Master. The first relates to the time before the visible establishment of the kingdom; the second points forward to that greatest of events. It will be clear, then, that we are not to account for the former of the two sayings (with which I am now chiefly concerned) by the remark that the speaker had the confined views of life natural to a village carpenter. Indeed, Nazareth was near enough to busy and luxurious Gentile cities for Jesus to have been affected, both as a man and as a teacher, by the materialism of the age, had He been other than He was. On the contrary, the saying is in a high degree characteristic, and has the nature of a protest; it well expresses the moderation of the Master’s attitude towards material things. He was neither an ascetic like John the Baptist and the Essenes, nor a Sadducæan voluptuary of the type described in the second chapter of Ecclesiastes. He did not refuse the company of the rich, nor absent Himself on principle from the cheerful feast, and He announced a kingdom of God which was soon to be set up on a purified and glorified earth. No; the clear-sighted Master avoided the falsehood of extremes. He could neither have said, “Many things

are needful," in the sense of an ignoble materialism, nor yet, "One thing only is needful," in the sense of a one-sided, even if noble, spiritualism.

And why, according to the Master's idea, are few material things needful? Because the inheritance of the kingdom is for persons of a certain character, which character must be formed during the period of probation and education, and because to be burdened with material possessions which do not promote this result, and the use of which is limited on every side by social convention, is to be deprecated. It remains true, however, that a few material things are needful. Without the daily bread, gained by honest toil, without the human and humanizing relations of the family, how should we gain those elementary moral qualities which, though not distinctively Christian, are yet essential in Christ's disciples? And without a certain number of painful experiences, proving that it is not in a man to direct his own steps, and without a certain number of blighted hopes and the moral reaction produced in a man by the humiliating discovery of his moral failures, how should those more advanced spiritual qualities show themselves, which can be said, on the authority of Jesus Christ, to entitle a man to the inheritance of the kingdom of heaven?

Certainly the gospel of such needful things as these—simplicity in our mode of life, righteousness (which in the Jewish sense includes brotherly love) in our dealings with others, and deep humility towards God, based on the conviction of a judgment to come—needs to be preached as much in this as in any preceding century of the Christian Church. But it is not of this gospel that I wish now to speak, but of another, which is, indeed, its natural complement—the gospel of simplicity in theology. Few things are needful in theology, but these few things are needful indeed; and if, through the value that it sets on a historical

connexion, our Church has come to possess a somewhat over-developed and somewhat inharmonious theology, no pains should be spared by thinkers and students to recover those first principles of Christ's gospel, by the light of which we can hope to reinterpret our faith to the new generation. And there is no reason why the special obligations of clergymen should make them backward in performing this duty. If we are no longer expected to believe everything in the Bible in the same simple, unthinking way as our forefathers, surely creeds and articles too can only be accepted subject to all the limitations which God's progressive education of the human spirit imposes upon them. Surely it must be recognised that the real normative influence on Christian thought is, or ought to be, exercised by those simple but deep first principles of which I spoke, though we cannot be forbidden to enrich our interpretation of them by the infusion of any congenial truth which God may have revealed to His children outside of the Bible.

The task thus laid upon us Christian students is no light one. But if we regard it in perfect simplicity as laid upon us by One who, together with the task, can give the strength to perform it, we shall not, even as individuals, and still less as a society, fail of some success. The difficulties, indeed, are endless—difficulties in the discovery and comprehension of the first principles, difficulties in their reinterpretation and development. But, as St. Paul said, "Woe unto me if I preach not the Gospel," so Christian students may say, "Woe unto us if we prepare not the way for a second spiritual coming of the Messiah in the hearts of men." It is our complicated theology which conceals from so many men the beauty of true Christianity. If in these latter days the Christian Church has been privileged to win no slight success, our rejoicing is tempered by the thought that, but for our persistence in a needlessly obscure presen-

tation of spiritual truth, the success of the Church might have been far greater.

This view of the duty of Christian students has been expressed more or less distinctly by not a few theologians. It needs, however, to be constantly expressed anew, and by whom can it be expressed more fitly than by the authorized teachers of our universities, which can no longer be described as the homes of lost causes and ideals tried and found wanting? And it needs also to be supplemented by a corresponding view of the duty of thoughtful Christians who are not in a special sense students of religion. Could they not give more sympathy than they do to straightforward investigation, and show more interest in the progress of the study of religious origins than they at present do? Ought they to allow us students, out of an ill-directed loyalty, to fetter ourselves in the pursuit of historical truth by a too constant reference to theological formulæ or to the supposed necessities of apologetic? Surely our primary considerations ought to be the love of truth and loyalty to Jesus Christ. Surely apologetic ought to accommodate itself to facts, and not facts to apologetic. Surely the only thing that is permanently valuable in a religious formula is its underlying principle, and this principle cannot have force simply because long ago it was adopted by some church assembly. It has to be tested periodically by its consistency with those really fundamental principles, which the larger Church derives, not from scholastic theology, but from the fountains of spontaneous and natural expression in the New Testament.

It may appear to some as if the tendency of this exhortation were to draw students away from the investigation of the Old Testament to that of the New, and within the New Testament field to concentrate their attention too exclusively on religious doctrine. Such is far from my intention. Religious doctrines cannot be rightly under-

stood apart from the facts of history and experience amidst which they have grown up, nor can we all at once distinguish between the facts which have a close bearing on religious doctrine and those which have not. The society of investigators of the sources of Christianity which is gradually arising cannot afford to allow itself to be altogether absorbed in what is sometimes technically called Biblical theology. Our most pressing need, as investigators, is to obtain somewhat more knowledge of the historical scenery of the great spiritual drama of the first Christian century. We must apply the varied methods of modern criticism to the New Testament records of facts; and since a training in these methods is necessary, and the training ought to be gained in a field less dimmed by excusable and even honourable prejudices, it is in the Old Testament literature that the critic must seek the most important part of his training. For the sake of the New Testament, therefore, I would urge all our best theological students to take not only a general survey, from a distinctly critical point of view, of the Old Testament literature, but to give a somewhat thorough and special study to some parts of it. What I now propose to them is not reading for examinations, which unhappily do almost as much harm as good, but reading after the examinations, and not merely reading (for books by themselves are not enough), but coming into close contact with men who are actually engaged in critical work. There is no greater mistake than to suppose that a well-read or erudite man is competent in virtue of his erudition to pronounce on critical questions. Book-learning is good, but it is not easy to "wear it lightly like a flower," and in England, where the examination system is still, alas! without its necessary counterweight in an organization of advanced teaching and study, it is specially difficult to make good use of erudition. Personal intercourse with critical scholars is absolutely essential to advanced theological students, and

these scholars must not all be men who work in the same groove, must not be all of one type; must be free to be cautious, but free also to be bold.

And this reminds me of a danger, of the existence of which, with all earnestness, I would venture to warn younger students. It is one to which we in England are particularly liable—in England, where it seems so natural to substitute one traditional authority for another, and to avoid reopening difficult questions. When a forward step is taken by some scholar slightly bolder than ourselves—a step which involves reconsidering, correcting, and supplementing critical theories and even critical methods which have been supposed to be established, when, in short, the prevalent critical tradition is threatened, it is very tempting to condemn that critic from our own narrower point of view without any adequate consideration, and to forget that even non-Christian moralists recognise the virtues of fairness and generosity. But let me warn younger students that this would be a most shortsighted and injudicious policy. For no greater service can be rendered to critical students than to force them to correct or supplement their methods, and to expand their theories; and in England, as I have said, this service is peculiarly needed. Far too much is said in these days about the assured results of criticism. There are such results, most certainly; but many of the points which the last generation of critics thought itself to have settled, at least so far as was possible, need, perhaps, to be unsettled again, and treated by new methods. Besides this, a quantity of new problems are rising up, for which, upon the old principles of criticism, no solution is possible. I venture to urge younger students not to pass these things by with supercilious contempt, nor to bring the cant expression, “sober and moderate criticism,” into the field as a weapon against forward-moving investigators.

The danger exists; it would not be the part of a friend to

conceal it. It is natural to wish to approach the multitude with as large a packet as possible of well-ascertained critical results, and of such results as admit most easily of adjustment to the traditional orthodoxy. Stoning, metaphorically speaking, has often been the lot of those who have been accused of destroying the indispensable shelters of faith. But truth is a severe mistress, and a comparison between her claims and those of the multitude will not give a scholar the same inward satisfaction as a course of straightforward consistency. To be a historical investigator of the sources of Christianity is as much a vocation as to be a missionary to the heathen. The right course for the investigator is not to adapt himself, except in non-essentials, to the multitude, but to take the multitude into his confidence, and to show them how natural, how interesting, how illuminative the conclusions and even the tendencies of progressive criticism are, and how they continually throw us back more and more on the first principles of Jesus Christ. The destruction of old theories is only the painful preliminary to the reconstruction of far better ones. Those who witness from outside the differences of critics are prone to misunderstand them. Sometimes they contrast two sorts of critics—moderate and advanced—to the disadvantage of the latter; sometimes, with unconcealed joy, they represent criticism as a falling house, divided against itself. Equal ignorance is shown in both cases. Moderate criticism, if such a thing there be, exists solely by its capacity for moving on; and in answer to the gibes of the adversaries of all criticism, we may quote the words of John Milton, spoken with reference to the divisions of Protestants:—

Fool! he sees not the firm root, out of which we all grow, though into branches; nor will beware, until he see our small, divided manacles cutting through at every angle of his ill-united and unwieldy brigade.¹

¹ *Areopagitica* (1644).

The hope of the future is in the increased co-operation and better mutual understanding of critical students of all schools. If in Germany there has been till lately a want of scholars—half critics and half church theologians—who can mediate between scholarship and the Church, in England there is still, perhaps, an inadequate supply of fearlessly progressive investigators, who, without wilfully hurting the least progressive Churchman of our own day, work primarily both for truth and for the Church of the future. Shocks must be given, unwillingly given, because the truth respecting Hebrew antiquity is becoming more and more different from what we have supposed. Some critics may be more advanced than others, but this is simply because they are so constituted, or have had such peculiar providential leadings, that they deliberately choose the more difficult and painful course. All critics are advancing; all have their special work from God. There is, perhaps, only one real hindrance to their friendly co-operation, and that is the new distinction which is being drawn by some non-critical theological writers between critics who will adopt their own asserting or defining language on supernatural facts or experiences, and those who, in no spirit of opposition, but through having caught a glimpse of something more satisfying to the complex needs of human nature, hesitate to do so.

That critical progress is compatible with fundamental Christianity is affirmed as earnestly by those who decline this new test as by those who take it. This is the link which unites the two schools (if schools they are), and which, should the occasion arise, would prove to the world that they have no intention of parting. What fundamental Christianity is, we shall see better when there is a fuller and more penetrating English criticism of the New Testament records. But the actual workers see already in what direction they are moving. They have found, as we Old

Testament critics have found, that the criticism of the Scriptures is a training-ground for faith. Let me enlarge the statement, however, so as to include all who, like that eminent man whose recent loss we mourn—Prof. Max Müller—devote their intellectual and spiritual energies to the comprehension of sacred books, and let me say that the study of all the great religions is a school of faith. No step in this study, apart from mere linguistic details, seems to me possible without either doubting Christianity altogether, or obtaining by degrees a rock-like faith, which is independent of the doubts of criticism. If the critical study of the literary sources of his religion has brought to any one temporary spiritual loss, it is because of an unspiritual doctrine of faith such as no critical worker of any eminence would approve. Should any of my younger readers feel spiritual danger from critical inquiries, I would bid him seek the personal friendship of some leader in the movement, and find out for himself that even critics can have a pastoral spirit, and a sound, practical theory of religion.

The few things in theology which are needful cannot here be indicated. Long and careful discussion would have to precede any such attempt. But one of them I may presume to mention to my juniors. It is not a doctrine of Inspiration. It is not a definition of Incarnation. It has nothing to do with Priesthood or with Sacramental Grace. It is this, that faith in the highest sense has for its objects neither books nor doctrines, but persons. “Believe in God, believe also in Me,” said Jesus, according to the Fourth Gospel. And again, “Ye search the Scriptures, for ye think that in them ye have eternal life . . . and ye will not come to Me that ye may have life.” These words, though partly coloured by the doctrines of the Evangelist, convey one of the most fundamental ideas of Jesus, who knew Himself to be the Saviour of men. The centre of gravity in theology

can never be shifted from the person of Christ. The Jesus whom we call Master is at once the historical Jesus of Nazareth, and that ideal form which becomes more and more glorious as man's moral capacity increases—the Jesus whom we can imagine moving about our streets, comforting those who mourn, healing the morally sick, stirring the consciences of the sluggish, and giving to all who see and hear fresh disclosures of truth, fresh glimpses of the ideal. Without the historical Christ the ideal Christ could never have beamed upon us. It is, therefore, our highest object as Biblical critics to revive, however faintly, the outlines of the historical picture of Jesus, and to recover the first principles of His teaching; and, next to that, to comprehend better those great ideas and those wonderful experiences of the New Testament writers which are the afterglow of that morally gorgeous sunset when Jesus of Nazareth finished the work which had been given Him to do. And in relation to that fascinating task, all that lower work which some of us are called upon to do on Pentateuch and Prophets and Psalms, and the tangled growth of apocryphal and apocalyptic literature, shine with a reflected brightness, for all of them are finger posts to Christ; and of the critics who are true to their vocation, and heed not the blame that is undeserved, it may, with humble confidence, be said that the good part which they have chosen will not be taken from them in the day when the shadows flee away and the Palace of heavenly Truth shall be revealed.

T. K. CHEYNE.

NOTES FROM THE PAPYRI.

It is not necessary at this time of day to enlarge upon the value of the great papyrus discoveries which have appeared during the past ten years. The pioneer work of Deissmann, soon, I believe, to be accessible in English, has accustomed

us to the fact that these documents, in which we are able to see the ancient world in every-day dress, contain material exceedingly helpful for our study of New Testament Greek. Deissmann has concerned himself mainly with vocabulary. In the course of work for the next edition of my father's *Winer*, I have been reading the papyrus collections of the British Museum, the Berlin Museum, the Archduke Rainer, and Dr. Flinders Petrie, and the six goodly volumes with which Drs. Grenfell and Hunt have enriched British scholarship within as many years. My purpose was entirely grammatical, and the detailed results I am collecting in the *Classical Review*. A general summary of them may perhaps be of service here, together with a few gleanings in vocabulary and phraseology. Since for his *Neue Bibelstudien* (1897) Deissmann had only the Berlin and Rainer collections (the former only as far as part 9 of vol. ii., since when the work has grown by eight parts), it is obvious that the spoil to be carried off now is greatly increased.

In papyrus citations the following abbreviations will be used, the documents being quoted by their number:—*B.U.* = *Berliner Urkunden*, to Heft 5 of Band iii. *B.M.* = *British Museum Papyri*, 2 vols. *G.* = Grenfell's *Alexandrian Erotic Fragment*, etc. *G.H.* = Grenfell and Hunt, *Greek Papyri*, second series. *O.P.* = *Oxyrhyncus Papyri*, 2 vols. *F.P.* = *Fayûm Papyri*, by the same editors. *C.P.R.* = *Corpus Papyrorum Raineri*.

Καταντᾶν εἰς, in *O.P.* 67 (338 A.D.), 75 (129 A.D.), 247 (90 A.D.), 248 (80 A.D.), 249 (*id.*), 250 (61 A.D.?), 274 (89–97 A.D.), is used in a legal sense for property “*descending to*” an heir. In *B.U.* 326 (a will dated 194 A.D.), καταντῆσαι πρὸς τινα occurs twice in the same sense. Like our *descend*, the word keeps its ordinary meaning elsewhere. The technical meaning seems exceedingly appropriate in 1 Corinthians x. 11, ἡμῶν, εἰς οὓς τὰ τέλη τῶν αἰώνων κατήντηκεν, on which

Prof. Findlay's unconscious comment is, "The Church is the *heir* of the spiritual training of mankind."¹ The Tennysonian parallel, "I the heir of all the ages," suggests itself at once. In 1 Corinthians xiv. 36, ἡ εἰς ὑμᾶς μόνους κατήντησεν (ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ); the same sense is probable—"Was the gospel your exclusive inheritance?"

Κολάζομαι, in *F.P.* 120 (100 A.D.), is used with gen. αὐτῶν, the editors translating, "I am feeling the want of them"; and so in 115 (same date and same writer), where the object is not expressed. In *B.U.* 249 (2nd cent.) I find the word with the same meaning, which gives us independent authority. It seems to me that the meaning "cut short," which the presumable connection with *κόλος* and *κολούω* would suggest, and the derivative *ἀκόλαστος*, "unchecked," supports, is the original sense of the word. In the Paris Thesaurus we find quotations for the meaning *prune* (*κόλασις τῶν δένδρων*), and a number of late passages where the verb denotes "correcting," "cutting down" a superfluity. Thus Galen, *ἰάματα κολάζοντα τὸ ὑπερβάλλον*. Of course this may be a derived sense, like the same for *castigo* and our *correct*, but in any case it is clearly a familiar sense during the New Testament period, and we cannot leave it out of consideration when we examine this very important word. In 1 John iv. 18 the idea of *κόλασις* as "deprivation" (a kind of *pœna damni*) is decidedly helpful: fear *checks development*, and is the antithesis of that *τελείωσις* which love works.

Σκύλλω, which in the classical period is physical—*lacero*, *lanio*, says the Thesaurus, with a note from Hesychius, "τὸ τοῖς ὀνυξί σπᾶν"—has become in late Greek almost entirely metaphorical, and has very different degrees of strength, like the English *distress*, which answers to it very fairly all

¹ Dr. Rendel Harris suggests to me that τὰ τέλη in this case means "the *revenues* of the ages."

round. It has very nearly its old physical meaning in *B.U.* 757 (12 A.D.). σκύλαντες δράγματα (πύρινα). Then comes ἐσκυλμένοι, "distressed," in Matthew ix. 36, which is best illustrated by σκυλμός in 3 Maccabees iii. 25, [iv. 6], vii. 5, and *O.P.* 125 (6th cent.), where it is joined with βλαβή, ζημία and ὀχλησις, or by the same noun in *F.P.* 111 (1st cent.), where it means "fatigue." A much weaker sense is apparent in Mark v. 35 and Luke viii. 49. Μὴ σκύλλου (Luke vii. 6) is just like μὴ σκλύλλε ἐατήν (*sic*), "don't distress yourself," in *O.P.* 295 (35 A.D., a letter which we may hope the mother addressed understood better than we do). It finally comes down to "hasten": *B.U.* 830 (1st cent.) σκῦλόν (τινα) πρὸς (τινα), *F.P.* 134 (4th cent.) σκῦλον σεαυτὸν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, and similarly in the passive, *O.P.* 123 (3rd or 4th cent.) ποιήσον αὐτὸν σκυλῆναι πρὸς Τιμόθεον, "Make him hasten to T." The editors there translate, "Make him look after T."; but σκυλῆναι πρὸς seems to be a common phrase in late Greek—see the literary parallels in the Thesaurus, and notably σκυλῆναι πρὸς με, "prendre la peine de venir," in the letter of Abgarus *ap. Euseb., H.E., i.* 13. The compound συσκύλλω occurs in *O.P.* 63 (2nd or 3rd cent.)—συσκύληθι αὐτῷ "take trouble with him," "give him your best attention."

Σκόλοψ occurs in *B.U.* 380 (3rd cent.) τὸν πόδαν πονεῖς ἀπὸ σκολάπου. These words are a normal specimen of the writer's orthography, but it is clear that the word in the vernacular meant "thorn" or "splinter," rather than "stake." The word would seem to have lost in late Greek its familiar classical use for something large: cf. the passages from Dioscorides and others in L. and S.

Συνᾶραι λόγον in Matthew xviii. 23 f., xxv. 19, is not isolated, as Keil and Weiss describe it: cf. *B.U.* 775, ἄχρης ἂν γένομε (= γένωμαι) ἐκὶ καὶ συνάρωμεν λόγον, and *O.P.* 113,

ὅ τι ἔδωκας αὐτῷ δῆλωσόν μοι, ἵνα συνάρωμαι αὐτῷ λόγον (both 2nd cent.).

Περισπᾶν, "distract," as in Luke x. 40, was common in the vernacular. See Grimm-Thayer, and add *B.M.* 42 (172 B.C.), εἴπερ μὴ ἀναγκαιότερόν σε περισπᾶν, "unless some special trouble is worrying you"; *ib.* 24 (163 B.C.), περισπώμενος ὑπὸ τῆς Ταθήμιος, and ὅπως καὶ αὐτὸς τῇ Ταθήμει ἀποδοὺς μὴ περισπῶμαι, "that I may be able to pay T. and be no more worried"; *G.* 15 (2nd cent. B.C.), ὅπως μὴ περισπώμεθα ἐπὶ τὰ [. . .] κριτήρια. The adj. ἀπερίσπαστος (1 Cor. vii. 35) occurs in *O.P.* 286 (82 A.D.), ὅπως παρέχονται ἡμᾶς ἀπερισπάστους "may secure us from trouble."

To Deissmann's examples I may add a few by way of supplement for the following words:—*Κυριακός* (1 Cor. xi. 20, Rev. i. 10) occurs in *B.M.* 323 (163 A.D.), εἰς κυριακὰς χρείας, "for the Imperial service," as in the quotations he gives.—*Κατάκριμα* is found in *O.P.* 298 (1st cent.), τοῦ κατακρίματος (δραχμῶν) Σ, apparently a "judgment" for a sum of money to be paid as fine or damages. Deissmann's passages from *C.P.R.* are all in the same formula, where he thinks it means "a burden imposed by judicial decision." Unfortunately, in *O.P.* the phrase quoted follows a hiatus.—*Σώματα* "slaves" in *G.* 21 (2nd cent. B.C.), ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκετικῶν σωμάτων δ' ὧν ὀνόματα, etc., still with the adjective, as also in *B.U.* 168 (169 A.D.), τὰ δουλικὰ σώματα, and *O.P.* 94 (83 A.D.). In *O.P.* 37 (49 A.D.) σωμάτιον is "a foundling," whom the next document shows to have been a slave *ipso facto*.

First century warrant may be given for *τρίστεγος* (*O.P.* 99, 55 A.D.), which has, however, slightly earlier authority from Dionysius of Halicarnassus. In *O.P.* 294 (22 A.D.) we find *κοστωδεία*, which is, I think, the earliest example of

this borrowed word (κουστωδία in Matt. xxvii. 65f., xxviii. 11). Κράβαττος comes in a papyrus of Trajan's reign, B.M. 291. In C.P.R. 27 (190 A.D.) we have ἐπιχορηγέω, "supply," for which χορηγέω is much more common in papyri.

The verb ἐκκενώω, on which, as appearing in Song of Solomon i. 3, and copied (?) thence by Theocritus, Prof. Margoliouth built so considerable a superstructure (EXPOSITION, 1900, vol. i., p. 33), occurs in B.U. 27 (2nd or 3rd cent.), a letter from a man in the corn service, who has been detained in Rome awaiting his orders. I quote the body of the letter in full:—γινώσκειν σε θέλω¹ ὅτι εἰς γῆν ἐλήλυθα τῇ ζ' τοῦ Ἑπείφ μηνός, καὶ ἐξεκένωσα μὲν τῇ ιγ' τοῦ αὐτοῦ μηνός, ἀνέβην δὲ εἰς Ῥώμην τῇ κε τοῦ αὐτοῦ μηνός, καὶ παρεδέξατο ἡμᾶς ὁ τόπος ὡς ὁ θεὸς ἤθελεν, καὶ καθ' ἡμέραν προσδεχόμεθα διμισσωρίαν, ὥστε ἕως σήμερον μηδέναν ἀπολελύσθαι τῶν μετὰ σίτου. "I wish you to understand that I have landed, on June 30th, and I finished unloading on July 12th, and went up to Rome on July 19th, and the place gave us such a reception as God willed, and we are daily awaiting our *congé*, so that to the present day not one of us in the corn service has been set free." He arrived at Ostia on June 30th, "*finished unloading*" on July 12th, and reached Rome a week later. The word, if I rightly render it, is thus the exact converse of the passage in Theocritus (xvi. 40), where shipping goods, not unshipping, supplies the figure; but I cannot see that the poet need have sought his phrase so far afield as the Professor declares. One may "empty" a freight into the hold of a ship, as well as "empty" the hold at the end of the voyage.

Βούλομαι is described by Blass (N.T. Gram., 38) as "a

¹ A very common formula: St. Paul uses it, with θέλω changed to βούλομαι, in Phil. i. 12; and in yet another form Rom. i. 13, 1 Cor. x. 1, xii. 1, 2 Cor. i. 8, 1 Thess. iv. 13; and again, with εἰδέναι, in 1 Cor. xi. 3, Col. ii. 1.

word adopted from the literary language." It is extremely common in the papyri, and not only in recurrent formulæ like βούλομαι μισθώσασθαι. If the word was literary, the New Testament writers were not the first to popularize it.

Ἰδιος seems to be used in its full sense: I can find nothing among scores of occurrences to illustrate the weakened meaning alleged for Matthew xxii. 5, John i. 41, Ephesians [iv. 28], v. 22 (see Winer, p. 192). In the astronomical work of Eudoxus, the papyrus of which dates from 165 B.C., Blass suspects an approximation to the modern Greek use of ὁ ἴδιος for ὁ αὐτός, but this does not serve us here. More to the point is the extremely common unemphatic use of ἐαυτοῦ, as in the formula by which a woman appears in a legal document, μετὰ κυρίου τοῦ ἐαυτῆς ἀνδρός (or other male relation), which occurs first in *G.* 18 (132 B.C.), and scores of times later. One use of ἴδιος may perhaps have a bearing on a very important passage. Letters are sometimes addressed to so-and-so τῷ ἰδίῳ, which implies near relationship. So *F.P.* 110 (94 A.D.), and others in the same series, addressed to one who was perhaps a nephew (though the son is always τῷ υἱῷ). If this was at all a normal use of ὁ ἴδιος, it might add something to the case for translating Acts xx. 28, τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ ἰδίου, "the blood of one who was His own" (Weiss, etc.).

Passing on from words to phrases, I note the Pauline κατ' ἐπιταγὴν (1 Cor. vii. 6, 2 Cor. viii. 8) in an inscription of Lindus, undated, but seemingly not old (*Inscr. Maris Aegaei*, i. 785). Τὰ καινότερον¹ is the phrase for "news" in *B.U.* 821 (2nd cent.), followed by ὅταν ᾗν (= ᾗ, as often) τι καινότερον, εὐθέως σοι δηλώσω: cf. Acts xvii. 21.—Πρὸς ὀλίγον εἰσχύει *O.P.* 67 (338 A.D.), "withstands but for a short time," might support the translation "for a little

¹ Like τὰ πάλαι, etc, unless it is a mere mistake for τι.

time" in 1 Tim. iv. 8 (as in Jas. iv. 14), were the document less artificial and older. 'Ὡς ἔπος ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν, "it may be said," comes earlier in the same sentence, qualifying πάντα: it is a literary reminiscence, as in Heb. vii. 9. A possible illustration for Phil. ii. 1, were we to accept Blass's correction εἴ τι throughout, would be *B.U.* 326 (194 A.D.) εἰ δέ τι περισσὰ γράμματα τῇ χειρὶ μου γεγραμμένα καταλ(ε)ίπω, βέβαια εἶναι θέλω, which would mean translating τι "at all." But if we are for emending, we had better take Blass's translation as well as his emendation ("if . . . avail aught").

Epistolary formulæ have been well worked by Deissmann and Dr. Rendel Harris (*EXPOSITOR*, vol. viii., 1898, pp. 161 ff.). It would be easy to produce a number of further examples from more recently published texts, to show how common these formulæ were. The latest volume of Drs. Grenfell and Hunt (*F.P.*) contains an interesting series of letters, in which many of them occur. I have not seen *B.U.* 246 quoted (2nd or 3rd cent.): οὐκ ἰδότες, ὅτι νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας ἐντυγχάνω τῷ θεῷ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν—it is hard to believe this pagan. (Cf. ὁ θεός in *B.U.* 27, quoted above.) In the latest number of the *B.U.*—827, undated—we have ἰδοὺ δὴ τρίτην ἐπιστολήν σοι γράφω, which recalls 2 Pet. iii. 1, with an opening like 2 Corinthians xii. 14.

I may bring these notes to an end, before diverging upon grammar, with more miscellaneous phrases which have analogues in the New Testament. In the marriage contracts, *C.P.R.* 24 (136 A.D.) and 27 (190 A.D.), we have αὐτῆς δὲ Ἀ. ἀκατηγόρητον ἐαυτήν [παρεχομένης ἐν τῇ] συμβίωσει, and αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς Θ. ἄμεμπτον καὶ ἀκατηγόρητον παρεχομένης, with a distant resemblance to such passages as Titus ii. 7, and 2 Timothy ii. 15—for ἄμεμπτος there are several Pauline passages. In *O.P.* 82 (3rd cent.) we have the oath of a strategus on taking office: προσκαρτερῶν τῇ στρατηγίᾳ ἀδιαλίπτως εἰς τὸ ἐν μηδενὶ μεμφθῆναι—cf. Acts vi. 4 and

Rom. xii. 12, Rom. i. 10, etc., 2 Cor. vi. 3, etc. The concluding clause (εἰς τὸ κ.τ.λ.) occurs in *B.U.* 18 (169 A.D.). The edict of an Eparch of Egypt (*O.P.* 34, 127 A.D.) runs thus: *τούτους τε οὖν κελεύω καὶ τοὺς πολειτικούς πάντας τὰ ἀκόλουθα τοῖς προστεταγμένοις ποιεῖν, εἰδότες ὅτι τοὺς παραβάντας καὶ τοὺς διὰ ἀπειθίαν καὶ ὡς ἀφορμὴν ζητούντας ἁμαρτημάτων τειμωρήσομαι.* "These therefore I command, and all the civil servants, to do what is in accord with the instructions given, knowing that those who have transgressed, and those who (have done wrong) deliberately (*lit.* by way of disobedience), and as seeking an occasion for wrong-doing, I shall punish." (In the very elliptical phrase *τοὺς διὰ ἀπειθίαν* it is possible that the Eparch accidentally omitted *ἁμαρτάνοντας*, though it can be translated without: we can hardly get help from Romans iii. 26, iv. 14, etc., as the preposition is much easier.) This last clause recalls Romans vii. 8 and other passages where *ἀφορμή* and *ἁμαρτία* are brought together. (*Ζητεῖν ἀφορμὴν* is a Western reading in Luke xi. 54.) Two heathen phrases I may add, to put beside Deissmann's *υἱὸς θεοῦ*. Taken out of its context, *τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ εὐεργέτου καὶ σωτῆρος ἐπιφανοῦς εὐχαρίστου* might almost seem an expansion of Titus ii. 13, but it is merely one among many similar titles of the Ptolemies (*G.H.* 15, 139 B.C.). The fact that such a phrase was current, with the *σωτήρ* undeniably identified with the *θεός*, may perhaps reinforce the argument of those who would make the article cover both words as titles of Christ in that much-debated passage. *Valeat quantum.* Then we find in *O.P.* 41 (3rd or 4th cent.) *εἰρήνην πόλεως* (voc.) as a complimentary address to a strategus: there may be no real resemblance to St. Paul's *αὐτὸς γάρ ἐστιν ἡ εἰρήνη ἡμῶν* (Eph. ii. 14), but it seems worth quoting. Dr. Rendel Harris suggests to me an interesting parallel for 1 Corinthians viii. 10, x. 21 in *O.P.* 110 (2nd cent.): *Ἐρωτᾷ σε Χαίρημων δειπνήσαι εἰς κλείνην τοῦ κυρίου Σαράπιδος ἐν τῷ*

Σαραπέῳ αὐριον, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἰε̄, ἀπὸ ὥρας θ̄. "Chæremon invites you to dine at the table of our lord Sarapis in the Sarapeum to-morrow, the 15th, at 3 o'clock."

These gleanings have taken more space than I expected, and I must not indulge myself in detail as to the grammar, for which I may refer to the *Classical Review* articles above mentioned. In general the papyri seem to me to supply evidence against those who expect to find in the *Κοινή* an extensive obliteration of distinctions which were real and living in classical Greek, but died out as the language went on its way towards modern Greek. This is especially the case with the tenses. It is very soon obvious that the perfect encroaches on the aorist markedly in the period covered by the Ptolemaic and Roman papyri. Formulæ where the aorist was once used appear with the perfect: e.g. "ex-gymnasiarch" (*et similia*) is usually γυμνασιαρχήσας in earlier papyri and inscriptions, γεγυμνασιαρχηκώς in the later, though there are many exceptions. But I have hardly found any passages in which the perfect could be said to be used *for* the aorist.¹ It is rather that in many places where classical idiom demanded the aorist *I gave*, people came to prefer the perfect *I have given*, which is more vivid and equally appropriate. Often the two stand side by side. Thus even so late as the 4th century (*F.P.* 135) τὰ ἀργύρια ἃ ἔλαβες καὶ δέδωκας αὐτῷ, "which you *received* (isolated event) and *have given* to him (action whose effects continue)." In death certificates we have ἐτελεύτησε where the date is given, τετελεύτηκε = "is dead": *O.P.* 258 (87 A.D.). [ὅς καὶ τε]τελεύτηκε τ[ῷ . . . ἔτει Νέρων]ος (if the supplement is correct) may be fairly explained as a combination of the two.² *B.U.* 163 (108 A.D.)

¹ Has any one noticed the beautiful parallel in Plato, *Apol.* 28c, for the characteristic perfect in Hebrews, describing what *stands written* in Scripture? Οσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασι (as is written in the Athenian's "Bible") is exactly like Heb. vii. 6 (see Westcott), xi. 17, 28.

² In *C.P.R.* 19 (330 A.D.) we have πρῶην βιβλία ἐπιδέδωκα τῇ σῇ ἐπιμελείᾳ ὥς

gives us a curious parallel to James i. 24, only with the tenses reversed: Ἀρπαγάθης τις ἔνκλημά σοι δέδωκε . . . καὶ ἀφανὴς ἐγένετο. In the same papyrus we find φασὶ οἱ παρόντες ἐκείνον μᾶλλον (? = *often*) τοῦτο πεποιηκέναι, καὶ γὰρ ἄλλοι ὡς πληγέντες ὑπὸ αὐτοῦ ἀναφόριον δεδώκασι, "have given information (from time to time) as having been assaulted by him." This is a perfect of the same class as πεποίηκα in 2 Corinthians xi. 25, on which I cannot agree with Prof. Burton (*N. T. Moods and Tenses*, p. 43): see Goodwin, *M.T.*, § 46, and add Lucian, *Pisc.*, § 6, ποῦ γὰρ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ὕβρικα; "where have I insulted you?" With γέγοναν in Romans xvi. 7 may be compared *B.U.* 592 (2nd cent.), ὁ Πν. τετελεύτηκεν πρὸ δωδεκαετίας καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ ἀντελάβοιτο πάντες οἱ υἱοί: there is a combination of "died 12 years before" and "has been dead 12 years," just as in Romans *loc. cit.* there is a fusion of "were in Christ before me" and "have been in Christ longer than I."

Other points I must merely catalogue. In accordance we have examples of such New Testament forms as σπείρης (normal in papyri), ἐφιδεῖν, σφυρίς, ἐραυνᾶν, ταμεῖον (normal), πείν, λήμψομαι, etc. (almost without exception), ἐάν for ἂν after conjunctions and relatives (greatly preponderating in 1st and 2nd cent.), the indeclinable πλήρης¹ (see Westcott and Hort, *App.*, p. 24, on Mark iv. 28), τάχειον, δέκα δύο, etc. (normal), τεσσαρεσκαίδέκατος, etc. (normal), ἐλθάτω, etc., γέγοναν, aorists in -οσαν (not many), 2 sing. in -σαι on analogy of perfect (χαριεῖσαι fut., like ὀδυνᾶσαι and καυχᾶσαι in New Testament), -εστακέναι, διδοῖ and δοῖ subj. (several exx.), ἐξέδετο, ἤμην, ἦτω.² The infinitive in -οῖν and the

ὅτι ἐβουλήθην τινὰ ὑπάρχοντά μου ἀποδόσθαι. The same explanation *may* apply, though we need not be so particular in a document of that date. By the way, ὡς ὅτι (Wessely tr. "dass") illustrates 2 Cor. v. 19 and 2 Thess. ii. 2.

¹ Since writing this, I see that Mr. C. H. Turner has applied this fact to help the grammar of John i. 14. I had collected a dozen examples from the first four centuries.

² A curious substitution of ἦν for ᾗ occurs very frequently. It appears in six places in the New Testament in one or two of the oldest uncials.

spelling τεσσεράκοντα are decidedly not encouraged by the papyri, still less τέσσερα. Τέσσαρες as an accus. (W.-H., *App.*, p. 150) is very common.

In syntax there is much to support Blass's argument as to the weakening of the idea of *duality* in later Greek. The superlative is almost always "elative," but I have noticed only one example of a comparative replacing it. The optative has shrunk greatly, and is often incorrectly used: there are no examples of a conditional sentence with optative in both members. We have ἵνα with subj. in place of an imperative,¹ and ὅτι introducing a direct quotation, as in New Testament. A curious feature is the rarity of οὐ μὴ, which is evidently not the ordinary unemphatic negative some would have us recognise in the New Testament. I have noted only *two* examples: one from a 4th century magical papyrus (*B.M.*, 46), οὐ μὴ ἐάσω, the other from the amusing schoolboy's letter (*O.P.*, 119, 2nd or 3rd cent.), ἀμ μὴ πέμψῃς οὐ μὴ φάγω, οὐ μὴ πείνω ταῦτα, "if you don't send, I won't eat, I won't drink—there now!"

[*Note.*—Since returning the proof I have found an additional example of *καταντᾶν* in *Inscr. Maris Ægæi*, vol. ii. (ed. Paton, 1898), No. 404 (Mitylene), κύριοι τῶν καταγείων τάφων τῶν εἰς ἑαυτοὺς κατηντηκότων ἀπὸ ἐν . . . In the same volume, No. 562 (Eresus), I notice an Aurelius who describes himself as *βουλευτῆς καὶ Ἀσιάρχης ναῶν τῶν ἐν Σμύρνῃ*: I have not looked far to see whether this inscription has been quoted by writers on the Asiarchs. The citation from *O.P.* 110 above (*εἰς κλείνῃν τοῦ κυρίου Σαράπιδος*) gains in interest from Prof. Ramsay's discussion in the February *EXPOSITOR*.]

JAMES HOPE MOULTON.

¹ See New Testament exx. in Winer-Moulton, p. 396. Prof. Jannaris ran this to death in the *EXPOSITOR* for 1899 (vol. ix.), p. 297 ff. I find exx. in *B.U.*, 48 (2nd or 3rd cent.), 625 (*id.*, with *ἔπος* for *ἵνα*), and *F.P.* 112 (1st cent.).

THE THEOLOGY OF THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.

III.

THE DOCTRINE OF SIN.

THUS far we have been concerned with sin and law as generalized ideas which in their relations to each other fill an essential place in the theology of St. Paul. But we do not really appreciate what he meant by them till we can trace their interaction in his experience, and the moment we attempt to do so the difficulty recurs by which we are so often haunted in the study of the Epistles. St. Paul had his experience of the law under the definite form of the law of Moses; that was for him the most obvious—we are tempted at first to say the only—embodiment of the concept. But the law of Moses cannot be reproduced by us. We cannot put ourselves into the position of a person brought up in a Pharisaic environment, and confronted with the statutes of the Pentateuch and the traditions of the elders; we cannot imagine ourselves called, out of our own resources, and without becoming God's debtors, to achieve by the perfect observance of all these traditions and statutes a righteousness of our own for which we might challenge the approval of God. We cannot imagine this, nor is it needful that we should do so. Life under the law is for us an untried and alien thing, and therefore (so it is argued) the experience of Paul under these conditions, and the theology which he based upon it, can hardly be intelligible and are certainly not authoritative for us.

The answer to this difficulty has already been suggested. That there is an answer is involved in the fact that, peculiar and peculiarly conditioned as the experience of Paul might be, he had been able to eliminate its peculiarities, to universalize it, and on the strength of it to address himself with victorious assurance to the common conscience of

mankind. That universal law, which in a previous paper was shown to determine for him all the relations of God and man, and by doing so to make them relations of moral import, takes shape variously, according to their circumstances and history, for the imagination and conscience of men. For Paul the law took shape—it defined itself with Divine authority, we may say—in the law of Moses : for other men it took other, yet analogous, shapes. But all its forms, whatever their adequacy, or inadequacy, owed their authority to representing law in its eternal and unchanging import. Every law, in other words, appealed to men because somehow or other the authority of God was felt through it. It is this which gives sin essentially the same character, no matter what its particular content may be. No things could be more unlike than the hideous vices of paganism which are pilloried in the first chapter of Romans, and the pretentious self-righteousness of the Jews which is exposed in the second ; but there is one relation in which they are identical—their relation to the eternal law of God. Unless Paul had been able to generalize both sin and law in such a way as to express this, he would have had no universal gospel to preach, and no theology of it to construct ; he would only have had a curious spiritual autobiography to record. But the mere fact that he could so generalize proves that his experience under the Mosaic law is in its very nature akin to something which belongs to human experience in general. Accordingly we do not expect to find what he says unintelligible or unreal ; on the contrary our anticipation, to borrow Bunyan's expression about Luther on Galatians, is that what he writes will be as though it were written out of our own hearts.

What, then, does Paul say about the relation and interaction of sin and law in his own (and therefore in all human) experience ?

He has to say much which implies that there is a close connexion between them, much which may seem unflattering to the law, and he takes care to make plain that for the law in itself he has nothing but the most religious respect. It is ἅγιος, holy; that is, it is *God's* law. The commandment in which it is expressed on any given occasion is holy and just and good. The natural and proper end of the commandment, that which God has in view in bringing it into man's consciousness, is life (vii. 10). If the law given by God had only been able to give life, righteousness would no doubt have been of law, and there would have been no need of the gospel (Gal. iii. 21). Nor does Paul say that it is the fault of the law that this result was not attained. On the contrary the law's incapacity is not to be referred to itself, but to the subject with which it has to deal (Rom. viii. 3). The one thing that has to be borne in mind at every point is that the law of God, defining itself variously to conscience according as the past of men or their surroundings vary, is always conceived as *confronting* those who are to keep it. It is of its nature to be a demand—an absolutely righteous demand, yet in the last resort a demand—not an inspiration.

When a man lives under law in this sense, the first result of it is that he comes to the consciousness of sin. When Paul pronounces the sentence διὰ νόμου ἐπίγνωσις ἁμαρτίας, he pronounces it, no doubt, as a Christian. His Christian intelligence enables him to focus the meaning of his pre-Christian experiences as he might not have been able to do in his pre-Christian days. We cannot deny that there is such a thing as blind, Pharisaic self-righteousness produced under the law; but the law does not produce this, any more than it produces sensuality or other sins. Its true result is an ever deepening consciousness—ἐπίγνωσις is full or adequate knowledge—that the life is not in relation to God what the law demands. It is not right with God; it is

wrong with God, and no divine righteousness is realized in it. The Jews had the law of God made real to them, through their Scriptures and their history, with a vividness to which no other nation presents a parallel, and hence it is in Jewish, not in ethnic religious literature, that we find the consciousness of sin most acute. But everywhere the great experiment has the same issue: the law, however our consciousness of it come to us, convicts us of failure.

But it reveals its power in another way; as St. Paul puts it, it works wrath (Rom. iv. 15, *ὀργὴν κατεργάζεται*). Through it, somehow, the holiness of God, of which it is the expression, reacts against sin; the man who has set himself against the will of God, as it appeals to him through the law, does not discover that the law gives way to him; on the contrary, it abides, and asserts itself against him. The consciousness that God is against us because we have been and are against Him, is the consciousness of His wrath; and there is nothing more real. It is quite true that *ὀργή* in the New Testament is predominantly an eschatological idea: God's wrath is something that is almost appropriated to the great Day. But eschatological ideas do not arise out of nothing: they are at least the projection in imagination of something which the conscience knows to be real. The manifestation of God's wrath in all its force is by His mercy deferred for a time; but His wrath itself has workings of which the sinner may be painfully conscious long before the last Judgment. Even if the sinner is unconscious, the spectator of his life, who is alive to God and to His working in the world, may see the stern and ominous reaction of His violated law—in other words, the wrath which it works—in the debasement and degeneration of the sinner himself. "With the perverse Thou wilt show Thyself froward": this is the truth which receives such appalling illustration in Romans i. 18-32, and which justifies us in regarding the phenomenon

there described as a manifestation of the wrath of God. Such wrath is wrought by the law. It is because men are under law and disregard it that it reacts so terribly in their life. The power of God is in it, and it never grows old.

Through the law, then, we get the consciousness of sin ; as the rule of the Divine reaction against sin, the law works wrath ; and the end of the life in which sin and wrath express man's relation to God and God's relation to man cannot be doubted : that life is doomed to death. There is probably no question on which more that is utterly misleading has been written than the question, What did Paul mean by death ? Modern minds make distinctions, such as spiritual, temporal, eternal death, and give answers to the question which imply that Paul also had such distinctions present to his mind. There is no indication that he had. Man was man to him, an indivisible whole, and to introduce such distinctions in the interpretation of his writings is only to mislead. It is equally misleading to suggest that the connexion of sin and death for St. Paul rested on a literal interpretation of the opening chapters of Genesis, and that we are only at his point of view when we assume that death was attached to sin in the same way as any penalty is attached by a human legislature to the violation of its laws, and that but for this statutory arrangement man's relation to death might have been quite other than it is. In spite of the references to the third chapter of Genesis in Romans v. 12 ff., I venture to maintain that St. Paul never raised the abstract questions here suggested. The story of the Fall and its consequences, including the connexion of death and sin, produces no impression at all until it produces an impression on the conscience, and that impression is one which attests itself. It is not through the study of natural history, but through experience of sin and law and wrath, that we learn the meaning of the words, " The wages of sin is death." The

mortality of man is pathetic, but the end of the sinner is tragic. It is not to be assimilated to any natural event; its real nature is only to be discovered in conscience, and to conscience it is never anything but a doom. It has to be interpreted in relation to sin and law, and in this relation it cannot shut out from itself the awful judgment of God. Thoughts and experiences like these, and not reminiscences of the opening pages of the Bible, give authority and poignancy to all St. Paul says of death in connexion with sin. What he says is verified not by appeal to Genesis, but by appeal to the conscience of sinful men.

It is quite unmeaning to say that the theology which rests on the apprehension of truths like these is Paulinism: it is doing even Paul too great an honour to appropriate to him, by such a designation, experiences which every man can verify in his own life. Sin, wrath and death, in their relations to one another and to the holy law of God, are not Pauline, nor Pharisaic, nor Jewish, nor even "legal"; they are human and universal. We know what they mean as well as Paul; and Paul knew that his own experience was not a mystery nor a private property, but something which when uttered would wake echoes in every conscience. He lays great stress on the universality of sin—in other words, on the negative presupposition of the gospel; and in the Epistle to the Romans he has at least four ways of proving it.

(a) First, there is the empirical proof which is worked out in chaps. i. and ii. In chap. i. Paul adduces evidence of the sinfulness of the Gentiles; in chap. ii. he demonstrates that no appeal to his historical privileges can exempt the Jew from the same condemnation. Strictly speaking, no empirical proof can establish a universal conclusion, but Paul assumes that no serious person will say, Not guilty. He charges all, as he expresses it in chap.

iii. 9, with being under sin, and he is confident that conscience must give the verdict in his favour.

(b) To this there is added a Scriptural proof in chap. iii. 10 ff. Formally, this proof is as inadequate as the other. The passages quoted do not refer to all men or to all times, but only to ages in the history of Israel when tyranny or corruption prevailed. But Paul does not think of what they refer to as originally written. It is his own mind he is expressing by them, the mind of a Christian and an Apostle about the condition of the human race, and the significant thing is that such a judgment can be expressed in Scripture words. Logically, it may be said, the quotations prove nothing. True; but they are not addressed to the logical faculties, but to the conscience; and the Apostle believes that in every man conscience will assent to the impeachment. If everybody who reads the indictment pleads guilty—and that is what he has a right to expect—it does not matter whether there is a logical flaw in it or not.

(c) But Paul has a religious argument for the universality of sin. This is expressed in chap. iii. 23 f., "All have sinned, and fall short of the glory of God, being justified freely by His grace." There is an inference *backward* from the one mode in which men can be put right with God to the antecedent condition in which they find themselves. If the only mode of justification is the one which Paul had experienced and which he preached—justification for nothing by the grace of God—then plainly there can be no such thing as a justification by works of law; in other words, the true and normal relations of God and man, as the law determines them, have nowhere been satisfied. It may be said that this is reasoning in a circle. "All men have sinned, and therefore justification must be by grace; and again, justification is by grace, and therefore all men must have sinned." But reasoning in a circle is not always

wrong. It is not wrong when the circle in which we reason is one which includes within it the whole world of realities with which we are for the time being concerned. Now this is the case here; and when Paul, starting with the primary certainty of his Christian experience, that there is only one way of sálvation and that a gracious one, argues to the universality of sin, his circle is quite legitimate. It simply means that the various aspects of reality which make up his spiritual world are consistent with each other, and apart from this it is not easy to see how there could be any assurance of their truth. If there is one gospel to be preached to everybody—and to Paul nothing was more certain—it is an immediate inference that everybody is in the condition which makes that gospel necessary.

(*d*) But besides his empirical, Scriptural, and religious arguments for the universality of sin, Paul has another, which may perhaps be called a metaphysical argument—the flesh. One is almost afraid to write the word which has been the subject of such rigorous and vigorous treatment, but it cannot be avoided. Whatever else the flesh may be, it is at least something which is common to all men, and which to human experience is universally associated with sin. Whoever says flesh says sin; the flesh is flesh of sin; the works of the flesh are moral horrors, and everybody in some shape or degree knows what they are. The flesh, it is not too much to say, represents for Paul the virulence and constitutional character as well as the omnipresence of sin; it carries in it always the emphasis of despair. It must be admitted that this is curiously unlike the way in which the flesh is spoken of in the Old Testament. There it is a graphic expression for the natural weakness of man; it does not aggravate the sinfulness of sin, but is rather put under the head of extenuating circumstances. “He, being full of compassion, forgave their iniquity, and destroyed them not; yea, many a time turned

He His anger away, and did not stir up all His wrath. And He remembered that they were but flesh, a wind that passeth away, and cometh not again." How could any one deal rigorously with such creatures? This is the tone, too, in which Jesus speaks, extenuating the fault of the disciples, who slept through His agony in the garden: "The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak." But if Paul's conception of the flesh cannot be explained from the Old Testament, or from the words of Jesus, just as little can it be traced to a dualistic psychology of Hellenic origin. What we find in such dualistic psychologies is the antithesis of the material and the intellectual; it may be felt as a burden, or a limitation, or in some other way a restraint on man's becoming what he would become; but nothing is more remote from such philosophical dualism, even in the finest moral natures, than the passion of abhorrence, condemnation, and despair with which Paul speaks of the flesh. The truth is that when he speaks of the flesh, it is not an antithesis that he is dealing with, but an antagonism; the flesh belongs not to his psychology—he has no such thing—but to his moral and religious experience; it is that in him which does not subject itself to the law of God, and cannot, but lives in the perpetual revolt of sin. That there is that in him which can be so characterized is as sure to him as that he is a human being, and it is as sure for others as for himself. Just because a man is what he is he finds himself in standing antagonism with the law of God. That is what Paul means by being in the flesh; and it is a conclusive demonstration of the universality of sin. For a man to say he knew no sin would be as much as to say that he had no part in the nature common to man.

It may be objected here that this, as an argument for the universality of sin, begs the question. So it does, if a man has no conscience. But if a man recognises in himself

what Paul is talking about when he talks of the flesh—and it is assumed by the Apostle, and surely with reason, that men *will* recognise it, not indeed as psychological theory, but as moral fact—then it does not beg the question. It wakes up in the conscience, the only place in which it can be felt, a sense of the dreadful, inevitable, pervasive, constitutional antipathy of man to the law of God; it gives him a new revelation of the depth and intensity of sin; the *misera necessitas peccandi*, as Augustine called it, closes in on him and all his kind. It is in expounding the law and the flesh in their interaction that Paul says the most daring and paradoxical things about sin. The law, he indirectly suggests in Romans viii. 3, might have done something great for man, but it was weak through the flesh; the flesh disabled it. Instead of subduing the flesh, the law irritated it. It acted, in point of fact, in a way that seemed to defeat its own end. All that its “Thou shalt not” produced from the flesh was “I will.” The forbidden fruit is the very fruit we want to eat. Paul does not hesitate to say—what must have seemed impious to a Jew, and is startling even for him—that this was God’s intention in the reign of law. He meant it, by evoking the instinctive antipathy of the flesh, to multiply transgressions, and so to bring man to despair. No doubt it is the Mosaic law of which Paul says this, both in Romans v. and Galatians iii.; but that does not make it meaningless for us. The instinctive revolt against the law which imposes its restraint on our nature is not a Jewish but a human experience; and whatever the law be which brings this characteristic of our nature into consciousness, it does for us what the Mosaic law did for Paul, and we understand his experience through our own. For us, as for him, such an experience is God’s way of shutting us up to another mode of attaining righteousness than that of works of law. Such a nature stands in no proportion to our calling; it leaves us face to face with an impossible problem, sold under sin.

It is common to ask at this point how Paul conceived man's nature to have become what it is, or whether he conceived it to have been what it is from the beginning. These are questions to which no answer is supplied; they are questions, indeed, which it would have been as impossible for Paul to answer as it is for us. We never knew ourselves to be anything else than what we are, and we cannot go out of our nature as it is to scrutinize it in assumed antecedent conditions. In man as he is—and that is man in the only sense in which we know anything about him—there is that which reacts instinctively against the law, that which is stimulated by the law into persistent and determined revolt, that which under such stimulus reveals to man the exceeding sinfulness of sin. This is what Paul means by the flesh, and it has simply to be taken as it stands. Its origin is not explained by such propositions as chap. v. 12, "Through one man sin entered into the world"; or chap. vii. 9, "I was alive apart from law once, but when the commandment came sin sprang to life, and I died." These propositions have precisely the same value: the first applies to humanity, individualized in its natural head, the same mode of conception which the second applies to the life of the writer himself. But in both cases it is a mode of conception which may be said to belong to ideal biography. We cannot go back in our life to a happy time when we had no conscience of sin, and no idea of what the flesh means; we know what the flesh means as soon as we have a conscience at all, and memory reaches no further, if indeed it reaches as far. Similarly we cannot go back in the history of man to a paradisaical condition in which sin had not entered and in which there was no trace of antagonism to law, no disproportion between man's nature and his vocation; as far as history is concerned, it has nothing to say of any such state. Alike in the individual and in the race the moral state has simply

to be accepted : questions of origins are hopelessly beyond our reach.

But by St. Paul it is accepted, and this is the point to be emphasized, *as a moral state*. Its moral character is of the very essence of it. It never occurs to the Apostle that because man is what he is, and because his nature, so far as it is known in experience, betrays uniformly this antipathy to the law, therefore man is discharged of all moral responsibility. The facts for him have their whole being and meaning in the moral sphere ; to say " the flesh " is not to pronounce man's acquittal, it is to exhibit the profound and hopeless character of his sin. To know what the flesh means does not prompt self-exculpation : it wrings from the sinful soul the cry, " O wretched man that I am ! who shall deliver me out of the body of this death ? "

One can imagine beforehand a way in which deliverance might come. If the law lost its external provocative character—if it ceased to be, as something which merely confronted man with its demands, and became instead a νόμος δυνάμενος ζωοποιῆσαι, an inspiring force ; or if man's nature was changed—if the flesh ceased to be, and instead of ruling man and making the law ineffective was itself reduced to impotence, then the deliverance might come. In the Christian experience of possessing the spirit both these results are combined. The spirit is, in a word, a νόμος δυνάμενος ζωοποιῆσαι, or what is the same thing, a δύναμις through which the law passes into act ; it is the union of law and impulse, in which the strife of sin is finally overcome. But this is anticipating. In the end the law as an external thing does pass, and its place is taken, and the ends it vainly sought to secure are secured, by the spirit. But it does not pass unhonoured. Even in its external and imperfect forms, of which the Mosaic law is the highest example, it represented the will of God ; and it is the will of God to which (in reacting against the law) human nature has shown

itself opposed. It is impossible for any one who sees this to believe that God can ignore it. It is impossible for him to believe that God asks men to forget it without more ado, and to dismiss from their life, not understood and not used, the painful experiences of sin, law, wrath, the flesh, death. The law as an outward thing passes, but between its passing and the coming of the spirit stands the whole body of Christian facts centring in the death and resurrection of Jesus. These facts are the condition of the spirit's coming; its coming is not direct, but mediated through them. The power to live a holy life is not poured into a sinful nature claiming immediate fellowship with a holy God; it is bestowed on such a nature, according to Paul, only through Jesus Christ and Him crucified. The righteousness of God, which is the answer to the whole necessities of the sinful world, is not revealed *in vacuo*. It is not transmitted into human nature by the vibrations of some sort of spiritual ether, as one might infer from the comparisons which are sometimes used to illustrate it; it is demonstrated in Jesus Christ set forth as a propitiation, through faith, in His blood. It is this which we have next to study in all the relations suggested by what we have seen of sin, the flesh, and the law.

JAMES DENNEY.

SCIENTIFIC LIGHTS ON RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS.

III.

THE DIVINE WILL IN NATURE.

THERE is one thing about the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament which has often struck me as peculiar. Although from beginning to end they are pervaded by the action of a designing God, they never state that the world was created with any extraneous design—for any purpose

outside of the world itself. We are introduced at once to the stage of creation ; we are allowed to admire the scenery ; but we get no hint of any *motive* for the decorations. We never read that the world was planned for the sake of something else. We hear of salvation planned for the sake of the *world*—to put right things that have gone *wrong*. But there is no indication of an outside design for which things were originally made *right*. This is all the more remarkable because in the Bible the element of choice occupies so prominent a place. From the narrative of Eden to the narrative of Galilee, from the presentation of the tree of knowledge to the presentation of the Son of man, the human soul is confronted with a choice. “ Chosen of God,” “ elected of God,” “ doing the will of God,” are expressions which lie at the very base of the sacred narrative. And yet we look in vain for any direct statement of the motive which prompted the collective work. We hear God say, “ Let there be light,” “ Let there be a firmament,” “ Let there be sun, moon and stars ” ; we hear Him say, “ Let there be earth,” “ Let there be life,” “ Let there be man ” ; but we hear not the why and the wherefore. What is the destination of this magnificent fabric ? Is it to be a temple or is it to be a hospital ? Is it to be a place for the glory of God, or is it to be a school for the training of Man ? Is it to be a home for the human spirit, or is it to be a foreign land in which the human spirit is to learn its *absence* from home ? To these questions there is no answer. The Architect in the Book of Genesis keeps silent as to the design of the building.

Now, do not misunderstand me. Do not imagine I allude to this as a blemish in the Christian Scriptures. To me it is no blemish ; nothing shows so much the artistic character of the Bible. The Bible contemplates her creative God as an Artist-God. The true artist should have no purpose beyond his art itself. He should not paint for money ; he should

not sing for fame ; he should not write poetry to propagate political opinions. He may accept these things as a *result* ; he should never make them a motive. He should have only one motive—the rapture he feels in the work itself—the beauty of the picture, the sweetness of the song, the worthiness of the subject to be expressed in poetry. The constant refrain of Genesis is “ God saw the work that it was good.” That is an artist’s refrain. Every outside purpose is banished. Utility is banished ; the search for gain is banished ; the love of praise is banished. Everything is superseded but one—the desire to give adequate expression to the life which is within him. When he thinks he has found in the outside world an adequate expression of his own ideal, he cries, “ It is good, it is very good.”

I will say, then, that there is in the Christian Scriptures an unspoken purpose of God, and that it is evidently an artist’s purpose. The aim of the artist is to embody in outer form his inner life—to make something in his own image. God’s image, say the Christian Scriptures, is embodiment—manifestation of His Spirit in the flesh. It is not an outside purpose ; no artist’s is. It is, what every artist’s is, the wish to construct an image which shall represent in bodily form a life corresponding to His own *ideal* of life. Life is to be created, not for what it may do, but for what it is. What the Divine Artist would image is life itself—highest life, His own life. He would reach a manifestation of the perfect form, the permanent form. He would reach it by ever-ascending gradations ; He would climb to it. Step by step He would carve the perfect living form. He would exhibit the mounting scales of being—from movement to light, from light to solidity, from solidity to growth, from growth to sentiency, from sentiency to reflection, from reflection to intuition. He would manifest the progress of the vital stream from its rising in spontaneous forces to its rest

in the great sea of balanced powers—ether, earth, crystal, plant, fish, bird, mammal, the primal man, the reasoning man, the Son of man.

We are driven, then, to this conclusion, that the Scriptural motive for the making of life is the value of life itself and not anything that life may do. The purpose revealed in the Bible is production and reproduction with a view to the emergence of the perfect form. It is for this that the children of Israel are isolated. It is for this that the nations of Canaan are exterminated. It is for this that the prohibitory laws are uttered against intercourse with the neighbouring tribes. It is for this that there is conceived the design of constituting a peculiar people holding themselves aloof from other peoples. The aim of the God of Israel is natural selection—the selection of those whose union will best promote the welfare of posterity. His object is to constitute a future race—to multiply the good forms, to replenish the wastes of being. To fashion this coming race he spares no labour. “Let us make man” is the keynote of all His care. It is the man of the future he contemplates—the coming man. He seeks to make that coming glorious. He selects the fairest specimens to contract the marriage tie. He isolates them from all beside. He bars out the Amalekite and the Moabite. He destroys the Cities of the Plain. He shuts the door on luxurious Babylon. Whatever will corrupt, whatever will corrode, whatever will enervate, whatever will tend to weaken the coming product, is feared and therefore forbidden. Nothing which is not in the Book of Life, nothing which is not essential to the character of life, is desired to have part or lot in the propagation of the future kingdom.

Now, whether I am right or wrong in making this the purpose of God as revealed in Scripture, there is no doubt at all of the fact that it is the order pursued by the principle of Evolution in Nature. I do not say it is the *purpose* of

Evolution in Nature. I have no right, in the meantime, to assume that Evolution has a purpose. I keep purely to matters of fact. But looking merely at the fact, it is quite patent that the order pursued by Evolution is the very order attributed to God in the Bible. The system of Evolution is confessedly a system of selection. It is a system by which certain forms are chosen to diffuse the fountain of life. You may say, if you will, that these forms are chosen by individual lives—not by the Author of Nature. We are not at present disputing that point. We keep to the simple fact which is admitted, nay, strenuously insisted on, by every man of science in the world—that Evolution selects forms for the diffusion of the vital stream. The motto of every biologist is, “The survival of the fittest.” That motto is not a theory ; it is a fact, known and read of all men. It states that, explain it as you will, Nature is picking out those forms most eligible for permanence, is making a choice of those types of being which are best calculated to ensure the continuance of the mundane system. Now, the question is, What is this choice of the eligible? does it or does it not involve the action of a Divine Will? I am not disposed to say that all selection implies will. I think there is such a thing in Nature as involuntary selection; how otherwise explain magnetic attraction or chemical affinity! The simple question is, Is *this* an involuntary selection? Is there anything about it which distinguishes it from a mere mechanical choice—from the magnetic, from the chemical, even from the animal? Does it contain an element which lifts it above common physical attraction, above unconscious instinct? Does it, in short, bear the stamp of intelligence, the mark of rational thought? On the answer which we give to this enquiry will rest the determination of the problem whether the selective Force of Nature is a blind power or the agency of a designing Spirit.

Now, there is one element in the selections of Nature

which I hold to be incompatible either with mere mechanism or with mere unconscious instinct ; it is the fact of progress.¹ Let us suppose you had a dream one night that you were living almost at the beginning of time. The original germs of life had already been created ; and you were asked to predict what would be the nature of their posterity. You might come to one or other of three conclusions. You might say either that there would be an advance, that there would be a decline, or that there would be a continuance in the state of the first parents. Which of these alternatives would you adopt as your prophecy ? Remember, you are to suppose that in this dream you had no perception of anything beyond mechanism and instinct—that Man was not yet created and that God was not yet seen. I repeat, what on this supposition would be your choice of possible alternatives ? The answer cannot be doubtful ; you would pronounce the decline probable, the continuance conceivable, and the advance impossible. To you the most likely of all things would be that the life in the first germ would in the act of transmission gradually disappear. You might admit as a possibility that it had a chance of retaining its present strength ; but by no possibility could you admit the chance of its transcending its first conditions and rising into heights of glory.

And in this dream of yours you would be logically correct. Imagine a ball set in motion at the opening of three roads. The first road, I will say, is level ; the second slopes down ; the third ascends. On which of these lies the likelihood of the ball's movement ? On the downward way the chance of the ball is superlative ; on the level way it is comparative ; on the ascending way it is nil. If, now, in spite of these prognostications, you found at the top of the ascending road

¹ Shall I be reminded that Mr. Spencer professes to derive all existing progress from the persistence of force. He does ; but, with him, the force which persists is that infinite and eternal Force which he calls the Unknowable.

that ball which half an hour ago you had seen at the foot, what would your conclusion be? Simply that some force had been imparted to the ball additional to its own force. That is exactly your position subsequent to the dream. When you awake, you find that, of the three roads in your vision, the ball of Evolution has taken the impossible one. You find that the heredity, instead of going down or remaining stationary, has gone up. It would have been no wonder that the original life should have been attracted by kindred elements; it would have been no wonder that in the struggle for existence it should have been driven back to elements beneath it; but that it should have risen to a height beyond it, that it should have been attracted by influences dwelling on a higher plane—this seems nothing less than an achievement of the impossible.

It is to explain this achievement that we call in the hypothesis of a Divine Will. We cannot account for the ball going up the hill *as* a ball, on the strength of its own rolling; we are obliged to assume that it has been propelled. That which impresses me as the Divine side of Evolution is not the variety of species, but the ascent of species. My need for a selective Intelligence does not arise from the multiplicity, but from the progressiveness of the structures. There might be endless multiplicity without the slightest progress, nay, alongside of degeneration. The striking feature of Evolution as it appears in our system is its upwardness. It steadily ascends the hill. We see no *physical* reason why it should ascend. So far as mechanism is concerned, it would be more natural either to move on the plain or to descend into the valley. But *our* Evolution goes up. It has moments of stagnation, it has seasons of retrogression, but these only show what it *might* have been, what, on mere physical principles, it *must* have been. Its aggregate march has been an ascent which nothing has permanently impeded. It has passed in

the heavens from the misty fire-cloud to the majestic field of stars ; it has advanced on the earth from the mollusc to the man. It is not too much to say that Evolution, as we know it, is itself an inversion of the natural order of things.

Is there any way of evading the inference that this inversion of the natural order is the evidence of a higher Will ? It is averred that there is. We are reminded that the principle of Evolution is the survival of the fittest. It is said : Does not this principle itself affirm that mere unguided Nature has an inherent power of progress ! Does not the survival of the fittest imply the gradual improvement of communities ! If there is a provision in Nature for the weeding out of lives unfitted to their environment, if there is a mechanism at work by which the best adapted to any age or clime come to the front and bear the sceptre, have we not already a natural explanation of the upward development of species ! Is there any need to evoke the aid of a Divine Will to account for that which seems to admit of a worldly solution !

But *does* the world supply the solution ? does the survival of the fittest supply the solution ? I think not ; I am sure not. The survival of the fittest will not account for the advance of either the animal or the man. For consider, there is no reason in the world why the fittest to survive in any age or clime should be the best in that age or clime. Remember, I use the word "best" not merely in a moral sense. I say there is no reason why the fittest to survive should be the most organically or mentally perfect. I admit they must be the most capable ; but for any particular period, the more perfect may be the least capable, and therefore, from the worldly side, the least eligible. Let me explain what I mean.

Imagine that to-day there were to take place a sudden catastrophe. Suppose that, without destroying life, this earth were all at once to be wheeled back into darkness.

Suppose that the darkness were absolute, hiding equally sun and star, and that no materials were within reach for creating artificial light. In this case two classes would enter upon the new world. There would first, in a large majority, be those who still possessed the capacity for sight, though they could not use it; and there would secondly be that small residuum consisting of those who had never possessed the sense of sight, and to whom the catastrophe had brought no personal change. The circumstances of both classes would be the same; the condition of each would be a state of darkness. The difference would lie in the fact that the majority would be more perfect than the minority, inasmuch as they were in possession of an additional faculty which in other circumstances they might have used.

But now, for the service of this new world, which of these two classes would be the more capable? Clearly the minority—the less perfect, the originally blind. They would be more capable by reason of their imperfection. They would be more fitted to survive. They would be more at home in the dark. They would be more accustomed to sightless locomotion. They would be more alive to impressions of touch. They would be more alert in hearing. They would be better able to serve their fellows, and so better able to win their bread. They would, at the outset, be the more eligible for marriage. The only chance for the majority would be to lose their original perfection—to drop the memory of sight, and, like the fish in the Cave of Kentucky, resort to a lower mode of subsistence.

Do not think there is anything extravagant in such a simile; it can be paralleled in experience. In point of fact the five senses did not dawn simultaneously on the creatures. They came as special gifts to special individuals—the lower gifts first, then the higher. In their first coming the higher must have conferred great disadvantage.

The few who first received an eye were naturally made unfit for survival. By "naturally" I mean "according to all physical principles"; that it has not been so is the point to be explained. The earliest coming of any gift, physical, intellectual or moral, is for the life to which it comes a present disqualification in the race for existence. The first man must have been unfit for his environment—unfit by reason of his comparative greatness. His rational power would weaken his instinct, while yet not strong enough to be itself a guide. He would be outrun by his inferiors, eclipsed by the creation on the lower steps of the stair. Nature, left to herself, would have destroyed her every new product ere it had time to grow. Morality would have been no exception. Has not man himself discerned the fact that the advent of goodness would be the advent of tragedy! Has not Plato told us that the perfect man, whenever he came, would have the greatest reputation for wrong-doing! Has not a writer, in another land than Plato's and reared under influences alien to his philosophy, yet concurred with him in the sentiment that the perfect man, when he appeared, would be "despised and rejected of men, a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief"! Has not Christianity professed to have realized that prophecy, to have exhibited in actual history the unfitness of the Son of God for survival in the race with animal life! And has not Prof. Huxley, the great apostle of Evolution, put, long centuries after, his imprimatur on the testimony by declaring that physical Nature makes no provision for the sacrificial life in Man.

Now, in spite of all these drawbacks, Evolution has ascended the hill. Each new faculty has in turn become dominant; each new species has in turn led the way. Man has become supreme among the denizens of earth; *moral* Man has borne the supremacy over all. What is the conclusion we derive from this? Can there be any but

one! If that has been done in Nature for which Nature is insufficient, is it not clear that there must be at work another agency, a higher agency, a voluntary agency! If a result has been effected for which physical selection will not account, for which sexual selection will not account—if that has been achieved which neither magnetic attraction nor chemical affinity can explain—are we not driven to the supposition that, beside these forces and within these forces, there abides the action of an intelligent Will!

And we are confirmed in this view by the fact that, at the end of its long line, Evolution itself has worked out an individual will. The latest stage of development is a designing mind, a power of conscious deliberation. I have always thought this the very strongest evidence for the existence of volition in Nature. It has been quite customary to say that the doctrine of Evolution has destroyed the force of the argument from design. We are told we can no longer say that the eye was made for light or the ear for sound, because light and sound have been recognised as simply the necessary results of eye and ear. But to me the stronghold of the argument from design has never been the adaptation of eye and ear. It has been something which the doctrine of Evolution can neither give nor take away—a matter of fact. That fact is the emergence of the *idea* of design in the latest fruit of the tree. If that idea had come early and had then passed away, I should not have been impressed with it. If the insect had possessed a will and the man an instinct, I should have been disposed to conclude, if I could have concluded anything, that will is *not* at the centre of the universe; and this would have been my impression irrespective of any testimony from the eye or the ear. The fact that will was the earlier, and instinct the later, product would have strongly suggested the inference that the principle of Nature is impersonal. But when in the order of Nature I see instinct early and personality late, when I

behold an intelligent will as the final product of the tree, when I discover the idea of deliberate design first emerging in the most developed of the creatures—what else can I do but conclude that Nature is animated by a living Will! The true test of a thing's character is not its spring but its autumn, not its morning but its afternoon. Nature's afternoon is Man; its ripest fruit is Personality. So far as Evolution has advanced, the formation of a personal will has been its ideal, its purpose, its artistic plan. In the light of that fact how can any one affirm that Evolution has weakened the evidence from design!

It is, then, to the sphere of human consciousness that I look for the re-establishment of a Natural Theology. I do not, indeed, disparage the old methods; I do not say that Evolution has rendered untenable the ground taken by Paley and the Bridgewater Treatises. But I think the stronghold of the design argument is not and never was the adaptations of Nature. We should not have seen design *outside* if the *idea* of design had not been already in the soul. Take, then, your start from the idea in the soul; it is the basis, it is the foundation, of all. When you are asked, Is there design in Nature? you can answer, Unquestionably, for I am a *part* of Nature, and there is design in *me*! You can say: "Not only is there design in Nature, but the latest phase of Nature *culminates* in design—*conscious* design. I am the latest phase, the last result of the material environment; and in me design has become a conscious process—the process by which I earn my bread, by which I build my houses, by which I form my society." In so saying you are formulating an argument as strong as it is true. You are asserting that design is likely to have been a preliminary idea simply because it has not been a primitive idea. The thought of it has dawned only at evening time. It has been the latest of all revelations—later than mechanism, later than animal instinct, later

than primitive man. It has been the product of the ripest culture. Is it not reasonable to conclude that the final seed dictated the original sowing and to say with scientific reverence, "That which is last has also been first" !

G. MATHESON.

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

IV.

IMMORTALITY IN MODERN THEOLOGY.

IN earlier papers I have proved that the phrase *the soul immortal* and the doctrine of the endless permanence of all human souls are altogether alien to the phrase and thought of the Bible ; and that they crept into the Christian Church in the latter part of the second century, under the influence of Plato. We shall now consider how this subject has been treated by representative modern theologians. In this paper I shall reproduce the teaching of certain writers who accept, or do not definitely and conspicuously reject, the immortality of the soul.

My first reference shall be to an excellent work well known in all Protestant Churches and nations, the *Christian Dogmatics* of Dr. Van Oosterzee.

In §§ 66-71 the writer discusses "Man's original nature." But he nowhere asserts the endless permanence of the soul. On the contrary, he says in § 68. 4, "Of the *soul* we know too little to find, by an appeal to its constitution, sufficient ground for our demonstration ; we cannot even represent to ourselves this soul, or its independent continuance separated from the bodily life ; and the uncertain can hardly be proved by the unknown. Throughout § 68 he speaks of "the hope of immortality" and of "the immortality of man." This last phrase he defines to mean "not merely the continuance of life, but also of the sense

of life." Dr. Oosterzee asserts clearly that the soul of man is designed by God for immortal life, and that retribution beyond the grave awaits all men, good and bad. But he does not attempt to prove that all human souls will exist and think and feel for ever.

In § 69 the writer discusses the image of God in man; and asserts that it was not destroyed, though sadly marred, by sin. He says in article 7: "While we must regard this image as natural and capable of propagation, we must deny that it is, as something accidental, even in the least degree capable of being lost. It was not merely an ideal after which man was to strive, but actually a treasure which he was to keep, and hand over to posterity unimpaired. 'The image of God in man cannot be destroyed. Even in hell it can burn, but cannot be consumed: it may be tormented, but cannot be extirpated' (Bernard of Clairvaux). Certainly, for it forms an original element of our human nature; and if we were wholly despoiled of it, we should then be as little men as the bird when deprived of the means of flying can bear the name of bird." This comparison leaves open the question whether the soul may ever cease to exist: for indisputably a bird may both lose its wings and by dissipation into inorganic matter cease to be in any sense a bird. Moreover, a treasure which we are bound "to keep and to hand over to posterity unimpaired" may nevertheless be lost. Yet Dr. Oosterzee seems to believe in the endless permanence of all human souls. But this is not plainly stated: and no attempt is made to prove it.

In § 79. 12 our author discusses the duration of the future punishment of sin. He writes: "At any rate the possibility of an endless misery is most distinctly declared in Matthew xii. 31, 32; and words such as those in Luke xvi. 26, Matthew xxvi. 24, xxv. 10, 41 could hardly be vindicated from the charge of exaggeration if He who spoke

them had Himself even seen a ray of light in the outer darkness." This language suggests strongly the endless suffering of the lost. But Dr. Oosterzee says nothing here about the possibility of their ultimate extinction, or of the passages which speak of them as being burnt up like chaff or weeds.

In § 149 the theory of the final restoration of all men is discussed; and we have a few words about annihilation. In article 2 we read: "Annihilation of the incurably evil would, we readily confess, appear most acceptable to *us*, if we should give to our thoughts the highest authority in this province. For it is very difficult to conceive of an endless existence in connection with one who is entirely separated from God, the source of life, on which account accordingly Scripture has described this condition as the second death." But this theory, if I rightly understand him, Dr. Oosterzee rejects as disproved by Revelation vi. 16, xiv. 11.

On the whole, the important doctrine of the immortality of the soul, *i.e.* the essential permanence of all human souls, though apparently assumed, is no part of the definite teaching of this volume; and the writer does nothing whatever in any way to prove it.

We now come to a work marked by deep and loving insight into the things of God and by great beauty of diction, Dr. Pope's *Compendium of Theology*. In vol. i. p. 423 we read, in reference to "the image of God in man," that "it was Essential and Indestructible: the self-conscious and self-determining personality of man, as a spirit bearing the stamp of likeness to God and capable of immortality, was the reflection in the creature of the Divine nature. . . . From beginning to end the holy record regards this image as uneffaced and ineffaceable, and still existing in every human being." This language is further explained on p. 426: "No clearer evidence of the indestructibility of the Divine likeness could be given than that of the sanction

thrown around human life ; it is inviolate, *for in the image of God made He man*. Of course this does not decide the question whether or not immortality was part of the indestructible image, though it might seem that we affirm it by using the term indestructible." On this last important question the writer says nothing whatever. He seems to be unwilling to state his own opinion.

Dr. Pope returns to the immortality of the soul in vol. iii. p. 372. He says, "The immortality or continued conscious existence of man's spirit is everywhere assumed in Scripture and nowhere proved." That the spirit will survive the body is assumed or stated throughout the New Testament in terms as decisive as the clearest categorical assertion ; *e.g.* in 2 Corinthians v. 10, where Paul asserts that we must all be manifested before the judgment seat of Christ in order that each may receive according to his conduct on earth ; similarly John v. 28, 29, Heb. ix. 27, etc. But this is very different from assuming the endless existence of all human souls. Our author says that the immortality of man's spirit is in Scripture nowhere proved. Is the divinity of Christ proved there ? It is : for in the New Testament we find decisive documentary evidence that Christ on earth claimed a superiority to men and a unique and close relation to God involving, in contrast to all mere creatures, a share of the Divine nature. But throughout the Bible we have no such proof, direct or indirect, or any clear suggestion, of the endless permanence of all human spirits. Dr. Pope adds : "The absolute immortality of the human spirit is not in question as yet." And it does not come into question throughout his work.

On p. 403, after a quotation of John v. 24-29, the writer adds : "The fuller revelation of immortality and eternal life includes, therefore, the foreannouncement of a resurrection of the whole man, and of the whole race of man, to an endless existence." But of this last all-impor-

tant statement no shadow of proof is given. On p. 421 we read of "the misery of the conscious eternal exclusion from" the vision of God; and that whatever the word eternal in Matthew xxv. 46 "means to the righteous it means also to the wicked."

On pp. 435-444 Dr. Pope discusses the theory of the annihilation of the wicked. He says: "1. The question of man's natural immortality is not allowed to be absolutely decisive; and perhaps more has been made to depend on this in the controversy than it will bear. Those who maintain that in the image of God, impressed upon man, there was a reflection in the creature of His eternity, and that this natural image was not destroyed by the Fall, are in possession of an argument which settles the matter at once. This is undoubtedly the view of Scripture, which nowhere asserts or proves the deathlessness of the human spirit any more than it asserts or proves the being of God. To us, therefore, the question is determined at the outset." Now, in the first chapter of Genesis are thirty statements which imply decisively the existence of an intelligent Creator who speaks and acts, and are therefore equivalent to categorical assertions of the existence of God. But no such statements implying the deathlessness of the human spirit are to be found throughout the Bible. This loose kind of argument has, by destroying confidence in its methods, done much to discredit theology.

On p. 437 we read, "It may be added that annihilation is to all intents and purposes an eternal punishment of sin committed in time." On p. 442 we read, "It must be admitted that the theologians of this new school (annihilation) have steadfastly asserted some fundamental principles. They hold fast the doctrine of the eternal punishment of sin." This is a most important admission. For the phrase *eternal punishment*, solemnly used by Christ in Matthew xxv. 46 in awful contrast to the *eternal life* awaiting the

righteous, is the strongest argument from the Bible for the endless suffering of the lost. This argument is surrendered by Dr. Pope, who anticipated my volume on *The Last Things* by asserting that final extinction of men created by God for endless blessedness would be eternal punishment. (See below, a quotation from Irenæus.) He also anticipated me by endeavouring to prove that extinction of the lost is not taught in the Bible. On the other hand, he agrees with Edward White by saying, on p. 443, that "Christ comes not to save an immortal sinner; but to give a mortal sinner, who had sinned, the offer of immortality." And I do not see that he has brought any serious objection to the doctrine of annihilation, except by overturning, as I do, arguments in its favour. Certainly he has done nothing to prove the immortality of the soul.

Much more definite and valuable, in reference to the subject before us, than either of the works quoted above is Dr. Laidlaw's admirable volume on *The Bible Doctrine of Man*. In lecture vi. he discusses "Man's nature and a future life." On pp. 224 ff. we read, "During most of the Christian centuries, the Scripture doctrine concerning the life to come has been held as bound up with and based upon that of the indestructibility of the human soul. Man is a being who must live after death, must live for ever. Conscience declares that present conduct and character are to influence an eternal hereafter. Nay, the very make of the soul tells of the timeless and changeless sphere to which it belongs. The doctrine of the natural and necessary immortality of the human soul has been religiously cherished as of the very essence of the scriptural or Christian belief in a life to come. . . . More cautious Christian opponents of the prevailing method of identifying divine revelation as to a future life with the tenet of the soul's indestructibility have preferred to rest the doctrine of survival on the resurrection of Jesus and the affirmations of Scripture, without

insisting on the soul's natural immortality. . . . The Bible does not affirm the immortality of the soul in any abstract or general form. Much less does it define the constitution of the soul as involving its necessary indestructibility. So much we may freely concede." This last is a most important concession. Throughout the volume Dr. Laidlaw does not appeal to the Bible in proof of the popular doctrine of the endless permanence of all human souls. Nor does he assert plainly that he accepts this doctrine.

The writer continues: "But when it is said that the notion of a separable soul or spirit in man is unscriptural, is nothing but a philosophical figment, and that the soul's separate existence is no necessary part of Christian belief, we are prepared on the strongest grounds to demur. . . . The personal existence of human beings after death is a doctrine that pervades the whole system of Scripture. The Bible sustains and illumines, in the most remarkable and varied ways, man's instinctive belief that he was made for an everlasting existence. . . . It would be wrong to import into these terms (*breath* and *spirit*) the metaphysical idea of an indissoluble substance, and thus commit the Scripture to the philosophical argument that the soul cannot die because it cannot be dissolved or dissipated. But the author of the Book of Wisdom seems to be fairly following the doctrine of Genesis when he says, 'For God created man to be immortal, and made him to be an image of His own peculiar nature.'" With all this I heartily agree.

Dr. Laidlaw then (on p. 229) distinguishes between "the Bible mode of affirming man's future existence and the methods of other religions and philosophies," especially that of Plato, "which has such close affinities with scriptural doctrine as to have been greatly identified with Christian eschatology, elaborated by the schoolmen as the foundation of the faith, and often preached from the Christian pulpit

as a substitute for the fuller light of the gospel on life and immortality." So on p. 233: "Gradually, in Christian schools, the Greek influence prevailed, and even in the Christian Church the idea of the soul's immortality for long took the place of the Scripture doctrine of a future life." In other words, our author admits, as was proved in my first paper, that the popular doctrine of the immortality of the soul was derived from Plato.

Dr. Laidlaw writes, on p. 240: "This theory of 'conditional immortality,' or of the ultimate annihilation of the wicked, may claim one advantage over its rival, the theory of universal restoration. In its appeal to the certainty of future punishment and to the irrevocable character of future destiny, it is somewhat more in accordance than the other with the findings at once of conscience and of Scripture. But both theories are incompetent solutions of the awful problem which they attempt. It is obvious that neither of them can be made to consist with the whole doctrine of Scripture as to the future of man." But the writer does not discuss the popular theory of the endless suffering of the lost, nor does he give his own interpretation of the teaching of the Bible about the future punishment of sin.

By asserting that the popular doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul—*i.e.* of the necessary and endless permanence of all human souls—has no place in the Bible, and differs from the teaching of the New Testament, and that it was derived from Plato, and by his own rejection of this doctrine as destitute of adequate proof, Dr. Laidlaw has anticipated my teaching in these papers. It is worthy of note that, while rejecting, as not taught in the Bible, the theory of conditional immortality, he does not quote any passage of Holy Scripture as contradicting it.

We come now to Dr. Salmond's interesting and attractive and useful volume on *The Christian Doctrine of Immortality*.

This title he appropriately explains in the preface : " It will be seen that the word ' Immortality ' is used in the large sense which Paul gives it when he speaks of ' this mortal ' putting on ' immortality. ' Life, eternal life, the immortality of the man, not the immortality of the soul, is the message of the Bible, alike in Old Testament and in New, in Christ and in Apostle, in John and in Paul. " The writer expounds, in general agreement with these papers, the opinions of the Jews and of various ancient nations about a future life ; and indicates correctly the essential difference between the teaching of Plato and that of the New Testament. He adds, on p. 156, that " when Christ came, Hellenic thought ruled the world. "

Dr. Salmond expounds also the teaching of Christ, the general apostolic doctrine, and the Pauline doctrine. Of Christ he says, on p. 393, " His gift to men is not the inculcation of the truth of an endless existence, not any dogma of the soul's deathless perpetuity, but the revelation of a higher life, and the inspiration of a hope stronger than any speculation, sacredly governing conduct, and accessible to the humblest soul. " Of Paul he says, on p. 573, " He never contemplates a simple immortality of soul ; he never argues for man's survival merely on the ground that there is a mind or spirit in him. " It is quite clear that, in Dr. Salmond's view, the Bible does not teach the endless permanence of all human souls. This last doctrine, which has occupied so large a place in popular theology, he passes over almost in silence.

Of " the doctrine of Annihilation " our author says, on p. 592, that " It had a large and well-understood place in pre-Christian speculation. It assumed different shapes, and was taught in different interests in the faiths and philosophies of the old world. " He thus admits, in harmony with my second paper, that Plato's doctrine of the immortality of the soul was far from universal in the ancient world.

On p. 593 Dr. Salmond says, in my opinion justly, that the advocates of conditional immortality have overstated their case by claiming as on their side the earliest Christian writers. But he mistranslates his most important quotation in proof of the endless suffering of the lost, viz. words attributed to Polycarp in chapter xi. of the Epistle of the Church at Smyrna, which should be, not "perpetual torment of eternal fire," but "the fire of the coming judgment and eternal punishment"; same words as in Matthew xxv. 46. The same mistranslation is given in Dr. Pusey's book on *Eternal Punishment*.

Our author says, on p. 595, that Irenæus "speaks also of 'immortal souls' and of the 'eternal' duration of punishments." This father frequently quotes Matthew xxv. 41, "the eternal fire"; e.g. bk. iv. 28. 2, iii. 23. 3; but so far as I have noticed he does not expound the meaning of the word *eternal* in this verse or in v. 46. Unfortunately Dr. Salmond does not tell us where Irenæus uses the phrase "immortal souls." Possibly he refers to the two passages mentioned on p. 206 of my last paper. On the other hand, Irenæus argues, in bk. v. 27. 2, as I do on p. 176 of my *Last Things*, that "the good things from God being eternal and endless, the privation of them also is, for this reason, *eternal and endless*": αἰώνιος καὶ ἀτελεύτος. Notice that here the word *endless* is added to the word *eternal* as a description of the loss of endless blessing. This suggests strongly that the words were not synonymous; for otherwise the addition would be meaningless tautology.

In contending against the theory of conditional immortality, Dr. Salmond sometimes betrays a disposition to accept the doctrine of the endless permanence of all human souls. He quotes with approval, on p. 610, a writer who says that "the notion of a soul immortal enough to live through death, but not immortal enough to live for ever, is too childish to be entertained beyond the

little school of literalists who delight in it." Again, on p. 624, he asks: "If man is not inherently immortal, why should the sinful man subsist at all after death"? The answer to this question is easy. God has decreed that, whatever a man sows, this he shall also reap. And, because for this reaping there is not space in the present life, He has decreed that after death comes judgment, this last involving conscious existence at least for a time. But this moral necessity for the survival of the wicked affords no proof or presumption that they will abide for ever in suffering. For, though we can see a moral necessity for judgment after death, we can conceive no moral ends to be served by endless permanence of evil in this awful form, an irremovable blemish on the rescued and glorified universe of God. Certainly the above suggestion is not absurd. It has been vindicated as legitimate by not a few modern theologians who cannot be dismissed as "childish."

An all-important point in Dr. Salmond's book is that while evidently disliking the doctrine of the ultimate extinction of the wicked, and apparently favouring the traditional doctrine of the endless permanence of all human souls, this involving endless suffering of the lost, he does not state plainly his own belief. Certainly he brings no proof from the Bible or elsewhere for the popular doctrine of the immortality of the soul. He thus affords strong presumption that it is not taught there, and that it does not rest on any reliable evidence.

In another paper I shall quote other writers holding various other views differing widely from those quoted above.

JOSEPH AGAR BEET.

SOME RECENT OLD TESTAMENT AND OTHER
LITERATURE.

DR. STREANE'S *Age of the Maccabees*¹ is practically an Introduction to the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, with a somewhat full treatment of the political, literary, and religious circumstances of the period to which most of them belong. The period dealt with is defined, Preface v., as that "from the Return of the Jews [536] . . . till the accession of Herod the Great," or, p. 89, as from B.C. 323-37. Even Second (Fourth) Esdras, which lies quite outside of this period, is included in order to complete the treatment of the Apocrypha. The book is written "in the main for the non-expert," Preface vii., who will find in it a clear and concise collection of useful information—in fact an adequate and scholarly "Bible Student's" Introduction to the Apocrypha, etc. The critical attitude is moderately and courteously conservative; the existence of Maccabean Psalms and the date of Daniel are treated as open questions. Appendix C gives, in tabular form, the arguments for the traditional date of the latter, the objections to them, and arguments for the Maccabean date. As far as it goes, it is, from the author's standpoint, a very fair and convenient conspectus. Naturally there is a very imperfect statement of the most convincing evidence for the Maccabean date, viz., that four times the Maccabean struggle is the point of transition from detailed history to vague prediction; and that, according to the general analogy of Apocalyptic literature, this transition fixes the date of the book. To any one who appreciates this evidence the time of composition of Daniel can scarcely be an open question. The traditional view as now held is stated thus (p. 257): "The book in its present shape has suffered more or less

¹ *The Age of the Maccabees, with special reference to the Religious Literature of the Period.* By A. W. Streane, D.D. (Eyre & Spottiswoode, pp. xii. 278.)

from interpolations (*e.g.* chap. xi.) and other alterations. These apart, the date to be assigned to its original form may well be the traditional one, viz., soon after the Persian Empire had established itself."

While, however, in the sections devoted to Maccabean Psalms and Daniel, the author regards them as open questions, in his general treatment of the history, religion and literature of the period he assumes the traditional views and ignores these works, together with the sections of Isaiah, etc., which some critics have dated in the Greek period.

Those who wish to see how the questions as to *Daniel* are handled by an uncompromising advocate of the authorship of that book by the prophet whose name it bears will be interested in reading Dr. Kennedy's work on the subject.¹

Prof. Orr² has published, at the request of the Auburn Seminary, New York State, a course of lectures prepared for the Mansfield Summer School of 1894, and delivered as the Morgan Lecture in 1897. They are an admirable example of a short course of lectures for a Summer School. The subject chosen is sufficiently limited for the time available and the audience; and the lecturer attacks current misconceptions on matters of general interest. Secretaries of Summer Schools would do well to send copies to their speakers. Prof. Orr's contention is that the Church of the first three centuries was more numerous, respectable, and influential than has been commonly supposed. The most important of the "Neglected Factors" is the Catacombs. Exploration has shown that at least a million Christians were buried there in the second and third centuries, which

¹ *The Book of Daniel*. By John Kennedy, M.A., D.D. (Eyre & Spottiswoode, pp. xii. 219.)

² *Neglected Factors in the Early Progress of Christianity*. By the Rev. James Orr, M.A., D.D., Professor of Church History, U.P. Coll., Edinburgh. (Hodder & Stoughton, pp. 235. 3s. 6d.)

proves that Gibbon's estimate of fifty thousand Christians at Rome, c. A.D. 300, is much too small. We can only note one or two points. There are some interesting paragraphs on recent developments in Church History, in the course of which we read: "If Baur's own criticism has gradually had to retract itself within comparatively narrow limits, it may claim, like the Nile waters, to have fertilised in the height of its overflow even the plains from which subsequently it had to retreat" (p. 16).

In considering social status, two quotations are given in which Milman speaks of the Church as mainly middle-class. We are not sure whether Prof. Orr intends to endorse this view, but it seems to be involved in the following: "I do not think it is an unreasonable conclusion to draw from these data that, while there were doubtless poor churches, and many poor people in all the churches, the general membership of the congregations was, contrary to the usual view, composed of fairly well-to-do and intelligent people, and commonly had among them also persons of highly respectable and sometimes quite conspicuous positions" (p. 112). We are not clear that the evidence cited proves more than that the proportion of well-to-do and cultured people in the churches was as large as in the general population.

We have also received *The Tabernacle and Its Priests and Services, Described and Considered in relation to Christ and the Church*, by William Brown;¹ *The Voice of the Spirit*, Book III., *Ezekiel and Song of Solomon*, by Howard Swan;² and the selection of *Bible Stories* from the Revised Version of the Old Testament, in Prof. R. G. Moulton's *Modern Reader's Bible*.³

W. H. BENNETT.

¹ Sixth Edition, Revised and Enlarged, with numerous Illustrations. (Edinburgh and London: Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier, pp. 315. 3s. 6d.)

² *Literary Passages from the Bible*, Re-written, Idea for Idea, in Modern Style. (London: Sampson Low, pp. xxvii. 169.)

³ Macmillan, pp. xii. 310. 2s. 6d.

“ATONEMENT AND PERSONALITY.”¹

DR. MOBERLY'S book is little less than a complete system of theology. It deals with such fundamental questions and the way in which it deals with them is itself so fundamental and so far-reaching that, either directly or by logical consequence, all the great doctrines of our faith seem to be involved. It is long indeed since a book appeared which gave the same impression of a whole series of connected problems not only handled thoughtfully but really *thought out*, traced back to their deepest roots and followed through to the very end.

And then the reasoned system thus constructed is so firmly knit together, its logical cohesion is so admirable, that it claims—and reasonably claims—to be accepted as a whole.

It is just this inner cohesion that increases the difficulty of those who come to the book more or less from without, with a different set of ideas in their minds and with something which, however inferior, is yet of the nature of a system of their own. They will not find it so easy as they do with most books to accept and assimilate a point here and a point there. What they have before them presents itself as a complete recasting—or perhaps more correctly a complete re-interpretation—of their whole creed. It will seem to the reader at times as though this re-interpretation had to be either taken or left as it stands, and could not be partly taken and partly left. The present paper is an attempt, which the writer thinks will have to be made by

¹ *Atonement and Personality*. By R. C. Moberly, D.D. (Murray).

others besides himself, to see how far any such separation of parts is possible.

Before going further let us add to the description by saying that the style in which the book is written reflects the qualities of the thought. The book is executed, as it is conceived, in the "grand style." The very construction of the paragraphs is such as befits a great book and not a small one. Perhaps there is just a little redundancy of illustration and exposition. We are sometimes tempted to ask whether, when a thing has been said as well as it can possibly be said in words of one syllable, it is quite necessary to repeat it or to repeat it more than once in words a good deal longer. But the important thing is that style and thought together are to an extraordinary degree consecutive, clear-cut, exact. If the reader experiences any difficulty we may be sure that it never arises from real vagueness or haziness or superficiality. Dr. Moberly emphatically knows his own mind, and it will be the reader's fault if he also does not know it. At the same time, though keenly logical, the book is the very reverse of dry and hard. It glows with intense conviction, with the inspiration of a lofty ideal; and yet the glow is subdued by the consciousness of dealing with the most sacred themes.

In short the book is one of such high distinction both in matter and form that I should hesitate to say what I really think about it or to assign to it the place in English theology that I believe it really holds. I may perhaps do so before I conclude.

It should be said further that every possible help is given to the reader. There is a motto in Greek (Gal. vi. 14). There is a dedication, which is really a summing up in brief of the central thought of the book. There follows an analysis of the contents which is remarkably full and able. And to complete the whole there is an excellent index. Seldom has a book been set before the public in which so

much was done to make the course of the argument clear and intelligible. And seldom has an argument been so commended by *gravitas, dignitas, pietas, reverentia*.

I.

I said that the dedication contains the gist of the whole volume. It is as follows: TO | THE CHURCH | ONE HOLY CATHOLIC | THE BODY OF THE SPIRIT | OF JESUS CHRIST | VERY GOD OF VERY GOD | INCARNATE | WHICH IS | THE REGENERATION AND HOPE | OF THE WHOLE WORLD.

It may surprise some readers to see that there is not a word here that suggests what they are in the habit of associating with Atonement; and it may be well to say at once that Atonement is to be taken throughout in the largest sense. It is not a part of what we sometimes call "the scheme or process of redemption," but the whole of it. I shall presently ask whether a certain portion of the process is not emphasized rather too exclusively, whether it is not made rather too much to absorb the rest. But in the meantime the terms of the dedication will explain what I meant at the outset when I said that the book touched in turn upon all the most fundamental doctrines of Christianity. It deals at very close quarters with the whole question of the Incarnation. It deals at equally close quarters with the whole doctrine of the Trinity. Its leading thought is an exposition of the nature and work of the Holy Spirit.

I do not know what will be the feeling of others, but I confess that to me the treatment of all this side of the subject is extraordinarily helpful and attractive. It happens that I have myself for some time past been engaged more particularly with these topics. And not only do I constantly find Dr. Moberly suggesting the very word or formula that I want, but I should also say that, as well as I can judge, the whole of my experience and read-

ing goes to confirm his conclusions. I certainly do not know any other book on these subjects which approaches this in value. It is bold with the boldness that comes when a thing has been really thought out; and the boldness is never, to the best of my belief, otherwise than justified.

I should like to quote and to quote freely; but I must content myself with setting down a few heads on which I would refer the reader to the book itself.

The doctrine of the 'Trinity is essentially a doctrine of Trinity *in* Unity. The basal truth is that God is one. The further revelation of Divine "Persons" explains and expands but does not contradict this. "The personal distinction in Godhead is a distinction within, and of, unity: not a distinction which qualifies unity, or usurps the place of it, or destroys it" (pp. xxiii. 83, 154 f., 202).

The popular theology verges dangerously upon Tritheism. The word "person" is the best that can be used. And yet in using it we ought to lay stress rather on its positive than on its negative side. We must guard against being misled by our own experience of personality. We should think of the Divine Persons as "mutually inclusive" rather than "mutually exclusive" (pp. xxiii. 156-63, 202).

The safeguard against Sabellianism lies in the word "mutual." The relations of the Divine Persons to each other are mutual relations. But Sabellianism "degrades the Persons of Deity into aspects"; and "there can be no mutual relations between aspects" (pp. 80, 165).

Christ is God, not generically but identically. For the word God does not admit of a plural. And Christ is also Man, not generically but inclusively. He is not one man amongst many. The nearest analogy for His relation to mankind is that of Adam; and even that analogy is imperfect. His Humanity "was not merely the Humanity of a finite creature, but the Humanity of the Infinite God." It had therefore a unique capacity for universal relation. And

the means whereby that universal relation is realized is His Spirit (pp. xx., 83 ff., 204). [This of course is difficult; but the difficulty is one that the Christian theologian cannot escape; and I know no treatment of it that is so helpful as Dr. Moberly's.]

In our insistence upon the Two Natures in Christ we are in danger of falling into Nestorian dualism. "The phrase 'God and man' is of course perfectly true. But it is easy to lay undue emphasis on the 'and.' And when this is done—as it is done every day—the truth is better explained by varying the phrase. 'He is not two, but one, Christ.' He is, then, not so much God *and* man as God in, and through, and as, man." It is a mistake to try to keep open, "as it were, a sort of non-human sphere, or aspect, of the Incarnation" (pp. xx., 96 f.; cf. 94).

The dominant idea in the minds of the New Testament writers is that of the Incarnation. The revelation both of the "Son" and of the "Spirit" has reference to this and grows out of it. The title "Son" is given to our Lord in the New Testament primarily as the Incarnate. To say this is not to imply that the terms "Father" and "Son" have not a further truth in regard to the eternal relations of the Godhead; but the order in which they are revealed arises out of the Incarnation (pp. xxiv., 184 ff.).

Hence the many passages, especially the salutations of the Epistles, in which Two of the Divine Persons appear to be mentioned without the Third, are by no means a "maimed Trinitarian formula." They contain no direct reference to the Trinity. The primary reference is rather to the Incarnation—to God as Eternal and God as Incarnate. But really the Third Person, though not mentioned, is implied. It is through the Holy Spirit that "grace and peace" come from God *to us* (pp. xxiv. 187–95).

I very much wish that space allowed me to develop these points as they deserve. But I have much yet to say; and

I very much hope that the reader who seeks enlightenment on these deep mysteries will seek it, not in these pages, but in those of the book itself. The references have been given partly to indicate where help may be had on subjects that are naturally difficult and abstruse, and partly to illustrate the wealth of valuable matter that surrounds the main course of the argument.

II.

But it is time to set out more directly what that argument is.

It starts from an analysis of the connected ideas of punishment, penitence, forgiveness. The main object of such punishment as comes within the range of Atonement is to produce penitence. It is penitence that really atones. Forgiveness is the correlative of "forgiveableness." It is not simply not punishing; or treating as if innocent; or regarding as innocent. These things are not even moral apart from a justifying cause. The justification is to be sought in penitence, which is a real change of self wrought from within.

Real penitence—not only the perfection but any adequate degree of penitence—is to simple human nature impossible. Perfect penitence requires not only contrition for sin, but complete identity of the self with the holiness which condemns sin. This combination is to be found only in Christ, whose death upon the cross was as it were a vicarious penitence perfect in its kind.

The great question is, How is this transcendent act of penitence on the part of Christ to be brought home to the human soul? And the answer is, Through the operation of the Holy Spirit transforming the human self from within; making the objective subjective; renewing our nature, so that it is no longer ours but Christ's, not by the destruction of our own personality but by its consummation. Pente-

cost is the true complement of Calvary. Calvary without Pentecost is not yet in vital relation with ourselves. Its virtue becomes ours through the indwelling Spirit of Christ.

These are the main lines of the argument, very imperfectly sketched. I will assume that most of those who read this will obtain a closer acquaintance with it. The hints that have been given may be enough to hang our comments upon; and they may in what follows receive some extension.

The points on which I propose to comment more particularly are three—(1) the conception of forgiveness as necessarily implying "forgiveableness"; (2) the mode in which the transition from objective to subjective is effected, as involving the denial of anything in the nature of a "transaction"; (3) the view of the indwelling Spirit as ultimately constituting the true self.

Now it is to be observed that on each of these central points Dr. Moberly's treatment is in the fullest possible accord with the tendencies of modern thought. Like him, modern thought also denies that forgiveness can be separated from forgiveableness. Like him, it repudiates any idea of a "transaction." Like him, not quite so broadly, but yet in an active section of its representatives, it is prepared to break down the distinctness of the individual. And over and above all this it must needs welcome the bringing of so large a part of the spiritual world under the dominion of rigorous and unchangeable laws.

This relation of Dr. Moberly's book to modern thought is, I need not say, a very important matter. It shears away at one stroke a whole forest of objections to Christianity. It supplies a theory in which many of the most cultivated minds may well be content to rest. It justifies the ways of God to men on a scale to which it would not be easy to find a parallel.

I am well aware of this; and I am also well aware that

the questions which I am about to raise and the criticisms which I am about to offer are not at all likely to meet with so favourable a reception in these quarters. I cannot say that I feel this to be wholly a misfortune. I have no wish to challenge the theory for those who desire to accept it. All I wish to do is to vindicate a place for another and older theory and to throw a shield, if I may, over those who cannot readily persuade themselves to part with it. It seems to me that this is just a case where the Christian Church should recognize alternative views as tenable.

III.

The first question that I should have to ask would be whether we can expect to make good a theodicy on so vast a scale. A theory such as that which is propounded to us seems almost to eliminate mystery from a large part, and that one of the most profound parts, of the dealings of God with men. I should not object to the theory if it took the form of one possible explanation of those dealings. What I stumble at are the negatives by which it is accompanied. I mean the strong assertions which meet us from time to time that such and such a thing cannot be.

I fall back upon Butler's *Analogy*. We live under a scheme of things imperfectly comprehended. We live under a scheme of things which contains many features that are different from what we should expect them to be. The one fact of the presence of evil in the world throws out many of our calculations; and perhaps it ought to throw out more than we suppose.

I have the greatest reluctance, even upon what seem to be obvious propositions of morality, to lay down laws for the Almighty. "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" is no doubt an axiom that stands absolutely fast. But it is another thing to say that we shall always be able to see what is right. The lines meet no doubt some-

where, but that meeting-point may be beyond our ken. It is well for us that it should be so. It is well that we should walk sometimes by faith and not by sight. It is well that we should feel that we are

Moving about in worlds not realized.

I shall have occasion perhaps more than once to fall back upon this principle. But the necessity does not trouble me. It is one of those for which I am antecedently prepared.

I can go with Dr. Moberly when he says that "remission of penalty must have a justification" (p. 51); but not if he means, as he seems to mean, a visible tangible definable justification. He seems to me to pursue this idea to the point of making forgiveness cease to be forgiveness in the sense that I should attach to the word. I must needs associate myself with his own admirable statement of the objection to his view, the substance of which was already in my mind before I reached it.

But when we venture to give to the word forgiveness any meaning of this character at all, we are met, no doubt, by one or two very real difficulties of thought. Thus the question suggests itself, if forgiveness (with whatever provisos) is made to be simply correlative to forgiveableness; and if to say that a man is forgiveable means not merely that he may be, but therefore *ipso facto* that he ought to be, nay, must be forgiven: if forgiveness, that is, is a sort of automatic and necessary consequence of a certain condition of the culprit's personality; are you not exactly taking out of forgiveness all that it ever had distinctively meant? Are you not precisely and completely explaining it away? When you say you forgive, you are merely recognising the growth towards righteousness of those who are already becoming righteous. You may call it forgiving only those who deserve to be forgiven. Is it really more than this, that you acknowledge the goodness of the good; or, at all events, the imperfect goodness of the incompletely good? You merely do not continue to condemn those who no longer ought to be condemned? So far as they are still wicked, you refuse to forgive them. So far as they are becoming righteous, they do not need any act of yours to forgive them. In other words, there is no place left for forgiveness. Either, in accordance with truth, you still condemn, or

else, in accordance with truth, you acquit and accept. Where does forgiveness come in? Justice this may be. But has not forgiveness, as forgiveness, dropped out altogether? Either there is nothing that can be called forgiveness at all; or, if there is, it is a forgiveness which can be said to have been, by deserving, "earned": and is not forgiveness that is earned exactly not forgiveness? (p. 58 f.)

I waive the point to which Dr. Moberly demurs about "earning" and "desert." I gladly acknowledge that later in the book (e.g. pp. 319 f., 321 f.; cf. 139 f.) he repeatedly lays stress upon the fact that the preparation for forgiveness is not the work of the sinner himself. But I do not think that he ever adequately answers the objection that forgiveness as he defines it is neither what is commonly meant by the word nor what is often meant by it in the Bible. It seems to me also that forgiveness is not the only word that does not come by its due. "Mercy" I should be inclined to say was another, and other words of the like kind.

Take for instance some familiar lines of Shakespeare's—

Whereto serves mercy,
But to confront the visage of offence?
And what's in prayer, but this twofold force—
To be forestalled ere we come to fall,
Or pardoned, being down?

And again—

But mercy is above this sceptre'd sway,
It is enthroned in the heart of kings;
It is an attribute to God Himself:
And earthly power doth then show likest God's
When mercy seasons justice.

I do not doubt that in such contexts as these Shakespeare as usual speaks for the popular mind. I do not doubt that in the myriads of cases in which "mercy" and "forgiveness" are ascribed to God the great mass of mankind understand by them simple remission of penalty, without regard to the cause of the remission.

And I should have equally little hesitation in asserting that there are numbers of places in which the Bible, New Testament as well as Old, does the same thing. The very word "forgiveness," I imagine, has this meaning. I should not be surprised if it were maintained that the word *πάρεσις* means something provisional or conditional. But that is just what I conceive distinguishes it from its synonym *ἄφεσις*. And if we seek for explicit statements, what can be more explicit than Romans iii. 24: "Being justified freely by His grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus" (*δικαιούμενοι δωρεὰν τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι, διὰ τῆς ἀπολυτρώσεως τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*), where the Greek is even more significant than the English? To reconcile this with Dr. Moberly's view should we not have to blot out *δωρεάν* altogether and to take away half its meaning from *τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι*? I appeal to this passage as perhaps the one most directly in point, though there are many others that seem with different degrees of directness to imply the same thing. Such would be (e.g.) Ephesians ii. 4-6; Titus iii. 4-5; Romans v. 6-11; Matthew xviii. 23-35 (the Unmerciful Servant); Luke xv. 1-7, 8-10.

I do not deny that some of these passages, especially those from Ephesians and Titus, do not stop at the moment of forgiveness, do not leave the sinner at the point where he is "dead in trespasses," but go on to speak in the one case of quickening or raising up with Christ, and in the other of the renewing of the Holy Ghost. I do not deny that we may also, if we please, take up the position that the Divine forgiveness always has in view these further stages of the Christian life. But it seems to me that if we follow the tenor of Scriptural teaching simply, without letting ourselves be disturbed and diverted by considerations from without, we shall see (i.) that the Christian life does consist of a series of successive stages; and (ii.) that the Scripture does not hesitate to speak of the initial stage

by itself and without reference to the later stages. I conceive that most of the places where St. Paul uses the verb "to justify" or "be justified" (*δικαιοῦν, δικαιοῦσθαι*) are of this sort. I cannot quite go with Dr. Moberly's note on this word (p. 335 f.). I believe that in all these places it has strictly the sense that belongs to it in common usage, and that this, and no other, entirely suits the contexts.

I think therefore that much of our popular theology—the theology of street preachers and evangelists—has really a great amount of Scriptural support behind it when it lays stress upon a "*free* forgiveness." I do not think that it is wrong in the order in which it presents its message—Forgiveness first, and love and obedience flowing from forgiveness. Not that this is the only order or that the links in the chain can be ever really separated, but that this is distinctly an order in which the Scripture itself presents the sequence, and that it has been found in practice to possess a great power of attraction.

For, further, it seems to me that this order appeals to an instinct that is really planted deep down in our nature. There are different types of forgiveness. That on which Dr. Moberly insists might be called the "parental," or "pædagogic" type. And if it is contended that that is the type most nearly analogous to Divine forgiveness, I should have nothing to say to the contrary. But the human heart is instinctively drawn to another form of forgiveness that has in it (as we should say) no *arrière pensée*, no element of calculation, but which is simply the pure outflowing of love; ignoring misdeeds, forgetting the past, and simply going forth to meet and embrace the offending and alienated friend. A love such as this asks no questions and makes no conditions. It is not thinking either of conditions or of consequences. The rush of its own inner strength carries it forward. If it is rebuffed, it takes its rebuff meekly. It sinks back perhaps bruised and wounded but in no way

repenting of its venture. And if it succeeds the success is glorious—just the kind of success to make the very angels in heaven rejoice.

Are we to think that there is nothing corresponding to this, with whatever unseen and unimagined modifications, in God? Is it only a product of human short-sightedness and imperfection? If we are obliged to say that it is, would not that mean that one of the purest and most disinterested feelings in man had no counterpart above itself? Should we not at last have found something which the Great King Himself may not enjoy though His subjects may? And would not that one thing be, no counterfeit, but the real distilled essence of forgiveness?

IV.

The next great issue that separates me from Dr. Moberly, without doubt a greater than the last, on which I know that I have made and feel that I ought to make so many concessions, that the difference between us (except just on the point of the paragraphs immediately preceding this) might be regarded as almost formal; the next, and not only greater but really greatest issue, is as to whether the atoning death of Christ can be described as in any sense a "transaction." Here again, and here most profoundly, I am aware that my friend has on his side an immense weight of cultured and highly trained opinion. I cannot be sorry that he should speak to so large a public in tones that it will recognize as its own. The only thing for which I confess that I am a little sorry is that in speaking of the "transactional" theory he should have thought it necessary to set it in the pillory, not only in its extreme forms but in a travesty even of them. I have in mind more particularly a sentence on p. 342, which recalls to me rather by way of contrast another sentence on p. xi. of the Preface as to certain "inferential structures"—it is the

same structures that are intended—"the most untrue of which has considerable relation to truth." *Abusus non tollit usum*. Nobody in these days believes in the more monstrous developments of the past. To denounce them is like slaying the slain. We do not need these awful examples. If we were not ourselves sensitive enough in regard to them, outside opinion would warn us off such ground. It is an altogether happier function to seek out the grain of truth that lies hid within the error, to set that in just proportion.

It is of course also a misfortune that we should have to use these terms "transaction," "transactional," which carry with them in the context a shade of meaning that is naturally repellent. It is not really this side that we wish to put forward. What we mean is that among the mysteries that surround the Atonement (and no one is more conscious of these than Dr. Moberly) there is one great field of mystery, with which we ourselves are only concerned through its effects and which we cannot explain but must not explain away.

Our reasons for believing in the existence of this particular field of mystery are partly because we think that it is revealed, partly because the assumption that it does exist seems to us to supply a key to many things in the history of the race which we could not understand without it; partly also because by the application of the historical method it appears that the antecedents of apostolic thought would naturally point in this direction.

I remarked some way back on the rather curious fact that the dedication of Dr. Moberly's book, which in a manner summarizes the leading thought of the whole, does not contain a single one of the terms that some of us are most in the habit of associating with the Atonement. It will seem to these that his treatment of the Scriptural basis of the doctrine is strangely unequal. Some of the passages

involved have the fullest possible justice done to them. They are set in a new light and are brought home to the mind in a very striking manner. But others which appear to be hardly less relevant are either not introduced at all or introduced only in a brief section in smaller print that comes in parenthetically in the last Supplementary Chapter on the "Atonement in History." In this section there is a rapid survey, which is no doubt very pertinent, of a number of New Testament passages bearing upon the doctrine.

Of course every writer must follow his own bent and treat his subject in the way that is most natural to him. It is no valid criticism that others would have treated it differently. Still the fact remains that we have stowed away in this small corner what for many of us would have had a place in the main thesis of the book; and I cannot help thinking that these parts of the subject are really minimized.

It may be true that the variety of the metaphors used in Scripture goes to show that none of them can be pressed to their full logical extent. But so many of these converge upon the one idea of sacrifice that it seems as though we were obliged to accept this idea as quite central and essential to the whole conception of Atonement.

Now, far be it from me to say that Dr. Moberly does not recognize this aspect of the Atonement as a sacrifice; but he seems to me to throw quite into the background certain features which in the writings of St. Paul and St. Peter and St. John and the Epistle to the Hebrews are not in the background, but prominent and even central.

One group of terms in particular to which I cannot find that justice is done is the group that we translate by "propitiate," "propitiation" (*ἱλάσκεσθαι, ἱλαστήριον, ἱλασμός*). Neither word occurs at all in the index; there is only an incidental reference to the group on p. 334.

Another group of the same kind is that which includes

"blood-shedding," "sprinkling of the blood," and the phrase "in the blood"; the underlying principle of which is laid down in Hebrews ix. 22, "Apart from shedding of blood there is no remission."

I am well aware that modern thought has a short and easy method with all these terms. If it is compelled to give an account of them it sets them down as relics of primitive barbarism. But more often it simply ignores them and goes on its way without them.

Dr. Moberly does not altogether do this, but he comes rather near doing it. Sacrifice is with him the expression of certain moral ideas, and he tries to treat it as though its significance were exhausted by those ideas.

I need hardly say that I sympathize with the effort, which is the better side of the movement of thought that we see around us. But those of us who start, not from any philosophical or theological system but in the first instance from the Bible, cannot wholly satisfy themselves with this method. It may be an open question, as it is no doubt a further question, how the Biblical teaching is related to their own ultimate personal beliefs. But before they come to that point they must resolutely make up their minds not at any cost to tamper with the facts as they see them. Whether they like or dislike, whether they understand or do not understand, their duty is the same. Neither ignorance nor knowledge, neither sympathies nor antipathies, neither the attractiveness of one theory nor their repugnance to another, not even the highest or purest of moral instincts and aspirations, must be allowed to divert them from the straight path. They are like Balaam before Balak, and what is put into their mouths that they must say, with all its chances of its being wrong, with all its risks of being misunderstood, with all their consciousness that it is but seeing "through a glass darkly."

Those then for whom I am speaking must directly face

the fact that these terms—"propitiation," "bloodshedding" and the like—have the prominence they have. It is quite another thing to say that they understand them. They are awful words. And when we try to penetrate into their meaning we soon find that we have to bow the head and be silent.

But so much at least seems to follow from them, that the Scriptures do recognize a mysterious something which, in our imperfect human language, may be described as a "transaction." It seems to me difficult for the plain reader of his Bible to deny this.

But, when we have got so far, abashed and silent as we may be, there seem to open out long vistas which at least give to the history of the human race and to the course of God's providential dealings with men a unity that they would not have otherwise.

1. A new light is thrown on what I have said that modern thought would dismiss as "primitive barbarism." This contemptuous estimate is in fact utterly superficial, and not less unscientific, in any true sense of science. Surely the doctrine of Evolution has taught us not to make light of humble beginnings. The first beginnings of sacrifice may be humble and the ideas associated with it may be crude; but we cannot stop short at these. The eye must needs follow it down the ages until it reaches its culmination on Calvary. If we take what I conceive to be the Biblical view of Calvary then we have a true evolution with a true culmination. The course of things becomes intelligible where before it was not. At least we see that the dim half-conscious gropings of the human mind far back in the past had a diviner goal than we might have supposed.

2. Another subject on which the propitiatory aspect of the Atonement appears to throw light is the value of Vicarious Suffering.

We may join with Dr. Moberly and the moderns in rejecting the idea of Vicarious Punishment, except in so far as this means pain incurred in the necessary working out of the consequences of sin. But whatever we may say as to Vicarious Punishment we must not lose our hold on Vicarious Suffering. On Dr. Moberly's theory the form which this takes is mainly as penitence. And perhaps it is true that vicarious penitence, His utter identification at once with the judgment of God upon sin and with the heartfelt contrition that man ought to feel but cannot adequately feel for it, was the most poignant of all the pangs of the Divine Sufferer on Calvary. But here again we have a climax, and our thought must include all the pain and all the humiliation that He underwent in taking upon Himself the nature of man.

It is just in regard to this vicarious suffering that the Old Testament comes in to reinforce the New. No other sacred book has anything like it. And here once more the great example does not stand alone, but is reached through a number of delicately drawn concentric circles of which it is the centre. The Bible is the most consoling book in the world just because it reveals to us the extreme beauty and value of that untold mass of suffering endured for the sake of others which seems at first sight the greatest flaw upon God's creation. We see at last that this form of suffering belongs fitly to such a world as that in which we live—not to a world serene, untroubled and always in sunshine, certainly not to a lotus-eating existence, to a world that has its sad minor chords, but yet to a world in which

We feel that we are greater than we know.

A world like this can have no other centre than Calvary.

3. When we look at the Biblical writers historically we see that the elements of this particular conception of the Atonement were already in their minds. They not only

inherited the great sacrificial system of the Old Testament, and they not only had before them the profound teaching of the latter part of Isaiah respecting the Servant of Jehovah with the parallel teaching of certain Psalms—Scriptures which took the deepest hold of the first generation of Christians—but in addition to this they in all probability had distinct ideas, if not exactly as to Vicarious Suffering (which was a subject developed in the Talmudical theology somewhat late and under the influence of Christianity), yet at least as to vicarious merit. Some of these ideas needed to be purified and they were purified; but we can see how they helped to supply material out of which the Christian doctrine was constructed. I am afraid that I cannot recall any contemporary teaching that would in like manner suggest Dr. Moberly's theory of vicarious penitence.

V.

We now come to the philosophical question which has caused Dr. Moberly to combine together in his title "Atonement" and "Personality." In regard to this I desire to keep an open mind, but I must confess to a good deal of hesitation.

Dr. Moberly's point is that Personality, when analysed, is found to consist of Will, Reason and Love. But in our present state each of these is necessarily imperfect; they only reach their perfection through the indwelling Spirit of God. Dr. Moberly goes so far as to say that this indwelling Spirit actually constitutes the renewed and regenerated self.

I think that he guards himself sufficiently against Pantheism, though I could rather wish that he had stated the distinction as explicitly as he has done in the case of Sabellianism earlier in the book. The self is not, as I understand him, merged and lost, but only comes to

respond perfectly to the Will of God. His view appears to be modelled more especially on two passages in the Epistles of St. Paul. One is 2 Corinthians xii. 2-5: "I know a man in Christ, fourteen years ago, (whether in the body, I know not; or whether out of the body, I know not: God knoweth,) such a one caught up even to the third heaven. And I knew such a man, (whether in the body, or apart from the body, I know not: God knoweth,) how that he was caught up into paradise, and heard unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter. On behalf of such a one will I glory; but on mine own behalf I will not glory, save in my weaknesses." On this we have the following remarks—

Of whom is St. Paul speaking? There is one before his thought whom he sharply contrasts with himself—*ὑπὲρ δὲ ἑμαυτοῦ οὐ*. Who is it? Who is the "self" of whom he will not glory and who is the "such a one" of whom he will? Are they not both—with whatever difference—himself?

Even then the veteran apostle and martyr, who, in vision, by anticipation, had himself seen and tested the truer reality of himself, yet means by "himself," in the present, the imperfect self, the self characterized by weaknesses within and distresses without, and chastened by the "thorn in the flesh," the messenger of Satan to buffet him.

As the clear vision of his transfigured self does not prevent his self-identification meanwhile with the weakness and distress; so does not his true self-identification with the weakness and distress obscure the truth that the transfigured being whom, having once felt, he cannot but contrast with himself, yet is, to say the least, something very far nearer than he is to the true and ultimate reality of himself (p. 320 note).

The other passage is Galatians ii. 20. Of this Dr. Moberly writes—

If any one desires a Christian formula for the central conception of human personality, it may be gathered from the words of St. Paul, "I have been crucified with Christ; yet I live; and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me." I yet not I, not I, and therefore I, the full, real, consummated "I" at last. Here is the real inmost principle of life and immortality brought to light by the gospel of Christ (p. 255).

The first passage brings out the continuity of the two selves ; the second brings out the identity of the renewed self with Christ.

It will thus be seen that Dr. Moberly has full Biblical support for his theory. And the two passages that have been given are only samples of a number of others. It must be confessed that this is a strong point in its favour.

My hesitation comes in rather from the side of philosophy. I cannot feel sure of the sufficiency of the analysis which resolves the "person" into will, reason and love. I desiderate something more—the bond to hold them together. I cannot find that I can do without the "distinct centre of being." If I interrogate my own consciousness this seems to me the prime fact to which it testifies.

It is no doubt true that this "centre of being" cannot be wholly isolated from its surroundings. It feeds so to speak upon these surroundings, just as the body takes in from without the food that keeps it alive. But as in the body there must be the organs to assimilate the food, so in the self there must be something central to correlate and unify the impressions from without. This constitutes the empirical self, the self of experience—the imperfect self if you will—but there must needs be a centre somewhere to maintain the continuity between the different phases.

This is as far as I can see at present. I am still disposed to try whether the formula of "influence," which I have hitherto been in the habit of using in these cases, will not best satisfy all the conditions. The influence may be the very closest and most penetrating conceivable ; but I am compelled as yet to think of it rather as influence than as absorption or substitution. It seems to me that for this too there is Biblical warrant ; e.g. St. John xiv. 23 : "If a man love Me, he will keep My word : and My Father will love him, and We will come unto him, and make Our abode with him" ; and Revelation iii. 20 : "Behold, I stand at

the door and knock : if any man hear My voice and open the door, I will come in to him and will sup with him, and he with Me." In such passages the reciprocity between the human self and the Divine Presence is fully maintained. As at present advised I should be disposed to explain the other passages in the light of these. By so doing we can keep in closer touch with mother earth and those realities of which we have the most immediate cognizance.

VI.

If I am, in conclusion, to try to form an estimate of the book as a whole, my first feeling must be one of regret that it should be unfortunate in its reviewer. Great as it undoubtedly is, and great as he feels it to be, it yet collides with too many of his own cherished ideas for him to be able to do it complete justice. It is true that the accessories alone are so replete with interest and instruction that, even if there was nothing in the main argument with which he could agree, he would still have a book that he could prize most highly. But there is of course much more than that. Even a reviewer whose mind is somewhat pre-occupied cannot help being impressed by the elevated character of the whole conception. It is, as was hinted at the outset, a really heroic attempt to construct a far-reaching theodicy of a large part of God's ways ; and it is an attempt that has all the inner marks of success that belong to a singularly well articulated and well compacted structure.

As the eye travels backwards over the course of English theology in search of a work of the same kind (i.e. in the department of philosophical theology) and of equal magnitude it seems to find nothing to stop at until it comes to Butler's *Analogy*. But then this book stands to the *Analogy* not so much in the relation of a supplement or development as of an alternative. The *Analogy* is based

upon a profound sense of the mystery of things, but the mystery is evenly distributed. Whichever way the mind looks it is met by mystery, and the resultant attitude is like that of the Psalmist when he says, "I refrain my soul and keep it low."

But with Dr. Moberly's book the case is different. There the mystery recedes to an unexpected degree from a part, and yet only from a part, of God's ways. One section of them as it were is thrown into bright light, the effect of which however is but to increase the surrounding shade.

And in relation to the Scriptures the effect seems to be similar. It is one of the strong points of the book, and a point by which I am duly impressed, that it gives the fullest possible force to certain of the Apostolic and even of the Evangelic utterances. But then there are others of which this cannot be said. Rather, the theory by its negations seems to stand in the way of adequate justice being done to them.

These negations indeed are not peculiar, they are common to much of the more advanced thought of our time. We who cannot share them are yet very far from grudging the help that is given to those who can. We are only compelled reluctantly to keep to old paths as best we may.

W. SANDAY.

HISTORICAL COMMENTARY ON THE EPISTLES TO THE CORINTHIANS.

XLV. THE APOSTOLATE.¹

NOWHERE does Paul state in clearer terms his views about the authority vested in an Apostle, and about the origin of that office, than in the chapter which we now approach. His own authority in Corinth was questioned, and he

¹ In the previous article, p. 234, read § XLIV. in place of XLII.

justifies it. Let us first try to understand exactly ¹ what he says, and then determine what can be fairly inferred.

IX. 1. "Am I not an Apostle," *i.e.* an accredited envoy and representative of Christ, despatched into the world? Am I not independent of any control exercised by any human power? Have I not come into direct and immediate relations with Christ, by being permitted to see Him and thus enabled to bear witness to the world of His glorified state? Is not my right made evident to all by your existence as a Church in Corinth? 2. Even if I should not be recognized as an Apostle elsewhere, yet assuredly I am an Apostle so far as you are concerned; for you are the seal guaranteeing the genuineness of my Apostolic powers. 3. This is my answer to such as inquire into my rights and my position.² The authority which Paul claims in Corinth is based on his position as the Apostle or envoy sent to them. If a proof is sought that his Apostolate is genuine, it is found in his success: the Corinthian Church is his proof. Such always is the ultimate test, as he has previously stated.³ As an Apostle, he is free; *i.e.* he is independent of all human control: no person or persons have any right to order or limit his action; he does, or refrains from doing, according to his own judgment of what his Apostolate requires.

But whence does his commission as an Apostle originate? How has he been appointed? In reply to that question he appeals to the fact that he has seen Jesus. The importance of this seeing of Jesus leads Paul to insist on it at greater

¹ In doing so we follow chiefly Canon Evans's admirable edition, and often use his words.

² The Authorized Version places only a comma here, and makes *v.* 4 the continuation of the sentence. The Revised Version rightly puts a period. There is a distinct pause at this point after *vv.* 1-3, which form a closely connected whole. Alford and Evans seem right in this (so too Findlay, etc.). The punctuation in Westcott and Hort's text places the pause at the end of *v.* 2, and connects *v.* 3 with the following verses, though marking it off by a period. That view is susceptible of defence; but Canon Evans's view carries conviction.

³ See § XLIII. p. 231 f.

length elsewhere in writing to the Corinthians. That is one of the leading ideas in the Epistles: it was one that rose again and again in his mind as a fact of special importance for them. He insists on it in no other of his letters; but to the Corinthians he mentions it in ix. 1, xv. 8, 2 Cor. xii. 3 f.¹ The reason for this insistence lies in the necessity of bringing home to them his apostolic commission. His glory and his peculiar honour was that he had been admitted more than once to come into direct relations with Jesus, and so marked out as His envoy and Apostle. He was one of the witnesses that Jesus was living.

Thus the argument comes practically to the same issue as we have seen in *Galatians*:² the only parties to be considered are the converted, the messenger, and the Divine Author of the message. No human authority can for a moment claim to intrude between these three.

Considering how important, how absolutely fundamental for Paul it is that his commission originates directly from God, and that no human power intervenes so as to acquire any authority over him, we cannot understand the opinion expressed by some distinguished scholars, whom we would gladly follow to the utmost possible limit, that he (and so too Barnabas) was not actually constituted an Apostle until he was invested with that office by the Church in Antioch (*Acts* xiii. 2). There is something hid from us, or alien to us, in the process by which such an opinion is reached.³

XLVI. "AM I NOT FREE?" (IX. 1).

That the meaning of "free" here is as we have assumed in the preceding section seems clearly proved by ix. 19:

¹ The last passage refers to a different incident, which as an "ecstatic vision" is regarded by some (following Neander) as much less important. Paul himself recognizes no such distinction of dignity, but counts those visions as the greatest glory of his life.

² *Hist. Comm. Gal.*, § XII. p. 270.

³ *St. Paul the Trav.*, p. 67.

“though I be free from all, yet have I made myself servant¹ unto all”: I have allowed my acts to be guided and determined by men, accommodating myself to them, in order to gain more complete success. The antithesis is rather rhetorical; but all its force comes from the sense which we have given to the word “free.”

It is characteristic of Paul's tone to the Corinthians that, while he claims freedom as a right, he says that in practice he has made himself a servant, a slave. In this Epistle he glorifies the duty of obedience and voluntary servitude. To the Galatians, on the contrary, he glorifies freedom. The difference in this respect between the two Epistles is very striking; and it shows how necessary it is always to interpret Paul's words by reference to the character and circumstances of his audience. The slavish Phrygians are called to freedom (v. 13): that is the Divine gift to them (v. 1): the Jerusalem which is now lies in bondage, but freedom belongs to the Jerusalem which is above (iv. 26): the Galatians are born free as the sons of the free woman and not of the slave mother (iv. 31).

On the other hand, the Corinthians, too self-confident, and too little disposed to obedience, are often reminded that freedom is not to be sought as an end always in itself desirable.² A mere numerical statement sufficiently indicates the difference of tone: the words “free” and “freedom” occur 10 times in the 6 chapters of *Galatians*, 7 times in the 16 chapters of 1 *Corinthians*, and once in the 13 chapters of 2 *Corinthians*.³ But when we look at the spirit of the passages in which “freedom” is mentioned to the Corinthians, the contrast to *Galatians* becomes still more marked. In ix. 1 Paul insists on his freedom, but he adds in ix. 19 that he has voluntarily made himself a slave. He points out

¹ More strictly “slave,” under the dominion of another man or men.

² This is not wholly forgotten in *Galatians*; see v. 13.

³ See *Hist. Comm. Gal.*, § LIV. p. 442.

that in the Church the slave has equal advantages with the free man (xii. 13),¹ and should not set it before himself as an object to attain freedom (vii. 21).² Freedom of conscience may be a danger to others (x. 29).

It is quite wrong to think, as some do, that Paul found he had gone too far in *Galatians* in praising freedom; and in *Corinthians* corrected his teaching so as to praise obedience. The advice in each case is relative to the audience. In each case Paul sees and says that freedom is the highest condition, though there are dangers in seeking after it too hastily. But in the one case it is prudent to insist more on the dangers, in the other on the advantages of freedom.

While Paul sees that it is necessary to impress strongly on the Corinthians the duty of obedience, we observe in what a generous and lofty way he does this. There is nowhere any expression that might tend to break the spirit, or wound the just self-respect of the Corinthians. No better example could be quoted of true nobility of mind than the manner in which Paul counsels them to be content with less than absolute freedom, and to acquiesce in the control of wisdom and authority.

XLVII. PRIVILEGES OF AN APOSTLE.

IX. 4. Have we not privilege to be maintained, while resident among you, at the cost of the Church? You know that we have. 5. Have we not privilege to take about with us a Christian woman for wife, as also the rest of the

¹ The same thought, of course, occurs in *Gal.* iii. 28.

² The second half of the verse is enigmatic. It has been understood by Alford, etc., as "if thou art even able to become free, remain in slavery rather"; but (although this is quite possible with the Greek) we feel bound to conclude with Evans, Findlay, etc., that Paul means, "but still, if thou canst also become free, rather make use of the opportunity (than not)." Though Alford's construction is in keeping with the general tone of the context, yet we scruple to take such an extreme meaning. Paul seems to be making a concession parenthetically in spite of the context.

Apostles, and the brethren of the Lord, and Cephas?¹ 6. Or is it only I and Barnabas that have not privilege to abstain from working for our bread? 7. The soldier is maintained by the State. The tenant (*métayer*) who plants the vineyard (*though he is not the owner of the soil and the vines, but merely contributes the work, and divides with the owner the profits*), eats the fruit of it (*i.e.* not to consume it all, but he is free to use the fruit for his own personal needs). He who tends a flock for the owner uses the milk for his own needs.

Three illustrations are here taken from common life.² The soldier is fed by the State: the illustration is drawn rather from the standing army of the Romans than the citizen force of a Greek city: it is more Roman than Greek.³ The agricultural system of *métayers* working the soil and paying a proportion of the crops to the owner was widespread under various modifications in ancient times.

This paragraph, with the following, has no bearing on the argument, unless the Corinthians had been struck by a contrast between Paul and some other teacher or teachers who lived at the expense of the community. Nor would it be sufficient to suppose that the Corinthians had heard that teachers in other places were supported by the congregation. Something that had come home to them in Corinth is needed to make the situation and the words intelligible. Apollos had gone to Corinth after Paul; but his conduct alone would not explain the prominence given here to the action of the Apostles. Something further must have occurred, and the thought of this, and of the talk roused in Corinth by it, is in Paul's mind. This event can hardly

¹ On the emphatic position assigned to Cephas, as marking a climax, see next section.

² Hence *κατὰ ἀνθρώπου* in the following verse: so *Hist. Comm. Gal.* § XXXIII. p. 349.

³ The Greek armies of the later centuries B.C. were, indeed, largely mercenary; but the idea always remained as a theory in the Greek city that every citizen of suitable age is a soldier in case of need.

have been anything else than the appearance in Corinth of some important personage who took advantage of the privileges which Paul denied himself.

XLVIII. ST. PETER IN CORINTH.

One of the most striking facts in this first Corinthian Epistle is the prominent position which St. Peter occupies in it.

1. A group or class of Christians in Corinth hold by him : "I am (a partisan) of Cephas" was their motto. It is implied in i. 12 and iii. 22 that the Corinthians discussed the merits and style of Paul and Apollos and Cephas as teachers, and some preferred the one, some another, while others again were not contented with the exposition of Christ as given by any of them.¹

2. In the passage before us Peter is singled out, separated from "the rest of the Apostles," and used to mark a climax rising from them, through "the brethren of the Lord" to "Cephas." This peculiar prominence is assigned to him in respect of a personal fact, viz. that he travelled accompanied by his wife and taking certain allowances.

There seem to be only two possible explanations of the importance thus attached to him. Either he was already recognized in Corinth as the supreme Apostle, whose example far outweighed that of all others, or he was personally known in Corinth, so that his example was peculiarly impressive to them.

It seems impossible to hesitate for a moment between these alternatives. Not a scrap of evidence is known to support the first. The second alone can stand. People in Corinth discussed Peter's teaching and his style and his conduct—with all the free criticism that Greeks used—because they had seen him and listened to him. For the

See § V. in EXPOSITOR, Jan., 1900, p. 28 f.

same reason they knew that he travelled in a different way from Paul.

3. He is quoted first and separately from the other Apostles as a witness that Christ was still living (see xv. 5). This might be sufficiently justified on chronological grounds: Luke xxiv. 34 mentions that Christ was seen by Peter alone before He was seen by the Twelve. But his evidence would be all the weightier to the Corinthians if they had heard him tell the story himself.

Elsewhere¹ we have studied the variation in the way in which Paul mentions individuals, according as they are, or are not, personally known to his correspondents. When the effect of the reference to an individual depends mainly on facts not stated in the context, but presupposed as familiar to the readers, that individual is probably known personally to them. On that principle we infer that Chloe and Sosthenes and Apollos were personally known in Corinth, and so also Cephas.

Nor is there anything improbable or strange in this conclusion. The Corinthian tradition was that the same two Apostles who preached in Rome had preached in their city—Paul and Peter. Dionysius, bishop of Corinth, mentions that fact in a letter written about 170–175 A.D. A tradition so early on such a matter has strong claim to be considered authoritative; and Lightfoot draws the proper inference² from a comparison between Dionysius's statement and 1 *Corinthians* i. 12, iii. 22. It must, then, be regarded as a fact, and a very important fact, that St. Peter had preached in Corinth before this First Epistle was written.

Now there is every probability—at least for those to whom the evidence seems conclusive as to St. Peter having preached in Rome—that he visited Corinth on his way to Rome. Corinth was the half-way resting-place between

¹ *Hist. Comm. Gal.*, §§ III., IV. p. 246 ff.

² See his note on Clement, vol. ii. p. 26.

Syria and Rome; and it seems improbable that Peter would stop short at Corinth when we consider what is likely to have been his business on this journey.

We shall probably not be wrong in supposing that Peter's visits to Rome, to Syrian Antioch (*Gal.* ii. 11), and to Samaria (*Acts* viii. 14), are to be all classed together as made on behalf of the supreme Church authorities. He was commissioned from Jerusalem to inspect these new Churches, and to report upon them after forming an opinion as to their character. Whether he was similarly commissioned to a purely Pauline foundation like the Corinthian Church is perhaps more doubtful; but we think it highly probable that he was so commissioned, for we see no reason to think that either Paul or the leading Apostles in Jerusalem wished to make any distinction between his churches and the rest.

In Rome, at any rate, the young Church must have been an object of much interest in Jerusalem; and those who think it unlikely that Peter would intrude on the Pauline Church at Corinth as a commissioner with authority from the central body in Jerusalem, must feel all the more strongly that he would be there only because it was on the way to some place beyond; and the only place beyond that has a moment's claim to consideration is Rome.

Even we who think that Peter was an authoritative commissioner in Corinth must feel that the interest attaching to the Church in Rome was likely to attract him thither, and that a commission to inspect the new Churches was most unlikely to stop short at Corinth.

Further, we must probably regard this visit of St. Peter as having formed part of a regular tour of inspection. "As Peter went through all parts he came also to the saints which dwelt at" Derbe and Lystra and Iconium and the cities of Asia and Corinth (*Acts* ix. 32). We must assume that he took the land route so as to visit the new Churches.

Moreover, if he was on his way to Rome (as we think highly probable), it would follow that he must have chosen the land route, for the sea route would not bring him to Corinth, but to Puteoli.¹ If he came to Corinth by the land route over Asia Minor, it is beyond doubt or question that he must have passed through Ephesus on the way. The regular voyage over the Ægean was between Ephesus and Corinth.

The character of this tour may perhaps explain why a staunch Paulinist like Luke did not mention it. He did not regard an inspection authorized by the Church in Jerusalem as an event of importance in the development of the Pauline Churches; and his rule is to mention only the great critical steps in the growth of the Church.

It is an interesting point that Peter is here implied to have been accompanied by his wife when he visited Corinth. Tradition records also that she was with him in Rome and that he saw her led to martyrdom there.

XLIX. THE DATE OF ST. PETER'S VISIT TO ROME.

It would furnish a fixed point of the highest value in an obscure subject if the precise date of St. Peter's visit to Corinth could be fixed. Apparently it had occurred some considerable time before this Epistle was written, for the effects on the congregation in Corinth after his departure are alluded to in i. 11, iii. 22. Moreover, we might have looked for some more explicit allusion to the visit, if it had occurred only shortly before the Epistle was written (winter-spring, 55-56): probably it was known to and mentioned by Paul in that previous letter (which is alluded to in v. 9).

The latest date for Peter's visit to Corinth, therefore, is the late spring of 55 A. D.

¹ Lucan, *Navis*, describes an Alexandrian corn ship on its way to Rome as lying in the harbour of Piræus, not far from Corinth; but it is evident that the visit was an unusual and unnatural episode of such a voyage, introduced for the sake of this dialogue, and explained as due to bad winds.

On the other hand it is evident from i. 12, iii. 4, 6, 22, that Apollos visited Corinth before Peter. Apollos was the first important teacher who had come there after Paul to carry on Paul's work: "I planted, Apollos watered." Now Paul passed through Ephesus in March A.D. 53; and some time afterwards Apollos arrived, was brought over to the Pauline views by Priscilla and Aquila, and sent across to work in Corinth. He had preached a little in Ephesus before he departed; and we can hardly date his arrival in Corinth earlier than the end of summer 53. He was in Corinth preaching when Paul reached Ephesus about mid-winter 53; and it is very unlikely that any ordinary person would cross later than October.¹ Hence we may fairly date the arrival of Apollos in Corinth about September 53, and suppose that he spent the winter of 53-54 at least, and perhaps the whole of 54, in Corinth.

These considerations show that Peter went to Corinth between spring 54 and spring 55.

But we can advance still further, and establish a fair probability that the spring of 55 was the date of the visit. The visit was doubtless a short one. Its purpose was probably, as we have seen, simply inspection, and Peter was on his way to Rome.

Now the date of Peter's visit to Rome is assigned to A.D. 55 by Lactantius (?) *de mortibus persecutorum*, a work written in A.D. 313-315 and of good historical value. He says that the Apostles spent twenty-five years, down to the beginning of Nero's reign,² in laying the foundations of the Church; and that Peter came to Rome when Nero was already on the throne.³ The writer is indubitably count-

¹ Peter also would not cross the sea in winter, and could therefore not reach Corinth earlier than late spring A.D. 54.

² *Usque ad principium Neroniani imperii*, c. 2.

³ *Cumque iam Nero imperaret Petrus Romam advenit*: the *iam* implies *principium Neroniani imperii*.

ing from A.D. 30 as the date of the Crucifixion, to 55 as the arrival in Rome.

Dr. Erbes¹ would explain this date as due to a confusion with the false date 55 assigned by Eusebius for the arrival of Paul in Rome. He is convinced (just as we² are) that Eusebius made a blunder of five years in interpreting that Pauline date; but his theory that Lactantius (writing earlier than Eusebius) erred in the same way about the Pauline date and then transferred it to Peter is a very thin-spun hypothesis, such as some writers take for chronological reasoning.

We hold that Lactantius (?) goes back to a good Roman tradition, fixing the arrival of St. Peter in the summer of 55; and the late *Liber Pontificalis* (as Dr. Erbes says) gives the same year, "Peter entered Rome in the first consulship of Nero Cæsar."³ That the whole history of Peter in Rome has been confused and distorted by the false idea that the two Apostles were martyred on the same day is quite true; but the date 55 has the look of a real fragment of history, preserved in the Roman tradition.

L. NOTE ON THE DATE OF SECOND JOHN.

A query in reference to Prof. Rendel Harris's interesting note on the address of Second John in the EXPOSITOR for March may not be out of place here, since the forms and methods of epistolary communication are of the utmost importance in studying the Pauline letters. Prof. Harris has done so much real service in this line of work that he can well afford to make allowance, if we hesitate to go with him completely. That Second John is a real letter to a lady, we entirely agree with him; and we accept his inferences as to her family and position as highly probable and

¹ *Todestage Pauli und Petri*, p. 13f.

² See EXPOSITOR, Aug., 1900, p. 92 f.

³ *Petrus ingressus in urbe Roma Nerone Cesare I.*, i.e. A.D. 55.

almost certain. But we cannot think that he has made out his case as to the meaning of the address—"that *κυρία* is a term of endearment, and should be so translated: at the least it should be 'dear lady.' " He quotes *κυρία μου Σερηνία* from an Egyptian letter, where Messrs. Grenfell and Hunt render "my dear Serenia." But the endearment there lies in *μου* rather than in *κυρία*. Those who have been used to colloquial Greek in modern times will feel at once the difference between *κυρία* and *κυρία μου*.

The use of *κύριος* and *κυρία* in polite communication at that period seems to be exactly similar to the use of *dominus* in Latin. Prof. Harris quotes another Egyptian letter, where a man addresses his own brother as *κύριέ μου* and concludes that "the expression must be affectionate rather than official." We remember that Seneca speaks about his brother (towards whom he had a very warm feeling) as *dominus meus Gallio* (if my memory serves me right); and we find the two cases quite parallel. But Seneca would also speak of the reigning emperor as *dominus meus* or *dominus noster*. The truth is, perhaps, that *κύριος*, *κυρία*, and *dominus* in the language of polite society at that time were almost colourless terms, mere forms of courtesy, and just because they were colourless in themselves they were susceptible of taking the colour of the surrounding circumstances. They might be very respectful; and they might be used of one's nearest relations. But there seems to be in them no note of love or affection: that is given only through the addition of a personal pronoun. In another Egyptian letter a father writes to his son as *κυρίῳ μου*, but he also says *δέσποτά μου*, and speaks of his wife as *τὴν δεσποίνην μου*. As Prof. Harris himself allows, the father was "a stickler for proprieties"; and we must see elaborately polite forms in his letter.

In regard to this one detail we would ask if Prof.

Harris's argument might not be strengthened. But, apart from this little point, he has brought out very instructively and convincingly the early character of the Epistle. In the same number we have tried to prove a similarly early date for the Third Epistle, and, as he says, it "was written at the very same time as the Second."

LI. HAD PAUL SEEN JESUS? (IX. 1).

It is remarkable that Paul, here and in xv. 8, lays such stress on his having actually seen Jesus—evidently referring to the appearance of Jesus to him near Damascus—whereas two of the three accounts of that event in *Acts* contain no direct statement that he saw the person who spoke to him, and even suggest that he did not see.

In *Acts* ix. 4-8, there shone a light: Paul fell on the ground: he heard a voice: he arose from the earth: he found that he was blind. In xxii. 7, also, there shone a light: Paul fell to the ground: he heard a voice: he could not see, but had to be led. Taken alone, these two accounts would certainly suggest that Paul had only heard, but had not seen, the form. Yet in 1 *Corinthians* he twice claims to have seen and to be a witness to the risen Jesus.

Moreover, those two accounts represent the voice as saying to Paul, "Rise and go into the city"; and they certainly would suggest that his rising from the ground took place at the end of the vision, and was the first action resulting from it.

In *Acts* xxvi. 13-20, the account varies in some important details: there shone a light: all fell to the ground: Paul heard a voice: he was ordered to rise and stand on his feet: a longer address was then made to him, declaring the intentions of Jesus in appearing to his eyes,¹ and laying stress on

¹ ὡφθην σοι, in *Acts* xxvi. and 1 *Cor.* xv. 8, is not quite adequately rendered in the Revised Version by "appeared to thee." The Authorized Version has "was seen" in 1 *Cor.* and "appeared to thee" in *Acts*. For perfect accuracy we need "appeared to thy sight," an awkward phrase.

the fact that his work would be to bear witness of what he had seen ¹ and of the circumstances in which Jesus should in future be seen by him.

We see, then, that the author of *Acts* was quite aware that Paul claimed to have seen Jesus; and when we look more closely at the other accounts, we observe that in ix. 7 the men who were with him "stood speechless, hearing the voice but beholding no man." There is no point in saying that they saw nobody, unless Paul saw some one. Might we not infer from that incidental touch that Paul had seen? Yet how indirectly and briefly is the information given!

Similarly, in xxii. 14, Ananias reminds Paul of the vision that appeared to him, when he was chosen "to see the Righteous One, and to hear a voice from His mouth," and to be a witness of what he had seen and heard. Here again the information is given by the author, in this indirect way, through the mouth of Ananias. He knows it; but he omits in the primary narrative what is sufficiently given in the immediate sequel. He also reports in the briefest way the words addressed to Paul, omitting what seems to us to be of the greatest importance, but giving the words much more fully in another part of his book. Surely we may infer that the extreme brevity of the account in chap. ix. was compensated in the writer's plan by the fuller information which was to come in the report of Paul's speeches in xxii. and xxvi., *i.e.* in writing ix. he had before his mind xxii. and xxvi.

We see from this case how to interpret the much abbreviated narrative of the New Testament; we should never

¹ ὧν τε εἶδες in the immense majority of MSS., including \aleph A (but not B C), is defended by xxii. 15, *μάρτυς . . . ὧν ἑώρακας καὶ ἤκουσας*, and is rightly preferred by almost all modern editors (Tisch., Blass, Knowling, Meyer-Wendt, Baljou, etc.). WH. and Rendall follow B C*, ὧν τε εἶδες με, but the construction then is worse than rude, it is intolerable in a speaker like Paul. We can understand him being led on in a desire for balance and symmetry to add ὧν τε ὁφθῆσομαι σοι after *μάρτυρα ὧν τε εἶδες*, but not his saying *μάρτυρα ὧν τε εἶδες με*. The corruption arose through the straining after a supposed correspondence *εἶδες με* with *ὁφθῆσομαι σοι*.

too hastily infer that, because only certain words are recorded in the account of any incident, therefore nothing else of importance was known to the writer. A detail which on some occasions St. Paul regards as of primary importance is altogether omitted both by him on one occasion, and by his friend and admirer Luke, from the account of the incident; and the omission is so made that the narrative seems to leave no gap and no room for that detail, until we find elsewhere the more complete account; and when we have that, the whole action becomes clear.

It is necessary to insist on this important principle. Most of the difficulties in early Christian history arise from failure to catch the method of the narrative.

The New Testament books have none of the character of formal treatises composed at a later time by persons who look dispassionately over past history. They bear the stamp of the stress and emotion of actual conflict. The speaker or writer remembers so vividly the details which are at the moment necessary for his immediate purpose, that he leaves out or slurs quickly over other details, also important, yet not at the moment pressing on his attention.

We must also recognize the close relation between 1 *Corinthians* xv. 1-8 and the command in *Acts* xxii. 15, xxvi. 16, "be a witness of what thou hast seen." Paul quotes to the Corinthians all the testimony which proved that Jesus was not dead: he himself is the last witness: in giving his testimony he is acting in obedience to the instruction mentioned in those two passages of *Acts*.

Another variation in the accounts may be noticed here. In xxvi. 16-18 the order to preach to the Gentiles is given Paul in the vision. In xxii. 21 it is not given¹ till long afterwards in Jerusalem. In ix. 17 f. it is presumably reported by Ananias to Paul. This last account is specially remarkable. Ananias hears about Paul in a vision, receives

¹ Except in the general order, "to all men," xxii. 15.

a message to deliver to him, and is informed that Paul is chosen to preach to Gentiles and to Jews. He goes to Paul and gives him quite a different message, omitting the prophecy as to Paul's future preaching, but mentioning his vision by the way and his receiving of the Holy Spirit (neither of which is reported in Ananias's vision). It seems quite clear that the author intends us to combine what Ananias tells Paul with the account given of Ananias's vision, and to understand that all the combined details occurred in the vision, and then were all reported in full by Ananias to Paul.¹ But nothing is mentioned twice : there is no room in so abbreviated a work as the *Acts* for needless repetition.

But one thing comes out clear from the minute examination of the various accounts. While the commission to go to the Gentiles was given to Paul at the very beginning, it was not given in the same explicit, precise, unmistakable fashion as on a later occasion in Jerusalem (*Acts* xxii. 17 ff.), shortly before the beginning of his first missionary journey.² At first it was united with a commission to the Jews : ix. 15, xxvi. 20² (briefly, "to all men," xxii. 15). Paul did not gather from the first vision a clear conception of the nature of his mission as being specially to the Gentiles. He was for a long time firmly persuaded that his experiences and his known vehemence as an enemy to the Christians qualified him specially to persuade the Jews : when at last the commission to the Gentiles was given to him in clear, brief words, he even ventured to object, on the ground

¹ Beyond doubt Luke thought it unnecessary to relate that Ananias delivered the message. He tells of the message given to Ananias, and then of the meeting between Ananias and Saul. The rest is left to be inferred by the reader.

² xxvi. 17 and 20 furnish a good example of the general principle we are trying to illustrate. In v. 17 Paul is commissioned to the Gentiles ; but in 20 he goes, in obedience to the heavenly vision, to the people of Damascus, Jerusalem, and Judæa, "and also to the Gentiles" : showing conclusively that the vision gave him a general commission to all men, Jews and Gentiles.

that the Jews knew him as the persecutor, the murderer of Stephen (and therefore would believe his assurance that he had seen the living Christ).

After that definite commission Paul, in looking back to the first vision, perceived that the commission to the Gentiles was given even then, though he had not at the time recognized it.

Further, this shows probably that, in comparison to later visions, Paul's appreciation and memory of the first was more confused and blurred. That is only what must be regarded as natural. If some rare and exceptional men are so sensitive to that Divine nature which surrounds us and embraces us and breathes through us as to be occasionally able, in moments of special exaltation and heightened sensibility, to commune with it, that quality in them will be strengthened during their life, and they will become more able to stand before and to comprehend the Power which manifests itself to them.

W. M. RAMSAY.

SCIENTIFIC LIGHTS ON RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS.

IV.

OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM.

THERE have been two extreme estimates of the present world—that of the Chinaman and that of the Indian. The Chinese view is rose-coloured. It regards Man as already among the celestials—in the enjoyment of social laws which are so perfect as to admit of neither repeal nor modification. The Indian view, on the other hand, is sombre, nay, it is dark. It looks upon this world as an absolute delusion—a series of dream-pictures or false appearances which lure the soul into temptation and debar it from its native rest.

These nations represent two sections of humanity—the

Optimist and the Pessimist. Every land on earth has reproduced the tendencies of the Chinaman and the Hindu. There are some to whom this world is the best possible world ; there are others to whom any form of life is a form of misery. And between these two views—the theory of a Leibnitz and the theory of a Schopenhauer—there is this in common, that they are equally paralysing to progress. He who looks upon the world as a sunlit hill of God, and he who looks upon the world as a hopeless vale of tears, are, if they are logical, bound to be unprogressive. Nothing can be progressive but hope ; either perfect light or blank despair must compel us to stand still. Neither China nor India has exhibited a movement from within. Their opposing tendencies have converged to the same result—stagnation. The man who feels himself to be at the top of the hill and the man who feels himself to be enclosed in the vale are alike under the influence of a mental paralysis. Both are impeded from going forward. The one is arrested by too much light ; the other is hindered by too much darkness. The cause of progress demands something intermediate. Neither Optimism nor Pessimism can make a civilization. Paul says, “ We are saved by hope.” He means “ by twilight ”—as distinguished from cloudlessness on the one hand and from raylessness on the other. To the building up of every kingdom—the kingdom of God included—there is required something different either from the sense of fulness or from the sense of emptiness—something which is best described as a bow in the cloud. We are led up, not by the sense of want, not by the sense of repletion, but by the sense of imperfection—the perception that we possess *one* half and that the other is not there. It is a perception, partially sad, partially comforting, wholly stimulative—more stimulative than would have been either the full possession or the absolute deprivation of the object.

The truth is, Optimism and Pessimism are alike and

equally founded on an unscientific view of the universe. They both assume that the formation of the world is already completed. In pronouncing it perfectly good and in pronouncing it wholly bad, they each take for granted that the structure is finished. Now, the conception of modern science is exactly the contrary. It is precisely the difference between the doctrine of Creation and the doctrine of Evolution. The Creationist says that the works were finished from the beginning; the Evolutionist says that they are not finished yet. To the one the temple is a completed structure; to the other it is only in the act of building. To the one the seventh day with its rest obliterates the six days of toil; to the other the six days of toil conceal the possibility of a seventh day of rest. In the one system, so far as Nature is concerned, God's attitude is only that of retrospect—there is a yesterday but no to-morrow; in the other God has both a yesterday and a to-morrow—something done and something yet to do. The God of Evolution is not, like the God of Creation, standing at the *end* of a process; He is engaged in the process. The Sabbath has not yet come; the final stone is wanting to the building. And the absence of the final stone makes a criticism of the whole impossible. The drama is proceeding; the chapters are being written; we cannot in the meantime expect to see perfection. It is not merely that so humble a being as Man is inadequate to grasp the whole; that is the old mode of putting it. But according to the new science the whole is not *there*. The Spirit of Nature has not completed its own environment. Nature itself is but a part of what it *will* be. It is not full-grown. It is a child—a child of promise, it may be—but none the less short of its ripest development. Even faith has no right to call itself already perfect.

If, then, we adopt the standpoint of modern science the question must take a new form. We shall no longer ask

whether this is the best possible or the worst possible world. The Cosmos is not completed, and therefore it cannot have reached either its best or its worst. But the form which the question will assume in our age of Evolution will be this, Are the stages of Nature good *after their kind*? The writer of Ecclesiastes says that God has made all things good "in their time." He means, "up to the *measure* of their time." Winter, for example, is not the fulness of the year; yet the provision which Nature makes for the wants of winter may be a beneficent adaptation—the most beneficent which the circumstances allow. This is the only Optimism which the process of Evolution admits of. When the process is finished we may look for more; but as long as it is incomplete the utmost which can be expected is that each stage of life shall be happy up to its measure.

Now, the question is, Is this the condition of *our* world? Have the stages of Evolution known to us been stages of beneficence proportionate to the capacity? Some say Yes, some No. But the point to which at present I wish to limit myself is one which does not involve a direct yes or no. I wish to ask whether the doctrine of Evolution has or has not added to the difficulty of an affirmative answer. There is a widespread impression abroad that this doctrine has thrown a dark shade over Nature. We have come to persuade ourselves that the beneficence of Nature was more apparent in the old régime than it is in the new. We look back to the ages of mechanical design as the halcyon days of theology—the days when God seemed more pitiful and Nature less severe. We talk as if the belief in Evolution had given a blow to our estimate of the Divine benevolence. We think of our forefathers as having lived under a sweet delusion—a delusion to which, if possible, we would fain return. We contemplate the skies under which we dwell as the revealers of a sterner message—a message which has

broken our trust in the Divine tenderness and turned the smile of the universe into a frown.

I venture to say that the reverse is true. There have always been difficulties in the problem of Divine providence both in the old system and in the new ; but in no case that I know of has the difficulty *originated* with the new. Evolution has taken its dark shades as an heirloom ; it has received them from the shadows of the past night. I do not believe it has added a single difficulty of its own. But be this as it may, it is quite certain that it has detracted from *previous* difficulties. The influence of the doctrine of Evolution in relation to the past has been the influence of a sunbeam upon a cloud ; it has helped to clear up much that was dark, to soften much that had the air of harshness. Take, for example, the great fact of Death. That remains in all systems. But in that of Evolution it is softened. Death is here not only a part of the *process*, but an inevitable part of the *progress*. The system of Evolution could not live unless from time to time one guest left the table to make room for another. In all systems Death is a *fact* ; here it is a benefit—a condition essential to the achievement of life's ideal. And then, here as nowhere else, Death has lost the character of Death ; it has revealed itself as change. In Evolution nothing ends ; things are simply transformed. Every end is a beginning. The forces which are spent by one object pass into another. It cannot be said of these forces that they have ceased to have a share in the work beneath the sun. In point of fact they pursue that work. The Force which existed in Alexander, in Caesar, in Napoleon, is at the present moment as operative as ever. That is the manner in which the doctrine of Evolution teaches us to think of the effect of Death, and it is a manner *peculiar* to Evolution. The previous systems magnified *Matter* and saw Death as a material decay. But to the Evolutionist there is nothing real but Force, and to

him Force is imperishable. Death is not a *decay* of Force; it is a mode of Force, a change of Force. Death does not diminish the sum of the world's energies. The amount of energy that exists in Nature now will not be affected by individual deaths; it will abide constant, invariable in quantity—the same yesterday and to-day and forever.

Let us take another point of illustration. Let us take the element of apparent waste in Nature. The common idea is that this appearance of waste in Nature has been mainly emphasized by the doctrine of Evolution. In truth it has been lessened by that doctrine. In all systems it has been a recognized fact that in the development of species only a few out of myriad seeds are utilized; the one has been taken for active service, and the many have been left. But the peculiarity of the system of Evolution is that it has *mitigated* the appearance of waste which the other systems reveal. It has mitigated this appearance by reason of its own theory. It tells us that the rejected seeds have not been in vain, that they have served a purpose ere they have passed away. It tells us that but for them the accepted seeds would not have been accepted. The survivors in the race owe their power of survival to the very seeds which they have beaten, for it is by the fight they have been made fit and it is by the struggle they have been made strong. Evolution denies all accident. Everything that has ever existed, whether it has been accepted or rejected in the race of development, has been included in the plan of Nature and has influenced that plan. According to the teaching of Evolution the myriad seeds which have been rejected have been as essential to the constituting of the present universe as the favoured ones which have been selected to carry on the process. The omission of any one of them from the original scheme of creation would have modified that scheme. So speaks the doctrine of Evolution. What do its words amount to? If they mean anything at

all, they can mean nothing less than this, that there is not and never has been any waste in Nature, that all physical forms have fulfilled a destiny, and that in relation to the universal organism no product of the world's forces has been a useless thing.

I will take a third illustration of the manner in which the doctrine of Evolution has softened the harshness of previous systems. It shall be from the field of animal life. Some years ago an eminent naturalist, who was also a clergyman and who had been bred in the old theology, sent out letters to some of his clerical brethren couched in the same terms. The words I need not record; but, as I was one of the privileged individuals, I can reproduce the substance. The writer of the epistle offered his blessing to any one who should relieve his mind of the agony it suffered from the impression of religious doubt created within him by certain facts of Nature. These facts can be summarized under two classes—the existence of organisms endowed with weapons of death, and the existence of organisms endowed with implements stimulative to lust. Here is an indictment against the God of Nature based on facts of the animal life! How are we to meet this indictment? We cannot gainsay the statement on which it is based. We cannot deny that there are creatures endowed with weapons of destruction; we cannot dispute that there are organisms which have implements whose function is lustful. Is there any escape from the imputation of an unrighteous act to the God of Nature, or from that agony of mind which to us as to the writer of the letter such a conclusion must bring?

Yes, there is such an escape; but, strangely enough, it comes through an aperture which is popularly regarded as the door into the prison. The escape comes through the doctrine of Evolution itself. The writer of the letter got his difficulties from the theory of *Creation*. According to the

theory of Creation these weapons of death and these implements of license were originally made by God. But Evolution steps forward and says that originally they were not made at all, and at no time were fashioned by *God*. It tells us that these instruments are an effect, not a cause. They are the result of previous tendencies in the animal nature—the tendency to live by preying and the tendency to propagate the species. If you want to find a ground of religious difficulty, it must be sought in the previous tendencies and not in the subsequent result. The so-called unrighteous instruments of the animal world are the effects of education—the education elicited by the environment. They have grown by the practising of an endowment previously existing, just as the power of hand and foot expands by exercise. The whole question is, What has been the nature of the exercise which has developed these instruments? If there is any indictment to be drawn up it must be there. The writer of the letter begins too late in his inquiry. A sword which has been sharpened may do much future mischief; and yet it may have been originally sharpened in a good cause. Let us go behind the instruments; let us appeal to the tendencies which gave them being. Let us take the two impulses from which these maligned structures have proceeded. Let us examine them calmly, dispassionately, without partiality and without prejudice. If they have been bad the instruments will not be sanctified by the fact that they have been only evolved, not created; if on the other hand they have been either good or indifferent the growth of these instruments will not impugn the righteousness of God.

First, then, the weapons of death have been formed and sharpened by the hereditary practice of preying. What is this practice? In what tendency of the animal nature does it originate? Does it come from a passion of wanton cruelty? No; it proceeds from an impulse which I can only

describe as anti-vegetarian. We hear a great deal in the animal world about "Nature red in tooth and claw." Yet we do not apply the quotation to the similar deeds of Man. Man preys upon the life of certain animals just as certain animals prey upon the life of their own kind. We kill and eat. We hook alive the fish of the sea. We hunt in the forest. We shoot birds of the air.¹ Why do we never speak of "*Man* red in tooth and claw"? Because, you say, we have found that the use of animal food is salutary. Exactly; and why should not the instinct of the lower creatures be allowed to come to the same conclusion! If animal food is salutary for the man why should it not be salutary for the animal itself! We refer the *human* act, not to cruel passion, but to rational judgment. Why should we not refer the *animal* act, not to cruel passion, but to *instinctive* judgment! No one would think it impious to say that some animals were intended to be food for Man. No one would think it impious to say that to ratify this purpose Man was allowed to sacrifice the life of these animals. Why not transfer the sentiment to the beast of prey! Why should *its* deed be any greater indication of ferocity than the carnage committed by Man! The latter is confessedly a more deliberate act than the former; if there is *any* "redness in tooth and claw" the balance would seem to lie on the *human* side. There is in my opinion no necessity whatever for imputing malevolent instincts to the lower creation. I admit the preying element both in the animal and in the human kingdom; I would only claim for the former, in the light of that affinity of species which Evolution discloses, the same interpretation of the facts which is by common consent accorded to the latter.

Again. The other class of tabooed implements possessed

¹ Doubtless these human sports were originally utilitarian acts limited to the search for food.

by certain organisms is the result of another hereditary tendency—the instinct for the propagation of species. What is this tendency? It is the most distinctive purpose which Nature reveals. There is nothing on earth for which Nature makes such provision as the reproduction of life. Other things seem to be subsidiary; this is her central aim. It is also, in the light of Evolution, a noble aim. The purpose of Nature revealed in Evolution is a *selective* process. It is not the multiplication of life haphazard; it is the choosing of types fitted to survive. As I said in one of the previous studies, Nature is engaged in carving the perfect form. It is for this end she amplifies the facilities for reproduction. It is for this end she gives every scope for sexual selection. She is working out the development of an individual form which shall represent all beauty and unite all power. Not to favour licentious passion does she seek the propagation of species. She seeks it, not for what it does, but for what it will bring. Throughout this physical process the goal to which she is working is a spiritual goal; she is aiming at the emergence of a life which shall be worthy to represent the universe. This is the end which sanctifies the means. It would have been a very different matter if the propagation of species had led nowhere. That would have indicated a lawless passion at the heart of the universe, would have constrained us to doubt the purity of the Spirit of Nature. But if, as Evolution affirms, the propagation of species is a search for higher things, if with each new diffusion of life the higher thing comes nearer, if every step of the process renders existence more noble, if the work is crowned before our sight by the emergence of a human soul, we feel that the seeming license has been on the lines of virtue, and that under the guise of passion Nature has been pursuing a path of rigid law.

From these combined considerations I think I am en-

titled to say that the phase of science current in our time has mitigated the religious difficulties which were read on the page of Nature by the followers of the old régime. It seems a strange conjunction—Evolution and Hope! These are stars which we should not expect to come together. We associate a bright view of the world with life's *unscientific* time—the age of youth. We speak of the *Optimism* of youth, the sanguineness of youth, the dreams of youth. We intend to convey the impresssion of intellectual pity. We express a judgment that the testimony of youth is of no value because it precedes all experience; we reject the morning roses just because they have been *gathered* in the morning. We call the testimony of the morning the voice of poetry, and we oppose it to the voice of science as the fanciful to the real. But has it ever struck us that the strongest support of Optimism is just the fact that it *is* greatest in youth! Whence does youth get its Optimism? It cannot be from personal knowledge, for its knowledge of life is to come; why should it tend to look up rather than down? I answer, The uplifted glance of youth comes from that very principle of Evolution which is supposed to be its counterpoise. It has no personal experience, but it has a vast ancestral experience. We must never forget that there is an ancestral memory. I come into the world an heir to personal experiences which were never mine; I wander by the side of a stream which has been long flowing. The bent which my youth receives is a hereditary bent. I have the blood of myriad human ancestors; I have the blood of myriad animal ancestors. All the testimonies of the past are within me. The generations of my fellow men are there; the wild beasts of the forest are there; the birds of the sky are there. The land in which I open my eyes is already ringing with echoes of vanished voices. Not without experience do I begin my earthly way.

But if in this beginning I tend to sing rather than to sigh,

if at the dawn of life's morning my accents are those of gladness rather than of gloom, how is this to be explained? Can it be otherwise accounted for than as the testimony of heredity to the balance of joy over grief! If you once concede the position that the age of youth is habitually the age of hope, you are driven into the other position that throughout the past ages hope has prevailed. Before you sneer at the Optimism of youth I would have you remember that the Optimism of manhood rests on no such solid basis. The songs of manhood are the result of its personal successes—of the sunshine I have individually experienced, of the triumphs I have individually won. But the songs of youth have no such origin; they are antecedent to personal fortune. And for that very reason they mean more, their testimony is more worth having. Theirs is the testimony of the past. They express the sum of common experience. If I am born with an instinct rather of joy than of grief I bring to the world a message from its yesterday; I prove that for one circle at least the gold dominates over the grey. If the inventory of present life should lead to the conclusion that the majority of the human race have shared in this experience—in other words, if the Optimism of youth be not only a phrase but a fact, we shall receive from the voice of a transmitted instinct the surest possible evidence for the predominance of happiness on the earth.

G. MATHESON.

BAPTISM FOR THE DEAD.

(1 CORINTHIANS XV. 19.)

THE object of this note is to point out that "baptism for the dead" in a literal sense is not in itself an improbable custom nor even in the circumstances of those days wholly unjustifiable; that St. Paul's words are best explained by the existence of such a custom; and that a right apprehen-

sion of the custom in question will account for its entire disappearance from the Church and even from the memory of succeeding generations, and consequently for the difficulty of interpretation which ensued.

Without reviewing at length the various explanations of the passage we venture to affirm generally that none of those interpretations which reject the literal meaning of "baptizing for the dead" would have been given unless the existence of such a custom had been deemed inconceivable, or at least open to very grave objection. Canon T. Evans, for instance, who in a very able note argues against the more obvious interpretation of the words, alludes to the custom as "a monstrous superstition," and Prof. Milligan speaks of it as "grotesque, superstitious and absurd" (*The Resurrection of the Dead*, p. 88).

The explanations based on such preconceived opinions are often forced and alien to the directness and simplicity of the language in which St. Paul expresses his arguments in the rest of the chapter. One interpretation indeed reached by a change in punctuation possesses some plausibility. By placing a note of interrogation after "baptized" as well as after "dead" it is possible to render the words "What shall they do which are baptized? Is it for their dead (bodies) that they are baptized? If the dead are not raised at all why then are they baptized for them?"

Canon T. Evans however (*Speaker's Commentary*, ad. loc. and in an additional note) accepts the rendering "for the dead" (A.V. and R.V.) as one which, "rightly understood is good and may well be retained." But he proceeds to give an interpretation to the preposition "for" (ὕπέρ) and to "the dead" (τῶν νεκρῶν), which is certainly not obvious and on the surface. We need hardly say that an accomplished scholar like Canon Evans is right in affirming that the preposition ὕπέρ signifies not only "in behalf of," but also "on account of, with an interest in, concerning,

with a view to," etc. Compare among other instances cited by Blass (*Grammar of New Testament Greek*, p. 135, Eng. Trans.) 2 Corinthians viii. 25, εἴτε ὑπὲρ Τίτου ("as concerning"): xii. 8, ὑπὲρ τούτου παρεκάλεσα: 2 Corinthians i. 6, ὑπὲρ τῆς ὑμῶν παρακλήσεως, "to," "with a view to." What we have to say is that any of these renderings might be accepted in this passage, and that no one of them is incompatible with a very literal interpretation of it.

But where we venture to differ from Canon Evans is not in the extended use of the preposition but in the extension of meaning which he gives to the words "the dead" (τῶν νεκρῶν). "Both context and circumstance," he says, "together proclaim that the ulterior view of a neophyte's mind bending over the long roll or class of the dead is their *resurrection*." So that with Theophylact and other Greek Fathers he expounds the phrase "for the dead" as "with an interest in the resurrection of the dead," or even "in expectation of the resurrection." Theophylact indeed paraphrases the words thus: τί δὲ ὅλως καὶ βαπτίζονται ἄνθρωποι ὑπὲρ ἀναστάσεως, τουτέστιν ἐπὶ προσδοκίᾳ ἀναστάσεως εἰ νεκροὶ οὐκ ἐγείρονται. In view of such a paraphrase we are tempted to ask—If this was indeed the meaning of the Apostle why did he not use those words or words as clear and unambiguous? If the reading in the text had been "with a view to the resurrection" (ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀναστάσεως) there would have been no difficulty or controversy in relation to this much disputed phrase. But what we doubt is that Theophylact's paraphrase is a true representation of St. Paul's words.

Indeed if St. Paul's argument at this point were drawn from Christian baptism only the words "for the dead" or even "for the resurrection" would have been superfluous to sustain it. "Why then are men baptized if the dead rise not?" would be a sufficient argument as it stands, for of course baptism has a relation to a future life and

implies a resurrection. But St. Paul had a purpose in adding "for the dead." And the natural inference is that there is an allusion to a special usage in baptism.

What that usage was may be conjectured from the circumstances of the Corinthian Church at the time. It was of course an infant Church consisting entirely of recent converts from Judaism and the various pagan cults. As yet there was no such thing as hereditary Christianity. To become a Christian was to break from the traditions of family and race. And to accept Christian privileges, union with Christ, a partaking of the Divine nature and a certain hope of an immortal life was to accept privileges from which many of those who were nearest and dearest to them had been debarred by death. But the new converts had been taught that Christ had died for all men. He had died for the dead and the living alike, for parents or brethren or friends whom they had lost, Jew or pagan though they were.

And as the Christian converts knew that only through union with Christ could their dead who were living enter upon the full enjoyment of immortal life a passionate desire would arise that all who with them had "waited for the consolation of Israel" or who in paganism had been "seekers after God" should be brought into that union and share with them the joy of the resurrection in Christ. They had been led to believe that the Lord would come "quickly"—the moment of the *parousia* was close at hand, there seemed therefore to be an immediate prospect of rejoining the friends whom they had recently lost. And it was an agonizing thought that anything should separate them from the loved companionship. How then, the new converts might reason, could their departed friends so like-minded with themselves, so prepared to receive Christ if that had been possible, how could they be brought into covenant with Him? Only by baptism as far as they knew.

Could they not then be sponsors for these dead friends living, as they knew they were, by the power of the resurrection? Could they not answer for their faith as they answered for their unconscious babes in baptism? It was only one step further to ask—could they not be baptized for them? Such we may imagine to ourselves was the train of thought which led on to “baptism for the dead.” We must remember that the revelation of immortality or incorruptibility (*ἀφθαρσία*) through the gospel, the certainty that departed friends were living, must have had an overwhelming effect on the first converts which it is difficult for us fully to realize. In the light of that revealed and certified truth all kinds of possibilities would present themselves. No limits could be set to the far-reaching power of this resurrection. And if the means of realizing ardent hopes was erroneous, it was at least human and pathetic; and however questionable in itself the usage implied belief in the future life, in the resurrection of the dead, in the efficacy of the resurrection of Christ and in the value of baptism.

Nor must it be forgotten that the thought of substitution lies at the root of Christian doctrine, and that therefore there would be no objection *in limine* for a Christian believer to the teaching that a vicarious act of love and piety might benefit those on whose behalf it was wrought.

It is natural to suppose that thoughts and uses would spring into existence under the first impulse of the proved fact of the resurrection which could not be permanently sanctioned by the Church and would pass with a changed condition of things and in the face of a more settled doctrine. Among these besides “baptism for the dead” may be reckoned “speaking with tongues” and exorcism, and that ceremonial unction by presbyters described in St. James v. 14.

When we come to consider St. Paul’s relation to this

usage, supposing it to exist, it may be observed that the change from the third person in *v.* 29 to the first person in *v.* 30 implies that the Apostle does not associate himself with the belief which was possibly local and confined to a small group of Christians in Corinth. The form of the expression *οἱ βαπτιζόμενοι ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν* appears to indicate a party distinguished from the general body of the Church. It is true that St. Paul bases one part of his argument on the usage. The very intensity of belief in the resurrection which the custom implied would make an appeal to it more telling. The belief itself was vital though the custom which grew out of it may have been inexpedient or even indefensible. But may not this have been a case where, if excision was needed, it was expedient to carry it out tenderly and without precipitation? May it not have been a point on which the Apostle hesitated to speak authoritatively at once?

Here indeed it may be noted that even at this day there is far from being agreement in Christendom as to the relations between the living and the departed who are in Paradise.

In any case the custom, limited as we conceive it to be, would vanish with the condition of things which made it possible. It would have no place in the generation which followed. In the second century indeed we have traces of vicarious baptism practised by certain heretical sects, a custom possibly founded on these words of St. Paul, but one which is according to our theory to be entirely dissociated from the primitive usage, the existence of which we infer from this passage.

We may add that it was in all probability the use of vicarious baptism by the Marcionites that induced the Greek Fathers to give an interpretation to this celebrated passage which would lend no support to a custom entirely discredited by the Church.

But a further objection has been made. It has been said—How could an argument founded on “baptism for the dead” be efficacious as against persons who denied the resurrection? To this it may be answered that with absolute unbelievers no argument derived from baptism would have weight; but the whole of the Apostle’s reasoning in this chapter is directed rather to confirm and warn the wavering than to refute the unbelieving.

We ought not perhaps to conclude this paper without referring to Prof. Milligan’s interpretation of the passage. According to this scholar “the dead” are the Christian dead who are at rest but still awaiting the completed victory of Christ. Every one therefore who is baptized and suffers for Christ, helping as he does to fill up the number of the elect, hastens the coming of Christ and the consummation of the bliss of His saints, and in this sense is baptized for the benefit or advantage of the dead in Christ. St. Paul’s thought here is, he says, substantially the same as that which he expresses when writing to the Colossians—“Now I rejoice in my sufferings for your sake, and fill up on my part that which is lacking of the afflictions of Christ in my flesh for His body’s sake which is the Christ” (Col. i. 24).

Expressed very briefly our objections to this exposition are—(1) that Prof. Milligan imposes on βαπτίζόμενοι a wider meaning than it can bear in this passage when he includes in it the thought of the trials and sufferings then inseparable from the Christian profession. (2) Although no doubt each Christian baptism does or may contribute to the completion of the number of the elect, still it cannot be regarded as a prominent thought or one usually present to the minds of the candidates for baptism as a motive. (3) The thought does not add to the force of St. Paul’s argument, which would have been equally strong without the addition of “for the dead.” (4) If the thought of suffering

be brought into this clause the argument is substantially identical with that which follows.

In conclusion we do not find any of the interpretations offered for the solution of this passage entirely convincing or satisfactory. There are none which do not more or less convey the impression of "explaining away." And on the other hand the existence of a practice to which the most literal and obvious interpretation points is neither so improbable or so indefensible as most commentators have supposed. At any rate the words stand written without any question of authenticity, demanding a solution: *si quid novisti rectius | istis candidus imperti, si non, his utere mecum.*

ARTHUR CARR.

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

V.

IMMORTALITY IN MODERN THEOLOGY (*continued*).

IN my last paper I quoted and discussed writers who either maintained with more or less confidence, or did not explicitly and conspicuously protest against, the traditional doctrine of the endless permanence of all human souls. I shall now refer to two other recent writers who, while differing greatly from those quoted above, yet maintain the same traditional doctrine; and shall then quote some other writers who protest strongly against it.

Dr. Welldon, bishop of Calcutta, in his interesting volume on *The Hope of Immortality*, endeavours to say something for the immortality of the soul without appealing to the Bible. But he is not very sure of his ground. For, on p. 3, he writes: "I do not aspire to prove Immortality but to make it probable." His doubt is far-reaching. For, on p. 5, he says: "No historical fact is certain."

And he fears (see p. 10) that his book may leave his readers "in some uncertainty"; a probable consequence which, strange to say, he does not regret.

Dr. Welldon defines clearly, on p. 57, the opinion he endeavours to make probable. "The soul is immortal, i.e. everlasting. It does not merely survive death; it survives everlastingly. It survives in virtue of the character which distinguishes it from all that is dissoluble and destructible." Again, on p. 63 he writes: "The soul which lives after death is not only spiritual but emotional and rational. It is the whole immaterial part of man. It survives and survives eternally in the fulness of its intellectual, moral, and spiritual powers."

The third chapter on "The Value of the Belief," is an able and beautiful statement of the moral worth of a belief that beyond the grave endless reward awaits the righteous. In chaps. iv. and v. the writer adduces the evidences, external and internal, for immortality. Unfortunately, in so doing, he omits, as outside the scope of his work, the one ground on which the Christian hope rests securely, viz. the promise of life in Christ Jesus with its historical and experimental credentials. This omission is most serious. For Dr. Welldon's book leaves the impression that this hope rests only on what he admits to be the uncertain grounds here adduced. Whenever these outlying proofs are brought forward, they ought to be supplemented by the more solid proof given to us in Christ. The evidence adduced is halting and uncertain. So far as it goes it affords a probability that man will survive death. And this survival the writer accepts as proof or presumption of the truth of his main thesis, viz. that all human souls will, in virtue of their nature, survive for ever; thus confounding survival with endless survival.

The last chapter discusses "The Christian Amplification of the Belief in Immortality." Like some other writers,

Dr. Welldon says: "Christianity does not prove immortality. It assumes immortality; or to speak exactly, it breathes a spiritual atmosphere in which the assumption of immortality is felt to be natural or even necessary." This is a terrible understatement. For Christ and His Apostles asserted again and again in plainest language that eternal life awaits all who put faith in Him: and in proof of this assertion God raised Him from the dead. Consequently the Christian hope of immortality rests, not on the uncertain grounds adduced in this book, but on the sure word of our risen Lord.

On p. 342 we read: "Of Hell, as it is called, and of the disciplinary process to which unhallowed souls are subjected when this life is ended, it is impossible to form a conception save through the contrast in which it stands to the beatific state; for it has not been the will of God to reveal more than its mere shadowy outline." Dr. Welldon suggests the hope that "when the soul stands at the judgment-bar, the misery of sin, the pain of loss, the burning sense of all that might have been and yet is not and may never be, above all the ever present consciousness of alienation from Him to whom man's spiritual being tends unceasingly, will be an agony so sharp and subtle as to extort an exceeding bitter cry for the pardon and peace of Heaven."

Although Dr. Weldon asserts, e.g. on p. 349, that "immortality is the inalienable prerogative of man," his essay affords fair presumptive proof that this is not taught in the Bible; which is my contention in these papers. What degree of probability he has claimed for his assertion, his readers will judge.

The last book to which I shall refer, as defending the immortality of the soul, is a most attractive and in many respects excellent volume on *Christian Theology* recently published by an American theologian, Dr. W. N. Clarke.

He asserts, on p. 192, that "MAN IS IMMORTAL, that is to say, the human personality is undying. The spirit is the person, and what is here affirmed is that the human spirit, with its essential powers in which it resembles God, is destined to live on endlessly. A human being will never cease to be a human being." But, for this statement, he does not quote Holy Scripture. On p. 198 he writes: "The influence of Jesus certainly has supported in Christians the conviction that all men live for ever; for among Christians this belief has been held, with only occasional variations, not merely as a natural conviction but as a Christian certainty. Christ does not affirm in so many words that all men live for ever, but He powerfully teaches it by His attitude and mode of appeal to men."

On pp. 450-453 Dr. Clarke refers to the doctrine of conditional immortality; but without approval. He denies a bodily return of Christ and a judgment at the end of the world. So p. 458: "If the coming of Christ is conceived as spiritual, not visible, and as a process, not an event, a change in one's idea of the resurrection will necessarily follow. If no visible descent of Christ is looked for, no simultaneous resurrection of humanity on the earth will be expected. If we accept the view of Christ's coming that has been expressed on previous pages, we shall naturally think that each human being's resurrection takes place at his death, and consists in the rising of the man from death to life in another realm of life. . . . According to this view resurrection is not simultaneous for all, but continuous, or successive; and for no human being is there any intervening period of disembodiment." How far removed this teaching is from that of the New Testament, I have in my volume on *The Last Things* endeavoured to show.

In his discussion of final destinies, on pp. 474-480, Dr. Clarke expresses a hope that for most or for all men there

may be probation and salvation beyond the grave. On p. 477 he reminds us that "there are passages in the New Testament in which there seems to be hope that God will yet gain the love and devotion of all souls. There arises also the question whether God would not be just so far defeated if an endless dualism were established in His universe by the endless sway of sin over a part of His intelligent creatures. From such considerations comes the hope of many that God will finally bring all souls from sin to holiness." So on p. 478: "It is hard to believe that God indefinitely perpetuates suffering that is not useful."

These two volumes, by Bishop Welldon and Dr. Clarke, reveal the natural tendency of the doctrine of the immortality of all human souls. They who believe that to every man God has given an intelligence which, whatever he may do, will for an endless succession of ages know and feel, may well be pardoned if they cherish a hope that this perishable gift will be to him, not an endless curse, but ultimately an endless blessing. Thus, as with Origen in the third century, so with many now, Plato's doctrine of the immortality of the soul has been the parent of a doctrine of universal salvation. They also illustrate the danger involved in adding to the theology of the Church, even in the supposed interests of the Christian life, doctrines not taught in the Bible. We have no right to go beyond the plain and abundant teaching of the Sacred Book. And, to do so, is perilous in the extreme.

To sum up. Of six modern works quoted in my last paper and in this, not one attempts to prove from the Bible, although some of them endeavour to prove in other ways, or assume without proof, the endless permanence of all human souls. This affords a presumption hardly distinguishable from certainty that this doctrine is not directly or indirectly taught in the Holy Scriptures. And in a matter pertaining altogether to the unseen world, other

proof is worthless. It may therefore be dismissed as no part of the gospel of Christ.

The most conspicuous protest in our time against the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, in the sense of the endless survival of all human souls, is that made by the Rev. Edward White in his *Life in Christ*, published in 1875, a third edition revised and enlarged in 1877. This bold protest rendered great service by claiming a reconsideration of the whole subject. It was, however, in my view, weakened by the writer's endeavour to prove that the Bible teaches the ultimate extinction of the lost, thus himself going, as I think, beyond the teaching of Holy Scripture in another direction. Mr. White's book also lies open to objection on sundry matters of detail. But, in spite of all this, it remains a most honourable protest against prevalent and popular error.

The teaching of Mr. White is ably supported by Dr. E. Petavel, of Lausanne, in a very useful volume entitled *The Problem of Immortality*.

A very remarkable and valuable protest against the same doctrine is found in Gladstone's *Studies subservient to the works of Bishop Butler*. On p. 142 the writer calls attention to the two meanings frequently confused or identified (e.g. by Bishop Welldon quoted above) of the phrase *immortality of the soul*, viz. its survival of death or its endless survival. He points out that Butler's argument in chap. i. of his *Analogy* "is a plea not for immortality, properly so called, but for persistence of life as against the special occasion of death. . . . There are those who say these two things, survival and immortality, are but one; and who seem to suppose that the case of surmounting death is like that of obtaining a passport which will carry us over the frontier of some foreign country; where, this once done, we have no other impediment to apprehend. But, on such an

assumption of the identity of survival with immortality, it is to be observed that it is a pure assumption, and nothing more. We have no title to postulate *in limine* that powers, which may be so adjusted or equipped as to face the contingency of death, must therefore be in all respects such as to be certain of facing with a like impunity every other contingency which, for aught we know, the dimness of the future may enfold in its ample bosom. Such questions may remain open, and without prejudice for independent discussion."

Mr. Gladstone denies strongly, and again and again, that the Bible ever teaches, in the proper sense of the phrase, the immortality of the soul. So, on p. 198: "Another consideration of the highest importance is that the natural immortality of the soul is a doctrine wholly unknown to the Holy Scriptures, and standing on no higher plane than that of an ingeniously sustained, but gravely and formidably contested, philosophical opinion. And surely there is nothing, as to which we ought to be more on our guard, than the entrance into the precinct of Christian doctrine, either without authority or by an abuse of authority, of philosophical speculations disguised as truths of Divine Revelation. They bring with them a grave restraint on mental liberty; but what is worse is, that their basis is a pretension essentially false, and productive by rational retribution of other falsehoods. Under these two heads, we may perhaps find that we have ample warrant for declining to accept the tenet of natural immortality as a truth of Divine Revelation."

Contrast this plain statement, which, if untrue, may be disproved by one quotation from the Bible, with the equivocal language quoted in these papers of mine from writers who assert, or assume, or do not deny, the doctrine in question.

The venerable statesman denies that this doctrine was

taught in the earliest age of the Church. So on p. 184 : "The secret of this mental freedom, the condition which made it possible, was the absence from the scene of any doctrine of a natural immortality inherent to the soul. Absent it may be termed, for all practical purposes, until the third century ; for though it was taught by Tertullian in connexion with the Platonic ideas, it was not given forth as belonging to the doctrine of Christ or His Apostles. . . . It seems to me as if it were from the time of Origen that we are to regard the idea of natural, as opposed to that of Christian, immortality as beginning to gain a firm foothold in the Christian Church." This is an important confirmation of my third paper.

On p. 189 we read : "It seems indisputable that the materials for the opinion that the soul is by nature immortal, whether we call it dogma or hypothesis, were for a long period in course of steady accumulation ; though this was not so from the first. After some generations, however, the mental temper and disposition of Christians inclined more and more to its reception. Without these assumptions it would be impossible to account for the wholesale change which has taken place in the mind of Christendom with regard to the subject of natural immortality. It would be difficult, I think, to name any other subject connected with religious belief (though not properly belonging to it) on which we can point to so sweeping and absolute a revolution of opinion, from the period before Origen, when the idea of an immortality properly natural was unknown or nearly hidden, to the centuries of the later Middle Ages and of modern time, when, at least in the West, it had become practically undisputed and universal.

In further agreement with my third paper, Mr. Gladstone says on p. 192 : "It seems, however, to be generally felt that the determining epoch in the history of seminal

Christian thought upon this subject was the life of St. Augustine, together with that period following closely upon it, when the Western Church became rapidly imbued with his theology in almost its entire compass."

Canon Gore, in vol. ii. pp. 210-214 of his recent work on *The Epistle to the Romans*, accepts without modification the teaching in Gladstone's *Studies* and in my own volume on *The Last Things* in reference both to the future punishment of sin and the immortality of the soul. On p. 212 he writes: "Careful attention to the origin of the doctrine of the necessary immortality or indestructibility of each human soul, as stated for instance by Augustine or Aquinas, will probably convince us that it was no part of the original Christian message, or of really catholic doctrine. It was rather a speculation of Platonism taking possession of the Church. And this consideration leaves open possibilities of the ultimate extinction of personal consciousness in the lost, which Augustinianism somewhat rudely closed."

The writer protests, as I do, against the assertion "that the souls of the lost will be at the last extinguished. These positive positions are no more justified than those of our forefathers which we have deprecated. We must recognize the limits of positive knowledge."

This confirmation, by a theologian so eminent as Canon Gore, of the protest now restated and amplified in these papers is of utmost value. And against it I know nothing. So far as I have read, no modern writer has done anything whatever to prove, from the Bible or in any other way, the endless permanence of the human soul. This is strong presumptive evidence that no valid proof of this doctrine can be brought; and thus confirms the contention of my second paper that it was not taught by Christ.

In another paper I shall discuss the positive teaching of the Bible about the human soul; and the bearing of this teaching, and of my protest against the popular doctrine of

the immortality of the soul, upon the ultimate destiny of those who persistently reject the salvation offered by Christ.

JOSEPH AGAR BEET.

HAD OUR LORD READ THE "TABLET" OF KEBES?

ONE of the little company of disciples who attended Socrates during his last hours in the prison-house of Athens was a young Theban named Kebes. He figures as one of the principal interlocutors in that immortal dialogue where the dying Master, *placidus ore, intrepidus verbis, intempestivas suorum lacrimas coercens*, discourses of the Immortality of the Soul. He is, moreover, the reputed author of a quaint little book, once better known than now. It is called the *Tablet*, and is a sort of allegory in the style of a Platonic dialogue. It purports to be a description of a tablet which hung in the Temple of Kronos and emblematically depicted the course of human life. From neither a literary nor a philosophical point of view is it a work of much importance, but it is invested with fascinating interest when it is found to contain two passages which are strikingly analogous to sayings of Jesus.

Here is the first (chap. xv.)—

“ ‘What is the way that leads to the true Instruction?’ said I.

“ ‘You see above,’ said he, ‘yonder place where no one dwells, but it seems to be desert?’

“ ‘I do.’

“ ‘And a little door, and a way before the door, which is not much thronged; but very few go there, so impassable does the place seem, so rough and rocky?’

“ ‘Yes, indeed,’ said I.

“ ‘And there seems to be a lofty mound and a very steep ascent with deep precipices on this side and on that?’

“ ‘I see it.’

“ ‘This, then, is the way,’ said he, ‘that leads to the true Instruction.’ ”

Of course this recalls our Lord’s more elaborate image of the Narrow Gate and the Two Ways: “Go ye in through the narrow gate: because broad and spacious is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many are they that go in through it; because narrow is the gate and straitened the way that leadeth to life, and few are they that find it” (Matt. vii. 13, 14).

Even more striking is the other analogy. One of the most remarkable of the *ἄγραφα* of Jesus is the precept *γίνεσθε τραπεζίται δόκιμοι*, “Show yourselves approved bankers” (see Westcott, *Introduction to the Gospels*, App. C). In the Clementine Homilies this is taken as an exhortation to exercise one’s critical judgment in order to distinguish between true Scriptures and false; and in this sense it may be compared with St. Paul’s exhortation: “Prove (*δοκιμάζετε*) all things, hold fast that which is good” (1 Thess. v. 21); and with that other precept of our Lord: “Take heed what ye hear” (Mark iv. 24).

Were it admissible, this would be a most natural and apposite interpretation of the precept. It was one of the special functions of the bankers, at least in Rome, to test coins and ascertain their genuineness (*probatio nummorum*), Heretical writings, which claimed an authority and inspiration they did not possess, were like spurious coins, and it was necessary for a Christian to examine them narrowly and reject base counterfeits. It is, however, a fatal objection to this interpretation of the precept that it takes *δόκιμος* in an *active* sense. The adjective is *passive*, and applies, not to the banker who tests the coin, but to the coin which is tested.

There is another interpretation which the precept may bear, and which is suggested by the following passage in the *Tablet* (chap. xxxi.)—

"God bids us not marvel whatever Fortune may do, nor show ourselves like the unscrupulous bankers (γίγνεσθαι ὁμοίους τοῖς κακοῖς τραπεζίταις). For they, when they receive money from people, rejoice and regard it as their own; and, when they are asked for it again, they are annoyed and think themselves hardly used; not remembering that they received the deposits on the understanding that there was nothing to prevent the depositor from taking them away again. God bids us maintain the like attitude also toward what is given by Fortune, and remember that such is her nature that she takes away what she has given, and presently gives again many times as much, and anon takes away what she has given."

It was usual for persons who had no taste or no turn for business to entrust their money to a banker, allowing him to trade with it on his own account, and stipulating only that they should receive a moderate interest and be at liberty to resume their capital whenever they pleased (cf. Matt. xxv. 27). So long as it remained in the banker's hands it was as good as his own except for the trifling discount on the score of interest; and a shrewd financier often made handsome profits by embarking his loans in successful enterprises. It sometimes happened, however, that a client would call in his deposits at an awkward moment when the banker had little money at his command; and then it was necessary for the latter to sell out on any terms. It seems that a banker thus inconveniently situated would sometimes behave unpleasantly, disowning his obligations and putting his client to no little trouble (Isokr. *Trapezit.*; cf. Becker's *Char.*, pp. 67 sqq.). Such is the situation to which Kebes refers when he says: "God bids us not . . . show ourselves like the unscrupulous

bankers. For they, when they receive money from people, rejoice and regard it as their own; and, when they are asked for it again, they are annoyed and think themselves hardly used; not remembering that they received the deposits on the understanding that there was nothing to prevent the depositor from taking them away again."

May not this be the key to the interpretation of our Lord's precept: "Show yourselves approved bankers"? It would then be a warning against worldly-mindedness, according well with the spirit of our Lord's teaching and recalling that word of the Apostle: "Them that are rich in the present world charge not to be high-minded nor have their hope set upon the uncertainty of riches, but upon God who furnisheth all things unto us" (1 Tim. vi. 17). Great indeed is the uncertainty of riches. Nothing that we possess is our own. We hold it on loan from God. It is a deposit which He has entrusted to us that we may trade with it for His honour and glory. At any moment He may resume it; and our duty is to show ourselves approved bankers, trading diligently with our Lord's deposits and cheerfully surrendering them when He requires them of us. The precept is an exhortation to cultivate a spirit of detachment from worldly things, sitting loosely by them and never setting our hearts upon them.

Besides these two outstanding analogies there are phrases in the *Tablet* which recall language used by our Lord. Thus we read in chap. iv.: "He (ὁ Δαίμων) enjoins on them that are entering what they must do that they may enter into life" (ὥς ἂν εἰσέλθωσιν εἰς τὸν βίον); and our Lord says to the young ruler (Matt. xix. 17): "If thou wouldest enter into life (εἰς τὴν ζωὴν εἰσελθεῖν), keep the commandments."

Such resemblances suggest the question whether it may not be that our Lord was acquainted with the *Tablet* and borrowed His imagery from it. This may seem the simple

and necessary inference, yet it is impossible to accept it off-hand. On the ground of a couple of somewhat doubtful anachronisms and the occurrence of some half-dozen words which are alleged to belong to the Greek of a later age, not a few critics deny that the *Tablet* was the work of Kebes the Theban and assign it to Kebes of Cyzicus, a Stoic philosopher of the second century of our era. External evidence casts but little light on the problem. The *Tablet* is twice mentioned by Lucian (*De Merc. Conduct.* § 42; *Rhet. Praecept.* § 6) who was born about 130 A.D.; and Tertullian, who was born some twenty years later, mentions the interesting fact (*De Praescr. Haeret.* xxxix.) that a relative of his had executed a poetic paraphrase of the work in the Vergilian measure. It seems a pretty safe inference that the *Tablet* was a recognized classic in the time of Lucian and Tertullian. Had it been the work of an obscure contemporary, Lucian would hardly have styled the author—as he does in both the passages just cited—ὁ Κέβης ἐκεῖνος, *ille Cebes*, "the celebrated Kebes."

Of course, were the *Tablet* proved to date from the second century, the supposition that it was known to our Lord would be ruled out of court; and the question would then arise whether the author, whoever he might be, was acquainted with the teaching of Jesus. The argument against its early date is, however, by no means conclusive. The truth would rather seem to be that, while the dialogue is in the main genuine, the closing chapters (xxxiii.-xli.) are by a later hand. They abound in faulty constructions and are obviously a clumsy and superfluous addition.

It is fortunately unnecessary to enter here into this vexed question. Whatever be the date of the *Tablet*, the image of the two ways is very ancient. It is as old as Hesiod (850-800 B.C.), who says (*O. et D.* 287-92): "Vice even in troops may be chosen easily; smooth is the way, and it lieth very nigh. But in front of Virtue the immortal gods

have put sweat. Long and steep is the way to her, and rough at first ; but when one cometh to the summit, then it is easy, hard as it was." Pythagoras of Samos (570-504 B.C.) adopted the image and elaborated it. He employed as a symbol of the two ways the letter Ψ , the archaic form of Υ , hence called "the Samian letter" (Persius, iii. 56-7; v. 34-5). The straight stem represented the innocent period of childhood, and the divergent branches the after-course of youth and manhood pursuing the straight path of Virtue or the crooked track of Vice.

Though it be granted that the *Tablet* dates from the second century of our era, the question remains: Did our Lord borrow from Pythagoras His image of the Two Ways? And this raises the larger question whether he had any acquaintance with Greek literature. It may help us to a satisfactory solution of the problem if we consider what was the Jewish attitude in our Lord's day towards pagan culture. It was for the most part an attitude of inveterate hostility. The proud imagination of Alexander the Great had conceived the grand design of welding the whole East into one vast Greek empire, Greek not only in government but in language, customs and religion; and he and his successors had bent their energies to the realization of the magnificent dream. In every conquered land they founded new cities and peopled them with Greek colonists. Each of these cities was a centre of Hellenic civilization, infecting the native population with the Greek spirit and compelling the adoption of the Greek language for the transaction of business. When Israel was conquered, it fared with her as with her neighbours, and even her stubborn nationality would have been obliterated by the flood of Hellenism but for the mad tyranny of Antiochus Epiphanes who attempted to effect the transformation with a high hand and roused Jewish patriotism to successful resistance under the Maccabees. The spirit of the Asidæans lived on

in the land and inspired a fierce abhorrence of pagan manners and institutions.

It is true indeed that the aristocratic Sadducees had bowed before the conqueror and abetted his designs. And even among the Pharisees there was a party which, while heartily loyal to the faith of Israel, regarded the Hellenic culture with kindlier eyes and a more tolerant spirit. The founder of the liberal school was the gentle R. Hillel, and his most distinguished follower was R. Gamaliel, the teacher of St. Paul. Gamaliel advocated the study of the *Chokmath Javanith*, and it was surely a striking providence which brought under his large-hearted influence the young Pharisee who was destined to be the Apostle of the Gentiles. St. Paul's classical quotations (Acts xvii. 28; 1 Cor. xv. 33; Titus i. 12) are reminiscences of his early training "at the feet of Gamaliel." It is impossible to estimate the debt which the world owes to that generous Rabbi who all unwittingly did so much to prepare the champion of a universal Christianity for his high vocation.

The liberal Pharisees, however, were a small and unpopular minority. The prevailing sentiment was that of the school of Shammai, which loathed whatever savoured of Hellenic civilization. It is related of R. Ismael that on one occasion he was asked whether, after one had mastered the law, one might not then turn to the study of Greek literature. He quoted Joshua i. 8 and added: "Find a time which is neither day nor night and give yourself during it to the study of the Greek wisdom." And R. Akibha once declared that no Israelite who read the books of the Greeks would attain unto eternal life.

Such was the general sentiment of the Rabbis in our Lord's day; and it was natural that the laity should adopt the tone of their teachers and look askance at Greek culture. There is no injustice in Origen's sneer at Celsus' imaginary

Jew who quoted Euripides, that Jews were not wont to be so well versed in Greek literature (*Contra Celsum*, ii. p. 80, Spencer's edition). A Jew with Greek quotations at his finger ends would have been reckoned at once a traitor and a heretic. Jesus was born in a peasant home and reared among peasant folk. From childhood He would know the sacred Scriptures, and there is abundant evidence in the Gospels how earnestly He had studied them, and what strength and comfort they afforded Him in His seasons of weakness and sorrow. But the likelihood is that never during those years which He spent in the village of Nazareth, did He see a Greek book; and, if ever the name of a great classic was mentioned in His hearing, it would be in a tone of hatred and abhorrence.

Is there any reason for believing that Jesus had transcended His environment and become acquainted with pagan literature? It seems indubitable that His image of the Two Ways is an echo, if not of Kebes, then certainly of Pythagoras; yet it does not follow that He had read the writings of either or had any direct acquaintance with their philosophy. Pythagoras was one of the great teachers of the ancient world, and some of his doctrines would pass current where his name was unknown. It does not follow that a man has studied Darwin because he talks about Evolution; and no more did the repetition of Pythagorean catch-words argue an acquaintance with the philosophy of Pythagoras. That image of the Two Ways would arrest the imagination. It would pass into a proverb and might well be quoted where the very name of its author had never been heard of. It would be no marvel though it found its way into the land of Israel, and were caught up by Him who loved to speak in parables, employing the homeliest pictures in illustration of His heavenly teachings.

And what of the other seeming analogy? May it not be that here also Jesus employed a homely and familiar

phrase? In all likelihood there was some proverb in the ancient world about bankers and their ways; and it is a reasonable and sufficient explanation of the resemblance between that phrase of Kebes *μὴ γίνεσθαι ὁμοίους τοῖς κακοῖς τραπεζίταις* and our Lord's precept *γίνεσθε τραπεζίται δόκιμοι* that the common proverb suggested both.

There is not a shred of evidence that Jesus had the slightest acquaintance with the literature of the great world beyond the land of Israel. There are perhaps only two other passages in His teaching where the faintest echo of its busy and wondrous life may be distinguished; and it will probably be thought by many that the resemblance is in each instance somewhat remote. One is that hard saying of our Lord to the Syrophœnician woman: "It is not fair to take the children's bread and throw it to the dogs" (Mark vii. 27; Matt. xv. 26). Is not this the Greek proverb *σεαυτὸν οὐ τρέφων κύνας τρέφεις*, "You starve yourself to feed dogs"? "It was said," Erasmus explains, "of one who, while too poor to procure the necessaries of life, endeavoured to maintain an establishment of horses or servants. It will be appropriately employed against those who, by reason of the narrowness of their means, have scarce enough to maintain life, yet ambitiously endeavour to emulate the powerful and wealthy in fineness of dress and general ostentation" (*Adagia*, sub proverb.). It takes the sting out of our Lord's reply to that poor heathen woman when it is understood that He was not flinging at her the brutal epithet wherewith Jewish insolence branded the Gentiles, but quoting a familiar proverb in a half-playful spirit in order to test her faith. It is as though He had said: "My grace is for those of My own household, and why should I lavish it upon a stranger?"

Again, the Greeks had a proverb "with unwashed feet" (*ἀνίπτοις ποσίν*), derived apparently from the ritual of the Mysteries. It means, according to Suidas, "without any

preparation" (χωρίς τινος παρασκευῆς), and is aptly exemplified by a passage in Lucian's sketch of the eclectic philosopher Demonax. Demonax, says his biographer, was no novice when he entered on his profession. "He did not rush at it, as the saying goes, 'with unwashed feet,' but he had been nurtured with poets and remembered most of them, and had been trained to speak, and had a thorough acquaintance with the philosophic schools." Is not this the key to the interpretation of that parabolic action of our Lord in the Upper Room, when "He put water into the bason, and began to wash the feet of the disciples, and to wipe them with the towel wherewith He was girded" (John xiii. 4)? Alike in Greece and in Palestine it was customary, when guests arrived at a house, for slaves to receive them and wash their feet heated with travel and soiled with the dust of the way; but it was not this menial office that the Master performed. The thing was done, not on the entrance of the disciples, but either during the meal or after it was finished, according as *γινομένου* or *γενομένου* is preferred in v. 2. It was rather an acted quotation of that familiar proverb. Even in that solemn hour, when the shadow of the Cross had fallen upon Jesus, the disciples were disputing "which of them should be accounted the greatest"; and, when He rose and washed their feet, it was as though He had said: "Such worldly and selfish ambition proves you still uninitiated into the mysteries of My Kingdom. Its law is love and its glory service. If you be not clothed with humility, you are no disciples of Mine. Think not to enter My school 'with unwashed feet.' If I wash you not, you have no part with Me." ¹

Such are the only points of contact between the teaching of Jesus and pagan literature—these four proverbs which

¹ Cf. discussion of our Lord's use of these two proverbs by the present writer in *Expository Times*, Sept. 1900, and April 1901.

had floated into Palestine and whose alien origin had doubtless been forgotten. Is it not marvellous that the incarnate Son of God should have lived and died in that little land of Palestine so utterly neglectful, to all appearance, of the world He had come to save?

DAVID SMITH.

NOTES ON SELECT PASSAGES IN THE OLD TESTAMENT.¹

GENESIS ii. 23: "And the man said, This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh." By a simple transposition, "This now is bone of my bones," etc., the intention of Adam to distinguish the creature now brought to him from all former ones is clearly made out. "This *is* now" would imply that she was not so before, which is *not* the sense intended. And the Hebrew word is not עַתָּה, but עַתָּה, "this time," which the Revisers have substituted for the A.V. "now" in Genesis xxix. 35 and Judges xv. 3. Prof. Chenery has proposed, "This time it is bone of my bones," etc. But לָאִשׁ is clearly "this (creature)."

GENESIS iii. 6: "Good for food" (A.V. and R.V.). See also Genesis ii. 9, vi. 21 (*bis*). But in Genesis i. 29, 30, where A.V. has "for meat," R.V. (first revision) has given "for food," but R.V. (second revision) goes back to "meat." Referring to the New Testament Revision, I find that the rule is to retain the "meat" of the A.V. whenever the Greek word is βρώσις, βρώμα, or βρώματα (only excepting

¹ This is the first instalment of a series of Notes selected from the original MSS. forwarded by the late Dr. Field to the Secretary of the Old Testament Revision Company. Dr. Field was an original member of the Company; but, being very deaf, he chose this method of communicating his views rather than personal attendance at the meetings. His contributions were read out by the Secretary, and usually formed the starting-point of the discussion which followed. The original MSS. are now in the Library of Trinity College, Cambridge, and it is by the kind permission of the College Council that this portion of their contents is now made public.—J. H. BURN.

2 Cor. ix. 10, ἄρτον εἰς βρώσιν, "bread for food," where A.V. also has "food"; and two places in St. Luke, where the Greek is βρώματα, A.V. "meat," R.V. "food"). Where A.V. renders τροφή by "meat," R.V. rightly adopts "food." In the Old Testament the LXX almost invariably render אֲכָלָה, אֲכָלָה, and מֵאֲכָל by βρώμα and βρώσις, preserving the etymology; in three instances only do they put τροφή for אֲכָל, and in all three both A.V. and R.V. have "meat." On the same principle I would correct the following passages—

Gen. ii. 9 }	A.V. "good for food."	R.V. the same.
„ iii. 6 }		
„ vi. 21	„ "all food that is."	„ „
„ vi. 21	„ "it shall be for food."	„ „
„ ix. 3	„ "shall be meat."	„ "food."
Lev. xi. 34	„ "Of all meat."	„ "All food."
„ xxv. 6, 7	„ "shall be meat."	„ "shall be for food."
Deut. ii. 6, 28	„ "shall buy meat."	„ "shall purchase food."

And so in other places. The only exception that occurs to me at present is Genesis xli. 35, 36: A.V. "And let them gather all the food (אֲכָל) of these good years . . . and the food shall be for a store." Here the corn not being intended to be *eaten*, but to be *stored up*, it seems more convenient to call it "food" than "meat." And so throughout the history of Joseph.

GENESIS iv. 7. Most recent interpreters take שִׂאת to be the infinitive used as a noun, in the sense of *elevatio* (subaudi פָּנִים). I suppose our translators did the same, but in the sense of *acceptance* in text, and *excellency* in margin. It seems strange that all these should have ignored the regular construction of הִיטִיב with the infinitive mood, as ה' לָכֵת "bene incedere" (Prov. xxx. 29); ה' נָנֹו "bene pulsare"

(Ezek. xxxiii. 32), etc. Of the ancient versions the Septuagint only has adopted this construction, rightly rendering οὐκ ἐὰν ὁρθῶς προσενέγκης, though the remainder of this version is entirely wrong. Of commentators I know only De Dieu (*Crit. Sacr.* p. 6) who has preserved the Hebrew idiom: *Annon sive bene offeras, sive non bene, ad ostium peccatum cubat.* The reason for rejecting this construction seems to be the want of an *apodosis*; but this is rather a recommendation of it than otherwise if it be considered that in the case of אֵן, followed by אֵל-אֵן, or ἐὰν . . . ἐὰν μὴ in Greek, the use of this figure (*ἀνανταπόδοτον*) is well established. In Greek the most trite example is Luke xiii. 9. In Hebrew we may refer to Exodus xxxii. 32, and Daniel iii. 15. See also 1 Samuel xii. 14, R.V. For אָנָּה, in the sense of *to bring an offering*, compare Deuteronomy xiv. 24, Ezekiel xx. 31.

GENESIS viii. 4: A.V. "Upon the mountains of Ararat." R.V. the same. From a misunderstanding of this text arose the inveterate error that Ararat in the Hebrew Scriptures is the name of a mountain. If "Ararat" is retained, let the margin inform the unlearned reader—"That is, *Armenia*. See 2 Kings xix. 37 (A.V.)." The late Astronomer Royal [Sir George Biddell Airy], who "cannot entertain the smallest doubt that the Flood of Noah was a flood of the Nile," only heavier and more destructive than usual, supposes "the mountains of Ararat to be the hills skirting the Nile valley, most likely those on the eastern side." He adds: "I am not aware of the slightest authority for interpreting the mountains of Ararat to be mountains of Armenia" (!)

GENESIS xl. 13. [Dr. Field cancels the alternative rendering in the margin of A.V., and adds the following note.] Comparing the margin on verse 19, it should be "reckon thee," or "reckon with thee" (*συνᾶραι λόγον μετὰ τῶν δούλων αὐτοῦ*, Matt. xviii. 23), and so the Samaritan version

יִתְּסֹכּוּ, *subducet rationem tuam*. But though the same Hebrew phrase is used in Exodus xxx. 12 and other places for *taking the sum of the people*, that (or a similar) meaning in this place is rendered improbable by the addition (in verse 19) of “from off thee,” which has compelled the authors of the marginal version to have recourse to an awkward ellipsis: “reckon thee, *and take thy office* from thee.”

GENESIS xl. 16. Render: “. . . three baskets ¹ of fine flour on my head”; ¹ Or, *of wicker* (Heb. *of holes*); or, *made of palm branches*. So Symmachus: *τρία καὶ βαῖνά*. Wilkinson (*Ancient Egyptians* ii. 178) says—“From the geréet, or branches of the palm tree, are made wicker baskets.”

FREDERICK FIELD.

RECENT NEW TESTAMENT CRITICISM.

I.

ITS METHODS.

It is a consoling reflection, fitted to establish the heart and deliver it from despondency, that there has never been a time in the history of Christianity when it has not seemed to believers as though the faith were in jeopardy and like to perish outright.

Hora novissima, tempora pessima sunt: vigilemus.

has been the cry of generation after generation, and, behold, the storm has always passed! The faith has emerged stronger and brighter from the ordeal, and its exultant assailants have been put to confusion. "It took twelve men to invent Christianity, and I have demolished it single-handed," was Voltaire's "thrasonical brag"; yet Christianity is here still, and Voltaire—where is he?

Surely this is a consoling reflection, one which ought to steady us in time of stress, and embolden us to look the enemy in the face and refuse to be dismayed by his shouts of victory. The likelihood is that his triumph is premature; and it is marvellous how unsubstantial the assailants of the faith are discovered to be at close quarters. They look very terrible at their first onset; but, when they are encountered boldly and keenly scrutinized, they have a knack of dissolving into harmless shadows. One is reminded in this connection of Lucian's stinging satire on feminine beauty unaccompanied by grace of mind and heart: "Such ladies seem to me like the Egyptian temples. For in that country the shrine itself is very beautiful and large, adorned

with precious stones and gold, and garnished with inscriptions; but inside, if you ask for the god, he is an ape or an ibis or an he-goat or a cat.”¹

It is no exaggeration to affirm that a serious challenge has been presented to faith by some recent literature on the critical problems of the New Testament, more particularly Moffatt's *Historical New Testament* and Schmiedel's contribution to the article on the *Gospels* in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, vol. ii. It is with extreme reluctance and no little pain that the writer adds to the list the article in the latter work on *Jesus* by his revered teacher and beloved friend, the late Dr. A. B. Bruce. The contributions of that fearless and brilliant scholar to the exposition and defence of Christianity have laid the Church under a heavy and abiding debt; while his memory is cherished gratefully by generations of students who sat at his feet and learned from his lips “the truth as it is in Jesus,” and attained, under his guidance, to triumphant faith in supernatural Christianity. It is a sense of amazement amounting to incredulity that is awakened by the *Jesus* article in one who knew Dr. Bruce and enjoyed the privilege of his familiar intercourse. The tone and manner are our master's, but the teaching is none of his. It is hard to conceive how those pages could have been written by one who believed in the Incarnation, the Resurrection, or even the Sinlessness of Jesus. They depict him as nothing more than a good and heroic man, and a teacher of unique but not perfect wisdom. “The words of Jesus concerning the future show limitation of vision. In other directions we may discover indications that he was the child of his time and people. But his spiritual intuitions are pure truth, valid for all ages. God, man, and the moral ideal cannot be more truly or happily conceived.”² Such is the final appraisal; and one who remembers the author's devo-

¹ *Imag.* § 11; cf. Clem. Alex. *Pæd.* iii. 4.

² § 33.

tion to the historic Jesus and his enthusiasm for the Kingdom of God may be pardoned the suspicion that there is some explanation. That this should be their master's final message to the world would be a surprise and a grief to not a few who owe to him their establishment in the Christian faith.

It would scarcely be possible to exaggerate the seriousness of the issue which has been raised by those recent critics. The Church need not be greatly disquieted if it be alleged that the patriarchs were mythical personages, that certain prophecies were falsified by the event, or that the Pastoral Epistles were not written by St. Paul. It is assuredly possible to maintain such positions while regarding the Bible as the record of an historic revelation and acknowledging Jesus as the supreme manifestation of redemptive grace. And it is the Church's wisdom to recognize the legitimacy, if not the truth, of such positions, and not be disquieted so long as the citadel of her faith is unassailed. But this is a question of life or death, and it is not too much to affirm that, if these critics have their way, Christianity is doomed. Their contention is that the sacred records are so utterly unreliable, so honeycombed by palpable inaccuracies, and so distorted, albeit unconsciously, by the ideas and prejudices of a later age, as to be practically worthless as historical narratives. The utmost assurance that can be reached is that there lived in the land of Palestine a teacher who made a powerful impression upon his disciples; but hardly a single lineament of the historic Jesus can be discerned with any certainty through the haze of devout misconception which has gathered round him.

This discomfiting conclusion is reached by the critics along two main lines of argument. One is *the investigation of the "sources" of the Evangelic narratives*. It is needless at this late day to explain this method of inquiry, and

equally needless to vindicate its legitimacy or demonstrate its fruitfulness. The facts of the mutual dependence of the Synoptic Gospels and their derivation from earlier "sources" were already recognized in the sub-apostolic period, and the problem has been diligently investigated during the last hundred and fifty years. The result has been the vindication of their substantial historicity; and it has been widely agreed that "Mark" is the earliest of the three Gospels, and, whether as it stands or in some more primitive form, one of the main "sources" of "Matthew" and "Luke," the other main "source" being the book of *Logia*.

Such is the present position of the problem, and Schmiedel details at length the steps by which it has been reached. Then by a single stroke he demolishes the whole edifice so laboriously constructed. Even when we have got back to those sources, he remarks, we have not arrived at the goal; for those sources must have been derived from still earlier sources, and what the latter may have been it is impossible to discover. And thus, with a wave of the hand, he relegates the problem to the limbo of insolubility. "The first impression one derives from the new situation thus created is, that by it the solution of the synoptical problem which appeared after so much toil to have been brought so near, seems suddenly removed again to an immeasurable distance."¹

It seems a curious turn of dialectic to conclude that nothing has been gained because the investigation does not carry us back to the ultimate sources. The *desideratum* is to get as near the historic situation as possible, and surely it is something to have been able to approach it by even a single stage. And, considering how short at the longest is the space between Jesus and the canonical Gospels, and how little room it affords for an extended series of sources, may we not reasonably hold that, when we have pushed

¹ § 129 (b).

back that single stage, we have reached the ultimate sources and are face to face with the historic Jesus?

Consider now where we stand. If Prof. Schmiedel's contention be allowed, that the ultimate sources are inaccessible, then it follows indeed that the critical investigation of generations has been proved little better than a laborious beating of the air; but it by no means follows that the slightest doubt has been cast upon the credibility of the Gospels. The problem simply remains unsolved, and it must be approached from another direction, and the credibility or incredibility of the Gospels determined on other grounds. They must be taken as they stand and judged on their apparent merits.

The other line of argument has been elaborated by Mr. Moffatt in his *Prolegomena. The Evangelists*, it is alleged, *could not possibly paint a reliable picture of Jesus, inasmuch as they wrote after the interval of at least a generation and saw Him, as it were, through a mist.* In every historical narrative there is a double reference—the “retrospective” and the “contemporary.” It is difficult for a writer to escape from his environment, and still more difficult to escape from himself. He sees the past through the atmosphere in which he lives, and interprets it at once according to the standards of his time and according to his personal sympathies or antipathies. πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος. It would be unjust to accept Thucydides' account of Cleon without taking account of the historian's quarrel with the demagogue; and in reading Macaulay's glowing narrative it may not be amiss to bear in mind that the historian was also a politician and could hardly treat with absolute impartiality of the contentions between the two great parties in the State. Environment and personality are the two influences which are apt to distort the historic judgment; and, where they are unsuspected and uncontrolled, there is no true vision of the past, and history

is merely, in Napoleon's phrase, "a fable agreed upon." "Consider," says Carlyle,¹ "what mere Time will do in such cases; how if a man was great while living, he becomes tenfold greater when dead. What an enormous *camera-obscura* magnifier is Tradition! How a thing grows in the human Memory, in the human Imagination, when love, worship and all that lies in the human Heart, is there to encourage it. And in the darkness, in the entire ignorance; without date or document, no book, no Arundel-marble; only here and there some dumb monumental cairn. Why, in thirty or forty years, were there no books, any great man would grow *mythic*, the contemporaries who had seen him, being once all dead."

It is precisely thus, according to those recent critics, that it has fared with Jesus. "To realize," says Mr. Moffatt,² "that the central materials of the gospels were mainly drawn up and collected during the three or four decades which followed the death of Jesus, and that the gospels themselves were not composed until the period 65-105; to realize these facts will show—(i.) that the gospels are not purely objective records, no mere chronicles of pure crude fact, or of speeches preserved verbatim; (ii.) that they were compiled in and for an age when the church required Christ not as a memory so much as a religious standard, and when it revered him as an authority for its ideas and usages; (iii.) that they reflect current interests and feelings, and are shaped by the experience and for the circumstances of the church; (iv.) that their conceptions of Christ and Christianity are also moulded to some extent by the activity and expansion of the church between 30 and 60, by its tradition, oral and written, and by its teaching, especially that of Paul." The Jesus of the Gospels is not the Jesus of history, but an idealized figure, partly distorted by ignorant misconception, partly glorified by devout reverence; and,

¹ *Heroes*, i.

² p. 45, n. .

if we would get at the true Jesus, we must clear away the mist which has gathered about Him. "To the historical student who is engaged in working back, by aid of sources, to the facts, the Christ of the Apostles is the forerunner to the Jesus of history. . . . Personally he left no written statement or expression of his views and deeds. For these, as well as for the sense of his personality, we are absolutely dependent upon the reminiscences of an after age, together with the impression produced by him on one or two men of exceptional ability who subsequently joined his cause. . . . These are the indispensable record of the ways by which the early Christian faith was formed, transformed, expressed and propagated." ¹

The question is, How does Jesus emerge from the ordeal of reconstructive criticism? Prof. Schmiedel leaves us in no manner of uncertainty. There are nine passages and only nine which he allows to be "absolutely credible." ² Here they are:—(1) Mark x. 17 f.: "Why callest thou me good? none is good save God only." (2) Matt. xii. 31 f.: that blasphemy against the son of man can be forgiven. (3) Mark iii. 21: that his relations held him to be beside himself. (4) Mark xiii. 32: "Of that day and of that hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son but the Father." (5) Mark xv. 34—Matt. xxvii. 46: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" (6) Mark viii. 12: "There shall no sign be given unto this generation"—a refusal to work miracles. (7) Mark vi. 5 f.: Jesus was able to do no mighty work (save healing a few sick folk) in Nazareth and marvelled at the unbelief of its people. (8) Mark viii. 14–21: "Take heed, beware of the leaven of the Pharisees and of Herod"—an evidence, according to Schmiedel, that "the feeding of the 5000 and the 4000 was not an historical occurrence but a parable." (9) Matt. xi. 5 = Luke vii. 22: the answer to the Baptist,

¹ Moffatt, p. 9.

² § 139.

where Schmiedel argues that the final clause "counteracts the preceding enumeration" and proves that "Jesus was speaking not of the physically but of the spiritually blind, lame, leprous, deaf, dead."

What manner of image is suggested by these nine *logia* which Schmiedel pronounces "the foundation-pillars for a truly scientific life of Jesus"? They amount to nothing more than a handful of negations, a brief series of emphatic repudiations by Jesus of supernatural attributes and powers which had been ignorantly imputed to Him. Truly, if this be all the available material, it is little that is known of the historic Jesus, and that little not worth knowing. ὦ Ζεῦ διόπτα, cries Dikaiopolis in the comedy¹ as he holds up his ragged garment and surveys it ruefully; and, viewing this tattered remnant of the goodly Evangelic record, one might echo the exclamation.

Such are the methods of those recent critics, and such the results they attain. There are several considerations which suggest themselves and seem worthy of earnest attention.

1. *We have heard all this before.* Those critics are simply old enemies with new names. Their methods and conclusions are those of Strauss, Baur, and Renan.

Consider Schmiedel's treatment of the miraculous narratives.² Some of them he regards as originating in "figurative speech." The feeding of the multitudes is just the saying "Blessed are they that hunger, for they shall be filled" turned into a narrative. In Mark i. 17, Matt. xiii. 47-50 he sees the germ of the miraculous draught of fishes. There are other miracles whose origin he finds in Old Testament passages: "For the raisings of the dead cp. 1 K. 17. 17-24, 2 K. 4. 17-37; for the multiplication of the loaves and fishes, cp. Ex. 16. 1-18, Nu. 11. 4-9, 2 K. 4. 42-44; for the walking upon the water Ps. 77. 20 [19],

¹ Aristoph. *Acharn.* 410.

² §§ 142-4.

Is. 43. 16, Job 9. 8; for the stilling of the storm, Ps. 107. 23-32; for the healing of the withered hand, 1 K. 13. 6; for the healing of the dumb man, Wisd. 10. 21." This is precisely Strauss's Mythical Theory.¹

In his discussion of "tendency" in the Synoptists² Schmiedel reproduces the Tübingen hypothesis in its crassest form. "In Lk. 5. 1-11 (call of Peter) the mission to the Gentiles is hardly mistakable: the other boat which is summoned (5. 7) to aid Peter in landing the multitude of fish, is that of Paul and his companions, whilst James and John (according to 5. 10) figure as the comrades of Peter, and the astonishment and apprehension they share with him (5. 8 f.) signify that until now they had not grasped the divine command of an extended mission."

The truth is that those recent writers are not advanced critics but reactionaries. They have reverted to positions which were abandoned a generation ago, and it is surely less than fair that we should be challenged to fight over again a battle which has already been fought and won. The utmost deference is due to so competent and unprejudiced an investigator as Wendt, and it is well to recall the verdict he has pronounced in his monumental work *Die Lehre Jesu*:³ "The idea that the severely critical consideration of the Gospels, which examines these writings according to the same principles as other written historical sources, would render problematical the historical figure of Jesus, or at all events would derogate from the ideal loftiness and purity of His life and teaching, we must at this day pronounce as simply obsolete. Critical inquiry has led, though not immediately in its first attempts, yet gradually and in course of time, to results whereby the historical picture of Jesus has lost nothing, but only gained."

2. It may seem a daring charge to bring against writers who claim to treat the sacred records on rigidly scientific

¹ *Das Leben Jesu*, Einl.

² §§ 108-14.

³ Engl. trans. ii. p. 400.

principles and allow themselves to talk contemptuously of others, but assuredly *they not unfrequently exhibit a most unscientific spirit.*

Consider Schmiedel's selection of his nine "absolutely credible passages." On what principle is it made? He alleges none, but it is obvious that he has chosen them because they seem to disprove the sinlessness of Jesus, His divinity, His omniscience, His miraculous power, and reduce Him to the common level of humanity. It is surely supreme audacity for such arbitrary procedure to pose as scientific.

It is difficult to suffer patiently the rejection of certain passages on the ground that they cannot be "primitive" according to the critics' *a priori* and subjective judgment of what is primitive and what is not. Mr. Moffatt brands Matthew xxviii. 16-20 as "a later appendix."¹ "Besides the conception of Jesus as the source of authoritative rules and regulations for the church, and the idea of Christ's spiritual presence (5. 20=18. 20), which can hardly be primitive, there are three notes of a late period in this passage." If it be true that Jesus rose again and appeared to His disciples, then it was fitting that He should give them, not indeed "authoritative rules and regulations for the church," but such counsels as are mentioned here. If it be true that He ascended, then His spiritual presence is a fact, and why should He not have proclaimed it on the eve of His departure? If, however, the Resurrection and Ascension be mere *Aberglaube* of a later age, then of course those sayings cannot be primitive. There are besides, Mr. Moffatt informs us, three notes of a later period in this passage. (1) "The universal mission (vers. 19, 20) can hardly have been known to the first disciples, or else they lived for years in flagrant disobedience to their Master's solemn command." It was, however, the way of the disciples, as

¹ pp. 647-8.

they appear on the Evangelic pages, to be somewhat slow to take in their Master's words, and somewhat slow to obey them even when they had taken them in. It was just on the back of His announcement of the doom which awaited Him at Jerusalem that they fell a-disputing which of them was the greatest (Mark ix. 30-4; Luke ix. 43-50; Matt. xvii. 22-xviii. 5). (2) "The incipient Trinitarianism." Of course this cannot be primitive if Trinitarianism be merely a *θεολογούμενον* of a later age; but it is remarkable that in one of the nine passages which Schmiedel recognizes as authentic *logia* of Jesus (Mark xiii. 32; cf. Matt. xi. 27), there occurs a quite Pauline collocation of *the Father* and *the Son*. (3) "The use of the baptismal formula belongs to an age subsequent to that of the Apostles, who employed the simple phrase of baptism into the name of Jesus (*εἰς χριστόν, ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματι* 'I. X.)." It should be observed, however, that the shorter phrases are equivalent to "Christian Baptism," and where they are employed (Acts ii. 38, viii. 16; Rom. vi. 3; Gal. iii. 27), the ceremonial formula would have been out of place.

A flagrant example of this subjective and truly unscientific method is the treatment accorded to that golden verse 2 Corinthians viii. 9. There is not a shadow of documentary evidence against it, and its absence would greatly weaken the Apostle's argument, yet Mr. Moffatt has bracketed it, apparently as an interpolation, without a word of explanation. Schmiedel's handling of the passage is simply grotesque. He accepts it as authentic (*quot homines tot sententiæ!*), but he finds in it an evidence how little St. Paul knew and how little he cared to know about the historic Jesus. "The details of the life of Jesus had so little interest for Paul that, for example, in 2 Cor. 8. 9 in order to induce the Corinthians to contribute liberally to the collection for the poor in Palestine he is able to adduce no other feature in Jesus than the fact of his

having become man.”¹ No stronger argument for self-sacrifice than the thought of the Lord of Life coming down from His throne of glory to suffer and die for our redemption! What Schmeidel means by this extraordinary language is that as early as St. Paul’s day the facts of the life of Jesus had perished, and what have been received as facts are simply late fictions. “All that can be said to be certain is this, that it is vain to look to the church fathers for trustworthy information on the subject of the origin of the gospels.”

3. In perusing the erudite pages of those recent writers one is constantly reminded of the maxim of Heraclitus *πολυμαθίῃ οὐ διδάσκει*. Erudition is a good gift, yet other gifts are requisite for the effective study of any authors and especially of those who have written of our Lord and His Gospel; and, if these be wanting, no erudition, however ample, can deliver a man from what Mr. Moffatt, with equal delicacy and modesty, styles the “leprosy of incompetence.” It is primarily essential to a sound judgment on the Gospels that they should be understood; and after a perusal of their laborious dissertations it is impossible to entertain a very exalted opinion of the insight of those writers. One feels that, had their faculty for exegesis been at all commensurate with their wealth of learning, their critical conclusions would have been very different. It may be that the Fourth Gospel dates from the first quarter of the second century; but to see in the words “Ye shall die in your sin” (viii. 21, 24) “the epitaph of Judaism written by Christianity as the first century closed,”² is simply a wild vagary of an unexegetical mind. Still less respect is due to the discovery in Matthew vii. 22, xiii. 41, xxiv. 12 of the Evangelist’s “antagonism to the libertine tendencies of Gentile Christians in Asia Minor.”³

Prof. Schmiedel’s article contains some marvels of

¹ § 147.

² Moffatt, p. 496.

³ *Ibid.* p. 23.

exegetical blindness. Let a single instance suffice. He quotes Luke xi. 41, "give for alms," as an evidence of the alleged Ebionitic "tendency" of the Third Gospel.¹ He takes no account of the words τὰ ἔνοντα, and it would have been awkward for his argument had he done so. Observe what our Lord says: The Pharisees abounded in almsgiving, but it was all vainglorious ostentation. "Ye cleanse the outside of the cup and the platter, but the inside of you is full of rapacity and churlishness. . . . Give for alms the things that are within (τὰ ἔνοντα)." So far from the passage teaching the Ebionitic doctrine that "beneficence wins salvation," it means the precise opposite. What it enjoins is that inward charity which is the true alms. It is no exaggeration to say that Schmiedel's article fairly bristles with misinterpretations, and in not a few instances the exposure of the exegetical blunder is the refutation of the critical conclusion.

4. *It is surely unreasonable that those writers should so confidently trumpet forth their destructive conclusions while frankly acknowledging their utter lack of finality.* The obvious result of Schmiedel's investigation is that whatever seemed to have been settled has been again unsettled, and the whole problem has been thrown back into the crucible. He acknowledges as much, and consoles himself and his readers with the reflection that "for science it is not altogether amiss if from time to time it is compelled to dispense with the lights it had previously considered clear enough, and to accustom itself to a new investigation of its objects in the dark."² If this be indeed the condition of critical science, it may perhaps be prudent to receive with a certain measure of reserve its pronouncements, be they ever so confident, on the incredibility of the Evangelic records and the impossibility of attaining any certain knowledge of the historic Jesus.

¹ § 110.

² § 129 (b).

"Tendency-criticism," says Mr. Moffatt, "has become a detected idol."¹ Yet it is only a generation ago that the tendency-criticism was dominant and seemed to many to have dealt Christianity its deathblow. It is but yesterday that the cry "Back to Christ!" was in wellnigh every mouth, and now Mr. Moffatt pronounces it "a natural and wholesome reaction," yet one which "has gone quite far enough."²

The truth is that every generation has its cry. The certainty of yesterday is discredited to-day, and the certainty of to-day will just as surely be discredited to-morrow. The history of New Testament criticism is the record of the rise and fall of a thousand theories, each influential and seemingly final for a brief space and each abandoned in its turn; and the New Testament has outlived them all, as it will outlive their successors to the end of time.

ἐξηράνθη ὁ χόρτος,
καὶ τὸ ἄνθος ἐξέπεσεν.
τὸ δὲ ῥῆμα Κυρίου μένει εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα.

Surely the lesson is plain. Were it duly laid to heart, it would deliver the critics from overweening dogmatism and the Church from vain alarm. When Massinger's Marcella heard Francisco's treacherous accusations against the absent Duke, she exclaimed—

Lies so false and wicked,
And fashioned to so damnable a purpose,
Cannot be spoken by a human tongue.
. . . If thou wouldst work
Upon my weak credulity, tell me, rather,
That the earth moves; the sun and stars stand still.

She could conceive no stronger attestation; yet, ere many generations had passed, it was discovered that the earth *does* move and the sun *does* stand still. It is unwise to pin one's faith to a theory. Especially in the domain of

¹ p. 10.

² p. 39.

critical investigation one never knows what a day may bring forth. Not once but often has it happened that some discovery, some simple observation, has let in a flood of light, accrediting what had seemed incredible and putting to shame what had been most surely believed.

DAVID SMITH.

THE CHRISTIAN PROPHETS AT PHILIPPI.

PROFESSOR RAMSAY, who has done so much in recent years to elucidate the Acts of the Apostles, especially upon the geographical and political sides of that unique history, has recently enforced his remarks on *The Church in the Roman Empire* by a paper in the *Contemporary Review* on "St. Paul the Statesman." I propose in the following pages to carry still further his main idea, clear and suggestive and convincing as it is, and to show that while St. Paul was a statesman and a patriot he was first of all a Prophet, and that his prophetic office had made him both statesman and patriot. Perhaps I may say that several of the following contentions require, and I trust will shortly receive, a fuller exposition than the limits of the present paper permit.

In the course of his "Second Missionary Journey" St. Paul writes to the Thessalonians (1 Thess. i. 5) that his gospel came unto them not in word only but in power and in the Holy Spirit and *in much fulfilment*. This last is a unique expression, and the occasion of it was unique. The function of the Prophets was, in the words of 1 Peter i. 10, to "seek out and to search out diligently what time, or (failing that) what manner of time, the Spirit of Christ, which was (from time immemorial) in them (as a historic body), was making clear." The Christian Prophets searched the Scriptures in order to find *fulfilment*. Their prophetic spirit indeed "searched all things, yea, the deep things of

God" (1 Cor. ii. 10), and "unto them did God make revelation through the (prophetic) spirit." Their function was, in other words, to find a correspondence between a written text or texts of Old Testament or Apocryphal Scripture on the one hand and a current event on the other. We in the present day are content to say that such and such an event *took place*; they would say of an event in the Divine purpose that it was *fulfilled*. Thus St. Luke in his preface to the Gospel speaks of "the things which have been fulfilled amongst us," for St. Luke was a Prophet himself.

Now let us endeavour to place ourselves in the position of the two Prophets, Paul and Silas, when they were at Troas in this "Second Missionary Journey." In front of them lay the Aegean Sea, with its mountainous islands of Imbros and Samothrace, beyond which lay the promised land of Europe, to be made ere long the possession of Christ; and in their hands was a guide-book, the Book of Joshua in Greek. But why call it the Book of Joshua? To them, as to all readers of the Septuagint, it was the Book of "Jesus." That is its one and only Greek name. And so, if there was one book of the Old Testament which must convey to the Christian Prophets their prophetic spiritual guidance in "things which are to be fulfilled among them," it was the Book of Jesus. Consequently when we read that the two Prophets Paul and Silas—for we know that Silas was a Prophet from Acts xv. 32—had been "forbidden by the Spirit of Jesus to go into Bithynia," we know what that expression means. "The Spirit of Christ" is not the same as "the Spirit of Jesus" (Acts xvi. 7), for this is the spirit of Jesus of Nazareth as typified by that of Jesus son of Naue (LXX for Nun). The Spirit of Jesus inspired them to find their guidance in the Book of Jesus. And so they were led in the course of this memorable journey to descend from the mountains of Mysia to the coast of Troas.

Here took place the next *fulfilment*. I do not say the first, for we shall find that there had been previous fulfilments. Prof. Ramsay has suggested that "*the man of Macedonia who stood* and besought Paul in a vision of the night at Troas" was none other than Luke himself. The suggestion—I gather from friends of mine—has "caught on," and commended itself. But without considering it to be "moonstruck fancy," to use the Professor's term, I think it will prove untenable eventually, though space forbids me to discuss it fully now. For there is one passage in the Bible where the expression occurs, "*Come over and help us,*" and it is in the Book of Jesus (Josh. x. 6), where "the men of Gibeon sent unto Joshua to the camp to Gilgal, saying, Come up to us . . . and help us." The rest of the vision originates or is suggested in the preceding chapter of Jesus, where the Captain of the Lord's host came beside him: "Behold, there stood a man before him, and his sword drawn in his hand" (v. 13). The two thoughts are blended, as thoughts which have passed in the day are so often blended, in the one vision of the night. Thus was the conviction of the two Prophets confirmed.

But where was the Lord's host? It was not yet; albeit the holy angels were with them. They were themselves but the pioneers of conquest; they were the two spies sent by Jesus Son of Naue, to spy out the land and Jericho. And here before them was their Jordan, the north-east corner of the Aegean Sea. Perhaps they knew how the Rabbis said (upon Josh. iii. 16) that "the breadth of the waters divided in Jordan was twelve miles" (John Lightfoot on Acts i. 12, quoting Kimchi). But the waters of their present Jordan were on a scale ten times as large; and as the Jordan did not divide for the spies to pass over them, neither did they expect their Jordan to divide for them.

We now come to a passage which has hitherto, I think, never received a satisfactory solution. What is the mean-

ing of Philippi being called (the) "first city of the portion Macedonia, a colony"? Hort wrote (*Notes on Select Readings*): "*Μερίς* never denotes simply a region, province or any geographical division: when used of land or of anything else it means a portion or share, i.e. a part in a relative sense only, not absolutely" (*μέρος*). The whole note should be read. He adds: "It is not impossible that *μερίδος* should be read as *Πιερίδος*," i.e. "the first city of Pierian Macedonia, a colony," but he acknowledges that the conjecture "Pierian" has no support and is unlikely. Although Hort says the reading must remain for the present in doubt, I venture to think that the text he has given us is sound, and indeed, as regards the one word *μερίδος*, the testimony is overwhelming. Nor is the meaning of *μερίδος*, *portion*, open to any more doubt than the reading, *pace* Prof. Ramsay. Nor is the explanation of it more difficult than the reading when once we have the clue in the Book of Jesus.

Jesus said (Josh. xviii. 6): "How long are ye slack to go to possess the land? Give out of yourselves three men from a tribe, and let them arise and go through the land and describe it before me. . . . And ye shall describe the land into seven *portions*. . . . The Levites have no *portion* among you." In xix. 9 we have: "The *portion* of the sons of Judah was made greater than theirs." What then can be plainer than the idea which was in the mind of the Prophet who wrote the Acts? He saw that the two Prophets had divided the Roman Empire into seven portions, one of which was "the portion Macedonia," and all of which were prepared by God in the Promised Land, the new inheritance of His people which He instructed Jesus of Nazareth, as He had instructed Jesus son of Naue, to allot to the tribes of the new and greater Israel.

When then the lots were cast in Selo (Shiloh) before the Lord, the first to come up was the tribe of Benjamin. This

of course was St. Paul's tribe, and he accepted Macedonia, as the inheritance of the Lord, in fulfilment of that allotment by Jesus.

But why was Philippi the first city of the portion Macedonia? Neapolis was where they set foot upon Europe. All that we know is that no particular fulfilment is connected with Neapolis. The fulfilments began in full at Philippi. Neapolis was the first city of Europe in order of time at which they touched; but Philippi was the *first city of the portion*. Philippi was their Jericho. We shall see further the truth of St. Paul's remark to the Thessalonians, how "the gospel came to them at first," and also to the Philippians, "in much fulfilment."

The capture of Jericho took place on the seventh day of solemn compassing. In Philippi Paul and Silas had sojourned certain days, till on the Sabbath day "we went outside the gate," and the crowning incident occurred.

The type of faith amidst unbelief was Rahab (Heb. xi. 31); the anti-type at Philippi was Lydia, who said: "If ye have judged me to be faithful to the Lord, come into my house and abide there."

Not only was Rahab saved when Jericho was taken, but "all her house"; so were the "house" of Lydia baptized.

The token of Rahab's house was a line of scarlet thread: the house of Lydia too had its stock of Thyatiran purple. With Clement (Cor. i. 12), who devotes a paragraph to Rahab, the scarlet thread is a type of the blood of the Lord, and he shows how "not only faith (Heb. xi. 31) but prophecy is found in the woman."

Jericho was "straitly shut up *and made fast with bars* (LXX): none went out and none came in." This is fulfilled in the prison at Philippi.

The shattering of the wall of the city, which fell down flat, is fulfilled in the earthquake at Philippi.

And a subsidiary fulfilment is to be discerned in the

manner of the city's fall. For "when the people heard the trumpets, all the people shouted together with a great and strong shout. And all the wall fell around." And so we read in Acts: "Paul and Silas were singing hymns to God, and the prisoners were listening to them, and suddenly a great earthquake took place. . . ." The great shout was fulfilled in the hymns; the hearing of the people in the listening of the prisoners; the simultaneous fall of the walls in the simultaneous opening of the prison doors.

There is however one part of the occurrence at Philippi, in fact the central incident of the ventriloquist girl, which has no parallel in the Book of Jesus. This girl, who had "a spirit, a Python," and who is commonly known as a Pythoness, was in fact a ventriloquist. Plutarch, who was living in St. Paul's time, tells us distinctly that Python (feminine Pythoness) was in his time the modern name for a ventriloquist. Now the witch of Endor is called by the LXX a *ventriloquist*. And we naturally look in 1 Samuel xxviii. to find some resemblance to the narrative in Acts xvi. Nor are we disappointed. Paul the Prophet was entitled to find some *fulfilments* in the book which records the saying about his fellow Benjamite: "Is *Saul* also among the prophets?" In this particular chapter however we first observe that the "witch" *constrained* (παρεβιάσατο) Saul to eat when there was no strength in him, whereas at Philippi it was not the Pythoness, but Lydia, who "constrained them to enter her house and abide there." The verb in Greek is the same in both cases: in the New Testament it only occurs in Luke xxiv. 29, and here; in the Old Testament half a dozen times. If this threefold fulfilment is not enough to satisfy all doubts, there is a further coincidence which does. The "witch" said unto Saul: "Behold now thy handmaid *heareth thy voice*, and I place my life in my hand, and I *hear the words which thou speakest* unto me." Of Lydia we read in Acts: "*She heard*, whose heart

the Lord had opened to *give heed to the things that were spoken by Paul.*"

It remains for us to observe the remarkable *fulfilment* of names of localities mentioned in the Book of Jesus, which is to be discerned in the record of Acts in dealing with this Macedonian journey.

E. C. SELWYN.

SCIENTIFIC LIGHTS ON RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS.

V.

IS NATURE MORALLY INDIFFERENT?

WHAT is the prevailing impression suggested to the mind by the contemplation of Nature? I think with most people it is a sense of being in the presence of a power which is indifferent to us. Perhaps the impression is most felt in the hour of sorrow. In seasons of joy we experience the poet's rapture—the sense of communion with wood and field. But in the time of grief, in the suffering of personal wrong or in the witnessing of public injustice, I think the most general sentiment is a feeling of being *overlooked* by the physical universe. I believe this is a far more common experience than the impression of an *angry* universe. Even in her stormiest moments Nature does not suggest that; if she did, her aspect would be less terrible. Analyze your thunderstorm, your hurricane, your tornado—what is it that invests the scene with an element of terror? Is it the dread that the powers of Nature may be your enemies? No; it is the sense that the powers of Nature are indifferent to you. Even the belief in their enmity would not be so bad. It is the sense of being overlooked that appals you. It is the impression that between you and the outside universe there exists no bond of interest whatever—that there is neither love nor hatred, neither pleasure nor anger,

neither peace nor war, but simply a separating sea—that sea of separation whose width is indicated by the portentous phrase, “Nothing in common.”

But perhaps it is in the moral sphere that men habitually feel this most keenly. Kant says that there are two things which fill him with wonder—the starry heavens above and the moral law within. But there is a third thing which has filled men with greater wonder still—the seeming want of congruity *between* these. Whatever be the relation of Nature to Man, it seems at first sight to be a relation indifferent to morality. The immediate perception of the eye can detect no connexion between the deeds of a man and the movements of the outer universe. The sun rises equally on the evil and on the good. We do not see the hand of the assassin paralysed in the act of committing his crime. The storm does not spare a ship because it is carrying a pious missionary. The lightning strikes down the useful life side by side with the useless. There are no moments of scepticism so deep as those in which we seem to behold the moral indifference of Nature. It is not her sternness that appals us. I think her stern aspects are often her least repelling aspects; we never experience such a sense of dissonance as in the physical illumination of a tragic hour. What disturbs us is the fact that, whether she smiles or frowns, her smile and her frown are to all appearance equally non-moral. We can see bright sunshine gleaming over a field of carnage; we can discern black clouds obstructing a beneficent journey. If the sunshine came uniformly to the latter and the clouds always visited the former, we should recognize in both cases a cause of gratitude. It is the apparent absence of congruity between Nature and Man that makes the smile seem insipid and the frown look meaningless.

But now let me ask, What has been the source of this impression? Has it come from science? No; not, at

least, from the latest science. It is the product of disappointed poetry; we have not found in Nature the poetic justice which we expected to find, and we have concluded that there is no justice. I venture to think that the latest science has contradicted the early poetry. I think that the doctrine of Evolution has disproved the assertion that Nature is morally indifferent. I think the process of evolution, as it appears in our world, is a distinctly moral process. When we speak of the dissonance between the starry heavens above and the moral law within, we are looking at the world through the old spectacles. We forget that, if the doctrine of Evolution be true, we can no longer accept such a view. Whatever morality exists on this earth has come originally from the stars, for the earth itself is an evolution from the stars. Prove that there is in *this* world a moral law, and you have connected the moral law with *all* worlds. This earth and all that is therein is the product of the heavens as surely as the fruit is the product of the tree. For all that is developed here below the starry spaces are accountable; whatever has its life on earth has its pedigree in the heavens. Dissonance is out of the question—it has ceased to be a possible thought. If you find a moral law written in your heart, and if you can trace that inscription to a process of earthly evolution, you will be bound to trace it farther back still; for the earth is itself the result of heavenly forces, and the terrestrial development has its root in the celestial glory.

Do we, then, find that what we call the moral law is the result of earthly evolution; in other words, is the scientific process of the present world a process of morality? I maintain that it is, and will try to prove it. But there is a preliminary question which must first be answered. What *is* morality? What *is* that law which man finds written in his heart? I will take the answer of science, and see if it squares with the answer of religion. Let Herbert Spencer

be the interpreter. In his great work, *The Data of Ethics*, he maintains that the root of all morality is sympathy. The word which in modern times is used to indicate this sympathy is "Altruism." Altruism is the opposite of selfishness or individualism; it is the term used to denote the life for others. To say, then, that sympathy is the root of virtue is to say that all virtue relates to Man's duty towards his brother man—not his conduct towards himself. In this view I entirely concur. I do not think that anything is entitled to the name of moral which has not a reference to the life of another. There are virtues which consist in personal self-restraint; but to make them virtues their motive must be *impersonal*. Economy is not a virtue unless it is prompted by altruism. If I am hoarding for myself, my deed is outside the moral life; I am still in this respect on a level with the earliest animal world. Or, take self-sacrifice. This too involves a personal restraint; but it is valuable just in so far as its motive is *impersonal*. Nothing makes self-sacrifice a virtue but its view to the benefit of another. If I give my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. No amount of sacrifice, no amount of privation, no amount of toil, will lift an act one inch nearer to the standard of morality if that act has not been prompted by the motive of Altruism. The man who struggles for his own mutilation is not a whit higher in the scale than the man who struggles for his own pleasure. Nothing sanctifies the sacrifice of self but the desire to serve another—be that other Divine or human. Neither the Epicurean pursuit of gain nor the Buddhist pursuit of loss is in itself a state of morality. Either of them may *become* so. If I seek gain for another's enrichment, if I seek loss for another's salvation, I have lifted both states into morality—but I have done it by the power of Altruism.

Now, I wish to point out that in this identification of

morality with sympathy Mr. Spencer is at one with the great lawgiver of the Old Testament and the greater Lawgiver of the New. There are two documents which stamp respectively the moral attitudes of Moses and Jesus; the one is the law of Sinai, the other is the fragment popularly known as the Lord's Prayer. And these two are one in their main feature; they both found morality upon Altruism. Moses says, "Thou shalt love the Lord with all thy heart, and thy neighbour as thyself"; Jesus says, "*Our Father, which art in heaven.*" Moses expresses himself in the form of law, Jesus gives His code in the form of aspiration; but both strike one initial and common keynote—Altruism. It is more remarkable in the case of Jesus than in the case of Moses. Moses is dealing with the relation of man to man, and therefore it is natural that Altruism should be emphasized. But Jesus is dealing with the most individual of all moments—the hour of prayer. Here, if anywhere, we should expect the man to be alone and divided from all beside. Such is not the case. The individual man is bidden to forget his individuality precisely in that act which is supposed to be his most private privilege. When he has entered the secret place of devotion and shut the door to be alone with God, he is commanded to reopen the door that his prayers may embrace the multitude. He is told to strike the note of Altruism, not Egoism. He is to say, "*Our Father.*" He is not to follow the common method of praying first for himself and then for others. He is to have no prayer for himself exclusively. Before he asks anything at all, he is to consider how the granting of his petition will affect other people. The document called the Lord's Prayer—professedly the Christian model for all prayer—is the most altruistic document in the world, and every time it is repeated in the Christian Church the Christian Church pledges itself to the cause of Altruism.

There is, then, a perfect agreement between science and

religion as to the identification of morality with sympathy. The Christian Church would say, "Sin is a transgression of the law of God"; Mr. Herbert Spencer would say, "Sin is a transgression of the law of Altruism." But, in the light of the Christian doctrine that God is Love, these mean the same thing. To the Christian Church and the modern scientist alike, sin is selfishness and morality is socialness. In the view of both, the best man is the most sympathetic man—the man best adjusted to his social environment. Here, then, is a common starting-point—*morality is sympathy*; and we are now in a position to advance. The next question is, Where does sympathy come from? How do we reach it? Is it an original element of life, or is it the result of education—of evolution? Is it born, or is it made? Is it a root, or is it a fruit? Has it been the sower of the precious seeds that lie within the heart, or is it itself the last result of the sowing—the latest flower of the garden?

On this subject there is a discrepancy between the popular view and the scientific view. The popular view is that we become social through sympathy; the scientific view is that we become sympathetic through society. The one holds that we are drawn into companies by a mutual feeling of regard; the other holds that we are drawn into companies by compulsion, and that mutual regard comes afterwards. The one says, "A hereditary bias has driven men into companionship"; the other says, "Men have been forced to unite by the necessities of life, and the union has created a hereditary sympathetic bias." The former is the typical view of the poet; the latter is the doctrine of Mr. Herbert Spencer.

As to which of these is right I will not here inquire. My personal opinion has undergone a change in the matter. At first I was strongly disposed to the poetic view; latterly I have gone over to the side of Herbert Spencer. But there is one point on which I have no doubt. I feel

quite convinced that the Altruism of the *New Testament* is based upon the Spencerian principle. Let us consider the facts. Christianity is professedly the attempt to establish a kingdom of Altruism—a kingdom in which love for others will dominate all selfish considerations, in which the least shall be the greatest, in which the one shall give his life for the many. That is the character of the kingdom which Christ designed to set up in the world, which to some extent He has set up in the world. But now I would direct attention to a very remarkable point. *How* does Christ propose to set up this kingdom of Altruism? Does He publish a manifesto inviting all the sympathetic men in Galilee to come together for the salvation of mankind? On the contrary, He does not make His first appeal to sympathy at all. He asks men to come together for their *own* salvation. He appeals to their personal need. He does not require a certain character as the condition of entrance into His kingdom. He only asks willingness to be enrolled. The first citizens of the Christian commonwealth come together for *worldly* considerations. They come through the hope of alleviating their earthly burdens, of finding rest from their labour and their ladenness. They come on the chance of being individually cured. In a sense they are "*compelled* to come in"—driven into fellowship as the cattle are driven by the storm. The earliest subjects of the kingdom of Christ are united in brotherhood by no other motive than the exigencies of life.

And yet from this unlikely beginning there has eventually emerged the most altruistic kingdom that has ever flashed before the human eye or floated before the human imagination—a kingdom which has almost heralded the *birth* of charity, which has found for the first time a place for the poor and needy, and vindicated against oppression the rights of man as Man. Christian sympathy has not originated

Christian contact ; yet it has been the result of that contact. Altruism has come from union. Men brought together by a common interest have remained together through a mutual interest. We become benevolent to the things which have blessed us ; we associate them with the joy of a special place and time. By-and-by the place and time are forgotten, and we love them for themselves alone. Man sought his brother for protection of himself ; he became benevolent to his brother on account of that protection ; he transmitted to his children the *feeling* of the benevolence without the memory of its cause. That is the Altruism of the Christian commonwealth ; that is the Altruism of Mr. Herbert Spencer.

Let us now see how, according to the doctrine of Evolution, the course of Nature has *developed* the kingdom of Altruism. If we give attention to the process, we shall dismiss forever the notion that Nature is indifferent to morality. And I would have you observe at the outset that Altruism is not the *original* law of life. By the admission of Mr. Spencer the original law of life is the opposite—individualism or selfishness. The first thing organic nature did was to pour forth a swarm of individual lives which had no sense of relation to one another. Each of the primitive creatures was an isolated unit. So far as consciousness went, each form was like Melchisedek—without father or mother or descent. Its life dwelt apart from other lives. It knew no tie—not even the rudimentary tie of parental instinct. The most prolific sphere of the world's inhabitants was precisely the sphere of the least Altruism—the sphere where each existence was an island—held within itself by the environment of a surrounding sea whose waves were traversed by no sail of sympathy.

Now, this is what I call the origin of evil ; that is to say, it is the origin of that which in the future was to be *termed* evil. The first condition of life was a condition of selfish-

ness ; and selfishness was in the future to become sin. Why in the future ? Why would no man dream of saying that these primitive creatures were leading a mean and degraded life ? Simply because there can be no valley where there is no mountain. Selfishness is not sin in a moneron. It is not merely that the moneron knows no better ; there is no better to be known. There can be no degradation where there is no height. Individualism was born before Altruism ; and as long as Altruism was unborn, individualism was blameless—it was the law of Nature. Yet it was not the perfect law, the final law. There is a saying, “ Self-preservation is the law of Nature ” ; and I firmly believe it. But the whole question is, What is the *self* ? The moneron’s self is the tiny life compressed within its own body ; the man’s self is co-extensive with his love. Self-preservation means something very different in the latter case from what it signifies in the former. Evolution does not propose to alter the principle of *self-preservation* ; it proposes to extend the dimensions of the *self* ; my definition of Altruism is simply “ the sense of a *larger self*.” That is what Nature has to create in the process of evolution. It exists not from the *beginning* ; individualism is first in the field. To be first in the field gives selfishness an advantage in the race—an advantage of which it has most powerfully availed itself. Evolution has found hard the task of overtaking it, of surpassing it. The progress has been slow ; and the difficulty of the journey tends to confirm my view of the alliance between Evolution and Morality.

Altruism, indeed, has not waited for the coming of Man. It has had its premonitions in the animal world. The first creation, as we have seen, was purely individual. But by-and-by the island life became bridged at certain points. The creatures began to gather into companies—some through fear, some for shelter, some for food. I doubt not that at first their meeting was conscious ; but heredity

made it instinctive. They would forget the original motive for their union—the dread of individual helplessness, the need of co-operation in their labours, the sense of safety in the sight of numbers. They would forget all this, and remember only as a united result the joy of animal brotherhood.

Every swarm of bees, every band of swallows, is to me a proof of the moral attitude of Nature—the altruistic attitude of Nature. Whatever perturbations brought them together, they are now complacent together—humming together, journeying together. And the proof is all the stronger from the fact that they were not always together. Their union is a conquest; they have won it. That which they possess of the kingdom of Altruism has been secured by war—by struggle. The first stage of evolution was opposed to their Altruism. It was a state of individualism, of separateness, of isolation. They have had to make their way *against* this difficulty, in the teeth of this difficulty. They have *made* that way; and the fact seems to me to indicate a purpose on the part of Nature. If it is a purpose at all, it is a moral purpose. It is Altruism. It is the effort to lead the individual out of his individualism. In the light of such an aim we can no longer assume that Nature is morally indifferent. We have not, indeed, reached the crowning proof of the contrary; that only comes with Man. But we see already the bias of Nature, and it is a significant bias. It is the tendency to set the solitary in families, to combine units into groups, to force separate lives to live in masses. Already, before the birth of Man, Egoism and Altruism are at war in Nature; the Life of Man continues the battle, but transfers it to a new field.

That field is the Human Soul itself. Hitherto the tendency to be gregarious and the tendency to be alone have been represented by two different sets of animals. But now these tendencies are to be represented in a single

life—the heart of an individual man. The human soul is the heir to both. On the one hand it has more need of Altruism than any other creature of the earth. Its long infancy, its protracted helplessness, its declining instinctive power, its comparatively slow attainment of its normal stature, its need to learn the road which previous generations had been able to traverse blindfold—all make it imperative that it should lean on the support of others. On the other hand it retains an individual will—a will to individualism. If it gets Altruism by personality, it gets selfishness by heredity. If present need impels it to come out into the life of others, the inveterate bias of the past constrains it to keep within its own life. There is a law in its members warring against the law of its mind. Yesterday strives with to-day; the old years impede the new hour; the influence of the ancestral stream resists the might of the coming wave.

And the result is that the journey of Man is to be an uphill journey. The kingdom of Altruism which stretches before him is to be slowly won. His progress to his rightful throne is to be no triumphal march; it is to be compassed with difficulties and surrounded with dangers. Not by instinct is Man to proceed to his destined goal. Instinct is against him. Instinct makes for the old régime—the animal régime. His advance into the kingdom of Altruism must be initiated by reason—worldly reason. Doubtless in the fulness of the time his Altruism will *also* become an instinct—the instinct we call Love. But the time is not yet. Man has to approach the multitude for the sake of the loaves. His sympathy is yet in a state of paralysis; he needs a material support; he has to be carried on a bed. He is to be drawn to his brother by a series of slow marches, each prompted by some exigency of his own; and the final stage of brotherhood is to be reached by the converging of roads that seem to lead to no goal.

And yet Man is to find a point of Altruism which is to place him practically in a new sphere of creation—a point of Altruism which is to constitute for him a unique pre-eminence among the creatures of the earth. Nature is to vindicate, in the man, that moral purpose which she has prefigured in the animal. Throughout the whole process the law of self-preservation will remain unbroken; but the self is henceforth to include its brother. The house which once consisted of many rooms is to be made one room by the breaking down of its interior walls. The process will be gradual; it will be slow; it will be resisted. The inner walls of the House of Humanity will not fall like the walls of Jericho—instantaneously at the blast of trumpets. The crisis will come by no blast, but by the reiterated knocking of the ages. None the less will the end be sure. The goal of Humanity is that Man shall love his neighbour as himself, that is, as a part of himself, as a member of his own body. It was a goal for which physical necessity might prepare, but which physical necessity could never constitute. The needs of life could bring the multitude together, but they could not feed the multitude. The feeding of that multitude with the Bread of Altruism implies “a Power not ourselves which makes for righteousness.” It indicates the fulfilment of a definite purpose on the part of that Primal Force which lies at the base of all things. The expansion of the consciousness of self demands the presence and the action of an agency beyond the physical. The nature of this expansion will be considered in the succeeding study.

G. MATHESON.

THE THEOLOGY OF THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.

IV.

THE GOSPEL A DIVINE RIGHTEOUSNESS.

THE study of St. Paul's doctrine of sin, with its correlated ideas of law, wrath, the flesh and death, enables us to understand the situation which the gospel has to meet. It is not man without qualification to whom it is addressed, but sinful men, and men whose sin has the constitutional, desperate and fatal character which we have seen. It is such men who are confronted with the problem: How shall we be righteous with God? They can find no answer for it. The answer, when it is found, is a *revelation* (ch. i. 17); it comes from heaven, and bears the name not of men but of God. "I am not ashamed of the gospel . . . a righteousness of God is revealed in it."

Whatever the righteousness of God may be in itself, it is surely clear that it is something of which we must eventually be the subjects. In whatever sense it is God's, there must be some sense in which it also becomes ours. It is we sinners who have to be justified by it, and if it were not available for our justification there would be no gospel in it for us. The Apostle expresses this in various ways. The connexion of vv. 22 and 24 in chap. iii. implies that it is in virtue of this *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* revealed in the gospel that we are justified. In chap. v. 17 he speaks of "the abundance of the gift of righteousness." In 2 Corinthians v. 21 he argues that the end of all God's reconciling work—the very meaning of the death of His Son—is that *we* should become the righteousness of God in Him. It is a fixed point therefore to begin with, that whatever *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* may be, abstractly considered, the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* which is the content of the gospel revelation is something which is

destined to become man's. But what does this phrase mean, into which Paul condensed the whole of Christianity?

One set of attempts to explain it proceeds, it may be said, philologically. It assumes that *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* must mean what it bears on its face: the righteousness which belongs to God, which is His essential attribute, an integral element in His nature or His character. In this sense, however, a revelation of the righteousness of God would only mean a revelation that God was righteous; and it may well be doubted whether such a revelation would constitute a gospel for men in the condition described by Paul. Hence it is usually assumed that the revelation of God's righteousness in the gospel includes in particular a revelation of the fact that this righteousness is not self-contained, so to speak, but self-communicating; it is God's, but it issues forth from God and imparts itself to men. Sometimes, as for instance in Sanday and Headlam's *Commentary* (p. 35), this is connected with passages in Isaiah which speak of God's righteousness as "going forth"; or, to use the language of these scholars, "as projected from the Divine essence and realizing itself among men." Without raising the question whether the Old Testament writer meant anything of this kind when he spoke of God's righteousness as "going forth," the religious truth of the conception which is thus associated with St. Paul's phrase need not be disputed. It conveys the same lesson as our Lord's word to the young ruler: "There is none good but one, that is, God." All goodness comes from Him; in men it is a stream fed from that central fountain. St. Paul would have been the last man in the world to deny this, but it may fairly be questioned whether the conception stands in a sufficiently close relation to the necessities of sinful men to constitute a gospel; and so far as the writer is aware, no one has even attempted to connect it in any specific way

with St. Paul's conception of the cross. It is by no means equal to the requirements of the case to say with Sanday and Headlam that to St. Paul "it seems a necessity that the righteousness of God should be not only inherent but energizing, that it should impress and diffuse itself as an active force in the world"; and then to add to this, as by way of supplement, that there is "one signal manifestation" of it, "the nature of which it is difficult for us wholly to grasp, in the death of Christ." This is not merely "one signal manifestation" of it; on the contrary, so far as the righteousness of God in St. Paul constitutes his gospel, it has no meaning whatever but that which it has as manifested at the cross. We may be getting to know God, perhaps, but we are certainly not getting to understand the Apostle, when we provide an indefinite background like this for the glad tidings of "Jesus Christ and Him crucified." St. Paul's gospel—for *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* is his gospel in brief—is something far more specific than the idea that God's righteousness overflows upon man, or that God makes us partakers in His own character, and does so the more eagerly and urgently because otherwise we have no character at all. The ultimate objection to such an interpretation of the righteousness of God is that it does not appreciate the ethical character of the situation. To St. Paul, the problem presented to God by the sin of the world is a moral problem of tremendous difficulty, and it is hardly too much to say that this is an attempt to solve it by ignoring the moral difficulties altogether. The righteousness of God is here conceived as acting after the analogy of a physical force. It "goes out," "energizes," "diffuses itself," as the light and heat of the sun, irrespective of moral conditions. It is its nature to do so and it can never do anything else. But in spite of the Biblical comparison of God to the sun, moral problems can never be solved by the categories of physics, and the gospel of St. Paul grapples far more closely with

the moral necessities of the case. His δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ as concentrated in Christ crucified has essential relations to sin and law and death which are here left out of sight.

Another attempt or series of attempts to get at the meaning of the expression may be distinguished from the last as historical. It aims at establishing a connexion in import as well as in form between St. Paul's language and that of the Old Testament. Its most distinguished representative was Ritschl, and it has been elaborately set out again by the lexicographer Cremer in his *Paulinische Rechtfertigungslehre*. Not that Cremer is entirely at one with Ritschl: indeed he pursues him all along with a sort of protesting criticism, the relevance or justice of which it is often not easy to discern. But they agree in trying to attach Paul's sense as well as his words to the Old Testament in something like the following fashion. They point out that God's righteousness is manifested when He acts as judge, and that when He does so it is always to see right done, to vindicate those who are in the right, to establish righteousness in the earth. Ritschl illustrates this conception principally from the Psalms: a notable instance is Psalm xxxv. 23-28: "Judge me, O Lord my God, according to thy righteousness: and let them not rejoice over me. . . . Let them shout for joy, and be glad, that favour my righteous cause" (literally, my righteousness). . . . And my tongue shall talk of thy righteousness and of thy praise all the day long." Here the righteousness of God is that principle in the Divine nature in virtue of which God cannot suffer wrong to triumph over right; when His people are wronged, it is in virtue of His righteousness that He vindicates or, as it may be expressed, justifies them. He pleads their cause and puts them in the right before all. Hence the appeals which we have in the Old Testament to the righteousness of God, not as something to be dreaded by His people, but as their one sure hope.

“In thee, O Lord, do I put my trust . . . deliver me in thy righteousness” (Ps. xxxi. 1). “Quicken me, O Lord, for thy name’s sake : in thy righteousness bring my soul out of trouble” (Ps. cxliii. 11). Hence also the use of the word “righteousnesses” to describe the great acts in which God interposed in His people’s cause and maintained their right in the world : “There shall they rehearse the righteousnesses of the Lord”—the various manifestations of His righteousness—“the righteousnesses of his rule in Israel” (Judg. v. 11 ; cf. 1 Sam. xii. 7). And hence also the combination, so frequent in the latter half of the Book of Isaiah, of righteousness and salvation. “My salvation is near to come, and my righteousness to be revealed” (Isa. lvi. 1). “My salvation shall be for ever, and my righteousness shall not be abolished” (Isa. li. 6).

In the line of passages like these it is argued, especially by Ritschl, that God’s righteousness is no abstract, and especially no legal retributive justice, but essentially gracious. It is not something to which justice must be done in order that grace may be free to act ; it is itself grace in action for the vindication or justification of the people of God. It is in this sense that *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* is to be interpreted in St. Paul.

Here again, as in the former instance, we may admit the religious truth of the representation. Granted that it is God’s people with whom we have to deal, and especially God’s people wronged by the world, we can understand that God’s righteousness is that to which they would appeal for salvation. Like Christ, reviled and insulted, they would commit themselves to Him who judges righteously (1 Pet. ii. 23) and trust in Him to plead their cause. Paul perhaps has this connexion of ideas in mind when he refers to the persecutions and afflictions endured by the Thessalonians as “a manifest token of the righteous judgment of God” (2 Thess. i. 5) : they speak plainly of the way in which the

Righteous Judge must interpose to do the injured believers justice and to punish their foes. Even when there is no conception of a hostile world against which the cause of God's people has to be made good, we find the righteousness of God spoken of in a way to which Ritschl can appeal in support of his interpretation. Wherever there is a people of God at all, there is a relation between them and God which involves obligations on both sides, and God's fidelity to these obligations is called His righteousness. It may have its most signal manifestation when His people have been false to the obligations on their side, and in this case it is closely related to the forgiveness of sins. God does not renounce His people when they err or sin in human frailty and then come to Him in penitence; He fulfils the covenant obligations as far as they are binding on Him, and He shows His righteousness in doing so. This is the explanation of those combinations which at first surprise a modern reader: "Deliver me from bloodguiltiness, O God, thou God of my salvation; and my tongue shall sing aloud of thy righteousness," i.e. of Thy fidelity to all that is involved in the promise to be the God of Israel (Ps. li. 14); or the precisely similar passage in the New Testament: "If we confess our sins, he is faithful and righteous to forgive us our sins"; i.e. true to the obligations involved in His relation to us as Christians (1 John i. 9). In passages like these a righteousness of God is undoubtedly spoken of which is a gracious thing and which is exhibited in the forgiveness of sins: the only question to be answered is whether it can be identified off-hand with that *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* which is Paul's gospel to a world lost in sin.

To the present writer it does not seem doubtful that the answer must be in the negative. In every case to which this line of interpretation can appeal, the righteousness of God is manifested in relation to a people of God. God

does right by them, it may be in achieving their deliverance from oppressors—this is “salvation” in the sense of the Old Testament; it may be in forgiving the sins of which they repent, and which are not in themselves a renunciation of their covenant with Him. No doubt the righteousness of God in this sense is sometimes spoken of as manifested to the world. “The Lord hath made known his salvation : his righteousness hath he openly shewed in the sight of the nations” (Ps. xcvi. 2). But this does not mean what Paul means when he speaks of the gospel of a divine righteousness being made known to all nations for the obedience of faith; it means that God has delivered His people from their enemies, and given an unmistakable demonstration on the stage of universal history of His fidelity to His covenant. “All the ends of the earth have seen the salvation of our God” (Ps. xcvi. 3) means “have seen the salvation he has wrought *for us*”; “the mercy and the faithfulness” which He has “remembered toward the house of Israel.” There is nothing here of the nature of gospel to those who are not the people of God. In spite of parallelism of language, there is not in such passages any real correspondence of thought with St. Paul. He does not preach his gospel to people who can make appeal to God to do right by them : he preaches to those who are hopelessly in the wrong before God. He does not preach to those who can think of themselves as somehow God’s people, and who can count on God’s fidelity to all that this means; he preaches to those who are not God’s people, who can count on nothing, and to whom his gospel is the one unqualified miracle of the world. And the righteousness of God which he preaches is neither the vindication of the good when they are wronged, nor the faithfulness of God to His people even when they have failed in their duty to Him. It is something far more wonderful and profound. It is a righteousness infinitely

more gracious and more compelling than either — a righteousness *which puts the ungodly in the right* (chap. iv. 5), and constitutes into a people of God those who lay under His judgement (chap. iii. 19). A righteousness like this, if such a thing can be, is unmistakably glad tidings for a sinful world ; it is a genuine gospel for those who need a gospel ; and this, one may venture to say, is not yielded by either of the other interpretations. This too, it is not too much to add, is decisive : the evangelist is in the last resort the judge of evangelical theology. If it does not serve his purpose it is not true.

To grasp the Apostle's meaning, it is necessary to follow the exposition which he himself gives of it in chap. iii. 21 ff. and to remember at the same time that when Old Testament words are used in the New Testament they cease *ipso facto* to be Old Testament words and carry in them a New Testament meaning. We take for granted only what has already been made clear : that this righteousness, which is at least named after God has God, as its source, that it eventually becomes man's, and that when this is accomplished man is justified—right with God and right in God's judgement ; and with these assumptions we proceed to an examination of the classical passage (ch. iii. 21-26).

We notice first that the Divine righteousness of the gospel is manifested *χωρὶς νόμου*, apart from law. This does not mean that it has no relation to the universal moral elements in the relations of God and man ; on the contrary, it is part of the Apostle's object to prove that in the way in which this righteousness comes justice is done to all these elements, so that God in revealing it not only "justifies" the believer in Jesus but is Himself "just." The new religion may be *χωρὶς νόμου*, but it does not annul law ; it sets law on its feet (iii. 31). It is *χωρὶς νόμου* in the sense in which a Jew laid stress on his fulfilment of

the law, or a Gentile on his life according to the law of nature, as constituting a claim upon God, in response to which He must acknowledge them to be in the right or righteous before Him: for the Divine righteousness which the gospel proclaims all men have to become God's debtors: it is a Divine gift, not a human achievement. It is *χωρὶς νόμου* only in the sense that to its presence in the world man's fulfilment of law contributes nothing.

Although it is *χωρὶς νόμου* it is "witnessed to by the law and the prophets," that is, by the Old Testament. Although the gospel is a new revelation belonging to the present age (*νυνὶ δὲ* v. 21, *ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ* v. 26), Paul is aware that revelation from first to last is a unity, and therefore consistent with itself. It is one God who is revealing Himself in it all along. In an age when criticism is illustrating the differences of a formal kind which exist in the record of revelation, this is a truth to be emphasized. The Old Testament and the New Testament are at bottom one, and will stand or fall together. It is their oneness which is the ultimate proof of their divinity. The unity of Scripture and its inspiration are correlative terms, and its unity consists in this, that it all attests the gospel. It is a complete mistake to try to solve difficulties about inspiration by striking out here and there what is not inspired, or by distinguishing a human element from the Divine (as if there were anything in Scripture which was not thoroughly human even while Divine), or by attempting to grade the various Scriptures according to the degree of inspiration they exhibit: we believe Scripture to be inspired because when we approach it with the one question on the answer to which the possibility of religion depends—How shall a sinful man be just with God?—from first to last it has one and the same answer. And because Scripture is the only authority in the world which has a consistent and convincing answer to give, we believe that inspiration

belongs to it alone. We ought to notice in passing that the particular Scriptures to which Paul refers in support of this assertion are not those of which such copious use has been made by writers like Ritschl, Häring, Cremer, Sanday and Headlam, and others, to explain the antecedents and associations of his phrase *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*. He does not quote any of the numerous passages from the Psalms or II. Isaiah in which God's righteousness is spoken of as "going forth," and has been represented as "energizing," or "enclosing and gathering into itself human wills." Probably he did not read the Psalms and Isaiah in this sense; at all events it is by appeal to passages of quite a different kind that he demonstrates the consistency of the Christian gospel with the ancient revelation of God.

The Divine righteousness of the gospel thus asserted becomes available for men—becomes men's in short, so that they stand right with God in virtue of it—through faith. It is a righteousness of God through faith in Jesus Christ coming to or extending over all who have faith. What faith means as the appropriation of the Divine righteousness will be considered in next paper; here it is only referred to for the light it casts on the nature of that righteousness itself. It emphasizes the fact that it is a gift, something which men may receive but which they cannot produce. If "the gift of righteousness" is the true way to describe it (*v.* 17), then the only way to have it as our own must be to "take" it. It cannot be ours if we leave it, and we are not able to earn it. This is what is implied in the emphasis here laid on faith.

At *v.* 24, as is well known, there is a certain irregularity in the Apostle's grammar, but the connexion of his ideas is not obscured. The sentence beginning *δικαιούμενοι δωρεὰν τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι* is virtually an exegesis of the 22nd verse. When sinful men believe in Jesus Christ, and the Divine righteousness manifested in Him becomes theirs, this is

what happens: they are justified freely by God's grace. They become right with Him, righteous in His sight, and they owe it to His pure unearned goodness. He has brought into being and put within the sinner's reach the very thing the sinner needs, and which, though he cannot produce, he can still appropriate—a "righteousness," namely, which because it is of God is properly described by His name, *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*, and not by the name of those for whom it is destined.

Paul cannot speak of the grace which underlies the gift of righteousness without going on to magnify it. That is what he does when he says that we are justified freely by His grace "through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus." It is possible to argue that what *ἀπολύτρωσις* (redemption) suggests is not the cost of liberation or emancipation, but the fact. Certainly the fact suggested by the word is not to be overlooked; to overlook it is to miss the meaning of justification. To be justified freely by God's grace is to be emancipated from a former state and its liabilities; it is to have our relation to God and our standing with Him changed, no longer determined by such powers and expressed in such words as Sin, Condemnation, Curse, Law, Death, but determined by Christ alone. But whenever we say "by Christ alone,"—whenever we think of the *ἀπολύτρωσις* as being *ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*—the cost of it comes into view. Paul preached no vague and unembodied redemption to sinful men; the Divine righteousness which he offered, and which meant this great emancipation from law, sin and death, he could only offer in Christ, and, as the next words show, in Christ crucified. There are modern theologians who hold that the Son has no place in the gospel, which is simply the revelation of the Father; but their gospel is certainly not that of the greatest of Apostles. He did not preach his "Divine righteousness," referring casually, as he might think it necessary or becoming, to Christ's authority; he

preached a redemption *in Christ Jesus*, he preached Christ as Himself made righteousness to us.

Nor is he content with a merely impressionist view of Christ, as it has been called; he thinks out the problems involved in the sinner's emancipation and justification in Him; he unfolds that interpretation of Christ which explains His power and sovereignty in his own heart and gives him His gospel of justification to preach; Christ Jesus he says, *whom God set forth as a propitiation through faith in His blood*. Alike by those who accept and by those who reject it this is felt to be the heart of St. Paul's theology and of his gospel. Happily for him the two things did not fall apart. The profoundest truth he knew was the most joyful message he could proclaim. Happily too he did not feel it necessary to apologize for the love of God; it did not seem incredible to him that that love should do things for men, in Christ, that fill the soul with fear and wonder. "By terrible things in righteousness wilt thou answer us, O God of our salvation." We can admit that when St. Paul wrote, "Christ Jesus, whom God set forth as a propitiation in his blood," he touched on one of the ultimate truths which, as Dr. Hort says, become apparent not by the light we can shed on them, but by the light which they shed upon everything else; but even so he does not leave us unable to grasp his meaning. No doubt it has points of attachment in the Old Testament. Stress need not be laid on the fact that the LXX uses *ἱλαστήριον* to translate *רִצְוֹן*, the "mercy seat" of our English version; if St. Paul had meant this he must have indicated it more definitely. But when he combined the two expressions *ἱλαστήριον* and *ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι* he certainly conceived of Christ's death as sacrificial; none but sacrificial blood had propitiatory power. The question remains however: Does it carry us any way into his mind to say so? Do we know what he meant or felt when he assimilated the death of Christ to a sacrifice?

Does he read the meaning out of the sacrificial system into the death of Christ, or, having discovered the profound import of Christ's death, does he suddenly become aware that here is the one sacrifice by which propitiation is made for ever, and adopt the language of the ancient ritual to find access for his thought to his hearers' minds?

In so far as these questions invite us to follow the psychological genesis of Paul's thoughts we probably do not require to answer them. One point is clear: he saw himself, and taught his contemporaries to see, an essential correspondence between the death of Jesus and the propitiatory sacrifices of the Old Testament. But in what did that correspondence consist? It consisted in this, that in both cases a connexion was assumed between the sacrificial death and sin. The victim's death was in the last resort due to sin: to put it in the simplest possible form, it was a death for sin. It is not unusual to hear this peremptorily denied, and the legitimacy of putting Christ's death in any relation to the ancient sacrificial system summarily ruled out of court. Wellhausen's *obiter dictum* that the cultus is the pagan element in the religion of Israel has met with a wonderfully wide and uncritical acceptance even among evangelical theologians. But it has the falsehood of all epigrams written on its face. The cultus in the religion of Israel is like the cultus in any other; it is pagan or something else than pagan, just as the religion does not or does possess the power to interpret, to spiritualize, to transfigure it. "Purge me with hyssop, and I shall be clean: wash me, and I shall be whiter than snow." That is the language inspired by the cultus, and interpreting it; is there anything pagan in that? No doubt an institution like sacrifice would mean many different things in the course of its long history. It would mean one thing in the primitive ages explored by Robertson Smith, another in those to which the later strata

of the Pentateuch belonged ; one thing to the man who killed his victim with his knife, but how much more to the man who, to use the words of a great preacher, killed it with his soul ! It is not necessary to go into these distinctions, nor when we consider the extent to which the ritual and sacrificial elements in the Old Testament have served to mould alike the religious thinking and the adoring worship of the New—recall only the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Book of Revelation—can we take seriously the proposal to set them aside as pagan and irrelevant to Christianity. The simple truth is that here, at the very heart of his gospel, in interpreting the one truth on which the hope of sinful men depends, Paul finds no language to express himself in but language prompted by the sacrificial system. And when the other New Testament writers come to the same place they do the same thing. In John, it is “ Behold the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world.” In Peter, “ He bore our sins in his own body to the tree ”—“ a lamb without blemish and without spot.” In Hebrews, “ He put away sin by the sacrifice of himself.” And the Apocalypse is full of “ a lamb as it had been slain.” The idea in all this is not ambiguous : it is that the death of Christ is essentially related to sin—has to be defined by relation to it, as the death of the propitiatory sacrifice had to be. When Paul says here that “ God set forth Christ a propitiation in His blood,” he only allows for a moment what for his readers at least is the illuminating idea of atoning sacrifice to fall upon the death of Christ. But what he means is precisely what he means when he says in other places, without the sacrificial figure, “ Christ died for our sins ; God made him to be sin for us ; he became a curse for us ; he was delivered up for our offences.” All that sin meant for us—all that in sin and through it had become ours—God made His, and He made His own, in death. He *died* for us. This death, *defined as it must be*

by relation to our sins, is that in virtue of which Jesus Christ is a propitiation for sin. Without it and without this interpretation of it St. Paul would have no gospel to preach. The word has been abused, and false inferences have been drawn from it, but is there a word in the world which covers the essential truth of this gospel better than the word *substitution*? αὐτὸς ἡμῶν τὰς ἀμαρτίας ἀνένεγκεν, HE bore OUR sins.

Further light is thrown on the idea of propitiation when we notice the double purpose it secures. It is its aim and its result that God should be at once just and the justifier of him who believes in Jesus. This second result is the one which we should regard as being immediately in view—the securing of a Divine righteousness for the sinful. But it is the peculiarity of a propitiation that it does this in a way which at the same time secures the righteousness of God Himself. What does this mean? What is the righteousness of God Himself which has to be secured in this connexion? Is it His righteousness regarded as a self-imparting quality to which justice is not done as long as there is sin in the world which it has not overcome? We have already seen the limits of this conception, and there is no way of deducing from it the specific propitiation which Paul preaches, or indeed any propitiation whatever. A Divine righteousness is the gift which God offers to man in Christ for his salvation, but salvation—and especially the salvation of the New Testament—is never traced to the righteousness of God as its source. Is then the righteousness of God Himself, as one of the ends to be secured by the propitiation, that fidelity of God to His covenant obligations, which we have seen is sometimes the meaning of the word? The answer must again be in the negative: if this were the case, the distinction between δίκαιον and δικαιοῦντα would disappear; for according to this view it is precisely in justifying that God shows Himself faithful, in vindicating the

right of His people that He is exhibited as a righteous God. Setting aside then both of these interpretations, nothing remains but to look to the context. There we see that the righteousness of God Himself is conceived as something affected by "the passing over of the sins done aforetime in the forbearance of God." There has been in the moral administration of the world a temporary suspension of God's ultimate judgement on sin, and so far His righteousness has been obscured and may be called in question. It is not apparent, men may say, that God does judge sin with an uncompromising judgement. But according to the argument of St. Paul in this passage, a propitiation not only enables God to put the gift of a Divine righteousness within the sinner's reach, but at the same time to silence this doubt; even in justifying the guilty God's uncompromising judgement upon sin is set in the clearest light. Now what is the immediate inference from this when we consider that God has set forth Christ as a propitiation in His blood? It is that the death of Christ must be defined in relation to sin, and to God's ultimate judgement on sin, in such a way that no one looking at it and knowing what it means can say any longer God is not righteous; He is more or less indifferent to evil. It would not be a propitiation to St. Paul—it would lack one of the essential constituents of propitiatory virtue—if it did not embody unequivocally God's condemnation of sin. Hence such a condemnation is part of the essential significance of the Cross.

The Apostle does not expand his thoughts here, but the connexion of ideas cannot be mistaken. All that sin means for man—all the doom that it involves—is summed up in death, the awful experience in which God's condemnation of sin becomes finally real to conscience; and *He died* for us. He made our doom His own. He took our condemnation upon Himself. He did it in obedience to the will of the Father, and in doing so He acknowledged the justice

of the Divine order which binds together death and sin. No one who knows what He did can think again that God is indifferent to this order. On the contrary, its inviolableness is maintained even in bringing sinful men salvation. There is no such idea in Christianity as that of God condoning sin. God condones nothing: His mercy itself is of an absolute integrity. He is a righteous God, even in justifying the ungodly; and the propitiation which He sets forth in Christ Jesus, dying in His sinlessness the death of the sinful, is the key to the mystery.

Once more, is not the word which spontaneously rises to our lips to express this the word substitution? The aversion to it which prevails so widely has many causes. Partly it is due to its abuse, and if the abuse can be guarded against should not weigh in our minds. Partly it is one form of the aversion to the very idea of mediation in religion. Substitution is mediation in the most acute and defiant form and provokes the most vehement opposition from those who reject mediation *ab initio* and prefer religion without the sense of personal debt to Christ. Partly again it rests on what are regarded as distinctively moral grounds. Substitution is quite frankly pronounced immoral. It is not possible, without anticipating what has to be said in a later discussion of faith, to give the whole answer to the moral protest, but it is not too much to deprecate the summary and angry rejection of an idea which has played the part which substitution has in evangelical preaching, and which has, to say the least, such specious points of attachment in apostolic doctrine. What we usually mean by the sphere of morality is the sphere of mutual obligation; you are morally bound to do something for me and I for you, and we have a moral right to require the fulfilment of these bonds. Manifestly in the sphere of such relations there is no room for such an action as the death of Christ if it means what Paul takes it to mean.

But even human life gives scope for acts in which the limits of such moral obligation are transcended—acts which are not moral, but far higher than moral; acts immediately inspired of God, the understanding of which is to morality as the discovery of a fourth dimension would be to geometry. It is only in this sense that the substitution of Christ is not moral. It transcends the moral world because it has to recreate it. Substitution, in short, is mediation raised to its highest power, exalted and glorified by love to its most compelling intensity. No one who accepts the idea of mediation in religion at all is in the right to reject it *a priori* here. To do so is to declare that he can measure the love of God beforehand and tell all that it can or will do. But it is not beforehand that we know anything about redemption. “*Hereby perceive we love.*” Who could have told beforehand that a Divine righteousness would come to sinful men in Christ Jesus set forth by God as a propitiation in His blood?

JAMES DENNEY.

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

VI.

PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES. THE ETERNAL PUNISHMENT OF SIN.

IN former papers I have traced the popular and traditional doctrine of the endless permanence of all human souls to the teaching of Plato and to the school of Greek philosophers of which he is the most illustrious representative; and have endeavoured to prove that it was altogether alien from the phrase and thought of Christ and His Apostles so far as His teaching and theirs are embodied in the New Testament, and that it entered into, and subsequently became prevalent in, the Church mainly through the influence of Plato apparently in the latter part of the second century. We have also considered the teaching of several

modern theologians, but have not found any one who seriously endeavours to prove that the immortality of the soul is taught in the Bible.

In this paper I shall discuss a few passages in the Bible which shed some light on the nature of the human soul, the inferences we may fairly draw from them, and the bearing of these inferences and of the popular doctrine of the immortality of the soul on Christian thought, and especially on the ultimate doom of those who reject the Gospel of Christ.

In Genesis i. 26 man is raised conspicuously above all other creatures of God by the deliberate purpose, "Let Us make man in Our image, according to Our likeness," and by his destination to "rule among the fish of the sea and among the birds of the heaven and among the cattle and in all the earth"; by the careful and repeated statement in v. 27 of the accomplishment of this purpose; and by the blessing and command in v. 28. It is worthy of note that in chapter ix. 6, even after the fall, and again in James iii. 9, man is still said to be made in the likeness of God. All this calls attention to the superiority of man to the other animals: and this superiority resides chiefly, though not exclusively, in the soul of man.

The unique superiority of man, both body and soul, is further emphasized in chap. ii. 7, where he is said to have been formed out of dust by a definite act of God, and his soul is described as a special inbreathing of life from God.

That even fallen man is described as still made in the image of God, implies that this image was not altogether lost by sin. And we notice that man's intelligence and self-determination survived the fall. On the other hand, we read in Colossians iii. 10 that "the new man is renewed for knowledge, according to the image of Him that created him." This suggests irresistibly that the image of God included a moral likeness to the Creator.

Upon this image of God, light is shed by Romans viii. 29: "Whom He foreknew, He also foreordained to be conformed to the image of His Son, in order that He may be Firstborn among many brethren." We have here the eternal Father contemplating the eternal Son with absolute satisfaction, and resolving, before the world was, to surround Him with later born sons who, in created human form, will bear His image. In consequence of man's sin, this creative purpose involved the suffering and death of the eternal Archetype. But, when Paul wrote, the price had been paid; and he announces the coming accomplishment of the original creative purpose.

Casual references in the Old Testament, e.g. Ecclesiastes iii. 21, xii. 7, Job xxxii. 8, call attention to the dignity of man's spirit and to its essential superiority to the life of animals. But they do nothing to prove or suggest its endless permanence when, through man's obdurate disobedience, God's purpose of mercy towards the individual has been finally frustrated. For, throughout the New Testament, the eternal life promised by Christ is made conditional on faith and obedience: just as, in Genesis ii. 17, continuance of the life given in Paradise is made conditional on obedience to a specific Divine command.

Some Christian writers have endeavoured to support the doctrine that all human souls will think and feel for ever by metaphysical arguments derived, like those of Plato, from its immaterial and uncompounded nature. Others have suggested that, since sin is utterly against the creative purpose of God, its ultimate result must be to extinguish the rational existence which He has given. All such arguments seem to me valueless. For life and reason and sin are to us insoluble mysteries. Certainly He who out of nothing called the reasoning soul of man can, if He will, send it back to the non-existence from which it came. But the destruction threatened to those who reject the salvation

offered by Christ is no proof that He will do so. For in many cases objects said to be *destroyed* (see p. 132) evidently continue to exist without prospect of extinction. Our only sources of knowledge touching the ultimate destinies of men are the historic revelations from God recorded in the Bible and especially the supreme revelation given to us in Christ and recorded in the New Testament.

The Bible teaches clearly that man as created was destined by God to share His endless blessedness. But this by no means implies that every man will exist for ever even when existence has become an unmixed curse.

The real significance of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul is its bearing on the ultimate destiny of the wicked. This solemn subject demands now brief consideration.

The only clear passage in the Old Testament on this topic is Daniel xii. 2: "Many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to eternal life, and some to shame, to eternal abhorrence."

Throughout the New Testament, e.g. Matthew vii. 13, 14, xxv. 32-46, John iii. 16, v. 29, Romans ii. 7-12, 2 Thessalonians i. 7-9, Revelation xx. 12-15, we read of two paths, one leading to life eternal, and the other to destruction. This last denotes, as we saw on p. 132, utter ruin, the loss of all that gives worth to existence, whether or not the lost object ceases to exist or continues in a worthless existence.

Some other passages speak of this ruin as final. So Philippians iii. 19, "whose end is destruction"; 2 Corinthians xi. 15, "ministers of Satan, whose end will be according to their works; Hebrews vi. 8, "whose end is to be burnt." Finality is also implied in the frequent metaphor of the destruction of vegetable matter by fire. So Matthew iii. 12, "the chaff He will *burn up* with fire unquenchable"; chap. xiii. 30, "collect first the tares,

and bind them into bundles, to *burn* them up"; v. 40, "just as then the tares are gathered together and *burnt up* with fire, so shall it be at the completion of the age." This metaphor implies finality. For no one who had any hope or thought of their ultimate restoration could compare the doom of the wicked to chaff or weeds cast into the fire and there *burnt up*. Finality is also implied in Matthew xxvi. 24: "Good were it for him if that man had not been born." For if endless blessedness, even in some cases after long suffering, were the ultimate destiny of all men, existence would in every case be an ultimate blessing. These passages prove that universal salvation was far from the thought of their writers.

Other passages speak of the acute suffering of the lost. So Matthew viii. 12, xiii. 42, 50, xxii. 13, xxiv. 51, xxv. 30, Luke xiii. 28: "There shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth." Also chap. xvi. 23, 24, 25: "lifted up his eyes being in torments. . . . I am in anguish in this flame." But in these places nothing is said about the duration of the suffering.

The only passages in the Bible which suggest the endless suffering of the lost are the following:—

We have Daniel xii. 2, already quoted: "Many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to eternal life, and some to shame, to eternal abhorrence." This last word is found also in Isaiah lxvi. 24, as a description of the corpses of the wicked: "They shall be an abhorrence to all flesh." It describes, not suffering, which is far removed from our thought of a corpse, but the horror produced in the beholders. Such horror may continue, as a memory, long after the object which evoked it has passed away; but not after the object has been restored. The above passage cannot therefore be appealed to in proof of the endless suffering of the lost.

In Matthew xviii. 8, xxv. 41, we read of "eternal (or

age-lasting) fire." But this does not imply the endlessness of that which is cast into the fire. Indeed the same words are used in Jude 7 to describe the fire which destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah: "they lie before us as a pattern, undergoing just punishment of *eternal fire*." The fire was *age-lasting* in the sense that the desolation wrought by it lay before the eyes of Israel for long *ages*.

Another terrible picture of the future punishment of sin is found in Mark ix. 43-48. Our Lord here bids His hearers make any sacrifice, even surrender hand or foot or eye, rather than "go away into Gehenna." This last word, He at once expounds by the addition, "to the fire unquenchable." In a second warning we have simply the phrase "cast into Gehenna." In a third, we have the same phrase with the remarkable addition, "where their worm dies not, and the fire is not quenched."

This remarkable phrase recalls at once Isaiah lxvi. 24, already referred to above. The prophet sees a new heaven and a new earth. Yet, amid that glory, the glorified ones will go forth and behold the corpses of those who have sinned. The words before us suggest continuance of the awful spectacle. For, if there were no corpses to feed upon, the worm would die: and, if there were no fuel, the fire would be extinguished.

The easiest explanation of these words in Mark ix. 48 is that they were added to convey the idea of intense suffering, like that caused by the gnawing of a worm or by fire. For we have here no mention of "corpses." But the change from "will not die . . . will not be quenched" in Isaiah lxvi. 24 to the present tense in Mark ix. 48, "their worm does not die and the fire is not quenched," suggests continuous suffering in the present rather than endless suffering in the future. This change of tense and the difficulty of the metaphor forbid us to interpret this passage as an assertion of the endless torment of the lost.

Very conspicuous is the solemn announcement in Matthew xxv. 46, "these shall go away into *eternal punishment*, but the righteous into eternal life." We have already seen, on p. 130, that the word *eternal* denotes *age-lasting*, and is frequently in the Septuagint applied to objects whose duration is by no means endless. But its precise meaning in this passage is immaterial, because other passages in the New Testament imply, as we shall see, that the punishment of the wicked will be endless. This meaning however lies, not in the word, but in other New Testament teaching.

We now ask, Does *age-lasting punishment* involve age-lasting suffering? Already we have seen that in the Synoptist Gospels the punishment of the wicked includes acute suffering. And indisputably the word *age-lasting* describes the duration of the punishment, or at least of its effect. But the future punishment of sin will include, not only actual suffering, but loss of the endless blessedness for which all men were created. Consequently, whether or not the suffering continues, the punishment will be as lasting as the life forfeited. For punishment does not cease till the punished one is restored to the condition in which he would have been if he had not sinned. Consequently we need not fear the paradox that a man may be undergoing punishment even after he has ceased to exist: for, if loss of existence be a judicially inflicted consequence of sin, it is itself a punishment. Similarly, the civil penalty of death is not measured by the pain inflicted but by the loss of life. No one thinks, apart from retribution beyond the grave, that the punishment is over when the criminal is dead. This is well put by Augustine in his *City of God*, book xxi. 11: "He who for some great crime is punished with death, do the laws reckon his punishment by the space of time in which he is put to death, which is very brief, and not by this, that he is removed for ever from the society of the living?" *In sempiternum auferunt de societate viventium.*

Just so, whatever becomes of the lost, their punishment continues so long as they are not restored to the favour and life of God. In other words, the phrase *eternal punishment* does not imply, and the verse before us does not assert, endless suffering.

A still more tremendous vision of punishment is found in Revelation xiv. 9-11: "If any one worships the beast and his image, and receives a mark on his forehead or on his hand, also he shall drink of the wine of the fury of God." These last words describe the stupefying effect of this punishment. The strange collocation of words following, "which is mixed unmixed in the cup of His anger," suggests a combination of different elements together with undiluted intensity. This terrible description of suffering is then strengthened by a change of metaphor: "they shall be tormented with fire and sulphur." A visible memento of suffering is seen in "the smoke of their torment"; and we are told that "for ages of ages" it "goes up." Even this does not close the awful picture. A few more words take us almost into that sulphurous flame, and reveal the ceaseless unrest of the sufferers there: "and they have no rest day and night." An announcement of suffering so terrible requires careful specification of the sufferers: "who worship the wild beast and his image, and if any one receives the mark of his name."

This passage suggests perhaps, but does not expressly assert, the endless suffering of the persons whose doom is thus described. For the smoke may go up even when the suffering of which it is a visible memento has ceased.

Age-lasting torment is asserted in Revelation xx. 10: "The devil was cast into the lake of fire and sulphur, where are the wild beast and the false prophet: and they shall be tormented day and night for the ages of the ages." But these words refer not to men, but to persons or abstractions whose active sin has been age-lasting. These two

passages, in highly figurative language, from the most obscure book in the Bible, a book whose origin is veiled in insoluble mystery, are a very unsafe foundation for important Christian doctrine.

It may be admitted that the above passages, or some of them, suggest, if they do not assert, the endless suffering of the lost. We now ask, Are they sufficient to justify a confident assertion that those excluded from the City of God will undergo endless suffering? For the following reasons, I think not.

We find in the New Testament other passages which, taken by themselves, suggest, or seem to assert, doctrines which we are compelled to reject. To thousands of devout men, Romans viii. 29, ix. 14-23, Ephesians i. 4, 5, John xv. 16, have seemed to assert the doctrine of unconditional election and predestination, now almost universally repudiated. And Matthew xvi. 27, 28, xxiv. 34, seem to assert that Christ would come to judge the world during the lifetime of those around Him. These passages are quite as clear, in a sense we cannot accept, as are any which seem to assert the endless suffering of the lost. They warn us not to accept, especially in proof of a doctrine open to serious objection, a few texts from the Bible. All the great doctrines of the Gospel are supported by abundant and decisive teaching of holy Scripture. And no doctrine ought to be asserted with confidence unless thus supported.

Moreover, against this doctrine may be set other passages as clear and as numerous as those quoted above.

In Matthew iii. 12, the Baptist says, "The chaff He will *burn up* with fire unquenchable"; similarly v. 10, "cast into the fire." This teaching is confirmed by Christ, who says in chap. xiii. 30, "At the time of the harvest I shall say to the reapers, Gather first the tares and bind them into bundles to *burn them up*." Notice here twice and again in v. 40 the strong word *κατακαύσει*. It suggests irresist-

tibly the extinction of the objects *burnt up*. For no process known to us is more like annihilation than is the destruction of vegetable matter by fire ; whereas it has nothing in common with endless suffering. The same metaphor is found in John xv. 6, Hebrews vi. 8. These passages, I do not quote in proof of the ultimate extinction of the lost ; but only to show how serious are the consequences of building important doctrine on a few verses of the Bible.

Equally opposed to the traditional doctrine of the endless suffering of the lost is another group of passages, viz. those which assert or imply the universal reign of Christ. So Isaiah xlv. 23, quoted in Romans xiv. 11 as including both Jews and Gentiles : “ As I live, says the Lord, to Me every knee shall bow ; and every tongue shall confess to God.” This great prophecy, a categorical and solemn assertion, refers evidently to the willing homage of happy souls. It cannot be fulfilled in the endless wail of the lost. The same may be said of the purpose expressed in Philippians ii. 10 : “ That at the name of Jesus every knee may bow, of those in heaven and on earth and under the earth ; and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.” Similarly 1 Corinthians xv. 28 : “ The Son Himself shall be subjected to Him who subjected all things to Him, in order that God may be all things in all.” These two passages describe the ultimate aim of the work of Christ. And, although the accomplishment of this purpose of infinite blessing is contingent, in reference to each individual, on his own personal submission to Christ, it is in the last degree unlikely that this Divine purpose of universal homage to Christ will be for ever frustrated.

Certainly these two groups of passages, from all four Gospels and from the undisputed Epistles of Paul, are equal in number and weight to the passages from the Synoptist Gospels only and the Book of Revelation which suggest or seem to imply the endless suffering of the lost. Viewed in

the light of the two other groups, this last group is an altogether unsafe foundation for confident assertion in God's name that those condemned in the great day will undergo endless suffering.

Notice now the extreme seriousness of the doctrine which in this series of papers I have discussed. If we accept as indisputable truth, as it has been accepted during fifteen centuries, the doctrine of the endless permanence of all human souls, the few and uncertain passages, quoted above, which suggest or seem to assert the endless suffering of the lost are reinforced by the more numerous and much more decisive passages which assert or imply the finality of their doom, e.g. Philippians iii. 19, 2 Corinthians xi. 15, Hebrews vi. 8, 1 Peter iv. 17, Matthew xxvi. 24, Mark xiv. 21, and those which compare the doom of the lost to the destruction of vegetable matter by fire. In other words, the doctrine before us leaves open only one alternative, either the endless suffering of the lost or their ultimate restoration to the favour of God and eternal life.

Not only against the endless torment of the lost, as our fathers taught it, but against any form of endless suffering, or of an endless prolongation of an existence which is only a helpless consciousness of utter ruin, the moral sense of thousands of intelligent and devout men and women is in stern revolt. The more carefully they consider it, the less are they able to harmonize it with the infinite love, or even with the justice of God. To such men, it is useless to say that they are unable to estimate the evil of sin, and the punishment it deserves. For, amid human fallibility and error, there is in man an inborn sense of justice and of the due proportion of sin and punishment which, in all ages, has been recognized as a reflection, imperfect but real, of the justice of God. There are children of ten years old who, if told that their father had punished another child, however naughty, by burning him to death, would at once

and justly repudiate the statement with indignation. Moreover, the picture of Christ in the New Testament, and His teaching as recorded there, claim and secure the homage of the moral sense of man, and this homage paid by that in us which is noblest and best to the teaching and character of Christ is the most powerful proof of His divine excellence. A doctrine which, instead of gaining the homage of our moral sense, drives it into revolt, has no moral authority over us. Man's sense of right and wrong needs to be educated; and at best is fallible. But, as taught by Paul in Romans ii. 14, 15, it is a divine transcript of the Law of God; and as such, it cannot be silenced even by quotation from holy Scripture.

The practical consequence is that not a few, assuming as not open to question, that every human soul will think and feel for ever, have been driven to hope and expect that all men will ultimately be received into the abode of the blessed. Thus, as with Origen, the doctrine of the immortality of the soul has been the parent of universalism. In other words, this doctrine closes a way of escape from a great difficulty which the Bible leaves open to us. By so doing, it has driven many to force a way violently through a door which the Bible has closed.

We will now, after eliminating the doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul, restate briefly the teaching of the New Testament about the future punishment of sin.

The various writers of the New Testament and Christ as His words are there recorded divide the human race at the last judgment into two widely separated classes. The one class will be received into a glory on which falls no shadow; the other will be banished into a darkness in which we look in vain for one ray of light. Between these classes stands an impassable barrier. To our view, this dual division presents serious difficulties. It finds no place for a large number of persons who seem to us unworthy of either

blessedness or destruction. This difficulty, the New Testament does nothing to remove or mitigate. Christ promises to all who put faith in Him eternal happiness ; but, having said all that is needful for our salvation, He does nothing to satisfy our curiosity about the destiny of the persons just referred to. We must leave them to the wisdom and love of our Father in heaven.

The various writers of the New Testament describe the punishment to be inflicted on the great day as ruin, utter, hopeless, and final. The Synoptist Gospels also represent Christ as teaching, and the Book of Revelation teaches, in plain and awful language, that the lost will suffer acute and continuous pain. This actual suffering is implied in the teaching, by Paul and other writers, that retribution will be according to works. For proportionate retribution involves degrees of punishment : and degrees of punishment imply consciousness ; for unconsciousness is alike to all. Moreover, consciousness of endless and glorious life forfeited through our own inexcusable folly and sin involves remorse and mental anguish beyond conception. To be compelled, in the unsparing light of eternity, to contemplate our own past sins, when all fascination of sin has worn away, and our rejection of the infinite love of God and our consequent and deserved loss of the glories of heaven, and this without room for amendment or hope of restoration, will be an undying worm and unquenchable fire. In other words, the vivid pictures in the Synoptist Gospels and in the Book of Revelation do but delineate a necessary inference from teaching permeating the entire New Testament.

Of this acute suffering, the writers of the New Testament see no end ; nor do they teach anything which logically implies that it will ever end. On the other hand, they do not go so far as expressly and indisputably to assert the endless permanence of these ruined and wretched ones, and the consequent endlessness of their torment. The curtain

is raised for a moment, revealing the anguish of the lost ; and then falls, hiding them from our view.

This picture of judgment reveals to us intelligent persons created by God in order that they may share His endless blessedness, yet, through their own sin and their rejection of salvation from sin, shut out, without hope of return, from the glory and happiness for which they were created.

To this teaching, no objection can be made on the ground of the character of God. It cannot be objected that His purpose will be defeated. For His purpose in creating man was to surround the eternal Son with later-born sons who by their own free choice have accepted Him as their Lord. This purpose will find eternal and glorious realization. Nor can we object to the doom of the lost as unjust. For of no one case are all the facts before us. We know not the greatness of the sins which will be punished by exclusion from the glory of God ; and therefore cannot compare the sin and punishment. The analogy of parental and royal love forbids us to say that the love of God is inconsistent with severe punishment of sin, or indeed with the final exclusion of sinners from the happy family of God. On the other hand, the principles of human justice warn us not to put into the threatenings of the New Testament more than its words legitimately convey.

The above teaching may be traced by decisive documentary evidence to the pen of the Apostles and Evangelists and to the lips of Christ.

This teaching has, in ancient and modern times, been supplemented or limited in three directions by other teaching about the ultimate destiny of the wicked.

1. To the pictures of actual suffering found in the New Testament, the traditional teaching of the Church has added the assertion that this suffering will be endless. This addition is a necessary consequence of the doctrine of the

immortality of the soul unconsciously borrowed, as we have seen, from Greek philosophy.

From the days of Tertullian to days remembered by men still living, imagination ran riot in depicting the physical sufferings of the lost and comparing them to the excruciating bodily pain caused by fire. In recent days, others have recoiled from bodily *torment* and have put the word *suffering* in its place. But the word *torment* is found in the New Testament as a description of the future punishment of sin. Moreover, it is difficult or impossible to conceive a lost and ruined soul, in full possession of consciousness, knowing itself to be finally shut out from the City of God in just punishment of inexcusable sin, otherwise than as in unspeakable misery.

Now all will admit that no theory about the future punishment of sin ought to be put forth as revealed truth unless supported by clear and abundant teaching of the Bible. This theory, which in many minds lies open to most serious objection, has, as I have endeavoured to show, no adequate support in holy Scripture. And, from the nature of the case, it can have no adequate support elsewhere.

2. Others, especially in recent times, have added to, and limited, the teaching of the New Testament by endeavouring to prove that the suffering therein depicted will ultimately, after different degrees of suffering in proportion to different degrees of guilt, be lost in unconsciousness. This theory maintains the finality of the punishment of the wicked, and at the same time avoids the difficulties involved in the endlessness of their suffering and the consequently endless permanence of evil. It finds some support in the metaphor, not uncommon in the New Testament, of the destruction of vegetable matter by fire to describe the doom of the ungodly, and indeed in Plato's frequent use of the word *destruction* to describe the extinction of the soul,

which he denies. But this metaphor and this use of the word *destruction* seem to me an altogether insufficient ground for definite assertion. This second theory is but a human attempt to remove a difficulty which the New Testament leaves unsolved.

3. Others have, not only gone beyond the New Testament, but have as I think contradicted it, by asserting with more or less confidence that all men will ultimately be saved. This last theory has found some support in passages which speak of the ultimate and universal triumph of good, taken in connexion with the traditional assumption of the indestructibility of the human soul. But, as we have seen, this assumption is without foundation. And this theory, destitute of solid foundation, is, in various ways, directly and indirectly contradicted in the New Testament.

The theory of a probation beyond death, of which we have no reliable indication in the Bible, has no practical bearing on the ultimate destiny of those who die in sin. For a further probation involves a possibility of further failure. And this brings back, in full force, the old difficulties.

Retribution beyond the grave and especially the future punishment of sin are to us, reason about them as we may, insoluble mysteries. The entire teaching of the Bible, abundantly sufficient as it is to guide us safely along the way of life, is altogether insufficient to enable us to anticipate the sentence which the great Judge will pronounce on the men and women around us. But to every careful student of the New Testament two doctrines stand out as clearly and frequently taught there: (1) that eternal life in infinite blessing awaits all who put trust in Christ and walk in His steps; (2) that ruin, complete and final, awaits those who reject the salvation He offers and persist in what they know to be sin. These doctrines may be traced by decisive documentary evidence to His lips as part of the

message from God which He announced to men. As His servants, we are bound, especially those who are recognized teachers in His Church, to announce these solemn truths to all who will hear us. To go further is to overstep the limits of the revelation given to us in Christ, and to announce in His name that which He has not spoken. To add to, is as perilous as to take away from, "the words of the prophecy of this Book." We have no right to assert in God's name anything more than we can trace by abundant and decisive evidence to the lips of Christ and the pen of the Apostles and Evangelists. And the teaching which can be so traced is all that we need.

JOSEPH AGAR BEET.

*THE AUTONOMY OF JESUS: A STUDY IN THE
FOURTH GOSPEL.*

THE Fourth gospel is a study rather than a biography of Jesus, and not so much even a study of his actual life as an artistic and symbolic exposition or application of great Christian ideas, which are conceived for the most part under the categories of Jewish Hellenism and presented in an historical form already current throughout the Christian communities. On page after page we have an interpretation of Jesus. Besides being an implicit refutation of the pretensions and criticisms advanced by contemporary Judaism, as well as of certain phases in Jewish Christianity, the book possesses a peculiar inward aspect; its primary aim is not to instruct outsiders upon the elementary facts and principles of Christianity, but to edify people who are already members of the church (xix. 35; xx. 31),¹ in view of certain widely diffused modes

¹ The latter passage is not quite unexampled (cf. Josephus, *Vita*, 76); but, taken with others (*c.g.* i. 14, etc.), it corroborates the internal evidence of the book. Here we have to do with a Christian preacher and his audience of

of thought and features of life. It is a devotional comment upon the primitive tradition. In technical language it may be rightly described as esoteric, no less than didactic and apologetic: and it is didactic in one sense pretty much because it is apologetic.¹ The author is endeavouring as a rule to exhibit certain aspects of Christ and Christianity which may serve, in his opinion, to meet difficulties felt by others, if not by himself, in the contemporary situation; while at the same time his characteristic conception of Jesus is to some extent modified by the very tendencies of gnosticism and of theosophy to meet which he employs ideas, earlier and hitherto comparatively alien, drawn from Alexandrian or Palestinian Hellenism. As the first century closed, he wrote this study in order to bring out in a timely fashion what he conceived to be the permanent significance of Jesus for the church and age; arguing that Christ was the real Logos, the Logos in person, no less than the genuine Messiah. He wrote also, it is to be observed, for men who, breathing an atmosphere which was to a large extent saturated with Greek speculation, often found themselves unable either to adjust the old faith to these new moral and mental conditions, or to discover in the synoptic gospels² adequate materials for such a *rapprochement*.

hearers or readers. He interprets, as he instructs, the consciousness of the local church, whether he was the final editor of the book or not.

¹ The apologetic aspect of the Fourth gospel is elaborately drawn by Wernle (*Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde des Urchristentums*, 1900, pp. 52-65); negatively, à propos of (a) the death of Jesus, (b) his limitations, (c) his eschatology, (d) his attitude to the depraved, (e) the sacraments; positively, in connexion with (a) his miracles, (b) his self-witness, and (c) his ideal of the true Christian. "Will man den Autor mit Schlagwörtern bezeichnen, so müsste er im Evangelium kirchlicher Apologet, im Brief anti-agnostischer Moralist heissen. Er ist fast in jeder Zeile ein praktischer Kämpfer für die Sache der Kirche gegen ihre äusseren und inneren Feinde." Apart from the local antagonisms and the recent expansion of Christianity in Asia Minor, the contents of the Fourth gospel are unintelligible; apart from the semi-historical methods of Alexandrian thought, its literary form is apt to be repeatedly misconceived. Theological reflexion dominates it thoroughly.

² That these were familiar to the original audience of the Fourth gospel may

From no other standpoint can the Fourth gospel be orientated in relation to Judaism, Alexandrianism, Old Testament prophecy, the synoptic tradition, and especially prior Christologies such as are represented in Paulinism and a book like Hebrews. Through all these affinities a distinct apologetic element is to be traced; and although this must not be unduly pressed—as if every sentence were written with a covert purpose of attack or indirect allusion—it cannot safely be overlooked. From prologue to epilogue there is a deliberate projection of Christian ideas into the author's sketch of Jesus. His book is, in one important aspect, a manifesto. It is in essence historical; but even taken as a historian he is to be judged by the fact that his account is introduced by a sketch of what he understood was an adequate philosophy of his religion, just as it is rounded off by an undisguised confession of religious endeavour. His tastes and sympathies were speculative, his purpose spiritual. Hence his treatment is dominated by his aim; Christianity is construed and presented as a faith in philosophic setting, history being, as it were, “used solely as a plastic material for setting forth religious ideas” (Pfleiderer). “Narrative is shot through and through with idealisms and mysticisms, and with symbolisms of the spiritual, making a half epic, half dramatic literature; a literary phenomenon, the likeness to which is found in Deuteronomy in the Hebrew literature.”¹ In consequence of this the author's prepossessions often lie upon the surface, and this is particularly the case with the leading idea of the

now be taken as an axiom of criticism. The evidence has been recently stated with much force by Zahn (*Einleitung in das Neue Test.* ii. pp. 498–527) and Wendt (*das Johannes-Evangelium*, pp. 6–44), more radically by Wernle (*die Synoptische Frage*, pp. 234–248), Abbott (*Encycl. Bibl.* ii. 1765 f.), and Schmiedel (*ibid.* 1578 f.).

¹ W. W. Peyton, *The Memorabilia of Jesus*, p. 14. The general data for the apologetic and polemical element are collected with care and (upon the whole) with good judgment by Baldensperger in his monograph on *das Prolog des vierten Evangeliums* (1897), e.g. pp. 152–165.

volume. The connexion between the historical Jesus and the semi-speculative Logos of Alexandrianism, which had been fostered by the amalgamation of Jewish and Hellenic speculation, was already in danger of abuse in Asiatic circles. It required to be defined, reset, illuminated. The Fourth gospel was therefore composed to confirm, but also to correct and purify, that contemporary faith in Jesus which loved to view him under the category of the true Logos. The result is that the human career of Jesus is chiefly transformed into an episode in the eternal existence of the Logos, through which he passes in a victorious and independent progress; for, with his speculative presuppositions, it was almost inevitable that the author should regard the life of Jesus in this world under the aspect of an assured triumph rather than a sustained and arduous struggle.

Starting from this position, observant critics have more than once noticed, among the tendencies and characteristics of the Fourth gospel, a disposition to lay stress upon what may be roughly but not improperly called the Autonomy of Jesus. It is pretty obvious that a number of passages, mainly narrative but occasionally reflective, are arranged in such a way that they betray a strong predilection for the spontaneity or self-determination of Christ, i.e. a desire to prove that his fountains of force and insight lay wholly within the serene control of his own consciousness. So keenly is this feature emphasized that it has been thought to almost impair the simplicity and beauty of his human character, and in one or two cases it is pressed very close to the verge of destroying moral causation altogether. Put briefly, it dilates upon the fact that Christ's motives were not drawn from outward circumstances, but purely from within, proceeding from a calm mysterious law by which his whole being was directly regulated. Independent and self-reliant, as the Fourth gospel pictures him, he is never determined by the world; he determines it. *Habere, non*

haberi, is the motto of his career. So far as his relations to mankind are concerned, he is absolutely a law to himself. He carefully dissociates himself from any attempt at influencing his conduct. He is represented, in a word, as too elevated to require any suggestions or assistance from outside, nor can any person anticipate his movements or mould his actions. Unhampered and unruffled by anything extraneous, he lives and moves from his inner consciousness, a centre to which he constantly returns, which cannot be reached by any influence or agency without, but maintains itself "beyond the arrows, shouts, and views of men."

The simplest method of understanding this engrossing conception in the Fourth gospel is first of all to watch its reappearance at point after point throughout the narrative. There are four passages especially in which it comes to the surface with quite unmistakable lucidity. The first (i.) is the story of the wedding festivities at Kana (ii. 1-11), which forms the opening incident of Christ's public ministry. Here the author represents Mary appealing to her son on behalf of host and guests. He puts her aside.¹ Then, after an interval which contains no change of situation and offers no fresh motive for action (so far as the narrative is concerned), Jesus does of his own accord what she expected. The water is turned into wine, not because he responded to a human request but (as the writer explicitly warns us) simply because he chose to do so; the initiative was all his own. The pragmatism of the gospel supplies other more or

¹ It is scarcely accurate to declare that this narrative "asserts emphatically a truth which is repeated again and again throughout this gospel, that there was a higher law for Christ's actions than could be derived from mere external circumstance—the law of a being whose guiding impulses were from within and from above" (R. H. Hutton, *Theological Essays*, p. 182). The phrase "mere external circumstances" is, in such a connexion, somewhat inadequate; for this case was just one of those natural needs which often formed the occasion for Christ's help in the synoptic narratives, without compromising his dignity. Besides, it was backed by a mother's entreaty, and in itself was quite innocuous.

less mystical motives¹ by which the origin and aim of this story can be explained, but this psychological reason maintains its place among them all. At the *débüt* of Jesus, he is distinctly brought forward as the creative and self-determining Power of God, emancipated from anything like human suasion, one whose "light of life was not, like other men's, reflected back from the mere visible circumstances of his earthly lot."

Similarly (ii.) in the anecdote of his journey to Jerusalem, it is hardly possible to miss a desire upon the part of the writer to make his readers aware that Jesus was never merged in the stream of influence and motive (vii. 1-11). Here again Jesus repudiates advice or pressure from his family, this time from his brothers. In reply to their appeal, he refuses to move. Afterwards, despite his former denial, he undertakes the journey *suâ sponte*. Yet (be it noted) in the circumstances narrated by the author no clue is furnished for this abrupt change of programme. The point of the tale is missed, in fact, until one sympathizes with his aversion to admit any outside impact upon Jesus, whose course of action here as elsewhere is dissociated from the natural suggestions and motives which might be supposed to have rippled upon his personality.²

Once more (iii.), in the speech delivered at Jerusalem (x. 1-18) Jesus is represented as emphasizing the spontaneity of his death. It is his own choice, due neither to the will nor to the plots of men, but to his own initiative, and therefore not inconsiderate or accidental. "No one takes my life away from me; I lay it down of myself."

¹ Such as the desire to represent Christ's actions as altogether apart from the Old Testament theocracy (Apoc. xii. 1-5), the sphere of the latter unable to control the Logos of Christianity. Otherwise Abbott: *Encycl. Bibl.* ii. 1800-1801.

² This view of the passage is simpler and more satisfactory than Wendt's subtle theory that verses 8-9 are a secondary addition by the evangelist, who misconceived the original and deeper sense of the words in verse 6 (= ii. 4): *op. cit.* pp. 134-136. To play upon the double sense of a term is characteristic of this author's method in dealing with the historical tradition before him.

The same idea (*emisit animam, non amisit*) is put with pathetic beauty in the later narrative, where the author gives special prominence (xviii. 4-7) to the activity and self-possession of Jesus in Gethsemane. "He went forth," we are told, without waiting to be sought for and discovered by his opponents. He overawes them, even physically, by his bold front. He does not wait to be addressed; he speaks first (xviii. 4). Up to the very end he is master of the situation, determining his course, possessed of free-will, and exercising powers of choice even within the limits of apparent necessity. It is consonant with this attitude that he alone speaks from the cross (xix. 26-30); no one ventures to address him there (as in the synoptic gospels). In short, the majestic dignity of the last days, and the absence of anything that might suggest weakness or agony, combine to illustrate the idea already expressed in x. 18, or in Barnabas viii. 5, ἡ βασιλεία Ἰησοῦ ἐπὶ ξύλου.

JAMES MOFFAT.

(*To be continued.*)

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